

Threshold EdDSA Submissions of FROST and (maybe) Sparkle

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Thanks for everyone in the FROST submission team for discussion, and Tim Ruffing.

Sept. 26, 2023

TLDR

- We will be submitting a FROST submission!
- Is there practical interest in a Sparkle submission?

	Scheme	Assumptions	Signing Rounds
Multi-sigs	MuSig [MPSW18, BDN18] SimpleMuSig [BDN18, CKM21]	DL+ROM	3
	MuSig2 [NRS21] DWMS [AB21] SpeedyMuSig [CKM21]	AOMDL+ROM	2
	Lindell22 Sparkle [CKM23] FROST [KG20, BCKMTZ22] FROST2 [CKM21] FROST3 [RRJSS22, CJRS23]	Schnorr DL+ROM AOMDL+ROM	3 2

All are concurrently secure ✓

Algebraic One-More Discrete Log (AOMDL):
 - stronger assumption
 + partially non-interactive schemes

FROST



Key Generation:
 $(sk_i, PK_i), PK$

R_i, S_i



z_i



Combine / Verify:

$$z = \sum_{i \in S} z_i$$

$$sig = (R, z)$$

$$c \leftarrow H(PK, m, R)$$

$$R \cdot PK^c = g^z \quad \checkmark$$

Round 1: Output $R_i \leftarrow g^{r_i}, S_i \leftarrow g^{s_i}$

Round 2: $a_i \leftarrow H'(PK, m, i, \{j, R_j, S_j\}_{j \in S})$

$$R = \prod_{i \in S} R_i S_i^{a_i}$$

$$c \leftarrow H(PK, m, R)$$

$$\text{Output } z_i \leftarrow r_i + a_i s_i + c s k_i \lambda_i$$

FROST Signing

- Two rounds; first round can be preprocessed
- Static security: AOMDL (falsifiable) + ROM
- Adaptive Security: Coming soon!
- Active security; honest minority
- Can be performed over a public channel assuming an untrusted coordinator

FROST Takes an Opinionated Stance

- Simplicity and performance matters
- If the protocol fails, misbehaving parties can be identified and re-run
- Robustness can be implemented at a higher layer (ROAST)

FROST/2/3

- Choice of plain FROST is to not exclude use cases [BCKMTZ22]; multi-scalar multiplication closes the computational gap



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Speeding up FROST with multi-scalar multiplication

June 1, 2023

by Deirdre Connolly, Conrado Gouvea

We optimized our implementation of FROST by upwards of 50% over the trivial implementation, without changing the protocol and therefore maintaining its existing security guarantees. We use a known trick to do so: multi-scalar multiplication, which is exactly designed to give this kind of performance speedup.

In the FROST threshold signing protocol, we perform many elliptic curve operations for key generation, signing, and signature verification. Because FROST is a Schnorr threshold signing scheme, the signature that is produced is compatible with single-party Schnorr signature verification. As such, there is no additional computation overhead to verifying signatures produced by FROST vs single-party.

However, when performing FROST signing, signers must perform a linear number of group element multiplications, proportionate to the number of signers, as shown below (see the [FROST specification](#) for details).

```
def compute_group_commitment(commitment_list, binding_factor_list):
```




FROST Submission Team

- Deirdre Connolly, SandboxAQ
- Elizabeth Crites, Web3 Foundation
- Conrado Gouvea, Zcash Foundation
- Jack Grigg, Electric Coin Company
- Jonathan Katz, University of Maryland & Dfns
- Chelsea Komlo, University of Waterloo & Dfns & Zcash Foundation
- Mary Maller, Ethereum Foundation & PQShield
- Nikita Sorokovikov, Dfns
- Denis Varlakov, Dfns

FROST in Practice, Today





ZIP: 312
Title: FROST for Spend Authorization Signatures
Owners: Conrado Gouvea <conrado@zfnd.org>
Chelsea Komlo <ckomlo@uwaterloo.ca>
Deirdre Connolly <deirdre@zfnd.org>
Status: Draft
Category: Wallet
Created: 2022-08-dd
License: MIT
Discussions-To: <<https://github.com/zcash/zips/issues/382>>
Pull-Request: <<https://github.com/zcash/zips/pull/662>>



jesseposner/
FROST-BIP340

BIP340 compatible implementation of Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr Threshold Signatures (FROST). This work is made possible with the support of Brink.

2 Contributors, 2 Issues, 20 Stars, 3 Forks



FROST Informational Draft

CFRG

Internet-Draft

Intended status: Informational

Expires: 28 July 2023

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
C. A. Wood

Cloudflare

24 January 2023

Two-Round Threshold Schnorr Signatures with FROST

draft-irtf-cfrg-frost-12



<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-frost/>

Sparkle



c_i

R_i

z_i



Key Generation:
 $(sk_i, PK_i), PK$

Combine / Verify:

Round 1: $R_i \leftarrow g^{r_i}; cm_i = H(m, S, R_i)$
Output cm_i

Round 2: Output R_i

Round 3: $R = \prod_{i \in S} R_i$

$c \leftarrow H(PK, m, R)$

Output $z_i \leftarrow r_i + csk_i\lambda_i$

$$z = \sum_{i \in S} z_i$$

$$sig = (R, z)$$

$$c \leftarrow H(PK, m, R)$$

$$R \cdot PK^c = g^z \quad \checkmark$$

Sparkle

- Three online rounds;
- Addresses the theoretical question of standard assumptions without expensive ZKPs
- Static security: DL + ROM
- Adaptive Security: AOMDL + AGM + ROM, without erasures
- Active security; honest minority
- Can be performed over a public channel assuming an untrusted coordinator

(My) Opinions

- Protocol flexibility is a good theoretical idea but is a huge source of bugs in practice- downgrade attacks, etc.
- We should aim to design submissions with as few of “moving parts” or choices as possible.
- Don't push complex and theoretical questions to users and implementors.

Takeaways

- We have a great team working on a FROST submission!
- Is a Sparkle of draft interest to implementors?
- Keeping things simple with as few of choices as possible leads to success and security for implementations.
- We have practical questions, like:
 - What ciphersuites should submissions cover?
 - Should implementations be fully self-contained (vendors dependencies)?

Thank you!