
From: simona s <simona.samardziska@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, September 03, 2018 8:11 AM
To: pqc-comments
Cc: pqc-forum@list.nist.gov
Subject: OFFICIAL COMMENT: MQDSS

Dear all,

Recently, after a related inquiry by Eliane Koussa and Ludovic Perret, we noticed that we have made a mistake in the choice of parameters in the NIST submission of MQDSS. In particular, the number of rounds in the submission is twice bigger than it is actually needed for the respective security level. This means that the number of rounds can be halved without affecting the security of the scheme, while substantially improving its performance: the signing and verification time will be halved, and (even more importantly,) the signature size will be halved.

We therefore announce a new Version 1.1 of MQDSS, in which this mistake has been corrected.

The specification and implementation of MQDSS Version 1.1. are available through our (brand new) web site <http://mqdss.org>
(Direct link to specification: http://mqdss.org/files/MQDSS_Ver1point1.pdf
and to reference implementation <https://github.com/joostrijneveld/MQDSS/tree/NIST>)

The new parameters of MQDSS give the following performance results:

| | Public key (bytes) | Secret key (bytes) | Signature (KiB) |
|-------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| MQDSS-31-48 | 46 | 16 | 16.15 |
| MQDSS-31-64 | 64 | 24 | 33.23 |

Reference implementation:

| | keygen (cycles) | signing (cycles) | verification (cycles) |
|-------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| MQDSS-31-48 | 1302K | 26500K | 19674K |
| MQDSS-31-64 | 2769K | 84615K | 63210K |

Implementation using AVX2 instructions:

| | keygen (cycles) | signing (cycles) | verification (cycles) |
|-------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| MQDSS-31-48 | 1078K | 3683K | 2504K |
| MQDSS-31-64 | 2495K | 8709K | 6183K |

We respectively hope that NIST will take into account the new parameters of MQDSS for the first round of the PQC standardization process, especially since they only improve the performance of the scheme (the security remains the same).

We also understand that NIST has the right to evaluate the candidates based solely on the initial submission.

Sincerely,
The MQDSS team