Boundary Consolidation Case Study

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Agenda

- Boundary Consolidation
- Why We Did It: Alignment & Efficiencies
- How We did it: Planning, Tailoring of Controls & Overlays
- Results: Control Assessment & Risk Management
In March 2015, a Business Impact Analysis (BIA) was submitted to the AO, proposing to manage several previously defined FISMA systems into one consolidated boundary. The BIA proposal was the result of a department wide Gap Analysis project, that started in May of 2014 and concluded in January 2015. The boundary recommendation was in alignment with NIST and the overall Gap Analysis Recommendations. The new system boundary provides alignment with department strategic goals, efficiency in level of effort and required resources, as well as overall risk management objectives.

**Current Systems Boundary**

- **Boundary 1**: SA&A Package: PIA/PTA, C&D, SSP, RA, SecCat, all Moderate controls, 313 for Rev. 4.0, mapped to Boundary 1
- **Boundary 2**: SA&A Package: PIA/PTA, C&D, SSP, RA, SecCat, all Moderate controls, 313 for Rev. 4.0, mapped to Boundary 2
- **Boundary 3**: SA&A Package: PIA/PTA, C&D, SSP, RA, SecCat, all Moderate controls, 313 for Rev. 4.0, mapped to Boundary 3
- **Boundary 4**: SA&A Package: PIA/PTA, C&D, SSP, RA, SecCat, all Moderate controls, 313 for Rev. 4.0, mapped to Boundary 4
- **Boundary 5**: SA&A Package: PIA/PTA, C&D, SSP, RA, SecCat, all Moderate controls, 313 for Rev. 4.0, mapped to Boundary 5

**Proposed System Boundary**

- **New Boundary**: SA&A Package: PIA/PTA, C&D, SSP, RA, SecCat, all Moderate controls, 313 for Rev. 4.0, mapped to New Boundary
Why We Did It: Alignment

The new boundary consists of multiple applications that facilitate the overall department mission of supporting management of benefit plans and providing benefit services.

The new boundary is classified into 3 major components:

- Server Applications,
- Client Applications, and
- Desktop Tools and Services.
Why We did it: Efficiencies

Resources

- Multiple resources from different operational units assigned security responsibilities part-time as part of “other duties as assigned”
- Resource allocations were not based on risk or system complexity.

Documentation & Reporting

- Documentation processes, standards, and quality varied widely across the different systems
- Management communications were inconsistent in content and frequency

Risk Management

- Cohesive understand of security compliance and risks was not available
- Quantification and oversight of risks were lacking.
How We Did It: Planning

Project plan served as the road map.

- NIST RMF was basis for project plan
  - Each RMF Step was delineated to capture all the tasks necessary to complete activities and associated deliverables associated

- Planned the Plan
  - Over a month of planning was dedicated to RMF Step 0: Develop the Plan

- Socialized plan to ensured support
  - Enterprise Cyber-Security Division (ECD)
  - Privacy Office
  - Department Directors

- Obtained approval from AO & CISO to ensure commitment
NIST 800-37 Rev 1.0 emphasizes the benefits of *controls tailoring*, where tailoring provides flexibility in applying the risk management concepts associated with the RMF in a manner that is most suitable for the organizations and the information systems involved.

The controls, and later assessment of risk and mapping of applicable POA&M items, were scoped according to:

- System Specific
- Hybrid_Inherited
- Fully_Inherited

By applying the Moderate Baseline for NIST 800-53 Rev 4.0 of 313 controls, and scoping some controls to be assessed at the Client Application level and/or the Server application level, the OBA security process had the following advantages:

- Leveraging efficiencies from CCP and avoiding the duplication of efforts
- Assessing risk at the appropriate level within the system boundary
- Overall improved resource allocation and risk management processes
Results: Controls Analysis

In accordance with the NIST 800-53A and the control tailoring used for the new boundary, a total of 396 controls were analyzed throughout the SAA process from April 2015 through March 2016.

Some details on the process:

- There was a total of 347 controls System wide but some were assessed more than once, either repeated in multiple quarters or assessed for multiple categories such as Client, Server or Inherited.

- While the team did not perform an analysis of the Fully Inherited controls, the ISCM process did include an assessment of risks inherited as a result of a weakness in any of the Common Control Providers programs.

- The team analyzed and assessed the system specific component of all Hybrid controls.
After the initial defining and consolidation of the boundary architecture and components, a total of **42 POA&Ms** identifying risk areas that were system specific or inherited according to the controls tailoring were tracked throughout the ISCM process.

On an ongoing basis, the OBA team in collaboration with the ECD, IT, and the Privacy Offices were able to close most of the POA&M’s.

At the end of the SAA assessment only **1 POA&M remain**.

A detailed Risk Assessment and Business Impact Analysis process was followed throughout the SA&A process, presenting the AO with the necessary information to make risk based decisions related to the boundary’s system security.

In instances where identified weaknesses could not be remediated within an acceptable time frame according to the OBA POA&M process, the ISCM team followed the BIA and Risk Acceptance processes.

A total of 28 Risk Based Decisions were tracked during the assessment period, 12 of those remain at the end of the process.
### Results: FY2015-2016 Improvements

The SA&A process was performed along with a number of process improvement initiatives and projects, some at the Security Program Level and some at the enterprise levels, a few listed below:

- Identified Orphan Systems that were added to the new boundary based on risk analysis
- Established a compliance and configuration management process using IBM Endpoint Manager (IEM) in collaboration with IT
- Leveraged enterprise implementation of an audit logging tool to coordinate and capture audit logs created by applications
- Ensured all components are assessed based on NIST 800-53 Rev 4.0 controls
- Addressed Organizationally Defined Parameters and Common Controls in collaboration with ECD
- In tandem with the ongoing assessment of the boundary components, the Security team worked with development teams on modernizing their systems, adding to the boundary as these systems moved from development into production
- Supported enterprise wide efforts and the ongoing change management and integrated process teams
Results: Vulnerability Management

Further details on another process improvement is the OBA vulnerability management process as seen below.

The process was established to allow for tracking of vulnerabilities over time and trend analysis.

The ISCM team analyzes the monthly scan results.

An analysis memo including a text summary of results, checklist of important performance metrics, and charts of current trends is provided to the ISO each month.

Vulnerability trends are monitored over the current period and compared with the prior month’s results for perspective of historic trends.

Vulnerabilities are examined to determine mitigation responsibilities. For vulnerabilities where application mitigation is required the team follows the POAM process.

There are currently 4 IT POAMs based on scanning results. At this point no system specific POAMs were opened on the scan process.
Results: Managing Risk Using Metrics

Facilitated the definition of a security baseline for the boundary introducing risk metrics as proposed by the NIST publications are shown here. The goal of the ISCM process is to minimize the residual risk exposure of the boundary.

The inclusion of risk metrics provides the OBA security with the following:

- Access to quantifiable measures used for evaluating the ISCM process for measures of success or lack thereof over time
- Ability to establish a baseline for risk tolerance based on the overall remaining residual risk values after all reasonable efforts are made to manage risks effectively
- Metrics that can be used to determine the overall effect of security methods implemented within the program
During the Q3 FY2015 - Q2 FY2016 assessment period, the SA&A process successfully implemented the risk management framework and yielded the following results:

1. The team was able to provide OBA management and security office with real-time risk analysis, using metrics as a quantitative assessment of risk for the boundary’s risks.

2. Risk areas were identified and tracked via the POA&M process and resulted in the closure of 37 POA&Ms for the boundary throughout the ISCM process.

3. A successful ISCM program was established, incorporating all new security policies, standards, guidance, and templates including the migration of all SAA documentation and control analysis information and evidence.

4. The ISCM team established new mature processes in several areas including ISA, Risk Acceptance, and recurring Vulnerability Management processes.

5. Security Team tailored the NIST 800-53 Rev. 4 controls moderate baseline system for the boundary components effectively assessing a total of 396 controls.
Questions?