Software Assurance:
A Strategic Initiative of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to Promote Integrity, Security, and Reliability in Software

InfoSec/Privacy Considerations for Software in Advancing National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace

March 21, 2005

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Director for Software Assurance
National Cyber Security Division
US Department of Homeland Security
National Strategy for Homeland Security

"We will lead the unified national effort to secure America. We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation. We will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Objective I</th>
<th>Key Objective II</th>
<th>Key Objective III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States</td>
<td>Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism</td>
<td>Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cyberspace & physical space are increasingly intertwined and software controlled/enabled

- Chemical Industry
  - 66,000 chemical plants
- Banking and Finance
  - 26,600 FDIC institutions
- Agriculture and Food
  - 1.9M farms
  - 87,000 food processing plants
- Water
  - 1,800 federal reservoirs
  - 1,600 treatment plants
- Public Health
  - 5,800 registered hospitals
- Postal and Shipping
  - 137M delivery sites

- Transportation
  - 120,000 miles of railroad
  - 590,000 highway bridges
  - 2M miles of pipeline
  - 300 ports
- Telecomm
  - 2B miles of cable
- Energy
  - 2,800 power plants
  - 300K production sites
- Key Assets
  - 104 nuclear power plants
  - 80K dams
  - 5,800 historic buildings
  - 3,000 government facilities
  - commercial facilities / 460 skyscrapers

An Asymmetric Target-rich Environment
Cyberspace & physical space are increasingly intertwined and software controlled/enabled

Critical Infrastructure / Key Resources

- Physical Infrastructure
  - Farms
  - Food Processing Plants
  - Power Plants
  - Production Sites
  - Railroad Tracks
  - Highway Bridges
  - Pipelines
  - Reservoirs
  - Treatment Plants
  - Hospitals
  - Cable
  - Fiber
  - FDIC institutions
  - Nuclear Power Plants
  - Government facilities
  - Dams

- Cyber Infrastructure
  - Internet
    - Domain Name System
    - Web Hosting
  - Services
    - Managed Security
    - Information Services
  - Hardware
    - Database Servers
    - Networking Equipment
  - Software
    - Financial System
    - Human Resources

Need for secure software applications
Cyber-related Disruptions and the Economy

Network disruptions lead to loss of:

- Money
- Time
- Products
- Reputation
- Sensitive information
- Potential loss of life through cascading effects on critical systems and infrastructure

Business Losses and Damages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virus</th>
<th>Damages</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Love Bug</td>
<td>$15B in</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>damages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.9M systems infected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code Red</td>
<td>$1.2B in</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>damages</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$740M for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>recovery efforts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slammer</td>
<td>$1B in</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>damages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaster</td>
<td>$50B in</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>damages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Doom</td>
<td>$38B in</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>damages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zotob</td>
<td>Damages TBD</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Impact of Spyware not fully known
Government plays key cyber security roles

Cyber Law Enforcement and Intelligence
FBI/DOJ, Homeland Security/Secret Service

Information Sharing with the States
Multi-State ISAC

Cyber Preparedness, Cyber Infrastructure Response, Recovery, Protection

Homeland Security

Information Security Standards and Guidelines
NIST

Consumer Protection, Cyber Fraud Prevention
FTC
DHS and the National Cyber Security Division

Secretary

Under Secretary for Management
Chief Medical Officer

Under Secretary for Science & Technology
Assistant for Grants and Training
Fire Administration

Under Secretary for Preparedness
Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection

Assistant Secretary for Policy
National Secretary for Cyber Security & Telecommunications

Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security & Telecommunications
National Capital Region Director

National Cyber Security Division
National Communications System
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace

- Outlines a framework for organizing and prioritizing efforts
- Provides direction to federal government departments and agencies
- Identifies steps to improve our collective cyber security
- Highlights role of public-private engagement
- Outlines Strategic Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Prevent cyber attacks against America’s critical infrastructures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reduce national vulnerability to cyber attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Minimize damage and recovery time from cyber attacks that do occur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cyber Preparedness

The National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) mission is to work collaboratively with public, private, and international entities to secure cyberspace and America’s cyber assets.

Mission components include:

- Implementation of the *National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace* and Homeland Security Presidential Directive #7 (HSPD#7)
- Implementation of priority protective measures to secure cyberspace and to reduce the cyber vulnerabilities of America’s critical infrastructures

Overarching Priorities:

- National Cyber Security Response System
- Cyber Risk Management
National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) goals are strategically aligned to four frameworks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace</th>
<th>Mandates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. National Cyberspace Security Response System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. National Cyberspace Threat and Vulnerability Reduction Program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Nation Cyberspace Security Awareness and Training Program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Securing Governments Cyberspace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. International Cyberspace Security Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NCSD GOALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Establish a National Cyber Security Response System to prevent, detect, respond to, and reconstitute rapidly after cyber incidents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Work with public and private sectors to reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of cyber attacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Promote a comprehensive national awareness program to empower all Americans — businesses, the general workforce, and the general population — to secure their own parts of cyberspace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Foster adequate training and education programs to support the Nation’s cyber security needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Coordinate with the intelligence and law enforcement communities to identify and reduce threats to cyberspace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Build a world-class organization that aggressively advances its cyber security mission and goals in partnership with its public and private stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HSPD-7: A national policy to protect our nation’s infrastructure

▸ Maintain an organization to serve as a focal point for the security of cyberspace

▸ Facilitate interactions and collaborations between and among federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, academia, and international organizations

▸ Execute a mission including analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability reduction, mitigation, and aiding national recovery efforts for critical information systems
The NIPP outlines a unifying structure

- Allows all levels of government to collaborate with the appropriate private sector entities
- Encourages the development of information sharing and analysis mechanisms and continues to support existing sector-coordinating mechanisms
- Broken down into 17 sector-specific plans to cover all areas of critical infrastructure, including the Information Technology (IT) sector

**NIPP Risk Management Framework**

*Dynamic Threat Environment*

- **Physical**
  - Set Security Objectives
  - Identify Assets
- **Cyber**
  - Assess Risks (Consequences, Vulnerabilities & Threats)
  - Normalize & Prioritize
- **Human**
  - Implement Protective Programs
  - Measure Effectiveness

**Governance**

**National Risk Profile**
NRP Cyber Annex describes the framework for response coordination

National Cyber Response Coordination Group

- Provide indications and warning of potential threats, incidents, and attacks
- Information sharing both inside and outside the government
- Provide technical assistance
- Conduct investigations, forensics analysis and prosecution
- Attribute the source of the attacks
- Defend against the attack

Lead National Recovery Efforts

Homeland Security
DHS National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) provides the framework for addressing cyber security and software assurance challenges.
DHS National Cyber Security Division (NCSD)

Acting Director
Andy Purdy

US-CERT/Operations
Jerry Dixon
- Situational Awareness
- Analytical Cell
- Production
- Federal Coordination

LE/Intelligence
Patrick Morrissey
- Intel Requirements
- LE Coordination
- NCRCG

Outreach/Awareness
 Liesyl Franz
- Communications
- Messaging
- Outreach to Stakeholders
- Cyber Security Awareness Partnerships

Strategic Initiatives
Hun Kim
- CIP Cyber Security
- Control Systems Security
- Exercise Planning & Coordination
- R&D Coordination
- Training & Education
- Standards & Best Practices
- Software Assurance

Software Assurance is a NCSD Strategic Initiative
DHS NCSD Priorities: National Cyber Security Response System

- Watch and Warning
  - Situational awareness
  - 24/7 operations
- Analysis
  - Malicious code
  - Risk analysis
  - LE/Intel
- Response
  - Incident management
- Recovery
  - NRP Cyber Annex
  - ESF-2
  - Regional preparedness
DHS NCSD Priorities: Cyber Risk Management

- The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)
  - Internet Disruption
  - Control Systems
- Outreach and Awareness
- Exercises
  - Regional & International Tabletop exercises
  - TOPOFF and Cyber Storm
  - Future Internet Disruption exercise
- Long Term Planning and Improvement
  - Research and Development
  - Training and Education
  - Standards and Best Practices
- Software Assurance
Needs in IT/Software Assurance

- Software and IT vulnerabilities jeopardize infrastructure operations, business operations & services, intellectual property, and consumer trust

- Adversaries have capabilities to subvert the IT/software supply chain:
  - Government and businesses rely on COTS products and commercial developers using foreign and non-vetted domestic suppliers to meet majority of IT requirements
  - Software & IT lifecycle processes offer opportunities to insert malicious code and to poorly design and build software which enables future exploitation
  - Off-shoring magnifies risks and creates new threats to national security, business property and processes, and individuals' privacy; requires domestic strategies to mitigate them

- Growing concern about inadequacies of suppliers’ capabilities to build/deliver secure IT/software – too few practitioners with requisite knowledge and skills
  - Current education & training provides too few practitioners with requisite competencies in secure software engineering – enrollment down in critical IT and software-related degree programs
  - Competition in higher-end skills is increasing – implications for individuals, companies, & countries
  - Concern about suppliers and practitioner not exercising “minimum level of responsible practice”

- National focus needed in countries to stay competitive in a global IT environment:
  - Computing curriculum needs to evolve to better embrace changing nature of IT/software business
  - Educational policy and investment needed to foster innovation and increase IT-related enrollments
  - Improvements needed in the state-of-the-practice and state-of-the-art for IT & software capabilities

- Processes and technologies are required to build trust into IT and software

Strengthen operational resiliency
Shortage of IT/Software workforce with requisite skills in US contributes to Offshoring

- Current enrollment declines & shortages of IT/software professionals in the US partially driven by misperceptions of students and American public
  - 2000 - 2003 trends indicated increase in IT/software jobs being offshored/outsourced accompanied by rise in US unemployment – changed perceptions & career choices:
    - Perception – limited future in IT careers; jobs subject to offshoring
    - Response – students opt for alternative disciplines;
    - Current trends show declining enrollments in IT/computing/software engineering
  - 2004 – 2006 trends indicate increase in domestic IT/software job positions
    - Offshoring continues, but domestic IT/software demands outpace offshoring
    - Employers cannot fill all positions with current IT/software domestic workforce;
  - Diminishing enrollment of US students in IT/computing will require further outsourcing.

- Do schools provide relevant curriculum for students to be competitive in a global IT economy to enable requisite core competencies in IT/software?

- Offshore sources sought to fill void of qualified US IT workforce
  - Some companies now seeking to “back shore” jobs in US after offshoring presented unacceptable risks or lacked expected benefits
  - Many companies opt to offshore to access readily available IT/software workforce when jobs cannot be filled by US workforce with requisite skills

Homeland Security
Tech Unemployment & IT Investment:

Total and Select Categories of IT-Related Occupation Unemployment and IT Investment (1)

- Computer Scientists and System Analysts
- Computer Programmers
- Computer Support Specialists
- Computer Hardware Engineers
- Computer Software Engineers
- Electrical and Electronic Engineers
- Total Unemployment Rate (-10y)
- % Nom. Invest. in IT

Diffusion of IT leads to technology jobs throughout US economy. 2/3 of IT workers work outside the IT sector. So, IT professionals exposed to both the tech cycle and business cycle.


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## Trade, Technology, and Jobs
**Cyclical exposure & structural change**

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**US Technology Occupations 1999-End 2004**

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Call-Center Type Occupations</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talamarkers</td>
<td>436,650</td>
<td>407,650</td>
<td>-29,000</td>
<td>-6.7%</td>
<td>$23,520</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Operators</td>
<td>60,520</td>
<td>36,760</td>
<td>-23,760</td>
<td>-39.4%</td>
<td>$29,960</td>
<td>-3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low-wage Technology Workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switchboard operators, including answering service</td>
<td>248,570</td>
<td>202,580</td>
<td>-45,990</td>
<td>-18.2%</td>
<td>$22,750</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer operators</td>
<td>198,500</td>
<td>133,230</td>
<td>-65,270</td>
<td>-32.9%</td>
<td>$33,140</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data entry keysers</td>
<td>520,220</td>
<td>307,400</td>
<td>-212,820</td>
<td>-40.9%</td>
<td>$24,560</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word Processors and Typists</td>
<td>271,310</td>
<td>161,730</td>
<td>-109,580</td>
<td>-42.0%</td>
<td>$29,830</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desktop Publishers</td>
<td>37,040</td>
<td>30,340</td>
<td>-6,700</td>
<td>-18.1%</td>
<td>$34,210</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical and electronic equipment assemblers</td>
<td>387,130</td>
<td>267,060</td>
<td>120,070</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>$27,980</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiconductor processors</td>
<td>42,110</td>
<td>43,420</td>
<td>1,310</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>$32,080</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Call-Center and Low-wage Tech. Workers</strong></td>
<td>2,741,660</td>
<td>1,550,560</td>
<td>-1,191,100</td>
<td>-43.7%</td>
<td>$26,259</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparable; Production Workers in the Manufacturing Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid-Level IT Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Support Specialists</td>
<td>452,440</td>
<td>391,660</td>
<td>-60,780</td>
<td>-13.4%</td>
<td>$43,680</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High-wage Technology Workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer and information scientists, research</td>
<td>26,280</td>
<td>25,960</td>
<td>-320</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>$90,860</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer programmers</td>
<td>528,600</td>
<td>366,300</td>
<td>-162,300</td>
<td>-30.8%</td>
<td>$66,480</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer software engineers, applications</td>
<td>297,600</td>
<td>139,720</td>
<td>-157,880</td>
<td>-53.1%</td>
<td>$70,870</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer software engineers, systems software</td>
<td>209,030</td>
<td>321,120</td>
<td>112,090</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
<td>$63,460</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer systems analysts</td>
<td>426,210</td>
<td>487,100</td>
<td>60,890</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>$69,470</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Database administrators</td>
<td>101,460</td>
<td>100,420</td>
<td>-1,040</td>
<td>-1.0%</td>
<td>$64,380</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network and computer systems administrators</td>
<td>234,680</td>
<td>262,590</td>
<td>27,910</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>$62,300</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network systems and data communications analysts</td>
<td>98,350</td>
<td>74,640</td>
<td>-23,710</td>
<td>-24.1%</td>
<td>$64,180</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer hardware engineers</td>
<td>60,420</td>
<td>79,570</td>
<td>19,150</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>$85,540</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical engineers</td>
<td>149,210</td>
<td>147,120</td>
<td>-2,090</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
<td>$75,540</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics engineers, except computer</td>
<td>106,830</td>
<td>133,410</td>
<td>26,580</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>$78,620</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total High-wage Tech. Workers</strong></td>
<td>2,700,650</td>
<td>2,581,380</td>
<td>119,270</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>$71,680</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparable; Total CES Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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**Low-wage in real trouble—from trade & technology**

Increased 'codification' puts some high-wage at risk (programming)

Increased jobs at middle & high-wage demand integrative & analytical skills
Globalization and Offshoring of Software:  
2006 Report of the ACM Job Migration Task Force

Provides the Emerging Trends, Debunked Myths, and More 
Realistic Picture of the Current State and Likely Future of IT

1. Offshoring: the Big Picture  
2. Economics of Offshoring  
3. The Country Perspective  
4. Corporate Strategies for Software Globalization  
5. Globalization of IT Research  
6. Offshoring: Risks & Exposures  
7. Education  

“Career opportunities in IT will remain strong in the countries where they have been strong in the past even as they grow in the countries that are targets of offshoring. The future, however, is one in which the individual will be situated in a more global competition. The brightness of the future for individuals, companies, or countries is centered on their ability to invest in building the foundations that foster innovation and invention.”

http://www.acm.org/globalizationreport
ACM 2006 “Globalization and Offshoring of Software”
Findings & Recommendations -- Implications for Software Assurance

► More IT jobs in the US – among the fastest-growing occupations
  ▪ Data from US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports, “despite a significant increase in
    offshoring over the past five years, more IT jobs are available today in the US than at the height
    of the dot.com boom.”
  ▪ US BLS predicts IT jobs to be “among the fastest-growing occupations over the next decade.”

► Global competition in higher-end skills is increasing -- these trends have
  implications for individuals, companies, and countries
  ▪ IT workers & students improve their chances of long-term employment in IT occupations by:
    – obtaining a strong foundational education,
    – learning the technologies used in the global software industry,
    – keeping skills up to date throughout their career,
    – developing good teamwork and communication skills,
    – becoming familiar with other cultures, and
    – managing their careers so as to choose work in industries and jobs occupations less likely to
      be automated or sent to a low-wage country.

► Offshoring between developed and developing countries benefit both
  ▪ Other countries benefit from generating new revenue and creating high-value jobs;
  ▪ US-based corporations achieve better financial performance as a result of the cost savings
    associated with offshoring some jobs and investing increased profits in growing business
    opportunities that create new jobs in the US.

http://www.acm.org/globalizationreport
To stay competitive in a global IT environment, countries must adopt policies that foster innovation – educational policy and core investment.

- To this end, policies that improve a country’s ability to attract, educate, and retain the best IT talent are critical.

- Building a foundation to foster the next generation of innovation and invention requires:
  - Sustaining or strengthening technical training and education systems,
  - Sustaining or increasing investment in research and development, and
  - Establishing governmental policies that eliminate barriers to the free flow of talent.

- There are some general principles that all countries can follow to mount an effective educational response to offshoring:
  - Evolve computing curriculum at a pace and in a way that better embraces the changing nature of IT.
  - Ensure computing curriculum prepare students for the global economy.
  - Teach students to be innovative and creative.
  - Evolve curriculum to achieve a better balance between foundational knowledge of computing on the one hand, and business and application domain knowledge on the other.
  - Invest to ensure the educational system has good technology, good curriculum, and good teachers.

http://www.acm.org/globalizationreport
Offshoring magnifies risks and creates new threats to national security, business property and processes, and individuals’ privacy – businesses and nations should employ strategies to mitigate them

- When businesses offshore work, they increase not only their own business-related risks they also increase risks to national security and individuals’ privacy.
  - intellectual property theft, failures in longer supply chains, or
  - complexity arising from conflicting legal environments

- Businesses have a clear incentive to manage these new risks to suit their own interests, but nations and individuals often have little awareness of the exposures created.
  - Many nations have COTS software and Internet Protocol technologies in IT-based military systems and critical infrastructure systems.
    - Many COTS systems are developed offshore, making it difficult for buyers to understand source/code.
    - Creates possibility that a hostile nation or non-governmental hostile agents (terrorist/criminal) can compromise these systems.
  - Individuals often are exposed to loss of privacy or identity theft.
    - Bank records, transaction records, call center traffic, and service centers all are being offshored today.
    - Voluminous medical records are being transferred offshore, read by clinicians elsewhere, stored and manipulated in foreign repositories, and managed under much less restrictive laws about privacy and security than in most developed countries.

- Companies and governments need risk mitigation strategies to address offshoring:
  - Companies should have security and data privacy plans and be certified to meet certain standards;
  - Service providers should not outsource work without the explicit approval of the client;
  - Offshoring providers should be vetted carefully;
  - Businesses should encrypt data transmissions/minimize access to databases by offshore operations;
  - Nations can adopt stronger privacy policies, invest in research methods to secure this data,
  - Nation-to-nation & international treatment of data and how compromises will be handled is needed.

- Identified major gaps in:
  - Requirements for software tools and technologies to routinely develop error-free software and the state-of-the-art
  - State-of-the-art and state-of-the-practice

- Recommended elevating software to national policy using public-private partnerships involving government, industry and academia

- **National Software Strategy** -- four major programs
  - Improving Software Trustworthiness
  - Educating and Fielding the Software Workforce
  - Re-Energizing Software Research and Development
  - Encouraging Innovation Within U.S. Software Industry

- Purpose of National Software Strategy:
  - Achieve ability to routinely develop and deploy trustworthy software products
  - Ensure the continued competitiveness of the US software industry

* See report at Center for National Software Studies            www.cnsoftware.org/nss2report
PITAC* Findings Relative to Needs for Secure Software Engineering & Software Assurance

- Commercial software engineering today lacks the scientific underpinnings and rigorous controls needed to produce high-quality, secure products at acceptable cost.

- Commonly used software engineering practices permit dangerous errors, such as improper handling of buffer overflows, which enable hundreds of attack programs to compromise millions of computers every year.

- In the future, the Nation may face even more challenging problems as adversaries – both foreign and domestic – become increasingly sophisticated in their ability to insert malicious code into critical software.

- Recommendations for increasing investment in cyber security provided to NITRD Interagency Working Group for Cyber Security & Information Assurance R&D

* President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee (PITAC) Report to the President, “Cyber Security: A Crisis of Prioritization,” February 2005 identified top 10 areas in need of increased support, including: ‘secure software engineering and software assurance’ and ‘metrics, benchmarks, and best practices’ [Note: PITAC is now a part of PCAST]
Offshoring also sought due to shortage of IT students & workforce in US

- Current shortage of IT/software professionals in the US and enrollment declines in relevant disciplines partially driven by misperceptions
- Offshore sources sometimes sought to fill void of qualified US IT workforce
- Schools must provide relevant curriculum for students to be competitive in a global IT economy; focus needed on requisite core competencies in IT/software
  - Computer programming easily offshored;
  - Domestic demand is high in IT/computing & information research, software engineering, systems analysts, network and systems administration, network and data communications analysts;
  - Domestic demand raising in all aspects of cyber security and information assurance; increasing needs associated with software assurance.
- To stay competitive in global IT environment, a US national focus is needed to reverse trends to increase enrollments in IT/computing disciplines
  - Improvement needed in state-of-the-practice and state-of-the-art for IT/SW capabilities
  - Computing curriculum needs to embrace changing nature of IT/software business
  - Educational policy and investment needed to foster innovation and increase IT-related enrollments

Homeland Security
GAO Reports relative to Software Assurance

  - Outsourcing, foreign development risks & insertion of malicious code
  - Domestic development subject to similar risks
  - Recommendations for program managers to factor in software risks and security in risk assessments


http://www.gao.gov
Why Software Assurance is Critical

► Software is the core constituent of modern products and services – it enables functionality and business operations

► Dramatic increase in mission risk due to increasing:
  ▪ Software dependence and system interdependence (weakest link syndrome)
  ▪ Software Size & Complexity (obscures intent and precludes exhaustive test)
  ▪ Outsourcing and use of un-vetted software supply chain (COTS & custom)
  ▪ Attack sophistication (easing exploitation)
  ▪ Reuse (unintended consequences increasing number of vulnerable targets)
  ▪ Number of vulnerabilities & incidents with threats targeting software
  ▪ Risk of Asymmetric Attack and Threats

► Increasing awareness and concern

Software and the processes for acquiring and developing software represent a material weakness
Knowledge of Supply Chain & Software Content

- Transparency of the Supply Chain should be an important element of an organization’s Risk Management efforts.

- Supplier identity and software content often blurred by reuse of legacy code, sub-contracting, outsourcing and use of open source software (OSS).

- OSS represents a major perturbation in software development processes, in software distribution and acquisition, and in the lifecycle aspects of usage.
  - OSS code is everywhere -- it will find its way into your organization in many ways, and calls into question existing assumptions regarding the software supply chain.
  - IT environments will be comprised of “mixed code” -- New tools and processes will be required to properly manage this environment.

- Tools needed to deliver transparency of supply chain and software content, (ie., the identification of software elements, combined with increasingly rich information about the identified software elements).

- Transparency of software content ultimately translates into increased security of IT operations, and is a new weapon in the mission to secure cyberspace, and maintain more resilient critical infrastructure assets.

http://www.gao.gov
What has Caused Software Assurance Problem
Increasing software vulnerabilities and exploitation

► Then
- Domestic dominated market
- Stand alone systems
- Software small and simple
- Software small part of functionality
- Custom and closed development processes (cleared personnel)
- Adversaries known, few, and technologically less sophisticated

► Now
- Global market
- Globally network environment
- Software large and complex
- Software is the core of system functionality
- COTS/GOTS/Custom in open and unknown, un-vetted development processes with outsourcing & reuse (foreign sourced, un-cleared, un-vetted)
- Adversaries numerous and sophisticated

Homeland Security
Exploitable Software:
Outcomes of non-secure practices and/or malicious intent

Exploitation potential of vulnerability independent of “intent”

*Intentional vulnerabilities are spyware & malicious logic deliberately imbedded (and might not be considered defects)

Note: Chart is not to scale – notional representation -- for discussions
Exploitation of Software Vulnerabilities

► Serve as primary points of entry that attackers may attempt to use to gain access to systems and/or data

► Enable compromise of business and missions

► Allow Attackers to:
  ▪ Pose as other entities
  ▪ Execute commands as other users
  ▪ Conduct information gathering activities
  ▪ Access data (contrary to specified access restrictions for that data)
  ▪ Hide activities
  ▪ Conduct a denial of service
  ▪ Embed malicious logic for future exploitation
Realities of Relying on Software

► Software has defects – many defects have security implications.

► As new attacks are being invented, software behaviour that could reasonably have been considered correct when written may have unintended effects when deliberately exploited.

► Current software patching solutions are struggling to catch up with the attacks.

► Since hackers are trying to break into system at every level of the application stack, heap or registry, it’s critical to understand the security implications of programming decisions in order to keep your software secure.
Reality of Existing Software

- Based on average defect rate, deployed software package of 1MLOCs has 6000 defects;
- if only 1% of those defects are security vulnerabilities, there are 60 different opportunities for hacker to attack the system
Software Assurance contributes to Trustworthy Software Systems

Suppliers must consider enabling technologies and lifecycle processes

Holistic approach must factor in all relevant technologies, protection initiatives and contributing disciplines

Standards are required to better enable national and international commerce and to provide basis for certification

Adopted from the TrustSoft Graduate School on Trustworthy Software Systems, started April 2005; funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). See German Oldenburg http://trustsoft.uni-oldenburg.de
Software Assurance Comes From:

Knowing what it takes to “get” what we want
- Development/acquisition practices/process capabilities
- Criteria for assuring integrity & mitigating risks

Building and/or acquiring what we want
- Threat modeling and analysis
- Requirements engineering
- Failsafe design and defect-free code
- Supply Chain Management

Understanding what we built / acquired
- Production assurance evidence
- Comprehensive testing and diagnostics
- Formal methods & static analysis

Using what we understand
- Policy/practices for use & acquisition
- Composition of trust
- Hardware support

*Multiple Sources:
DHS/NCSD, OASD(NII)IA, NSA, NASA, JHU/APL
Software Assurance Lifecycle Considerations

- Define Lifecycle Threats/Hazards, Vulnerabilities & Risks
- Identify Risks attributable to software
- Determine Threats (and Hazards)
- Understand key aspects of Vulnerabilities
- Consider Implications in Lifecycle Phases:
  - Threats to: System, Production process, Using system
  - Vulnerabilities attributable to: Ineptness (undisciplined practices), Malicious intent, Incorrect or incomplete artifacts, Inflexibility
  - Risks in Current Efforts: Polices & Practices, Constraints
DHS Software Assurance Program Overview

- Program based upon the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace - Action/Recommendation 2-14:
  
  “DHS will facilitate a national public-private effort to promulgate best practices and methodologies that promote integrity, security, and reliability in software code development, including processes and procedures that diminish the possibilities of erroneous code, malicious code, or trap doors that could be introduced during development.”

- DHS Program goals promote the security of software across the development life cycle

- Software Assurance (SwA) program is scoped to address:
  - **Trustworthiness** - No exploitable vulnerabilities exist, either maliciously or unintentionally inserted
  - **Predictable Execution** - Justifiable confidence that software, when executed, functions in a manner in which it is intended
  - **Conformance** - Planned and systematic set of multi-disciplinary activities that ensure software processes and products conform to requirements, standards/ procedures
## Software Assurance Program Alignment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NCSD Goal</th>
<th>National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace</th>
<th>HSPD-7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Priority 1: National Cyberspace Security Response System</td>
<td>&quot;...maintain an organization to serve as a focal point for the security of cyberspace..&quot;</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority 2: National Cyberspace Threat and Vulnerability Reduction Program</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority 3: National Cyberspace Security Awareness and Training Program</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority 4: Securing Govt.'s Cyberspace</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority 5: International Cyberspace Security Cooperation</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NCSD Goal 1:** Prevent, detect, and respond to cyber incidents, and reconstitute rapidly after cyber incidents.

**NCSD Goal 2:** Work with public and private sectors to reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of cyber attacks.

**NCSD Goal 3:** Promote a comprehensive national awareness program to empower all Americans to secure their own parts of cyberspace.

**NCSD Goal 4:** Foster adequate training and education programs to support the Nation’s cyber security needs.

**NCSD Goal 5:** Coordinate with the intelligence and law enforcement communities to identify and reduce threats to cyber space.

**Software Assurance Program alignment**
# Software Assurance Program Alignment – FY06

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</tbody>
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| NCSD Goal 2: Work with public and private sectors to reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of cyber attacks. | Developers Guide for SW Security in the SDLC, v1.0 in March 2006 |
| | Build Security In Web site – stakeholder review, CCB, updates |
| | SwA Common Body of Knowledge – version 1.0 in March 2006 |
| | Articles in journals |
| | SwA Forums, workshops and conferences |
| | SAMATE: Metrics and Tool Evaluation |
| | Federation of Labs --- Tools & Product Eval (NIAP Review) |
| | Acquisition Mgr Guides: Procurement templates & due diligence questionnaire |
| | Processes and Practices |
| | National & International standards |
| | SwA security measurement |
| | Software Assurance Program Management – SwA Deputy Director/Program Mgr (being hired) |
DHS Software Assurance Program Structure

Program framework encourages the production, evaluation and acquisition of better quality and more secure software; leverages resources to target the following four areas:

- **People** – developers (includes education & training) and users
- **Processes** – sound practices, standards, and practical guidelines for the development of secure software
- **Technology** – diagnostic tools, cyber security R&D and measurement
- **Acquisition** – software security improvements through specifications and guidelines for acquisition/outsourcing
DHS Software Assurance: Acquisition

- Collaborate with stakeholders to enhance software supply chain management through improved risk mitigation and contracting for secure software **
  - Collaborate with stakeholder organizations to support acquisition community to develop and disseminate:
    - Due-diligence questionnaire for RFI/RFP and source selection decision-making
    - Templates and sample statement of work / procurement language for acquisition and evaluation based on successful models
    - Acquisition Managers guidebook on acquisition/procurement of secure software-intensive systems and services
  - Collaborate with government and industry working groups to:
    - Identify needs for reducing risks associated with software supply chain
    - Provide acquisition training and education to develop applicable curriculum
  - Chair IEEE CS S2ESC WG to update of IEEE 1062, “Software Acquisition”
  - Collaborate with agencies implementing changes responsive to changes in the FAR that incorporated IT security provisions of FISMA when buying goods and services

**NCSD Goal Action 2.3.4**
“Supply chain introduces risks to American society that relies on Federal Government for essential information and services.”

30 Sep 2005 changes to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) focus on IT Security

Focuses on the role of contractors in security as Federal agencies outsource various IT functions.

FISMA IT security provisions now in FAR

- 30 Sep 2005 amended FAR parts 1, 2, 7, 11, and 39 implements IT security provisions of FISMA for all phases of IT acquisition life cycle
  - Incorporates FISMA (Federal Information Systems Management Act) into Federal Acquisition with clear and consistent IT security guidance
    - Require agencies to identify and provide InfoSec protections commensurate with security risks to Federal information collected or maintained for the agency and info systems used or operated on behalf of an agency by a contractor
    - Incorporate IT security in buying goods and services
    - Require adherence to Federal Information Processing Standards
    - Require agency security policy and requirements in IT acquisitions
    - Require contractors and Fed employees be subjected to same requirements in accessing Fed IT systems and data
  - Applies Information Assurance definitions for Integrity, Confidentiality and Availability to Federal IT, including Sensitive But Unclassified information

See www.regulations.gov and article at www.fcw.com/article90982-09-30-05-Web
NIST Enterprise Risk Management Framework

Starting Point

SP 800-53 / FIPS 200
Security Control Selection
Selects minimum security controls (i.e., safeguards and countermeasures) planned or in place to protect the information system

SP 800-53 / FIPS 200 / SP 800-30
Security Control Refinement
Uses risk assessment to adjust minimum control set based on local conditions, required threat coverage, and specific agency requirements

SP 800-18
Security Control Documentation
In system security plan, provides a an overview of the security requirements for the information system and documents the security controls planned or in place

SP 800-53A / SP 800-37
Security Control Assessment
Determines extent to which the security controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing desired outcome with respect to meeting security requirements

SP 800-37
Security Control Implementation
Implements security controls in new or legacy information systems; implements security configuration checklists

FIPS 199 / SP 800-60
Security Categorization
Defines category of information system according to potential impact of loss

SP 800-37
System Authorization
Determines risk to agency operations, agency assets, or individuals and, if acceptable, authorizes information system processing

SP 800-37
Security Control Monitoring
Continuously tracks changes to the information system that may affect security controls and assesses control effectiveness

Source: FISMA Implementation Project, Dr. Ron Ross, NIST, April 2004
DHS Software Assurance: People

- Provide Guide to Software Assurance Common Body of Knowledge (CBK) as a framework to identify workforce needs for competencies and leverage standards and “best practices” to guide curriculum development for Software Assurance education and training**
  - Hosted five Working Group sessions (April, June, Aug, & Oct 2005 and Jan 2006) with participation from academia, industry and Government
  - **Addressing three domains: “acquisition & supply,” “development,” and “post-release assurance” (sustainment)**
  - Distribute CBK v1.0 in March 2006
  - Updating CBK awareness materials, including articles & FAQs
  - Update CBK -- identifying prioritization of practices and knowledge areas in domains, contributing disciplines and curricula, and “use” aids
  - Develop pilot training/education curriculum consistent with CBK in conjunction with early adopters for distribution by September 2007

**NCSD Goal Action 2.3.1**
Secure Software Assurance
A Guide to the Common Body of Knowledge to Produce, Acquire and Sustain Secure Software, v1.0, March 2006

► Further review and comments have been solicited for feedback -- broader stakeholder community being contacted
► To provide comments, people have joined the Software Workforce Education and Training Working Group to collaborate through the US CERT Portal (https://us-cert.esportals.net/) using Organization ID 223
► Version 0.9 released in Jan 2006 via Federal Register Notice, accessible via “buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov” with v1.0 to be published March 2006
► Offered for informative use; it is not intended as a policy or a standard
Disciplines Contributing to SwA CBK*

In Education and Training, Software Assurance could be addressed as:
- A “knowledge area” extension within each of the contributing disciplines;
- A stand-alone CBK drawing upon contributing disciplines;
- A set of functional roles, drawing upon a common body of knowledge; allowing more in-depth coverage dependent upon the specific roles.

Intent is to provide framework for curriculum development and evolution of contributing BOKs.

* See ‘Notes Page’ view for contributing BOK URLs and relevant links

The intent is not to create a new profession of Software Assurance; rather, to provide a common body of knowledge: (1) from which to provide input for developing curriculum in related fields of study and (2) for evolving the contributing disciplines to better address the needs of software security, safety, dependability, reliability and...
Reaching Relevant Stakeholders

Leverage Evolving Efforts in Universities, Standards Organizations & Industry

Education
- Curriculum
- Accreditation Criteria
  CNSS IA Courseware Eval
  IEEE/ACM SW Eng 2004 curriculum
  AACSB & ABET
  AIS IS & MSIS curriculum

Professional Development
- Continuing Education
- Certification
  Certified SW Development Professional (CSDP), IEEE
  IEEE CSDP Prep Course
  IEEE CS SWE Book Series

Training and Practices
- Standards of Practice
- Training programs
  IEEE CS SW & Systems Engineering Standards Committee (S2ESC)
  ISO/IEC JTC1/SC7 & SC27 and other committees

Adopted from “Integrating Software Engineering Standards” by IEEE Computer Society Liaison to ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 7, James.W.Moore@ieee.org, 23 February 2005
Integrating SwA CBK with CNSS IA Standards
(An example path for inserting SwA in Education Curriculum)

Software Assurance considerations for IA functional roles:
-- add SwA material in applicable CNSS 4000 series standards
-- add a new CNSS 4000 series standard on SW Assurance
Significance of SwA Education Curriculum

Courseware –

- Through DoD & DHS co-sponsorship, the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) and the National Security Agency (NSA) provide certification that academic institutions offer a set of courseware that has been reviewed by National Level Information Assurance Subject Matter Experts who determine if the institutions meet National Training Standards for Information Systems Security Professionals,
- NSTISSI No. 4011 for Information Security Professionals (as a minimum, plus at least one of the other 4000 series standards) for specific academic years.

Center of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education

- Designation as CAEIAE by NSA (based on CNSS certification of courseware).
- See http://www.nsa.gov/ia/academia/caeCriteria.cfm

Scholarship for Service (SFS)

- **CAEIAE certification** (or qualified equivalent criteria determined by NSA & DHS) is a qualifying requirement for institutions to offer the National Science Foundation (NSF) SFS program.
  - **Scholarship Track** -- increase the number of qualified students entering the fields of information assurance and computer security and
  - **Capacity Building** -- increase the capacity of the U.S. higher education enterprise to continue to produce professionals in these fields to meet the needs of our increasingly technological society.
SwA CBK relative to Computing Curricula

Currently mapping SwA CBK content to Computing Curricula

Goal is to provide the resulting mapping to assist in integrating SwA in relevant degree programs

Computing Curricula 2005

The Overview Report
covering undergraduate degree programs in
Computer Engineering
Computer Science
Information Systems
Information Technology
Software Engineering

A volume of the Computing Curricula Series

The Joint Task Force for Computing Curricula 2005

A cooperative project of
The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
The Association for Information Systems (AIS)
The Computer Society (IEEE-CS)

30 September 2005
Integrating SwA CBK with IT Security Training
(An example path for inserting SwA in IT Workforce Training Programs)

- Provide input to the DHS-led federal IT workforce training initiative by leveraging evolving efforts in federal government:
  - DoD IA Workforce Training and Certification Requirements for IA Workforce (see DoD 8570.1M)
  - NIST IT Security Training Requirements (see NIST Special Pub 800-16)
  - Federal CIO IT Workforce Council

- Provide recommended core competencies and course content for federal acquisition managers to consider SwA due-diligence in procurement efforts
  - Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI)
  - Defense Acquisition University (DAU)
  - National Defense University Information Resource Management College
DHS Software Assurance: Process

- Provide practical guidance in software assurance practices and process improvement methodologies**
  - Launched a web-based repository “Build Security In” on US-CERT web site “buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov” on October 3, 2005
  - Publishing developers’ guide “SECURING THE SOFTWARE LIFECYCLE”
  - Developing business case analysis to support software security throughout lifecycle practices
  - Completing DHS/DoD co-sponsored comprehensive review of the NIAP & use of the Common Criteria
  - Continuing to seek broader participation of relevant stakeholder organizations and professional societies
  - Participate in relevant standards bodies; identify software assurance gaps in applicable standards from ISO/IEC, IEEE, NIST, ANSI, OMG, CNSS, and Open Group and support effort through DHS-sponsored SwA Processes and Practices Working group**NCSD Goal Action 2.3.2
DHS Software Assurance: Process (cont.)

- Provide practical guidance in software assurance practices and process improvement methodologies**
  - Provides dissemination of recommended “sound” practices and technologies for secure software development
  - Continuing to sponsor work with CMU Software Engineering Institute and industry to further develop practical guidance and update the web-based repository
  - Updating site to include additional development guidance and add new focus for acquisition and ops/sustainment

**NCSD Goal Action 2.3.2
Process Agnostic Lifecycle

Launched 3 Oct 2005

Touch Points & Artifacts

Architecture & Design
- Architectural risk analysis
- Threat modeling
- Principles
- Guidelines
- Historical risks
- Modeling tools
- Resources

Code
- Code analysis
- Assembly, integration & evolution
- Coding practices
- Coding rules
- Code analysis
- Resources

Test
- Security testing
- White box testing
- Attack patterns
- Historical risks
- Resources

Requirements
- Requirements engineering
- Attack patterns
- Resources

System
- Penetration testing
- Incident management
- Deployment & operations
- Black box testing
- Resources

Fundamentals
- Risk management
- Project management
- Training & awareness
- Measurement
- SDLC process
- Business relevance
- Resources

Key
- Best (sound) practices
- Foundational knowledge
- Tools
- Resources

https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov
DHS Software Assurance: Process (cont.)

- Provide practical guidance in software assurance practices and process improvement methodologies** (cont.)

- Collect, develop, and publish practical guidance and reference materials for security through the software development life cycle
- Provide an informative aid for developers on software assurance process improvement methodologies.

Information for Developers

(version 1.0 published Mar 2006)

- Initial content from DoD-sponsored Application Security Developer Guides:
  - Securing the Software Development Lifecycle
  - Security Requirements Engineering Methodology
  - Reference Set of Application Security Requirements
  - Secure Design, Implementation, and Deployment
  - Secure Assembly of Software Components
  - Secure Use of C and C++
  - Secure Use of Java-Based Technologies
  - Software Security Testing

- Content updated, expanded, & revised based on documents and inputs from other sources across SwA community

Information for Developers

(version 1.0 published Mar 2006)
“Securing the Software Lifecycle:
Making Application Development Processes – and the
Software Produced by Them – More Secure”

- Offered for informative use; it is not intended as a policy or standard
  - Further review and comments have been solicited for feedback -- broader stakeholder community being contacted
  - Previously, to provide comments, people joined the Software Processes and Practices WG to collaborate through US CERT Portal (https://us-cert.esportals.net/) using Organization ID 223

- Latest draft version released Jan 2006 via Federal Register Notice, accessible via “buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov” with v1.0 to be published by March 2006
DHS Software Assurance: Process (cont.)

► Provide practical guidance in software assurance process improvement methodologies** (cont.)
  ▪ Participate in relevant standards bodies;
  ▪ identify software assurance gaps in applicable standards from:
    – ISO/IEC,
    – IEEE,
    – NIST,
    – ANSI,
    – OMG,
    – CNSS, and
    – Open Group

► Support effort through DHS-sponsored SwA Processes and Practices Working group
  ▪ April, June, August, October, and Nov-Dec 2005
  ▪ January, March, June and September 2006

**NCSD Goal Action 2.3.2
Value of Standards

*A standard is a Name for an otherwise fuzzy concept*

In a complex, multidimensional trade space of solutions ...

... a standard gives a name to a bounded region.

*It defines some characteristics that a buyer can count on.*

- **Software Assurance** needs standards to assign names to practices or collections of practices.
- This enables communication between:
  - Buyer and seller
  - Government and industry
  - Insurer and insured

Standards represent the “minimum level of responsible practice” and “sound practices” that are consensus-based, not necessarily the best available methods.
Role of Standards for Software Assurance

Standards are needed to better enable exchange of information among participants and enable interoperability between solutions (provided by multiple vendors) needed to perform SwA activities.

- Offer common ground for communication
- Provide consensus-based, sound practices for engineering
- Provide benchmarking criteria for gauging the achievement of objectives
- Allow different participants to initiate collaboration and activities in area of SwA through the common framework and achieve greater automation of SwA processes by enabling interoperability between different supporting tools

Standards relevant to Software Assurance would:

- Increase interoperability among tools and manual processes by creating an open framework.
- Provide guidance and criteria for making claims about the integrity (safety, security, & dependability) of products and systems.
- Enable generation of new solutions to benefit all sectors (Government, Industry, etc)
- Better ensure that all sectors are investing within a coordinated strategy.
Using Standards and Best Practices to Close gaps between state-of-the-practice and state-of-the-art *1, 2

Raising the Ceiling

- Information Assurance, Cyber Security and System Safety typically treat the concerns of the most critical system assets.
  - They prescribe extra practices (and possibly, extra effort) in developing, sustaining and operating such systems.

Raising the Floor

- However, some of the concerns of Software Assurance involve simple things that any user or developer should do.
  - They don’t increase lifecycle costs.
  - In many cases, they just specify “stop making avoidable mistakes.”

* [2] US 2nd National Software Summit, April 29, 2005 Report (see http://www.cnsoftware.org) identified major gaps in requirements for software tools and technologies to routinely develop error-free software and the state-of-the-art and gaps in state-of-the-art and state-of-the-practice
Using Standards and Best Practices to Close gaps between state-of-the-practice and state-of-the-art \(^*1, 2\)

**Raising the Ceiling**
- Information Assurance, Cyber Security and System Safety typically treat the concerns of the most critical system assets.
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\(^*1\) Adopted from Software Assurance briefing on “ISO Harmonization of Standardized Software and System Life Cycle Processes,” by Jim Moore, MITRE, June 2, 2005,

\(^*2\) US 2nd National Software Summit, April 29, 2005 Report (see http://www.cnsoftware.org) identified major gaps in requirements for software tools and technologies to routinely develop error-free software and the state-of-the-art and gaps in state-of-the-art and state-of-the-practice
For a safety/security analysis to be valid ...

The execution of the system must be predictable.

This requires ...

- Correct implementation of requirements, expectations and regulations.

- Exclusion of unwanted function even in the face of attempted exploitation.

Predictable Execution = requisite enabling characteristic

*Adopted from Jim Moore, IEEE CS S2ESC Liaison to ISO SC7*
Simplified Relationships among Disciplines

Software Engineering

Various

Achieves desired function

Fault Tolerant Design

Permits confidence in

Predictable Execution

Multi-disciplinary Methods

Precludes undesired function despite attempts to exploit

Security Functions

Permits confidence in

Information Assurance

Safety

* Adopted from Jim Moore, IEEE CS S2ESC Liaison to ISO SC7
Security and Assurance Concerns in ISO

ISO

TMB
Advisory Group on Security

IEC

JTC 1
Information Technology

IEEE
Computer Society

SC 7
Software and Systems Engineering

SC 22
Programming Languages

SC 27
IT Security

Liaison role between IEEE CS S2ESC and between ISO SCs
Harmonization Efforts Impacting Systems and Software Assurance

Who’s Collaborating

- ISO
- IEC
- TC176: Quality
- JTC1: Information Technology
- TC56: Dependability
- SC65A: Functional Safety
- SC1: Terminology
- SC7: System & SW Engineering
- SC22: Language, OS
- SC27: IT Security Techniques
- IEEE CS
- DHS
- DoD
- NIST
- S2ESC: Software and Systems Engineering
- IASC: Information Assurance
- U.S. Gov’t
- ISO
- IEC
- IEEE CS
- U.S. Gov’t
- FISMA Projects
- CNSS & MIL-STDs Policies & Directives
SwA Concerns of Standards Organizations

* DHS NCSD has membership on SC7, SC27 & IEEE S2ESC leveraging Liaisons in place or requested with other committees
ISO SC27 (INCITS CS1) Standards Portfolio

 ► Management
   ▪ Information security and systems
   ▪ Third party information security service providers (outsourcing)

 ► Measurement and Assessment
   ▪ Security Metrics
   ▪ Security Checklists
   ▪ IT security assessment of operational systems
   ▪ IT security evaluation and assurance

 ► IA & Cyber Security Requirements and Operations
   ▪ Protection Profiles
   ▪ Security requirements for cryptographic modules
   ▪ Intrusion detection
   ▪ Network security
   ▪ Incident handling
   ▪ Role based access control
Leveraging US & International Efforts

ISO/IEC

NIST

Open Group

OMG

CNSS

Committee on Nat’l Security Systems

IEEE Reliability Society

IEEE Computer Society

IEEE Standards Assn

IEEE CS SAB

IASC

S2ESC

Information Assurance

Software and Systems Engineering

ANSI

ANSI Accreditation

Category A Liaison to SC7

Membership in US TAG to SC7
Safety and Security Standards

**IEC 61508**
Functional Safety

**IEC 60880**
SW in nuclear power safety systems

**DO 178B**
SW considerations in airborne equip certification

**ISO/IEC 9796**
Digital Security Schemes

**ISO/IEC 10181**
Security frameworks for open systems

**ISO/IEC 15408**
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation

**ISO/IEC 10181**
Security frameworks for open systems

**ISO/IEC 17799**
Code of Practice for Information Security Management

**ISO/IEC 13335**
Management of information and communications technology security

**IEEE P1619**
Standard Architecture for Encrypted Shared Storage Media

**IEEE P2200**
Baseline Operating System Security

**IEEE P1667**
Standard Protocol for Authentication in Host Attachments of Transient Storage Devices

**ISO/IEC 21827**
Systems Security Engineering CMM

**IEEE P1700**
Security Architecture for Certification and Accreditation of Information

**DO 178B**
SW considerations in airborne equip certification

**Military Standards**

**MIL-STD-882D**
Standard Practice for System Safety

**DEF STAN 00-56**
Safety Management Requirements for Defence Systems

**IEEE P2600**
Standard for Information Technology: Hardcopy System and Device Security

*Adopted from Paul Croll, Chairman of IEEE CS S2ESC and ISO SC7 WG9*

Assurance in the IEEE/EIA 12207 Software Life Cycle Process Framework

Context for IT/Software Security

The environment consists of a changing set of conditions, Policies, and other factors often unknown at the time of implementation but realized during use or consumption.

The system is an arrangement of products fulfilling a need, Constrains the environment of each product.

The product is the unit of purchase and frequently has multiple uses.

Implementation of an IA algorithm in a product

“feature function”

“product”

“system”

“environment”

Domain of FIPS

Domain of NIAP for IA and IA Enabled products

Domain of Certification and Accreditation (all products, interfaces, configuration and other issues)
Scope of ISO/IEC 15026 “System and Software Assurance”

“System and software assurance focuses on the management of risk and assurance of safety, security, and dependability within the context of system and software life cycles.”

Terms of Reference changed: ISO/IEC JTC1/SC7 WG9, previously “System and Software Integrity”

Adopted from Paul Croll’s SSTC May 2005 presentation, “Best Practices for Delivering Safe, Secure, and Dependable Mission Capabilities”
“Safety & Security Extensions for Integrated Capability Maturity Models” – Input to 15026

1. Ensure Safety and Security Competency
2. Establish Qualified Work Environment
3. Ensure Integrity of Safety and Security Information
4. Monitor Operations and Report Incidents
5. Ensure Business Continuity
6. Identify Safety and Security Risks
7. Analyze and Prioritize Risks
8. Determine, Implement, and Monitor Risk Mitigation Plan
10. Develop and Deploy Safe and Secure Products and Services
11. Objectively Evaluate Products
12. Establish Safety and Security Assurance Arguments
13. Establish Independent Safety and Security Reporting
14. Establish a Safety and Security Plan
15. Select and Manage Suppliers, Products, and Services
16. Monitor and Control Activities and Products

From synthesis and harmonization of practices from 8 standards (4 on security and 4 on safety)

Source: United States Department of Defense and Federal Aviation Administration joint project on, Safety and Security Extensions for Integrated Capability Maturity Models, September 2004

www.faa.gov/ipg
ISO/IEC 15026 – System and Software Assurance Interface with ISO/IEC Standards – Assurance Case/Argument

- Describes interfaces/amplifications to the Technical & Management processes of ISO/IEC 15288 System Lifecycle & 12207 Software Lifecycle
- Establishes centrality of the Assurance Argument
- Leverages IT security concepts and terminology in ISO/IEC15443
- Leverages OMG’s ADM Task Force – Knowledge Discovery Meta-model

Source: ISO/IEC 15026-D4, JTC1, SC7, WG9 (currently in the process of modifying the context interrelationships)
The Assurance Case/Argument – Requires Measurement

- Set of structured assurance claims, supported by evidence and reasoning, that demonstrates how assurance needs have been satisfied.
  - Shows compliance with assurance objectives
  - Provides an argument for the safety and security of the product or service.
  - Built, collected, and maintained throughout the life cycle
  - Derived from multiple sources

- Sub-parts
  - A high level summary
  - Justification that product or service is acceptably safe, secure, or dependable
  - Rationale for claiming a specified level of safety and security
  - Conformance with relevant standards and regulatory requirements
  - The configuration baseline
  - Identified hazards and threats and residual risk of each hazard and threat
  - Operational and support assumptions

Adopted from Paul Croll, ISO SC7 WG9 Editor for Systems and Software Assurance
The Assurance Case/Argument

Structure

Part 1
A coherent argument for the safety and security of the product or service

Part 2
A set of supporting evidence

Attributes

- Clear
- Consistent
- Complete
- Comprehensible
- Defensible
- Bounded
- Addresses all life cycle stages

*Adopted from Paul Croll, ISO SC7 WG9 Editor for Systems and Software Assurance
Key Standards for Software & System Processes

- **ISO/IEC 15288, System Life Cycle Processes**
  - 25 processes spanning the life cycle of a system.
  - The standard is primarily descriptive.

  - 17 processes spanning the life cycle of a software product or service.
  - The standard is somewhat prescriptive in defining a minimum level of responsible practice.
  - Describes processes meeting the needs of organizational process definition.

- **ISO/IEC 12207:Amd 1**
  - Describes processes to meet the needs of process assessment and improvement.

- **ISO/IEC 15026, Integrity Levels ➔ Assurance**
  - Describes additional techniques needed for high-integrity systems.
  - Currently, not process-oriented, but is being repositioned.

- **ISO/IEC 16085, Risk Management Process**
- **ISO/IEC 15939, Measurement Process**
- **Other standards treating specific processes in greater detail**
Partition of Concerns in Software-Intensive Systems

Considerations for Assurance Arguments:
-- What can be understood and controlled (such as failures and attack vectors)?
-- What must be articulated in terms of “assurance” claims and how might the bounds of such claims be described?

From facilitated discussions in SwA WG on Practices and Processes, Aug & Nov 2005

Safety: Sustaining predictable, dependable execution in the face of unpredictable but unintentional faults (hazards)
Security: Sustaining predictable, dependable execution in the face of intentional attacks (threats)
Framework for IT Security Assurance


- Guides selection of an appropriate assurance method when specifying, selecting, or deploying a security service, product, or environmental factor such as an organization or personnel (known as a deliverable).

- Facilitates the understanding of the assurance type and effort required to achieve confidence that the deliverable satisfies stated IT security assurance requirements and security policy.

- Describes fundamentals of security assurance and relation to other security concepts.
  - Clarifies why security assurance is required and dispels misconceptions that increased assurance is gained by increasing the strength of security mechanisms.
  - Includes a categorization of assurance types and a generic lifecycle model to identify the appropriate assurance types required for the deliverable.

- Demonstrates how security assurance must be managed throughout the deliverable's lifecycle requiring assurance decisions to be made by several assurance authorities for the lifecycle stage relevant to their organization (i.e. developer, standards, consumer).

- Accommodates different assurance types and maps into any lifecycle approach so as not to dictate any particular design.

- Includes advanced security assurance concepts, such as combining security assurance methods.
Framework for IT Security Assurance (cont.)

ISO/IEC Technical Report 15443 addresses (within three parts):

- **Part 1, Overview and Framework** provides fundamental concepts and general description of assurance methods:
  - Targets IT security in developing a security assurance program, determining the security assurance of deliverables, entering assurance assessment audits (e.g. ISO 9000, ISO/IEC 21827, ISO/IEC 15408-3), or other assurance activities.

- **Part 2, Assurance Methods** describes a variety of assurance methods and approaches and relates them to Part 1 security assurance framework model:
  - Identifies qualitative properties of assurance methods.
  - Aids in understanding how to obtain assurance in a given life cycle stage of deliverable.

- **Part 3, Analysis of Assurance Methods** analyzes the various methods with respect to their assurance properties and aids Assurance Authorities:
  - in deciding relative value of Assurance Approaches and determining that they will provide the assurance results most appropriate to their needs.
  - to use assurance results to achieve desired confidence of the deliverable.
ISO/IEC TR 15446 – Additional guidance with applicable concepts specifying security claims


- Provides guidance relating to the construction of Protection Profiles (PPs) and Security Targets (STs) that are intended to be compliant with ISO/IEC 15408 (the "Common Criteria").
  - Gives suggestions on how to develop each section of a PP or ST.
  - Supported by an annex that contains generic examples of each type of PP and ST component, and by other annexes that contain detailed worked examples.

- Is primarily aimed at the development of PPs and STs.
  - Is likely to be useful to evaluators of PPs and STs and to those who are responsible for monitoring PP and ST evaluation.
  - May also be of interest to consumers and users of PPs and STs who wish to understand what guidance the PP/ST author used, and which parts of the PP or ST are of principal interest.
Proposed standardization work within OMG

Recently, OMG launched Architecture-Driven Modernization (ADM) Task Force to develop specifications related to modernization of existing software systems.

- Often referred to as “MDA-in-reverse,” it addresses the need to apply modeling techniques to software products that are already in production to facilitate understanding, evaluation, assessment, certification, or modernization.
- ADM techniques reach new frontiers in software understanding.

The first specification of the ADM Task Force – Knowledge Discovery Meta-model (KDM) - establishes the Foundation for Software Assurance and Modernization by standardizing common platform-neutral framework for describing software systems, their artifacts, designs, architecture and their operating environment.

- KDM defines common terminology that can be shared by tool vendors and integrators, and assessment and certification bodies;
- KDM also defines a formal interoperability specification, so that descriptions can be exchanged; thus it providing interoperability in software understanding.
Software Assurance Meta-model

- Process of building trust … embodied in software asset evaluation

- Claims about software systems…
  - Involve certain Target Requirement (intentions)
    - Related to risks
    - How vendor-specified risk is mitigated
    - Security requirements
    - Process requirements (cleanroom, ISO, etc.;)
    - Architectural TR (especially when system of systems; integrations of 3rd party components is involved)
  - Specify the degree to which the target requirement was addressed
  - Levels of certainty of the claim
  - What kind of proof exists to support the certain claim
  - What benchmarks were involved

- Process of building/assembling software components

- Trust is derived from claims
  - Levels of trust and how vendor-specified risks match buyer’s risks
Interoperability facilitates exchange

In order to facilitate exchange of claims about software industry-wide, there should be (at least):

- Agreement of common terminology, boilerplate claims, properties, etc.
- Structured way to exchange such claims (templates, XML schemas, etc.)
- Agreed-upon ways to interpret such claims, properties, etc. (common meaning, as opposed to simply common format).
- Archives of such claims (libraries, repositories) that allow search, comparison, etc. (which again needs shared taxonomy, etc.)
- Automated methods (supported by tools)
Examples of Desired Relationships

- NIST 800
- IEEE IASC
- JTC 1/SC 27
- IEEE S2ESC
- JTC 1/SC 7
- JTC 1/SC 22

Agreement on selected Concepts relating disciplines

Harmonization of Concepts among organizations working in the same discipline

* Adopted from Jim Moore, IEEE CS S2ESC Liaison to ISO SC 7
Some Current Efforts

► ISO SC7
  ▪ Incorporate “raise the floor” assurance practices into life cycle standards.
  ▪ Incorporate “raise the ceiling” practices into separate standards strongly related to the life cycle standards.
  ▪ Use “16 Practices” as a benchmark for measuring success.

► ISO SC22
  ▪ Develop coding guidelines for common programming languages.

► ISO SC27
  ▪ Expand their perceived context to include assurance concerns.

► IEEE S2ESC
  ▪ Use as an “integrator” of standards for packaging and transition to industry.
DHS Software Assurance: Technology

- Enhance software security measurement and assess Software Assurance testing and diagnostic tools**

- Collaborate with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to inventory software assurance tools and measure effectiveness, identify gaps and conflicts, and develop a plan to eliminate gaps and conflicts
  - NIST SAMATE workshops to assess, measure, and validate tool effectiveness
  - Provide common taxonomy from which to compare capabilities
  - Provide common attack pattern enumeration and classification

- Develop R&D requirements for DHS S&T consideration; coordinating Software Assurance R&D requirements with other federal agencies
  - Advocate funding of R&D (through the DHS S&T Directorate) that will examine tools and techniques for analyzing software to detect security vulnerabilities.
  - Leverage multi-agency Cyber Security and IA R&D provided to stakeholders.
  - Include techniques that require access to source code & binary-only techniques

- Collaborate with other agencies and allied organizations to
  - Mature measurement in security to support SwA requirements
  - Explore needs and organizing mechanisms for federated labs

**NCSD Goal Action 2.3.3
Examining IT/Software Security Requirements

- How are common flaws (vulnerabilities) in software addressed in procurements?
- Are existing schemes for product evaluation adequate?
- What test guidance should be provided?
- How should certification and accreditation processes better address security requirements?
- How does acquisition community evaluate capabilities of suppliers to deliver secure software?
- How can measurement be enhanced to better support decision-making associated with IT/software security?
SwA Measurement & Tool Evaluation (SAMATE)

* SAMATE Reference Dataset (SRD), version 2, on-line

  This dataset will have 1000s of test cases for evaluation and development of SwA tools. Cases will have breadth of

  - language (C, Java, UML, etc.)
  - life cycle (design model, source code, application, ...)
  - size and type (small and huge, production and artificial, ...)

* Specifications and a reviewed test, including a suite of test cases (from the SRD above) for one class of SwA tool, probably source code scanners.

* Specifications & test for another class of SwA tool, probably web applications.

* Establish an advisory committee and create a road map to creating tests for all SwA tools (which tool classes should be done first?).

* List SwA areas with underdeveloped tools; sketch R&D that could fill each area.

* Publish at least one major paper on some part of the work done in SAMATE.

SAMATE project leader, Paul E. Black, paul.black@nist.gov (p.black@acm.org),
100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8970, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899-8970
Common Attack Patterns Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

**Service Description**
- Supports classification taxonomies to be easily understood and consumable by the broad software assurance community and to be aligned and integrated with the other SwA community knowledge catalogs.

**Service Tasks**
- Identify and analyze reference Attack Pattern resources from academia, govnt, and industry.
- Define standard Attack Pattern schema.
- Identify and collect potential Attack Pattern seedling instances.
- Finalize scope of effort to clarify number of Attack Patterns to be targeted for initial release.
- Translate Attack Pattern seedling content into the defined schema.
- Analyze and extend Attack Pattern seedlings to fulfill schema.
- Identify set of new Attack Patterns to be authored.
- Author targeted list of new Attack Patterns.
- Map all Attack Patterns to the Common WIFF Enumeration and Classification (CWEC).
- Define a classification taxonomy for Attack Patterns.
- Map Attack Patterns into the defined classification taxonomy.
- Publish content to SwA community, solicit input, collaborate, review, and revise as needed.
- Define process for ongoing extension and sustainment of the CAPEC.
- Provide assistance to design, build, test, and deploy a website for public hosting of CAPEC.
Common Attack Patterns Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

CAPEC Service Deliverables

- Primary catalog deliverable
- Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification XML document
- Attack Pattern schema description document
- Attack Pattern XML schema document
- Attack Pattern Classification Taxonomy XML document
- References list document
- Interim work product deliverables
- Operational Support element deliverables
- Conference/workshop presentations on CAPEC
- CAPEC extension and sustainment process document
Software Security Measurement: A collaboration among US DHS&DoD, UK MOD Australian DMO

- Tasking via Practical Software & Systems Measurement (PSM) Support Center (US Army)
  - Safety Measurement White Paper -- December 2005

Homeland Security
DHS Software Assurance Outreach Services

- Co-sponsor semi-annual Software Assurance Forum for government, academia, and industry to facilitate the ongoing collaboration -- next 16-17 March 2006
- Sponsor SwA issues of CROSSTALK (Oct 05 & Sep 06), and provide SwA articles in other journals to “spread the word” to relevant stakeholders
- Provide free SwA resources via “BuildSecurityIn” portal to promote relevant methodologies
- Provide DHS Speakers Bureau speakers
- Support efforts of consortiums and professional societies in promoting SwA
Software Assurance — The Financial Impact

Background

"Software assurance" has been defined as security being built into software, rather than the prevalent approach of applying after-the-fact bolt-on security protection. The federal government, especially the national security agencies, strongly believes that widespread adoption of software assurance practices is vital to assuring the trustworthiness of federally-acquired software. In a prior TargetView (Issue 7, "Software Assurance: Vendors Should Start Taking Notice"), INPUT provided an assessment, from a federal vendor’s standpoint, of the advantages and barriers to establishing a software assurance program.

Cost is one of the largest perceived barriers associated with adopting a software assurance program. A difficulty facing federal IT vendors seeking to address this area is the void of publicly available data on the costs associated with establishing and implementing a software assurance program. This is doubly important, given the general skepticism among decision makers on software development costs.

To fill this information void, INPUT has developed first-generation financial models describing the potential impact of software assurance.

Software Lifecycle Costs: The Base Case

An important factor in establishing the relative cost of a software assurance program is to look at costs — including potential savings — across the entire software lifecycle.

In order to compare system development costs with and without software assurance components, INPUT’s first step was to develop a base case financial model of the traditional lifecycle, utilizing the assumptions described below. These assumptions are based on commonly accepted ratios in software development. These ratios may differ from

Vendor Highlight

Over the lifecycle of a typical software development process, using software assurance would most likely not add to development costs, and in fact would more likely reduce overall costs.

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Software Assurance: Vendors Should Start Taking Notice

Background

In October 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) hosted a conference on Software Assurance for an invited group of agencies, academia, and vendors. There were two main topics discussed at the conference:

1. Many IT systems are insecure because of serious flaws in software design and implementation.
2. Comprehensive software assurance programs, especially within federal national security agencies, are needed to restore trust in computer systems.

Much of the conference was spent making a strong case for the technical benefits produced by a successful software assurance program. There was recognition that the software development processes and technologies were only one piece of the solution. Attendees strongly believed that agency buy-in at the management and program level was also critical for success. The concern being that the federal government did not have the resources or the technical expertise to go-alone. Consequently, success required broad support for software assurance from vendors and organizations responsible for the critical infrastructure.

Federal standards are in the process of modifying to support software assurance. Perhaps more importantly for vendors, the acquisition process for software and IT systems may be changed to encourage the acquisition of IT products and services which utilize software assurance.

INPUT

Federal vendors should take notice of these developments for both reactive and proactive reasons. Federal standards are in the process of modifying to support software assurance. Perhaps more importantly for vendors, the acquisition process for software and IT systems may be changed to encourage the acquisition of IT products and services which utilize software assurance.

Independently of the federal government’s procurement "push" toward software assurance, there is increasing business justification for vendors to adopt a software assurance program. This TargetView will focus on the forces driving such justification.
The Impact of Software Assurance on the Procurement Process

Background and introduction

The federal government’s software assurance initiative, led by the Software Assurance Program in DOD’s National Cyber Security Division, has been gaining traction (see TargetView, Issue 7, “Software Assurance: Vendors Should Start Taking Notice”).

Part of the government’s strategy has been to show the benefits and feasibility of software assurance. Realistically, however, there exist roadblocks to the widespread adoption of software assurance techniques, notably organizational inertia as well as caution in the face of the unknown. The oft-cited cost—barrier may, however, be overrated (see INPUT’s TargetView, Issue 8, “Software Assurance – The Financial Impact”).

Another important dimension of the government’s strategy is leveraging procurement to jumpstart the software assurance adoption process. INPUT has been closely following federal planning on using the procurement process to reinforce the government’s software assurance strategy. This TargetView provides INPUT’s assessment of government efforts to date relating to procurement and discusses some of the potential impacts on vendors.

Federal Government Software Assurance: Objectives and Role

A key assumption in the federal government’s software assurance planning is that the government will not produce very much of its own software. Reliance on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and outsourcing are widespread, even for agencies that previously were able to rely on isolated secure IT environments. Within DOD, for example, “network-centric warfare” assumes interconnectedness; in virtually all agencies, the Internet is a fact of life, creating security challenges in unexpected places. In addition, national security agencies have come to realize that critical infrastructure organizations (such as first
DHS Software Assurance Program

Program goals promote security for software throughout the lifecycle:

- Secure and reliable software supporting mission operational resiliency *
- Better trained and educated software developers using development processes and tools to produce secure software
- Informed customers demanding secure software, with requisite levels of integrity, through improved acquisition strategies. *

Program objectives are to:

- Shift security paradigm from Patch Management to SW Assurance.
- Encourage the software developers (public and private industry) to raise the bar on software quality and security.
- Partner with the private sector, academia, and other government agencies in order to improve software development and acquisition processes.
- Facilitate discussion, develop practical guidance, development of tools, and promote R&D investment.

* Guiding principles in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace provide focus on “producing more resilient and reliable information infrastructure,” and includes “cyber security considerations in oversight activities.”
Software Assurance Observations

- Business/operational needs are shifting to now include “resiliency”
  - Investments in process/product improvement and evaluation must include security
  - Incentives for trustworthy software need to be considered with other business objectives -- measurement needed to better support IT security decision-making

- Pivotal momentum gathering in recognition of (and commitment to) process improvement in acquisition, management and engineering
  - Security requirements need to be addressed along with other functions
  - Software assurance education and training curriculum is a key enabler

- From a national/homeland security perspective, acquisition and development “best practices” must contribute to safety and security
  - More focus on “supply chain” management is needed to reduce risks
    - National & international standards need to evolve to “raise the floor” in defining the “minimal level of responsible practice” for software assurance
    - Qualification of software products and suppliers’ capabilities are some of the important risk mitigation activities of acquiring and using organizations
  - In collaboration with industry, Federal agencies need to focus on software assurance as a means of better enabling operational resiliency
Many security incidents are the result of exploits against defects in the design or code of software. The approach most commonly employed to address such defects is to attempt to retroactively bolt on devices that make it more difficult for those defects to be exploited. This is not a solution that gets to the root cause of the problem and threat.

What is “Build Security In” (BSI)?

Build Security In is a project of the Strategic Initiatives Branch of the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) of the National Cyber Security Telecommunications Cooperative (NCSC). The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) was engaged by the NCSC to provide support in the Process and Technology focus areas of the initiative. The SEI team will develop and collect software assurance and software security information that will help software developers, architects, and security practitioners to create secure software. Links here to Learn More...

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US-CERT Publications on Securing Computers

► Before You Connect a New Computer to the Internet
  ▪ Tips for first time connecting a new (or newly upgraded) computer to the internet
  ▪ For home users, students, small businesses, or any organizations with limited Information Technology (IT) support

► Home Network Security
  Overview of security risks and countermeasures associated with internet connectivity

► Home Computer Security
  Examples, checklists, and a glossary for securing a home computer

► Common Sense Guide to Cyber Security for Small Businesses
  ▪ Security practices for non-technical managers at companies with more than a single computer, but without a sophisticated in-house information technology department
  ▪ Details of small businesses that were adversely affected by cyber crimes

► Virus Basics
  An introduction to viruses and ways to avoid them

► Software License Agreements: Ignore at Your Own Risk
  An overview of the risks computer users may incur by blindly agreeing to terms contained in software licensing agreements.
Vulnerabilities and Malware

► Vulnerability information
  - National Vulnerability Database (NVD)  http://nvd.nist.gov
    Search U.S. government vulnerability resources for information about vulnerabilities on your systems
  - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures List (CVE)  http://cve.mitre.org
    Search vulnerabilities by CVE name or browse the US-CERT list of vulnerabilities in CVE name order
  - Open Vulnerability Assessment Language (OVAL)  http://oval.mitre.org
    Identify vulnerabilities on your local systems using OVAL vulnerability definitions

► Malware
  - Common Malware Enumeration (CME)  http://cme.mitre.org
    Provides single, common identifiers to new virus threats to reduce public confusions during malware outbreaks.
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is a vulnerability resource tool co-sponsored by NIST and the DHS National Cyber Security Division/US-CERT, and it:

- Is a comprehensive IT vulnerability database that integrates all publicly available U.S. Government vulnerability resources and provides links to industry resources
- Is built upon the CVE standard vulnerability nomenclature and augments the standard with a search engine and reference library
- Provides IT professionals with centralized and comprehensive vulnerability information in order to assist with incident prevention and management to mitigate the impact of vulnerabilities
- Strives to include all industry vulnerability databases, creating a “meta search engine”
- Provides official U.S. Government information on virtually all vulnerabilities
- Provides a fine grained search capability
- Provides user requested vulnerability statistics

http://nvd.nist.gov
NVD Search Capability

The NVD enables users to search a database containing virtually all known public computer vulnerabilities by a variety of vulnerability characteristics including:

- related exploit range
- vendor name
- software name and version number
- vulnerability type, severity, impact

Updated every 4 minutes, to date, the NVD contains:

- Over 12,800 vulnerability summaries
- 38 US-CERT Alerts
- 1090 US-CERT Vulnerability Notes
- Over 1,000 OVAL queries
- 47,000 industry references
- 36 executable Cold Fusion programs

http://nvd.nist.gov
An international security community activity
to provide common names for publicly known security vulnerabilities and exposures

Key tenets
- One name for one vulnerability or exposure
- One standardized description for each
- Existence as a dictionary
- Publicly accessible on the Internet
- Industry participation in open forum (editorial board)

The CVE list and information at http://cve.mitre.org

12,081 unique CVE names ~350-500 new/month
Community-based collaboration

Precise definitions to test for each vulnerability, misconfiguration, policy, or patch

Standard schema of security-relevant configuration information

OVAL schema and definitions freely available for download, public review, and comment

Security community suggests new definitions and schema

OVAL board considers proposed schema modifications

1,141 OVAL Definitions
CME provides single, common identifiers to new virus threats to reduce public confusions during malware outbreaks.

- Assign unique IDs to high profile malware threats
- Create a community forum for sample exchange and deconfliction
- Standardize malware analysis content to provide consistent information to incident responders and enable machine consumption by network management tools

CME is not an attempt to solve the challenges involved with naming schemes for viruses and other forms of malware, but instead aims to facilitate the adoption of a shared, neutral indexing capability for malware. The CME initiative seeks to:

-- Reduce the public's confusion in referencing threats during malware incidents.
-- Enhance communication between anti-virus vendors.
-- Improve communication and information sharing between anti-virus vendors and the rest of the information security community.

Building on CVE and OVAL efforts