## The Need for Parallel Ultra Fast Cryptographic Designs for Emerging Technologies

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**Presented by** 

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## Outline (in a form of abstract)

- The exponential growth of computing power
- Was not followed by the development of the cryptographic designs in
  - Hash functions and
  - Public Key Cryptography
- The current trends in the Digital Universe
  - Either use less secure primitives like MD5
  - Or hit the wall of massive usability even with the obsolete security parameters (around 2<sup>80</sup> crypto computations)
- We offer arguments that there are technological and theoretical preconditions for design of new parallel and ultrafast cryptographic primitives
- And we propose establishment of a regular mechanism "Cryptographic Contests" for addressing the cryptographic challenges for the emerging technologies



#### Microprocessor Transistor Counts 1971-2011 & Moore's Law



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### Each Year We Get Filer More Processors



Historically: Boost single-stream performance via more complex chips.

#### Now:

Deliver more cores per chip (+ GPU, NIC, SoC).

The free lunch is over for today's sequential apps and many concurrent apps. We need killer apps with lots of latent parallelism.

Graph and comments from article by Herb Sutter, Dr. Dobb's Journal, 30(3), March 2005)

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#### Total data storage in the world

Source: IDC's Digital Universe Study, sponsored by EMC, June 2011

М	∕·d·e			
SI decimal prefixes		Binary	IEC binary pre	efixes
Name	Value	usage	Name	Value
(Symbol)			(Symbol)	
kilobyte (kB)	10 <sup>3</sup>	2 <sup>10</sup>	kibibyte (KiB)	2 <sup>10</sup>
megabyte (MB)	10 <sup>6</sup>	2 <sup>20</sup>	mebibyte (MiB)	2 <sup>20</sup>
gigabyte (GB)	10 <sup>9</sup>	2 <sup>30</sup>	gibibyte (GiB)	2 <sup>30</sup>
terabyte (TB)	10 <sup>12</sup>	2 <sup>40</sup>	tebibyte (TiB)	2 <sup>40</sup>
petabyte (PB)	10 <sup>15</sup>	2 <sup>50</sup>	pebibyte (PiB)	2 <sup>50</sup>
exabyte (EB)	10 <sup>18</sup>	2 <sup>60</sup>	exbibyte (EiB)	2 <sup>60</sup>
zettabyte (ZB)	10 <sup>21</sup>	2 <sup>70</sup>	zebibyte (ZiB)	2 <sup>70</sup>
yottabyte (YB)	10 <sup>24</sup>	2 <sup>80</sup>	yobibyte (YiB)	2 <sup>80</sup>
See also: Multipl	es of bi	ts • Orde	ers of magnitude	of data

130, Exabytes

2005



# OpenStack - open source software for building private and public clouds







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# Use of cryptographic hash functions in OpenStack Object Storage

- Object Storage documentation on use of MD5
- "Various hashing algorithms were tried. SHA offers better security, but the ring doesn't need to be cryptographically secure and SHA is slower. Murmur was much faster, but MD5 was built-in and hash computation is a small percentage of the overall request handling time. In all, once it was decided the servers wouldn't be maintaining the rings themselves anyway and only doing hash lookups, MD5 was chosen for its general availability, good distribution and adequate speed."

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- The Apache<sup>™</sup> Hadoop<sup>™</sup> project develops opensource software for reliable, scalable, distributed computing.
- The project includes these subprojects:
  - Hadoop Common: The common utilities that support the other Hadoop subprojects.
  - Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS<sup>™</sup>): A distributed file system that provides high-throughput access to application data.
  - Hadoop MapReduce: A software framework for distributed processing of large data sets on compute clusters.
- Default block size is 64MB, but frequently is 128MB
   or even more

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# Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS<sup>™</sup>)

- Hadoop's internal Distributed hash-checksum mechanic:
  - Saving the CRC32 of every 512 bytes (per block) and then doing a MD5 hash on that.
  - Then when the "getFileChecksum()" method is called, each block for a file sends its MD5 hash to a collector which are gathered together and a MD5 hash is calculated for all of the block hashes.



# The use of MD5 cryptographic hash function

- The same mistake as WEP designers did for the wireless security
- But it is understandable because programmers and engineers need fast digesting functions
- The big cloud computing projects that deal with thousands of petabytes would benefit a lot from a cryptographic hash function that is significantly faster than MD5





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# Operations in most popular public key algorithms are essentially sequential

Signing time (file size from 0 to 10M)



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# Operations in most popular public key algorithms are essentially sequential



**D NTNU** Innovation and Creativity Digital signatures are composed of two cryptographic operations (hashing and public key operations that in this moment are essentially sequential)

Signing time with RSA1536 vs hashing time with SHA256



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Digital signatures are composed of two cryptographic operations (hashing and public key operations that in this moment are essentially sequential)

Signing time with ECDSA192 vs hashing time with SHA256



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# Public key security recommendations vs reality

Security level	$2^{80}$	$2^{96}$	$2^{112}$	$2^{128}$	$2^{192}$	$2^{256}$
RSA/DSA	1024	1536	2048	3072	7680	15360
ECDSA	160	192	224	256	384	512

- A generally accepted position is that for the period 2010 - 2030, the minimum security level should be at least 112 bits, and beyond 2030 the minimum security level should be 128 bits.
- Still, a lot of organizations that use the public key cryptography are using security levels of 80 or 96 bits.



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	The connection uses TLS 1.0.	
	The connection is encrypted using RC4_128, with MD5 for message authentication and RSA as the key exchange mechanism.	
	The connection is not compressed.	
	The server does not support the TLS renegotiation extension.	
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	What do these mean?	



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	Site information	Field	Value	<u>^</u>
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		Valid from Valid to	14 July 2011 02:00:00 14 July 2012 01:59:59 www.facebook.com, Face	
		Public key	RSA (1024 Bits)	-



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Jtv Justin.tv - Strea	www.facebook.com     The identity of this website h     VeriSign Trust Network. <u>Certificate information</u>	anas been verified by	on fb is not a default option!	i Find Friends Home 🔻
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# BUT, after the successful user login, the TLS connection is gone

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### With millions (billions) of users and millions of petabytes that need to be securely digested, checked, authenticated, stored or transmitted, apparently we are hitting the wall of usability with some of the current crypto algorithms.



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### We need cryptographic hash and public key algorithms that will be essentially parallel, and thus will be ultra fast on the current and future CPUs.



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## Look at SUPERCOP for Measurements of public-key signature systems



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# Beside well established and trusted RSA, DSA and ECDSA

Primitive	Description
donald512	DSA signatures using a 512-bit prime
donald1024	DSA signatures using a 1024-bit prime
donald2048	DSA signatures using a 2048-bit prime
	ECDSA signatures using the standard NIST B-
ecdonaldb163	163 elliptic curve, a curve over a field of size
	2^163
	ECDSA signatures using the standard NIST P-
ecdonaldp521	521 elliptic curve, a curve modulo the prime
	2^521-1
ronald512	512-bit RSA signatures with message recovery
ronald4006	4096-bit RSA signatures with message
	recovery

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## A lot of other designs

	Primitive	Description	Designers	]
1.	3icp	3-invertible cycle with minus and prefix	Jintai Ding Christopher Wolf Bo-Yin Yang	
2.	bls	Boneh–Lynn–Shacham: Pairing-based short signatures	Michael Scott	
3.	ed25519	EdDSA signatures using Curve25519	Daniel J. Bernstein Niels Duif Tanja Lange	
			Peter Schwabe Bo-Yin Yang	1111
4.	hector	Hyperelliptic Curve with Two-Rank One: Signatures using a genus-2 hyperelliptic curve of 2-rank 1 over a field of size 2^113	Peter Birkner Peter Schwabe	
5.	mqqsig160 - mqqsig256	160 - 256 bit signatures based on Multivariate-Quadratic-Quasigroups	Danilo Gligoroski Rune Steinsmo Ødegard Rune Erlend Jensen Ludovic Perret Jean-Charles Fauge`re Svein Johan Knapskog D NT Smile Markovski	NU n and Creativity

## A lot of other designs

	Primitive	Description	Designers
c	- £] b 1	C*- with a prefix over GF16 designed to match	Jintai Ding
0.		SFLASH	Bo-Yin Yang
7		Dainhour multivariate quadratic signatures	Jintai Ding
/ .	raindow	Kambow mutuvariate-quadratic signatures	Dieter Schmidt
		Deinheur euer CE21	Jintai Ding
8.	rainbow5640 & rainbow6440	Kainbow over GF31	Bo-Yin Yang
9	rainbowbinary16242020 &	Rainbow over GE16	Bo-Yin Yang
· ·	256181212		
10.	rwb0fuz1024	1024-bit Rabin-Williams signatures with compression	Adam Langley (Google)
			Louis Goubin
11.	sflashv2	SFLASHv2 multivariate-quadratic signatures	Nicolas Courtois
			Thomas Icart
12.	tts6440	Rainbow over GF16	Bo-Yin Yang



### amd64; Sandy Bridge (206a7); 2011 Intel Core i7-2600K; 4 x 3400MHz; threads; sandy0, supercop-20110708

	C	ycles to sign	59 bytes
quartile	median	quartile	system
1283164	1297996	1306580	ecdonaldp192
1324288	1337120	1343664	ecdonaldp256
1360532	1371852	1380548	donald2048
1625044	1637744	1655040	ronald1024
1657112	1665588	1679752	ecdonaldk163

### New designs vs RSA or ECC 10, 100, 1000, 5000 times faster

	2703104	2790500	2017732		ecuonarupsor
Γ	3904204	3922324	3953112		ronald1536
	5136420	5157552	5174616		ecdonaldk283
	5605980	5629004	5642988		ecdonaldb283
	5858976	5888580	5918352		ecdonaldp521
Γ	7677956	7725364	7787476		ronald2048
	11096908	11127692	11162296	J	ecdonaldk409
Γ	12296128	12321440	12349988		ecdonaldb409
Γ	21587800	21683476	21818548		ronald3072
	23877492	23920456	23994632		ecdonaldk571
	26748216	26795812	26865356		ecdonaldb571
	47030164	47083916	47179400		ronald4096

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]	Cycles to sign 59 bytes				
	em	syst	quartile	median	quartile
1	mqqsig224		5040	5032	5028
5	mqqsig256		5060	5052	5044
C	mqqsig160		5652	5616	5564
2	mqqsig192		7520	7476	7424
2	ary256181212	rainbowbin	21488	21404	21348
C	tts6440		44944	44860	44772
C	nary16242020	rainbowbi	49004	48560	48176
Э	ed25519		72280	72068	71984
C	rainbow5640		78076	75796	75628
2	sflashv2		101264	101088	100872
)	rainbow6440		132340	128516	128356
2	donald512		240488	237392	233836
2	ronald512		537420	525092	513472
1	donald1024		570192	562480	555784
N	rainbow		584072	582392	580932
)	ecdonaldp160		739864	734420	726780
3	ronald768		984668	968972	958388
2	3icp		1704396	995116	328804
1	ecdonaldp224		1165640	1156900	1149144
I	pflash1		2203320	1208212	708052

#### **ONE SLIDE of self-promotion**

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## Multivariate Cryptography Projects under my supervision at NTNU

- MQQ (design in 2008, broken by Groebner bases)
- MQQ-SIG (design and SW implementation finished in 2011, HW implementation is ongoing, so far resistant against all known attacks, very fast, but huge public keys 125 – 512 KB)
- MQQ-SIG with smaller public keys (2 16 KB), (design is done in 2011, now in SW implementation phase)
- MQQ-SIG (narrowband subliminal channels, simple design, implementation still pending but very simple to implement on top of existing SW implementation – 2011, 2012)
- MQQ-ENC (encryption, design is done, now in SW implementation phase 2011, 2012),
- MQQ-ID (Identification schemes, initial design in 2011),
- MQQ-IBE (first Multivariate Quadratic Identity Based Encryption scheme, initial design done in 2011).
- Security of MQQ crypto: Was and will be a matter of public scrutiny of the crypto community
- Efficiency: 1,000-10,000 times more efficient than currently most popular schemes
- All of MQQ crypto algorithms are PATENT-FREE

#### "Cryptographic Contests"

- Positive experience of several previously conducted cryptographic contests (DES, AES, NESSIE, eSTREAM, SHA-3)
- Cryptographic community was
  - galvanized,
  - motivated,
  - gained new knowledge, and
  - provided a huge amount of scientific feedback
- There are technological and theoretical preconditions for design of new parallel and ultra fast cryptographic primitives for the emerging technologies



#### "Cryptographic Contests"

- Benefits of being organizer of a cryptographic contest
  - Harvest the state of the art public knowledge of a vast and growing worldwide cryptographic community
  - In connection with industry and society, via the topics of the contests, influence the directions of the development of the cryptology
  - Get very qualitative and patent-free crypto designs
  - Get a massive public security scrutiny for free
- Benefits of participating in a cryptographic contest
  - Faster way to disseminate your crypto designs
  - Faster way to get feedback about your (crypto or crapto) design ③
  - Chance to break other designs (make friends or enemies  $\ensuremath{\textcircled{}}$  )
  - Have a nice feeling that you are contributing for the safer future of the humanity <sup>(2)</sup>



#### Instead of conclusions ...

We propose to establish a regular mechanism "Cryptographic Contests" for addressing the cryptographic challenges for the emerging technologies



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## Thank you for your attention!



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