Format-Preserving Encryption

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A Tiny Bit About My Perspective

- Voltage builds and sells key management and encryption systems to financial and health care enterprises.
 - Been doing this since 2003
 - Typical customer: large regulated enterprise
 - Motivations: PCI, HIPAA, risk reduction
- From this experience, I'll address:
 - How commercial customers look at encryption
 - A widely deployed solution that does primitive operations on ciphertext

Why Don't We Encrypt Data?

- Encryption is often a retrofit
 - Systems implemented without privacy
 - System requirements changing (PCI)
 - System assumptions changing (dial-up -> IP)
- Legacy lives longer than you think
 - Mainframe lives on
 - Payment edges expensive to upgrade (fuel, etc.)
- The Voodoo Factor
 - "I'd rather not encrypt than use a non FIPS solution"
 - Tokenization vs. Encryption

Making Ciphertext Valuable


- Access control via crypto can be tricky
 - Key management overhead
 - Authenticating endpoints is hard
 - Semi-solved problem for humans
 - Authenticating a process, less so
- Partial solution
 - Give ciphertext some properties
 - Allow semi-trusted processes limited processing
 - Partial plaintext access
 - Searching
 - Sorting?

Format Preserving Encryption

- The FPE setting:
 - Define a finite set of plaintexts
 - Encrypt onto that set
 - Encrypt a 16 digit CCN onto a random 16 digit value
 - Encrypt a 9 digit SSN onto a random 9 digit value
- The ideal FPE cipher functions a psuedorandom permuation over the set of plaintexts
 - In some situations, safe to use deterministically
- FPE ciphers are typically tweakable

FFX FPE Framework

- FFX : Parameterized Finite
 Feistel framework
- Core idea
 - Express a string format as a length and radix
 - Build a Feistel network operating in that radix
 - Internal PRF based on AES



FFX Security

- Security reductions
 - Given a random internal PRF, for some number of adaptive queries, FFX is IT indistinguishable from a PRP
 - Asymptotic results from Patarin at 6+ rounds,
 Rogaway shows unbalanced results
 - Bellare, Ristenpart, Rogaway, Stegers show results for message recovery, other models
- Best known attack
 - Essentially, enumeration of all possible internal PRFs (Patarin)

Why do we care?

- Oblivious operations over ciphertexts
 - Deterministic encryption allows search
 - Tweaking allows selective revelation of plaintext
- Credit card example
 - Modern cards are 15-19 digits
 - First 6 digits identify issuing bank
 - Last 4 digits used for receipt printing
 - Typical format keeps first 6/last 4 clear, use to tweak encryption of inner digits

Commercial adoption

Products

- Payment networks (all major POS vendors)
- Data masking products

Standards

- X9.124 FPE for Financial Industry
- NIST parallel FPE specification
- VISA Guidance document

Promising tools / Wishlist

- Order preserving encryption
- RASP (multi-dimensional query over data)
- Ideal Feistel security bounds