# LESSONS LEARNED
# UOCAVA VOTING PILOT PROJECTS

WORKSHOP ON UOCAVA VOTING SYSTEMS

August 6, 2010

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# FROM WOODROW WILSON TO THE
# WORLD WIDE WEB



First Presidential online balloting 10/12/2000

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# REMOTE ABSENTEE VOTING: THREE VARIATIONS



**30 Days**
**BALLOT CONVERSION (HTML)**
**BALLOT DELIVERY**

**No Days**
**BALLOT CREATION/IMPORT**
**BALLOT DELIVERY**
**BALLOT TABULATION**

**10 Days**
**BALLOT IMPORT**
**BALLOT DELIVERY**
**BALLOT TABULATION**

**LEO**
**Election Management System**

**LEO**
**Voter Registration System**

# MAJOR BARRIERS

1. No formal policy-making structure or process
2. Incomplete testing standards
3. No pilot system testing and certification process
4. No forum for meaningful exchange of views

## POLICY-MAKING STRUCTURE

- EAC –'new' agency with oversight of voting technology
- TGDC – UOCAVA voting now a priority topic
- NIST – actively engaged in UOCAVA voting research
- FVAP – re-energized with new leadership

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## INCOMPLETE TESTING STANDARDS – THEN

- VOI (2000) – 1990 FEC VSS, FL VSS
- SERVE (2004) – 2002 FEC VSS, FL VSS, other state requirements
- ODBP (2008) – FL VSS

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## INCOMPLETE TESTING STANDARDS – NOW

- 2005 VVSG
- 2007 Recommendations
- 2009 TGDC accepts UOCAVA standards tasking
- 2010 EAC pilot testing requirements (attended kiosk system)

## PILOT TESTING AND CERTIFICATION PROCESS - THEN

- VOI – DITSCAP, State of Florida
- SERVE – DITSCAP, consolidated state testing, NASED?
- ODBP – State of Florida

## PILOT TESTING AND CERTIFICATION PROCESS – NOW

- 2007 – EAC Testing & Certification Program
- 2010 – EAC Pilot Testing & Certification Program

## FORUM FOR MEANINGFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS

- Issues too technical and complex for media 'sound bites'
- Media reporting is very one-sided
- Hearings rely on prepared statements, no interchange between presenters
- UOCAVA workshops?

## COMMUNICATING ABOUT RISKS

"There are intrinsic risks posed by any voting scheme that uses the Internet ... the authors of the SERVE critique do an excellent job of raising concern about these risks ... but the question of whether the program has to be scrapped ... is a policy question that I cannot decide by my technical evaluation alone."

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## PRIORITIZING THREATS/RISKS

- 10 years since 1<sup>st</sup> Internet voting pilot
- Need to sort out high impact, hard to mitigate threats for priority attention
- Election officials and technologists have to work together on this
- EAC risk assessment tool

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## CANDIDATES FOR THE BOTTOM OF THE LIST

- Voter privacy
- Denial of service
- Man in the middle
- Vote buying/selling
- Voter intimidation
- Spoofing
- Tampering with voter PC
- Malware on voter PC

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## IT'S UP TO YOU

- We're making progress, but need to move faster
- Opportunities for pilots only happen once every two years
- It takes 18 -24 months to plan and implement a pilot
- How much longer are UOCAVA voters going to have to wait for a better voting solution?

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