

Elections through the Internet: can it be done in practice?

Piet Maclaine Pont / MullPon for Het Waterschapshuis

UOCAVA, DC - August 6-7,2010

The Netherlands




- Kingdom, fully "controlled" by parliament
- Population: 16,605,164 (29 July 2010 12:04:10 GMT)
 (5.36 % of USA)

• Size: 41,528 km² (0.43 % of USA)




RIES?



- Why is RIES?
- And were did it come from?

It was a long walk...



IBM (1968-1998)


- End-user --> consumer automation
 - Physical distribution
 - Supermarket scanning
- Pragmatic authentication
 - PC security
 - Smartcard development


Independent consultant (1999-current)


- Pragmatic authentication
- Internet election technology





















My independent years






Pragmatic Authentication

Focus on higher education in Holland

RIES: Volledig transparant stemsysteem





INLOGGEN TOT HET NETWERK

Inlognaam

Je inlognaam bestaat uit het 7 cijferig studentennummer van IJselland. Deze staat op je studentenkaart.

Wachtwoord

Je wachtwoord bestaat uit 6 cijfers (ddmmjj) vormt je eerste wachtwoord.

ACCES TO THE NETWORK

Username

Your username is your 7 digit studentnumber of IJselland. You can find this number on you studentcard.


Password

Your birthdate in 6 numbers (ddmmyy) is your initial password.

Veel plezier op het netwerk !

*Much fun on the network ! *





SURFSPOT.NL




Niegefoon and Niegebach both chipcard based





1998 - 2003: Internet elections






Photo's ISCIT wISCIT





Photo's ISCIT wISCIT






The Netherlands



- Kingdom, fully controlled by parliament
- Population: 16,605,164 (29 July 2010 12:04:10 GMT)
- Size: 41,528 km² (0.43 % of USA)
- Government levels
 - Centrally located in The Hague
 - State level (12 states: "provincies")
 - City level (430 municipalities)
 - District Water Boards (26, regionally located)


NL Elections ...



...from a government point of view:

- Formally key topic
- No systems approach
- Major flows in today's system (Major elements not transparent)


NL Elections ...



No systems approach

- Just very general isolated issues
 - Vote secrecy
 - Reliability
 - Tally and recount
 - Independent recount
 - Safe for internal and external intrusion
- Incident driven
- Exclusively driven by government lawyers
 - Why change?
- Major legal discrepancies
 - Ruling on vote distributions over parliament seats
 - Council of Europe (CoE) ruling on electronic elections

NL Elections ...




Major flows in today's system

Major elements not transparent:

- Management of List of eligible voters
- Voting by proxy
- Results consolidation
 - Within each municipality (430, each with 10 to 500 PollingCommittee's)
 - Of all 430 municipalities

Experiments require special legislation




Main aspects:

- To avoid detailed classical legislative requirements
- To allow for Competitive Dialogue instead of regular Tender
 - Development requires close cooperation of
 - Government
 - Knowledge sources
 - Market parties
- Has to follow Council of Europe ruling/advice
- Restricted time period

→ Lead time: many years


Development started with Water Boards



Main aspects:

- Postal elections for all eligible voters
- No voter registration
- Not under Home Office jurisdiction
- Arm length distance from Electoral Council

Main differences NL vs. USA



- Voter registration
 - NL: none (except expats)
 - USA: always --> more possibilities
- Government ruling
 - NL: centralized
 - USA: by local electoral administration
- Electoral Council
 - NL: centralized (although just legal supervision)
 - USA: ?

26 Water Boards in The Netherlands





Rijnland District Water Co



Nordsee N DE DE R - 0 100 200 km

Ratwijly Gode Bljn Utrecht

Hoek van Hotland Rotterdam Negerijin Afriheim

Niesiwe Waterden Lippe

Waai Lippe

Duisburg

Ruhr

Düsseldorf

Köln

Sieg

Bonna

Rhein-ker 560

Koblenz

FRANKREICH

Rijn Delta


Basel Bodensee Recently OSTER-Adre Alpenrhein REICH Vorderrhein Hinter-



2008

Rijnland: 1100 km²; 1.3 million people

Water board election 2004 with RIES



- 35% voters used it (72,235)
- 86 % positive user feedback and zero negative
- Flawless in processing
- Full validation by independent parties

What is RIES and how did we get there?


Comfort and Transparency: user's perspective



- Ability to cast vote in different ways and several times
- Abilityto check if their vote was actuall ycast and counted in the tally; 70% of the voters stressed this as important
- 99% should be able to use the system on their regular Internet attached PC
- Meets the formal government criteria for elections (transparency, etc etc)

Validation of votes: thrust Worth Met Waterschapshuis election







Transparency and accountability 'appreciated 2008

waterschaps verkiezingen

HetWaterschapshuis



RIES Internet elections



RIES_participaing_voters_Inet.doc

- → Over 140,000 Internet voters used RIES in 4 formal elections (2004-2006)
- → N.B. In 2008 RIES was deployed for the postal elections for all Water Boards for 13,500,000 eligible voters

RIES based on DES Virtual Ballot System

- Developed by Pieter G. Maclaine Pont/MullPon since 1998
 - With IBM, SURFnet, TNO, Bell Identification, Alfa & Ariss, Rijnland, Magic Choice
 - NL patent 1023861 (extended "Robers" protocol)
 - International patents in process
 - 8 man-year development by inventor
 - 9 man-year development by partners
 - 35 "student" man-year development
- Internet elections applied at
 - 2000: CHOOSE for Polytechnic University Delft
 - 2004: Water boards Rijnland and De Dommel
 - 2005: Rijnland re-election, SURFnet work council
 - 2006: Parliament elections for non-resident Dutch voters

RIES based on DES Virtual Ballot System

Some main facts:

- 2005 EU eGovernment Good Practice Label
- 2006 UN Public Service Award

- Country-wide water board elections in 2008
- → All with intensive cooperation of SURFnet

RIES based on DES Virtual Ballot System

General characteristics:

- DES virtual ballot (extended "Robers" protocol)
- Personal secret cryptographic voter key
- Translated in 2x8 "34AN" characters on Votingcard (Voting code)
- Voting code exclusively with voter
- Public validation files published before election start
- "Casting application" in browser via Javascript
- Personal voter key in encrypted OCR line on Postal ballot (and regular ballot where applicable)
- Central combination of all casted votes (TTPI)
- Publication of all casted votes and adjustments to validation files

Stemkaart







Waterschapsverkiezingen Rijnland 2004

HIER OPENEN

stemmen via www.internetstemmen.nl

HIER OPENEN

Zo gemakkelijk is stemmen via internet:

- ① Zoek in de kandidatenkrant of op <u>www.riinlandkiest.nl</u> de kandidaat van uw keuze.
- ② Ga naar www.internetstemmen.nl en vul al uw persoonlijke codes in.
- ③ Vervolgens verschijnt uw stembiljet.
 (Als u voor meer categorieën mag stemmen, krijgt u daar eerst informatie over.)
- Kies uw kandidaat en bevestig uw keuze.

 (Als u voor meer categorieën uw stem mag utbrengen, verschijnt een nieuw stemblijet. U kiest nu opnieuw een kandidaat en bevestigt uw keuze. Dit herhaalt u voor alle categorieën.)
- ⑤ Verstuur uw stem(men) door het bevestigen van uw wachtwoord. (Het stembureau bevestigt de ontvangst van uw stem met een statusoverzicht. Wilt u na de verklezingen stemcontroles uitvoeren, dan kunt u nu technische informatie over uw stem krijgen en deze bewaren. Stemcontrole kan van 9 t/m 12 oktober op www.rijnlandklest.ni/stemcontrole.)

Uw persoonlijke codes en wachtwoord zijn alleen aan u bekend. Door deze gegevens geheim te houden, wordt uw stemgeheim gegarandeerd. Vernietig na het internetstemmen deze stemkaart en uw stembiljetten, zodat niemand er misbruik van kan maken.



Uw persoonlijke codes om te stemmen via internet	
Deelnamegroep > 26	
Stemcode >> 162 f ms2e	
Wachtwoord >>> WWWW xdx2	

米

Stembiljet



Waterschapsverkiezingen 2004 Categorie Ingezetenen

Zet een kruis in het hokje 🔀 van één kandidaat met blauw of zwart schrijvende pen

•			123456789 12345678901234	12345678901234
<1231>	<1231>	<1231>	<1231>	<1231>
Marie-Louise van Heemskerk				
Alphen aan den Rijn				
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Alphen aan den Rijn				

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Waterschapsverkiezingen 2008

Poststembiljet

voor stemmen per post




Waterschap Rivierenland

<Naam Kiesdistrict>

950112011 0000000009753085 2089361494981754 Stap 2: Stap 1: Stap 3: X Kies nu de kandidaat waarop u wilt Europese Kleurenpartij (EKP) Nummer 1 Om misbruik van uw stembiljet te voorkomen, verzoeken we u Planten voor het Volk (Pv.h.V) Nummer 2 vriendelijk om de laatste twee EUROPESE WEERMANNEN Nummer 3 cijfers van uw geboortejaar in te vullen. Algemene Materialen Partij (AMP) Nummer 4 Europese Dieralliantie (EDA) Nummer 5 VKP Nummer 6 Mijn geboortejaar: Lijst Vrede Zij Met U! Nummer 7 Lijst Smaak Nummer 8 Neem de laatste 2 cijfers 9 Partij van de Sport (PVDS) Nummer 9 van het geboortejaar over 10 t Partijtje in bovenstaande vakjes Nummer 10 11 Alliantie Vernieuwing en Democratie 11 Nummer 11 28-11-1974 12 Alliantie Vernieuwing geplakt 12 Nummer 12 13 Nummer 13 14 Dè diàcriétén părtij é Nummer 14 Nummer 15 16 CUVVDPVDACDAD66 Nadat u Stap 1 t/m 3 heeft ingevuld kunt u uw 17 12345678901234567890123456789012345 ingevulde stembiljet in de bijgevoegde 18 abcdefghijklmnopgrstuvwxyz123456789 19 ABCDEFGHUKLMNOPORSTUVWXYZ123456789 antwoordenvelop verzenden. 20 9 Stuur uw stembiljet op voor 26 november 2008.

Main elements RIES



- Pre-preparation
 - Set formal responsibilities
 - List of eligible voters
 - List of candidates
 - Publication set-up
- Preparation
 - Voting code
 - Validation file ("Referentiebestand")
 - Publications
- Voting period
 - Technical vote
 - Receipt-confirmation
- Tally
 - Reference value
 - Publications
- Vote count validation

RIES


Minimal exchange of data over Internet:

- Simple ballotbox server
- Internet PC as independent as possible
 - START:
 - Server: SSL
 - PC: receives server script with list of candidates
 - local input (by voter)
 - Server: reads status, verfies earlier casts from this voter
 - Vote cast: local (by voter)
 - Sending in the vote:
 - local input (by voter)
 - → Server: calculates receipt-confirmation
 - → Server: update status
 - STATUS: local (by voter)

Validating the Electronic Tally


- By voter himself: Based on all published election data
- By independent experts or involved parties
 - Candidates
 - Radboud University
 - By anyone with the desire to do so
- No specific "validation of sold vote" problem

Tally validation



- New
- Needed
 - How can the voter effectively file complaints with traditional elections?
- Validation procedure
 - By voter himself
 - Independent expert verifies voter complaint
 - Arbiter determines if complaint is right
 - Impact on election results?
- Accuracy in all procedures should be much higher compared to conventional elections


Multi disciplinary approach needed



- Dimitris A. Gritzali: "Principles and requirements for a secure evoting system"
- Edited by Dimitris A. Gritzali" Secure Electronic Voting"
- Laurence Monnoyer-Smith: "e-democracy"
- Christopher G. Reddick (University of Texas at San Antonio, USA):
 "Handbook of Research on Strategies for Local E-Government
 Adoption and Implementation: Comparative Studies" Pages: 231 249: Janita Stuart (Stuart Controls Ltd, New Zealand); Val Hooper
 (Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand)

STS-approach essential for these kind of processes!


Major flaws (RIES-2008)



(Just postal voting with RIES for 13,500,000 voters)


- Ruling for pre-elective publication of Reference file
 - Approx.300,000,000 clear/cipher text combinations
 - Underestimate of today's PC DES processing capabilities
 - → Instead of rule change: Internet voting forbidden
- Inadequate testing Response processor data
 - High accuracy requirements underestimated by vendor (no escape: frozen dates couldn't be shifted)
 - Operated isolated from Architecture team
 - → RIPOCS reset during production (fault to be opened)
- Politics & publicity
 - Active opponent group
 - → stream of negative publication

Risk assessment



- No formal process
- Instead scaling-up_{th} rough steps with increase_i n risks
 - 1998-1999 wISCIT:
 - test elections
 - Risk research of specific elements
 - 2000 wiscit:
 - CHOOSE (Student Board Polytechnic University of Delft)
 - 2003 TNO:
 - Feasibility study
 - 2004-2005 Rijnland: Water Board elections at
 - Rijnland
 - De Dommel
 - 2006 Home Office & Rijnland:
 - Expat voting Dutch parliament
 - 2008 Het Waterschapshuis
 - Countrywide Water Boards elections


Risk assessment



Independent reviews


- TNO, Delft (initial feasibility)
- Cryptomathic, AarHus (DK) (crypto design)
- TNO Human Factors, Soesterberg (voter screens)
- Madison Gurka, Eindhoven (crystal box security evaluation of server and network design)
- Radbout University (Bart Jacobs team) (external network & server penetration tests)
- Burger&overheid, ICTU, Den Haag (large scale end-user evaluation)
- Extensive specialist auditing for Dutch Home Office (2006 parliament elections)
- EIPSI, TuE, Eindhoven (Description and Analysis of the RIES Internet Voting System, on request by Het Waterschapshuis (HWH))
- Collis, Leiden (Review integrity RIPOCS source code, on request by HWH)
- Fox-IT, Den Haag (overall technical evaluation for Ministry of Transport & Communications)

Tradeoffs



- RIES costs
 - Design, implementation, testing & operation (small complete team: SURFnet, TTPI, HWH)
 - → relatively low
- Audit & external consultancy: expensive part (out of line)
- Example: 2006 KOA project
 - Total budget > EUR 2,500 K
 - RIES costs EUR 500 K

What Else?



- RIES & Patent open source
 - Website <u>www.openries.nl</u>
 - Partly in Dutch
 - Full English translation < EU 25K
- Unconventional investigation of total project aspects (Science Technology & Society)
 - See other high-tech project failures
 - Bruno Latour: "Aramis"
 - Polly Maclaine Pont: "Dutch Student Chipcard"
 - Laurence Monnoyer Smith: "e democracy"
 - Local talent: Polly Maclaine Pont (pmaclaine@gmail.com)