


SHA-3 Proposal: FSB

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High Overview of FSB

- ◇ FSB uses the Merkle-Damgård construction (chaining and padding), with a **large internal state**:
 - it uses a **final compression function**.
- ◇ the main compression function uses a one-way function from coding theory:
 - **security reduction** for inversion and collision search.



FSB's Compression Function

Overview

- ▶ The compression function of FSB is made of two steps:
 - ▷ a **non-linear** bijective step,
 - ▷ a linear compression step.

- ▶ First the s input bits are transformed in a binary vector of length n and Hamming weight w :
 - ▷ for efficiency we use **regular words**.


- ▶ Then this vector is multiplied by a binary matrix \mathcal{H}
 - ▷ $w \ll n$ so this is simply the XOR of w columns of \mathcal{H} .

FSB's Compression Function


In practice

In practice \mathcal{H} is a truncated quasi-cyclic matrix


circulant



quasi-cyclic



truncated quasi-cyclic



In practice \mathcal{H} is a **truncated quasi-cyclic matrix**

- ▷ \mathcal{H} is described by its **first line**: $\frac{n}{r}$ vectors of p bits.
- ▷ columns of \mathcal{H} are truncated cyclic shifts of these binary vectors.
- ▷ which vectors to choose and how much they should be shifted depends on the input:
 - w indexes are derived from 13 or 14 input bits each,
 - 8 IV/chaining bits and 5 or 6 message bits,
 - the i -th index is taken in the interval $[i\frac{n}{w}, (i+1)\frac{n}{w}-1]$,
 - the w indexes correspond to the w columns to XOR.

The best algorithms that can be used to attack FSB are:

Generalized birthday algorithm

- ▷ best algorithm for inversion and second preimage,
- ▷ requires a lot of memory.

Information set decoding

- ▷ best algorithm for collision search,
- ▷ yields strong constraints on the choice of r and w .

Proposed parameters have been chosen according to these algorithms, plus a **security margin**.

Inverting the compression function requires to find w columns of \mathcal{H} which XOR to a target vector.

- ▷ this is an instance of the **syndrome decoding problem**,
- ▷ this problem is NP-complete for random matrices, but also for truncated quasi-cyclic matrices,
- ▷ well chosen values of p and r give supposedly hard instances of the problem.

Collisions require $2w$ columns of \mathcal{H} which XOR to 0.

- ▷ also an instance of the syndrome decoding problem,
- ▷ an “easier” instance in practice.

An important point is that these reductions are **tight**.

adversary	best attack	reduction
collision	$\text{ISD}(n, r, 2w) \times 1$	$\text{CSD}(n, r, 2w)/1$
preimage	$\text{GBA}(n, r, w) \times 1$	$\text{CSD}(n, r, w)/1$
second-preimage	$\text{GBA}(n - w, r, w) \times 1$	$\text{CSD}(n - w, r - w, w)/1$

ISD = Information set decoding

GBA = Generalized birthday algorithm

CSD = Computational syndrome decoding.

One call to the adversary solves the CSD problem, one call to ISD/GBA is enough to build an adversary.

Final Compression Function

Few constraints apply to the final compression function.

it must not weaken the main compression function

- ▷ any linear function is bad
simple truncation is impossible.

it does not require collision resistance/one-wayness

- ▷ collisions on the final compression do not directly lead to collisions on FSB

Cryptographers and the NIST need to be convinced...

- ▷ anything too simple should be avoided.

Final Compression Function

We propose to use Whirlpool [Rijmen, Barreto 2004]:

The r -bit output of the main compression function is input as an r -bit message to Whirlpool

▷ the final output is a **truncated Whirlpool hash**.

This is a **safe choice**, not an efficiency oriented choice:

▷ Whirlpool is highly non-linear,

▷ we are confident that it is a secure hash function,

▷ attacks on Whirlpool would probably not affect our construction.

The main compression functions is very simple:

- ▷ shift and XOR w times some vectors
with precomputed shifts, only XORs are required.
- ▷ parameters of FSB are quite large
the XORs are expensive: 250 to 500 cycles/byte.

The description of FSB is large:

- ▷ 2 millions bits from digits of π define the vectors
this is a problem for constrained environments,
- ▷ using pseudo-random data could improve this but
would loosen the security reduction.

The main interest of FSB is its compression function:

- ◇ inversion and collision search reduce to hard problems,
- ◇ it is slow, but much faster than most “similar designs,”
- ◇ it is very simple to describe/implement
 - only very basic operations are used,
- ◇ the description of FSB is large as “random bits” are needed.

Security reduction to hard problems comes at a cost, but it can be practical in many contexts.