

Subject: OFFICIAL COMMENT:DynamicSHA

From: v.klima@volny.cz

Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2008 17:31:22 +0100 (CET)

To: hash-function@nist.gov

CC: hash-forum@nist.gov

Dynamic SHA is vulnerable to generic attacks.

According to security requirements (part 4.A iii) of the hash functions NIST expects the SHA-3 algorithm should be resistant to length-extension attacks.

Length-extension attack is not correctly understood and described in paragraph 6.1 of submitted Dynamic SHA documentations.

As a consequence, Dynamic SHA (with 256-bit and 512-bit outputs) function (h) is trivially vulnerable to length-extension attacks. Given $h(m)$ and $\text{len}(m)$ but not m , the attacker easily creates m' (with correct padding) and calculates $h(m \parallel m')$ simply from $h(m)$ and m' .

Moreover, in the function's design there are no precautions against other generic attacks (multi-collisions etc.).

Best regards,
Vlastimil Klima

Subject: Re: OFFICIAL COMMENT:DynamicSHA
From: "?? ?" <xuzijiewz@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2008 05:18:53 -0500
To: Multiple recipients of list <hash-forum@nist.gov>

Hi!

I write the documentation too hurriedly. I make a mistake at "Length-extension attack ". If I can change it , I will change it.

Because it is hard to find the collision of Dynamic SHA , I use no precautions against other generic attacks (multi-collisions etc.). If I know it is most important and it is not enough, I will some precautions against other generic attacks (multi-collisions etc.). such as message length.

Regards
Xu ZiJie

2008/12/15, v.klima@volny.cz <v.klima@volny.cz>:

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According to security requirements (part 4.A iii) of the hash functions NIST expects the SHA-3 algorithm should be resistant to length-extension attacks.

Length-extension attack is not correctly understood and described in paragraph 6.1 of submitted Dynamic SHA documentations.

As a consequence, Dynamic SHA (with 256-bit and 512-bit outputs) function (h) is trivially vulnerable to length-extension attacks. Given h(m) and len(m) but not m, the attacker easily creates m' (with correct padding) and calculates h (m || m') simply from h(m) and m'.

Moreover, in the function's design there are no precautions against other generic attacks (multi-collisions etc.).

Best regards,
Vlastimil Klima

Subject: Re: OFFICIAL COMMENT:DynamicSHA
From: Guerre Bear <guerrebear@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2009 16:05:50 -0400
To: Multiple recipients of list <hash-forum@nist.gov>

Not sure what the point is of the c code is -- it just prints the two pre-computed messages and their hashes. Did you mean to post the code which calculated the two colliding blocks?

Guerre

On Thu, Apr 23, 2009 at 1:17 PM, Sebastiaan Indestege
<sebastiaan.indestege@esat.kuleuven.be> wrote:

Dear,

We have found a practical collision attack on Dynamic SHA. It applies to all digest lengths Collision pairs can be found in a matter of seconds on an average desktop PC. Attached to this e-mail is C source code demonstrating example collisions for DSHA-256 and DSHA-512.

Also, we have attacks on Dynamic SHA-2. A paper describing all of our attacks on Dynamic SHA and Dynamic SHA-2 is upcoming.

Best regards,

Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Orr Dunkelman, and Sebastiaan Indestege.

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Sebastiaan Indestege sebastiaan.indestege@esat.kuleuven.be
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Subject: Re: OFFICIAL COMMENT:DynamicSHA

From: Sebastiaan Indesteege <sebastiaan.indesteege@esat.kuleuven.be>

Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2009 05:03:55 -0400

To: Multiple recipients of list <hash-forum@nist.gov>

On Mon, Apr 27, 2009 at 04:02:29PM -0400, Guerre Bear wrote:

Not sure what the point is of the c code is -- it just prints the two pre-computed messages and their hashes.

That is exactly the point. The collision example shows that we have a working, practical collision attack on Dynamic SHA. For a collision resistant hash function, it should not be feasible to come up with such an example.

We could have just given the colliding messages, but source code which uses the Dynamic SHA reference implementation makes it easier for anyone to verify the collision.

Did you mean to post the code which calculated the two colliding blocks?

More information on how the attack works will be published soon.

Best regards,

Sebastiaan

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