Subject: OFFICIAL COMMENT: TIB3
From: Miguel Montes <miguel.montes@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2009 17:17:27 -0200
To: hash-function@nist.gov
CC: hash-forum@nist.gov

Dear all:
Yesterday Florian Mendel and Martin Schläffer sent us a pseudo-collision and collision attack on a hash function very similar to TIB3. This work showed us a mistake in our testing suite, and we have been able to find a pseudo-collision attack in the actual TIB3-256 which can be extended to a collision attack on the hash function with complexity we estimate is $2^{116}$. This is due to the underlying cipher having a differential characteristic of low weight we had previously not seen because of the mistake in our testing suite. TIB3-512 is also vulnerable to this pseudo-collision attack.

TIB3 can be easily modified to block the attack, but given the rules of the game, we understand the probability of getting to the second round is very low (we estimate this probability to be $2^{(-128*\text{number of contestants})}$).

Credit is due to Florian and Martin. We are sure they are working now in the actual TIB3, and soon they will publish their results.

Miguel Montes and Daniel Penazzi
Dear all,

Miguel Montes wrote:
Credit is due to Florian and Martin. We are sure they are working now in the actual TIB3, and soon they will publish their results.

Thanks for the credit, we have published the results in the sha3zoo now: http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/uploads/2/2b/Tib3-pseudo.pdf

Martin
Yesterday Florian Mendel and Martin Schläffer sent us a pseudo-collision and collision attack on a hash function very similar to TIB3. This work showed us a mistake in our testing suite, and we have been able to find a pseudo-collision attack in the actual TIB3-256 which can be extended to a collision attack on the hash function with complexity we estimate is $2^{116}$. This is due to the underlying cipher having a differential characteristic of low weight we had previously not seen because of the mistake in our testing suite. TIB3-512 is also vulnerable to this pseudo-collision attack.

Miguel and Daniel, can you please describe the collision attack on TIB3-256 with estimate complexity of $2^{116}$?

I have read Florian and Martin's paper, which gives a collision attack with estimated complexity of $2^{122.5}$. However, the description of the extension from pseudo-collision to collision seems incomplete, and I cannot figure out how to fill in the blanks in a way that achieves complexity less than $2^{127}$. I sent the authors a query a couple of days ago, but have not heard back from them yet.

I just noticed that you gave an even lower estimate of $2^{116}$, which would seem to improve upon Florian and Martin's techniques. Please share the attack so I and others can learn from it.
That number (2**116) was wrong. We found the same characteristics as Florian and Martin. There are slightly more than 2**11 characteristics, so we rounded to 12. (256/2)-12 = 116. It should be (256-12)/2, (or (256-11)/2, as in their paper).

Miguel Montes

On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 8:01 PM, Wei Dai <weidai@weidai.com> wrote:

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Dear all:
NIST has indicated that it will allow the 15 candidates that go to the second round to do some minor tweak on their submissions.

We have decided to announce now what our tweak would be if we are selected, to give ample time for analysis, although we understand that NIST is under no obligation to even look at the proposed tweak.

We have decided to do a small tweak to TIB3 because we made a mistake in the diffusion of the underlying block cipher that TIB3 uses, which allows some differential paths to be confined to just one active Sbox.

Florian Mendel and Martin Schlaffer exploited this weakness of the cipher on an attack on TIB3, although the attack is not lethal. (it is within NIST guidelines as stated in Leuven). Nevertheless, a small tweak makes TIB3 much more secure, so we feel that if we are selected and if we are given the chance to make this change, we would like to do it.

The tweak changes just one part of the DIFFUSION macro. Basically, the instruction A=A~+G, where ~+ meant the parallel 32 bit addition of the 64 bit registers A and G, is changed in the 224/256 version to A=(G<<<37) xor (A<<<13) xor (A>>1) and something similar for the 512 version.

For details, see the TIB3 page:


A short .pdf with explanation of the tweak and some security analysis is in:


In the page there are the new .c files, new KATS and some output files on some tests that we run.

The speed of the tweak is slightly worse than the original version: (cycles per byte)

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<tr>
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Daniel Penazzi
Hi Daniel,

Currently the attacks listed on the SHA3-Zoo page are collision attacks of $2^{122}$ and $2^{244}$ for the 256 and 512 hash sizes, resp.
Also, there is a pseudo-collision attack. If I understood correctly, the pseudo-collision attack has no other implications than making possible the former collision attacks. Can you confirm this for us?

Thanks, Rene.

Quoting Daniel Penazzi <danielpenazzi@gmail.com>:

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