

# Gröbner Bases Techniques in Post-Quantum Cryptography

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A major tool to evaluate the security of post-quantum schemes

- Multivariate cryptography: **intrinsic tool** (Jintai's talk)

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Eurocrypt 2010.



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Algebraic and Physical Cryptanalysis in Code-based Cryptography.  
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- **LWE-based cryptography: new tool for asymptotical hardness**

# Algebraic Cryptanalysis

## Idea

- Model a cryptosystem as a set of algebraic equations
- Try to solve this system, or estimate the difficulty of solving
  - ⇒ Gaussian Elimination, Gröbner basis, ...



# Polynomial System Solving

Matrix in degree  $d$

Rely Heavily on Linear Algebra

GB Complexity is driven by the maximal degree  $d_{max}$  reached

Gaussian Elimination of matrices up to degree

$d_{max}$

$$O\left(\binom{n+d_{max}}{n}^\omega\right)$$

Gröbner: total degree

Linear Algebra in  $\mathbb{K}[x]/I$

$$\rightsquigarrow x_i = h_i(x_n)$$

$$\tilde{O}(\#Sols^3)$$

Gröbner: lexicographical

$$f_1 = \dots = f_m = 0$$

- Buchberger (1965)
- $F_4$  (1999)
- $F_5$  (2002)
- ...

- FGLM (1993)

- GBLA team: B. Boyer, C. Eder, J.-C Faugère, F. Martani.

## GBLA

### Presentation

GBLA is an open source ([GPLv2](#)) C library for linear algebra specialized for eliminating matrices generated during Gröbner basis computations in algorithms like F4 or F5.

### Download source

Current stable [source](#) (version 0.0.3).

In order to use it, you can proceed as follows :

```
tar xzf gbla-x.y.z.tar.gz
cd gbla-x.y.z
./autogen.sh
./configure
make
```

The configure step can be customised. Help is provided with `configure --help` and can be used like `configure CFLAGS="-march=native -O3"` to replace default `"-g -O2"`.

If you need the tools :

```
cd tools ; make ;
```

### Usage

#### • Programme gbla

See [usage](#) for detailed help, and the following for a few examples.

Example:

```
xsat mat1.gz | ./gbla -
```

Computes the eliminations, uses 1 thread, outputs nothing, uses the old format, reads from the gunzipped stream `mat1.gz`.

```
xsat matrices/mat1.gbm.gz | ./gbla -v 1 -t 4 -
```

Computes the eliminations, uses 4 threads, outputs minimal information, uses the new format, reads from the gunzipped stream `matrices/mat1.gbm.gz`.

```
./gbla -v 2 -t 32 -n matrices/mat1.gbm
```

Computes the eliminations, uses 32 threads, outputs timings and information, uses the new format, reads from a matrix `mat1` on disk.

#### Binaries

Compiled binaries can be found there:

- [linux](#) (Intel static)
- [linux](#) (Intel AVX static)

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## **Fukuoka MQ Challenge**





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## Fukuoka MQ Challenge



- Type VI,  $\text{GF}(31)$ ,  $m = 16$ ,  $n = 24$ , GBLA: 2640 s. (FGB: 5280 s.)

- 1 Algebraic Algorithms for `LWE` Problems (joint work with M. Albrecht, C. Cid, J.-C Faugère)
  - Learning With Errors `LWE` Problems
  - Linear Equations with Noise  $\mapsto$  Noise-Free Algebraic Equations
  - A Gröbner Basis Algorithm for `BinaryErrorLWE`

# Plan

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## Learning With Errors (LWE)

$q$  : size of field     $n$  : nb. of variables     $m$  : nb. of samples

### LWE

**Input.** a random matrix  $G \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times m}$  and  $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{F}_q^m$ .

**Question.** Find – if any – a secret  $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$  such that:

$$\text{error} = \mathbf{c} - (s_1, \dots, s_n) \times G \text{ is "small"}.$$

👉 Decoding a random  $[n, m]$   $\mathbb{F}_q$ -linear code with a **special error distribution**.



O. Regev.

“On Lattices, Learning with Errors, Random Linear Codes, and Cryptography”.

Journal of the ACM, 2009.

## LWE with Binary Errors

$q$  : size of field     $n$  : nb. of variables     $m$  : nb. of samples



D. Micciancio, C. Peikert.

“Hardness of SIS and LWE with Small Parameters”.

CRYPTO'13.

### BinaryErrorLWE

**Input.** a random matrix  $G \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times m}$  and  $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{F}_q^m$ .

**Question.** Find – if any – a secret  $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$  such that:

$$\text{error} = \mathbf{c} - (s_1, \dots, s_n) \times G \in \{0, 1\}^n.$$

- a prime  $q \in \text{poly}(n)$  (for instance,  $q = \text{NextPrime}(n^2)$ ),
- $m = n(1 + o(1))$  is bounded

## Hardness Results

- Gap-SVP is hard, even in the quantum setting.

### BinaryErrorLWE [Micciancio-Peikert'13]

- ✓ Solving BinaryErrorLWE with  $m = n \cdot 1 + o(1)$  allows to solve Gap-SVP in **the worst-case**
- ✓ Algos. for BinaryErrorLWE are exponential when  $m = n \cdot 1 + o(1)$   
**Polynomial-time algorithm** if  $m = O(n^2)$  (Arora-Ge'11)

# Gröbner Bases Techniques

## Arora-Ge'11

- ✓ Algebraic Modelling for LWE-problems
- ✓ Linearisation

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Complexity analysis of Arora-Ge equations with Gröbner bases.



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## Arora-Ge'11

- ✓ Algebraic Modelling for LWE-problems
- ✓ Linearisation

## Natural Idea

Complexity analysis of Arora-Ge equations with Gröbner bases.

Results [M. Albrecht, C. Cid, J.-C Faugère, L. P., “Algebraic Algorithms for LWE”. IACR Eprint, 2014]

- BinaryErrorLWE is hard when  $m = n \cdot 1 + o(1)$  ( $\equiv$  Gap-SVP) and easy when  $m = O(n^2)$ .

A sub-exp. algorithm for BinaryErrorLWE when  $m$  is quasi-linear.

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## Algebraic Modelling

### BinaryErrorLWE

**Input.** a random matrix  $G \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times m}$ , and  $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{F}_q^m$ .

**Question.** Find – if any –  $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$  such that:

$$\mathbf{c} - (s_1, \dots, s_n) \times G = \mathbf{error} \in \{0, 1\}^n.$$

$m$  linear equations in  $n$  variables over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  with binary noise.

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$m$  linear equations in  $n$  variables over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  with binary noise.

## Arora-Ge Modelling

Let  $P(X) = X(X - 1)$ :

$$f_1 = P(c_1 - \sum_{j=1}^n s_j G_{j,1}) = 0, \dots, f_m = P(c_m - \sum_{j=1}^n s_j G_{j,m}) = 0.$$

$m$  quadratic equations in  $n$  variables over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ .

## Until Now

- $P(X) \in \mathbb{F}_q[X]$  be vanishing on the errors.

### Arora-Ge Modelling

Solving BinaryErrorLWE  $\equiv$

$$f_1 = P \cdot c_1 - \sum_{j=1}^n x_j G_{j,1} = 0, \dots, f_m = P \cdot c_m - \sum_{j=1}^n x_j G_{j,m} = 0.$$

### Arora-Ge Algorithm

- BinaryErrorLWE:  $m$  quadratic equations in  $n$  variables over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ .  
✓ **Linearisation**  $\mapsto$  polynomial-time algo. when  $m = O(n^2)$ .

# Plan

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# Solving BinaryErrorLWE with Gröbner Bases

## Assumption

We assume that the systems occurring in the Arora-Ge modelling are **semi-regular**.

**Rank condition** on the Macaulay matrices.

## Theorem

Under the **semi-regularity assumption**:

If  $m = n \left(1 + \frac{1}{\log(n)}\right)$ , one can solve BinaryErrorLWE in  $\mathcal{O} \ 2^{3.25 \cdot n}$ .

If  $m = 2 \cdot n$ , BinaryErrorLWE can be solved in  $\mathcal{O} \ 2^{1.02 \cdot n}$ .

If  $m = \mathcal{O}(n \log \log n)$ , one can solve BinaryErrorLWE in  $\mathcal{O} \left(2^{\frac{3n \log \log \log n}{8 \log \log n}}\right)$ .

# Solving BinaryErrorLWE with Gröbner Bases

## Theorem

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## Remark

- Exact CVP/SVP solver: time  $2^{0.377 \cdot n}$  using memory  $2^{0.029 \cdot n}$ .



A. Becker, N. Gama, A. Joux.

"Solving Shortest and Closest Vector Problems: the Decomposition Approach."  
2013.

GB better when  $m/n \geq 6.6$ .



## About the Assumption

### Assumption

Systems occurring in the Arora-Ge modelling are **semi-regular**.

**Rank condition** on the Macaulay matrices.

Magma	$D_{\text{reg}}$	$D_{\text{real}}$
$m = n \cdot \log_2(n), n \in \{5, \dots, 25\}$	3	3
$m = n \cdot \log_2(n), n \in \{26, \dots, 53\}$	4	4
$m = 2 \cdot n \cdot \log_2(n), n = 60$	3	3
$m = 2 \cdot n \cdot \log_2(n), n = 100$	3	3

## About the Assumption

### Assumption


Systems occurring in the Arora-Ge modelling are **semi-regular**.

**Rank condition** on the Macaulay matrices.

- Full proof of the assumption  $\equiv$  proving the well known *Fröberg's conjecture*
- Semi-regularity of powers of generic linear forms [R. Fröberg, J. Hollman, JSC'94]
- Assumption proved in restricted cases

# Conclusion

- Similar analysis for LWE
- New way to investigate the (asymptotical) hardness of lattice-based cryptography
- Main (challenging) open question is to prove the assumptions !

 M. Albrecht, C. Cid, J.-C Faugère , L. Perret.  
“Algebraic Algorithms for LWE”.  
IACR Eprint, 2014.