

ANSI X9.82, Part 3 Deterministic Random Bit Generators (DRBGs)

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The Plan:

- Stroll through the document
- Hash-based and block-cipher based DRBGs (John Kelsey)
- Number theoretic DRBGs (Don Johnson)
- Address additional questions/issues

Functional Components (1)

- Entropy Input
 - Approved NRBG
 - Approved DRBG (or DRBG chain)
 - Other entropy source
 - Conditioned (translate to bits & remove bias)
 - Entropy assessed
 - Opt. derivation function

Functional Components (2)

■ Other Inputs

- Personalization string
- Additional input
- Counters, etc.

■ Internal State

- All the working parameters and other stored values
- Some portion changes during each request

Functional Components (3)

- Internal State Transition Function
 - Instantiate
 - Generate bits
 - Reseed
 - Uninstantiate
- } Fundamental


Functional Components (4)

- Output Generation Function
 - Selects bits from the internal state
 - Varies by DRBG
- Support Functions: Testing and Error Handling
 - Performs health checks
 - Aborts for catastrophic errors


DRBG Boundary

- Physical or logical boundary
- Protects the DRBG internal state
 - Exists only within the boundary
 - Only affected per the DRBG spec.
 - State values remain within the boundary
- Other crypto functions
 - May reside within the boundary
 - May access the DRBG's crypto primitive(s), but not the state

- All DRBG processes may be in the same boundary




- DRBG boundaries may be distributed



DRBG Boundaries and Cryptographic Modules

- DRBG processes used by applications shall be in FIPS 140-2 cryptomodule boundaries
- A DRBG may be distributed across multiple cryptographic modules
- All DRBG processes for a given DRBG in a cryptomodule shall be in the same DRBG boundary
- Multiple DRBGs may be in the same or in different DRBG boundaries within the same cryptomodule

Example of A DRBG in Two Cryptomodules




- - - Logical DRBG Boundary

DRBG Boundaries and Cryptographic Modules (contd.)

- FIPS 140-2 issues:
 - When a DRBG is distributed, the state needs to be transferred between DRBG boundaries within cryptomodule boundaries.
 - Entropy input source may be outside cryptomodule boundary
 - Manual and electronic entry
 - Different requirements for different FIPS 140-2 levels

Instantiation and the Internal State

- A DRBG is instantiated for one or more purposes
- Reseeding creates a new instance
- Additional input can be provided




Instantiation and the Internal State (contd.)

- The internal state contains:
 - Values derived from the seed
 - DRBG-specific information
 - Prediction resistance flag
 - Security strength
 - (Opt.) Transformation of entropy input

Seeds (1)

- Acquired prior to the generation of pseudorandom output
- Used to instantiate the DRBG and initialize the state
- Seed construction:
 - Entropy input
 - (Opt.) personalization string
 - Goal: The seed shall be unique



Seeds (2)

- Entropy requirements
 - A seed shall contain sufficient entropy for the desired security level
 - Entropy shall be distributed across the seed
 - $entropy \geq \max(128, security_level)$
- Seed size: Depends on the DRBG and the security level

Seeds (3)

- Entropy Input Source:
 - Approved NRBG
 - Approved DRBG (or chain of DRBGs) seeded by an NRBG
 - Entropy of higher DRBG \geq lower DRBG requirement
 - Other source whose characteristics are known
 - Need not be co-located with the instantiation process

Seeds (4)

- Entropy input and seed privacy
- Reseeding
 - Why? Reduce security risks; Recover from compromise
 - Replace seeds periodically
 - As specified
 - Check that entropy input is different
 - Combine new and old entropy to generate new seeds
 - Alternatively, reinitialize

Seeds (5)

- Seed use
 - DRBGs used to generate secret and public information
 - Should use different instantiations
 - Entropy input and seeds shall remain secret
 - Different instantiations and instances shall use different seeds
 - No output until sufficient entropy is available

Seeds (6)

- Seed separation
 - DRBG seeds shall not be used for other purposes
 - Recommend different seeds for different data types
 - DRBG seed separation a cost/benefit decision

Other Input

- During instantiation, generation or reseeding
- Another source of entropy?
- Personalization string
- Additional_input

Backtracking Resistance

- Backtracking resistance
 - Compromise of the state has no effect on the security of prior outputs
 - Built into the DRBG design



Prediction Resistance

- Prediction resistance
 - Compromise of the state has no effect on the security of future outputs
 - Obtain sufficient new entropy



Supported Security Strengths

- Support 80, 112, 128, 192 and 256 bits
- Determined during instantiation by the request and the crypto primitive used
- Entropy requirement must support all requests

Security Strength, Entropy and Seed Size

- Seed (i.e., entropy input) must have sufficient entropy
- $min_entropy = \max(128, requested_strength)$
- Entropy input size: a range of sizes
- Seed size depends on the DRBG and the security level

DRBG Purposes and States

- Recommend different instantiations for different purposes
- One internal state per instantiation
- DRBGs handle multiple states
 - Allow sufficient space for multiple states
 - Allow a state for health testing

State Table

Handle

1	$V_1, C_1, \text{reseed_counter}_1, \text{strength}_1, \text{prediction_resistance_flag}_1, \dots$
2	$V_2, C_2, \text{reseed_counter}_2, \text{strength}_2, \text{prediction_resistance_flag}_2, \dots$
<i>n</i>	Null, Null, 0, 0, 0, ...

Instantiating a DRBG (1)

- Instantiate process:
 - Input:
 - Requested strength
 - Prediction resistance request
 - (Opt.) Personalization string
 - DRBG-specific parameters
 - Mode
 - Output:
 - Status
 - State_handle

Instantiating a DRBG (2)

- Get_entropy function:
 - Input:
 - Minimum entropy
 - Minimum length
 - Maximum Length
 - Output:
 - Status
 - Entropy_input

Instantiating a DRBG (3)

- Find_state_space function:
 - Input:
 - Mode
 - Output:
 - Status
 - State_handle
- Derivation functions
 - Hash_df
 - Block_Cipher_df (Coming)

Reseeding (1)

- How requested?
 - Explicitly by an application
 - When prediction resistance is requested
 - At the end of the seedlife
 - Triggered by external events

Reseeding (2)

- Reseed process:
 - Input:
 - State_handle
 - (Opt.) Additional_input
 - Mode
 - Output:
 - Status

Generate Pseudorandom Bits (1)

- Generate bits for only one value
- Multiple requests may be used to construct a single value

Generate Pseudorandom Bits

(2)

- Generate process:
 - Input:
 - State_handle
 - Number of bits requested
 - Strength to be provided
 - (Opt.) Additional input
 - (Opt.) Prediction resistance request
 - Mode
 - Output:
 - Status
 - Pseudorandom bits

Removing a DRBG Instantiation

- Used to release an instantiation's state space
- Uninstantiate process:
 - Input:
 - State_handle
 - Output:
 - Status

Self-Testing (1)

- To obtain assurance that the implementation continues to operate correctly (health testing)
- Used during validation
- Test the DRBG processes within the DRBG boundary
- Strawman testing process provided

Self Testing (2)

- Test for correct results
- Test error handling
- Abort for failures

DRBGs

- Hash-based:
 - Hash_DRBG
 - HMAC_DRBG
 - KHF_DRBG
- Block cipher-based:
 - CTR_DRBG
 - OFB_DRBG
- Number theoretic
 - Dual_EC_DRBG
 - MS_DRBG

Assurance

- Designs have been evaluated
- Documentation shall be available
- Implementations may be validated
- Operational (health) tests shall be performed

Summary of Part 2 (DRBGs)

- DRBG and Cryptomodule Boundaries
- The internal state and the seed must be protected
- Seeds must have sufficient entropy (in accordance with the security level)
- DRBG processes:
 - Required: Instantiate, Generate, Self-test
 - Optional: Reseed
- Assurance