Security Policy

For

NRZ/T1/E1 Link Encryptor

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Rev B

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Prepared by

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1 Scope of Document

This document contains the security policy requirements for the Cylink NRZ/T1/E1 Link Encryptor system module. The NRZ/T1/E1 Link Encryptor System shall be referred to as the CLE (Cylink Link Encryptor) in this document.

2 Applicable Documents

- FIPS 140-1  Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
- DTR  Derived Test Requirements for FIPS 140-1, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules (DTR)
- FIPS 46-2  Data Encryption Standard (DES)
- FIPS 81  DES Modes of Operation
- FIPS 180-1  Secure Hash Standard (SHA-1)
- FIPS 186  Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
3 Security Level

The CLE meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-1, and meets Physical Security applicable to Level 3.

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4 Security Rules

This section documents the security rules enforced by the CLE to implement the security requirements of FIPS 140-1 overall Level 2 module, with Level 3 Software and Physical Security.
4.1 Cryptographic Module

The CLE shall be implemented as a "Multiple-Chip Standalone Cryptographic Module", as defined in FIPS 140-1.

4.2 Roles and Services

The CLE shall employ role based authentication of the operator. The module supports two roles as required by FIPS 140-1. The roles are the User Role and the Crypto Officer Role. Access to these roles is restricted at the front panel by the use of a Medeco lock, and at the Network Management (ethernet) port by the use of a password entered into the PrivaCy Manager system. An operator is authenticated to the User and Crypto Officer roles at the front panel through possession of the key that will turn the Medeco lock to the Enable position. Concurrent operator access/operation is prevented by disallowing SNMP access when the Medeco lock is set to enable the front panel.

PrivaCy Manager is an application that can be used to remotely control the CLE through an Ethernet connection. In addition to the services that can be initiated from the front panel, PrivaCy Manager can initiate network/voice authentication, initiate a software download operation, display the CLE MAC address, and display the date and time of the last key exchange.

Physical Maintenance shall be performed at the factory, as there are no services that require the cover to be removed in the field, and there are no logical maintenance services performed in the field. The CLE module should be zeroized by a Crypto Officer before the module is returned to the factory, either by command or by removing the cover.

4.2.1 User Role

The User Role provides the operator with the ability to control the operational mode of the CLE and thus configure the network security policy. The services available to an operator while in the User Role are as follows:

1. Set Operational Mode: This service allows the operator to select the current operational mode. The operator shall be permitted to command the CLE into the following modes:

   a) Clear Mode
   b) Standby Mode
   c) Secure Mode
   d) Clear Pending Secure Mode (Dial-Up only)
   e) Standby Pending Secure Mode (Dial-Up only)
4.2.2 Crypto Officer Role

The Crypto Officer Role provides the operator the ability to perform all of the services listed below.

1. Alarm/Event Services
   a) Display Event Log: This service allows the operator to scroll through and view the contents of the CLE's event log.
   f) Clear Event Log: This service allows the operator to completely clear the contents of the event log.

2. Time/Date: This service allows the operator to set the real time clock to the current date and time.

3. Key Management
   a) Set Auto Key Change Attributes
   b) Days Interval
   c) End to End Delay
   d) Clear Modes Allowed/Disallowed
   e) Mode NET CERT, MANUAL (authentication) KEY, UNAUTH DH
   f) Zeroize Keys: This service allows the operator to erase critical security parameters. When this service is activated the following information shall be actively erased:
      (i) CLE Network Certificate
      (ii) CLE DSS secret key (X)
      (iii) PrivaCy Manager DSS public key
      (iv) PrivaCy Manger/CLE (SNMP) encryption key
      (v) PrivaCy Manger/CLE SNMP message counter
      (vi) CLE/CLE encryption key
      (vii) Manually Entered Authentication Key
      (viii) Far End CLE serial number
      (ix) Last key change timestamp
      (x) Event Log
   g) Set Manual Authentication Key

4. Set Line Interface Configuration Parameters

5. Network Management
   a) Display/Set Unit IP Address
   b) Display/Set Gateway IP Address
c) Display/Set Subnet Mask Address

d) Display/Set Trap1/Trap2 IP Address

6. System Test: This service allows the operator to set a Network Encryptor Loopback, or a DTE Encryptor Loopback, or clear a loopback that has been previously set. CLEs with a T1 or E1 interface also allow setting or clearing a Network Line Loopback or a DTE Line Loopback

7. Display Manufacturing Info: This service allows the operator to display the following information:
   a) Firmware Revision
   b) Firmware Date
   c) Hardware List
   d) Hardware Issue
   e) Manufacturing Date
   f) Unit Serial Number
   g) Line Interface Unit (LIU) Type
   h) End to End (Link) Key Size, and Encryption Mode and Algorithm
   i) SNMP Key Size, and Encryption Mode and Algorithm

8. Set Default Configuration

9. Firmware Update

4.3 Physical Security

1. Access to the circuitry contained within the CLE shall be restricted by the use of a Medeco lock. It shall not be possible to remove the enclosure cover without unlocking the lock.

2. The CLE shall include tamper response and zeroization circuitry. Upon the removal of the enclosure's cover, all plaintext cryptographic key and unprotected critical security parameters shall be immediately zeroized. This capability shall be operational whether or not power is applied to the module.

3. The CLE shall not employ ventilation holes, and shall be designed to prevent physical probing inside the enclosure.

4.4 Operating System Security
The FIPS 140-1 operating system requirements (FIPS PUB 140-1 section 4.7) do not apply to
the CLE because it is not a general purpose computer and thus it cannot run untrusted user-
supplied software. However, the CLE’s firmware can be field updated using a download
process. The following rules apply to the downloading of new CLE firmware.

The CLE shall verify the signature of the binary image. If this verification fails, the module shall
continue operation using the previous version of firmware, the downloaded binary image shall
be marked as non-executable, and an SNMP-readable MIB status shall be set reporting the
failure.

4.5 Key Management

1. The PRNG seed (referred to as the XKEY in FIPS 186 Appendix 3.1) shall be installed
into the CLE using the Cylink Manufacturing Configurator (CMC) process.

2. PrivaCy Manager/CLE encryption keys shall be re-negotiated each time a new CLE
Network Certificate is loaded.

3. PrivaCy Manager/CLE encryption keys shall be established using the Diffie-Hellman
Key Agreement process.

4. Messages exchanged between the PrivaCy Manager and the CLE systems that contain
the Diffie-Hellman public components used to establish the PrivaCy Manager/CLE
encryption key shall be signed using the DSA associated with each entities
Manufacturing Certificate.

5. Prior to accepting the PrivaCy Manager/CLE encryption key the CLE shall perform
various message and certificate signature verification tests.

If any of the tests fail the PrivaCy Manager/CLE encryption key and the newly loaded
Network Certificate are rejected and the CLE shall report the failure at the end of the
protocol.

6. A new CLE/CLE encryption key shall be negotiated each time the CLE transitions from
a non-secure state to a secure state.

7. While in the secure mode the CLE/CLE encryption key shall be periodically re-
negotiated.

8. CLE/CLE encryption keys shall be established using the Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
process.

9. When establishing a new CLE/CLE encryption key, the messages containing the Diffie-
Hellman public component shall be signed.

10. Prior to accepting the CLE/CLE encryption key each CLE shall:
    a) Verify the compatibility of the two units’ session settings:
    b) Verify the validity of the Network Certificate’s signature.
    If any of the above tests fail the CLE/CLE encryption key shall be rejected.
11. If the Leased Line link encryption key generation process fails, the CLE shall generate an alarm.

12. If a successful Leased Line CLE/CLE key exchange does not occur within the Days Interval setting of the previous key exchange, the CLE shall produce an alarm due to the resulting Local Secure mode.

13. The CLE shall have the ability to generate a pseudo-random authentication key, and use it to authenticate the end-to-end communication protocol, in situations where PrivaCy Manager and Network Certificates are not available. The plaintext 24-byte authentication key shall be generated randomly as per FIPS Pub 186, shall not be displayed after user acceptance, and shall be zeroized by operator command or by a tamper situation.

14. The CLE shall have the ability to accept and utilize a manually entered end-to-end authentication key. The plaintext 24-byte authentication key shall not be displayed after user entry, and shall be zeroized by operator command or by a tamper situation.

4.6 Crypto Algorithms

1. The CLE shall use the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm or Triple DES to protect the user line data. Sensitive PrivaCy Manager/CLE data shall be protected using the Triple DES algorithm.

2. The CLE shall use the Digital Signature Standard as described in FIPS 186 for the authentication of all security related information.

3. As specified in FIPS 186, the module will also support the Secure Hash Standard (SHA-1) as described in FIPS 180-1.

4.7 Self Test

1. The following Power-Up Self Tests shall be performed when power is first applied to the system.
   a) Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) Test
   b) Program Memory (ROM/FLASH) Integrity Test
   c) General Purpose Memory Test
   d) Non-Volatile Memory Integrity Test
   e) Real Time Clock Test
   f) Cipher Chip Test
   g) Random Number Generator Test
   h) General Cryptographic Algorithm Test
i) Pairwise Consistency Test

2. During normal operation, once during each second the battery that backs up the non-volatile RAM shall be tested.

3. All keys to be used for symmetric key cryptographic algorithms shall be checked to verify that they are cryptographically suitable for use as an encryption/decryption key. This check shall be performed immediately after the value of the key has been established and before the key is used or stored for later use.

For example, a DES key must be checked to verify that it is of the correct parity and is not on the list of known "weak" or "semi-weak" DES keys.

5 Definition of Security Relevant Data Items (SRDIs)

(1) CLE Manufacturing Certificate
(2) PrivaCy Manager Manufacturing Certificate
(3) PrivaCy Manager/CLE SNMP Encryption Algorithm Flag
(4) PrivaCy Manager/CLE SNMP Encryption Mode Flag
(5) PrivaCy Manager/CLE SNMP Encryption Key Size Flag
(6) CLE to CLE Encryption Algorithm Flag
(7) CLE to CLE Encryption Mode Flag
(8) CLE to CLE Encryption Key Size Flag
(9) Near End Network Certificate
(10) Far End Network Certificate
(11) Far End Manual Authentication Code
(12) Firmware Binary Image Signature
(13) PRNG Running Seed (XKEY)
(14) CLE DSS Secret Key (X)
(15) CLE DSS Public Key (Y)
(16) PrivaCy Manager DSS Public Key
(17) PrivaCy Manager/CLE (SNMP) Encryption Key
(18) PM/CLE Message Counter Value
(19) PrivaCy Manager/CLE Message Counter
(20) CLE/CLE Encryption Key
(21) Near End CLE Challenge Value
(22) Far End CLE Challenge Value
6 Definitions of SRDI Modes of Access

The table below defines the relationship between access to SRDIs and the different module services. The modes of access are shown as codes in the table and are defined as follows:

a) **D** - The SRDI is set back to the manufacturing default by the service.

b) **G** - This service generates the SRDI internal to the CLE.

c) **I** - The SRDI is input into the CLE by this service.

d) **R** - The SRDI is read and used by the service.

e) **U** - The SRDI is updated by the service.

f) **V** - The SRDI is verified by the service.

g) **Z** - The SRDI is erased by the service.
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