**Contact Information**
See our Web sites for regional Customer Support telephone and fax numbers.

RSA Security Inc.  
RSA Security Ireland Limited

**Trademarks**
ACE/Agent, ACE/Server, Because Knowledge is Security, BSAFE, ClearTrust, Confidence Inspired, e-Titlement, IntelliAccess, Keon, RC2, RC4, RC5, RSA, the RSA logo, RSA Secured, the RSA Secured logo, RSA Security, SecurCare, SecurID, SecurWorld, Smart Rules, The Most Trusted Name in e-Security, Transaction Authority, and Virtual Business Units are either registered trademarks or trademarks of RSA Security Inc. in the United States and/or other countries. EMC is a registered trademark of EMC Corporation. All other goods and/or services mentioned are trademarks of their respective companies.

**License Agreement**
This software and the associated documentation are proprietary and confidential to RSA Security Inc., are furnished under license and may be used and copied only in accordance with the terms of such license and with the inclusion of the copyright below. This software and any copies thereof may not be provided or otherwise made available to any other person. Neither this software nor any copies thereof may be provided to or otherwise made available to any third party. No title to or ownership of the software or any intellectual property rights thereto is hereby transferred. Any unauthorized use or reproduction of this software may be subject to civil and/or criminal liability. This software is subject to change without notice and should not be construed as a commitment by RSA Security Inc.

**Note on Encryption Technologies**
This product may contain encryption technology. Many countries prohibit or restrict the use, import or export of encryption technologies and current use, import and export regulations should be followed when exporting this product.

**Distribution**
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.

**RSA Security Inc. Notice**
The RC5® Block Encryption Algorithm With Data-Dependent Rotations is protected by U.S. Patent #5,724,428 and #5,835,600.
Efficient field multiplication in a normal basis is protected by U.S. Patent #6,389,442.
Compaq MultiPrime™ technology is protected by U.S. Patent #5,848,159 and is the subject of patent applications in other countries.
Other trademarks in this document are held by their respective owners.

© 2008 RSA Security Inc. All rights reserved.  
Published October 10, 2008
# Table of Contents

1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................4
   1.1 References ..................................................................................................................................................4
   1.2 Document Organization ..........................................................................................................................4

2 Crypto-C ME Cryptographic Toolkit ..................................................................................................................5
   2.1 Cryptographic Module .............................................................................................................................5
       2.1.1 Configuring Single User Mode ........................................................................................................7
   2.2 Crypto-C ME Interfaces ...........................................................................................................................9
   2.3 Roles and Services .......................................................................................................................................10
       2.3.1 Officer Role ........................................................................................................................................10
       2.3.2 User Role ..........................................................................................................................................10
   2.4 Cryptographic Key Management .............................................................................................................10
       2.4.1 Key Generation ..................................................................................................................................10
       2.4.2 Key Storage .......................................................................................................................................11
       2.4.3 Key Access .......................................................................................................................................12
       2.4.4 Key Protection/Zeroization .............................................................................................................12
   2.5 Cryptographic Algorithms .........................................................................................................................12
   2.6 Self-tests ....................................................................................................................................................13
       2.6.1 Power-up Self-test ...........................................................................................................................14
       2.6.2 Conditional Self-tests ......................................................................................................................14
       2.6.3 Critical Functions Tests ..................................................................................................................14
       2.6.4 Mitigation of Other Attacks ............................................................................................................15

3 Secure Operation of Crypto-C ME .....................................................................................................................15
   3.1 Crypto Officer and User Guidance ...........................................................................................................15
   3.2 Roles .........................................................................................................................................................16
   3.3 Modes of Operation ...................................................................................................................................16
   3.4 Operating Crypto-C ME ............................................................................................................................17
   3.5 Startup Self-tests .......................................................................................................................................18
   3.6 Random Number Generator ....................................................................................................................18
       3.6.1 PRNG Seeding ...................................................................................................................................19

4 Services ..............................................................................................................................................................19

5 Acronyms and Definitions ..................................................................................................................................23

6 Contacting RSA ....................................................................................................................................................26
   6.1 Support and Service ....................................................................................................................................26
   6.2 Feedback ......................................................................................................................................................26
1 Introduction

This is a non-proprietary RSA cryptographic module security policy. This security policy describes how RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition (Crypto-C ME) meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2, and how to securely operate Crypto-C ME in a FIPS 140-2-compliant manner. This policy is prepared as part of the FIPS 140-2 Level 1 validation of Crypto-C ME.


1.1 References

This document deals only with the operations and capabilities of Crypto-C ME in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information about Crypto-C ME and the entire RSA BSAFE product line is available from the following resources:

- Information on the full line of RSA products and services is available at http://www.rsa.com/.
- Answers to technical or sales related questions are available at http://www.rsasecurity.com./node.asp?id=1067.

1.2 Document Organization

This document explains the Crypto-C ME FIPS 140-2 relevant features and functionality. This document comprises the following sections:

- This section, "Introduction", provides an overview and introduction to the Security Policy.
- "Crypto-C ME Cryptographic Toolkit" on page 5 describes Crypto-C ME and how it meets FIPS 140-2 requirements.
- "Secure Operation of Crypto-C ME" on page 15 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS 140-2 mode of operation.
- "Services" on page 19 lists all of the functions of Crypto-C ME.
- "Acronyms and Definitions" on page 23 lists the acronyms and definitions used in this document.
2 Crypto-C ME Cryptographic Toolkit

The Crypto-C ME software development toolkit enables developers to incorporate cryptographic technologies into applications. Crypto-C ME security software is designed to help protect sensitive data as it is stored, using strong encryption techniques that ease integration with existing data models. Using the capabilities of Crypto-C ME software in applications helps provide a persistent level of protection for data, lessening the risk of internal, as well as external, compromise.

The features of Crypto-C ME include the ability to optimize code for different processors, and specific speed or size requirements. Assembly-level optimizations on key processors mean that Crypto-C ME algorithms can be used at increased speeds on many platforms.

Crypto-C ME offers a full set of cryptographic algorithms including public-key (asymmetric) algorithms, symmetric (secret key) block and stream ciphers, message digests, message authentication, and Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) support. Developers can implement the full suite of algorithms through a single Application Programming Interface (API) or select a specific set of algorithms to reduce code size or meet performance requirements.

Note: When operating in a FIPS 140-2-approved manner, the set of algorithm implementations is not customizable.

2.1 Cryptographic Module

Crypto-C ME is classified as a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module for the purposes of FIPS 140-2. As such, Crypto-C ME must be tested on a specific operating system and computer platform. The cryptographic boundary includes Crypto-C ME running on selected platforms running selected operating systems while configured in "single user" mode. Crypto-C ME was validated as meeting all FIPS 140-2 Level 1 security requirements, including cryptographic key management and operating system requirements. Crypto-C ME is packaged as a set of dynamically loaded modules or shared library files that contain the module's entire executable code. The Crypto-C ME toolkit relies on the physical security provided by the host PC in which it runs.

For FIPS 140-2 validation, Crypto-C ME is tested on the following platforms:

- Red Hat®:
  - Enterprise Linux AS 4.0, x86 (32-bit), built with LSB3.0.3 and gcc 3.4.6.
  - Enterprise Linux AS 5.0, x86_64 (64-bit), built with LSB3.0.3 and gcc 3.4.6.

- Sun™:
  - Solaris™ 10, SPARC v8 (32-bit).
  - Solaris 10, SPARC v8+ (32-bit).
  - Solaris 10, SPARC v9 (64-bit).
  - Solaris 10, x86_64 (64-bit).
Microsoft®:
- Windows XP Professional SP2, x86 (32-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005 SP1 using the /MT option.  
- Windows Vista® Ultimate, x86 (32-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005 SP1 using the /MD option.  
- Windows Vista® Ultimate, x86_64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005 SP1 using the /MD option.  
- Windows 2003 Server SP2, x86_64 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005 SP1 using the /MT option.  
- Windows 2003 Server SP2, Itanium2 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005 SP1 using the /MT option. 
- Windows 2003 Server SP2, Itanium2 (64-bit), built with Visual Studio 2005 SP1 using the /MD option. 
- Windows® Mobile 5.0, ARM (32-bit).
- Windows Mobile 6.0 Professional, ARM (32-bit).
- Windows Mobile 2003/Pocket PC, ARM (32-bit).

IBM®:
- AIX® 5L v5.3 PowerPC (32-bit).
- AIX 5L v5.3 PowerPC (64-bit).

HP:
- HP-UX 11.11, PA-RISC 2.0 (32-bit).
- HP-UX 11.23, PA-RISC 2.0W (64-bit).
- HP-UX 11.31, Itanium2 (64-bit).

Wind River®:
- VxWorks® 5.5, PowerPC 603 (32-bit).
- VxWorks 5.5, PowerPC 604 (32-bit).
- VxWorks General Purpose Platform 6.0, PowerPC 604 (32-bit).

Note: Compliance is maintained on all of the above platforms for which the binary executable remains unchanged.


1 The /MT compiler option causes the application to use the multithread, static version of the run-time library(libcmtd.lib), while the /MD causes the application to use the multithread- and DLL-specific version of the run-time library(msvcr71.lib/msvcr80.dll). For more information, see http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/2kzt1wy3.aspx.
2.1.1 Configuring Single User Mode

This section describes how to configure single user mode for the different operating system platforms supported by Crypto-C ME.

2.1.1.1 Red Hat Linux

To configure single user mode for systems running a Red Hat Linux operating system:

1. Log in as the root user.
2. Edit /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to remove all the users except root and the pseudo-users (daemon users). Make sure the password fields in /etc/shadow for the pseudo-users are either a star (*) or double exclamation mark (!!). This prevents login as the pseudo-users.
3. Edit /etc/nsswitch.conf so that files is the only option for passwd, group, and shadow. This disables the Network Information Service (NIS) and other name services for users and groups.
4. In the /etc/xinetd.d directory, edit rexec, rlogin, rsh, rsync, telnet, and wu-ftpd, setting the value of disable to yes.
5. Reboot the system for the changes to take effect.

2.1.1.2 Sun Solaris

To configure single user mode for systems running a Sun Solaris operating system:

1. Log in as the root user.
2. Edit /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to remove all the users except root and the pseudo-users (daemon users). Make sure the password fields in /etc/shadow for the pseudo-users are either a star (*) or double exclamation mark (!!). This prevents login as the pseudo-users.
3. Edit /etc/nsswitch.conf so that files is the only option for passwd, group, and shadow. This disables the Network Information Service (NIS) and other name services for users and groups.
4. Edit /etc/inet/inetd.conf to remove or comment out the lines for remote login, remote command execution, and file transfer daemons.
5. Reboot the system for the changes to take effect.

2.1.1.3 Microsoft Windows

To configure single user mode for systems running a Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP2, Windows 2003 Server, and Windows Vista Ultimate operating system, guest accounts, server services, terminal services, remote registry services, remote desktop services, and remote assistance must be disabled. For detailed instructions on how to perform these tasks, see the Microsoft support site.

Windows Mobile operating systems are single user operating systems so no steps are required to configure single user mode.
2.1.1.4 IBM AIX

To configure single user mode for systems running an IBM AIX operating system:

1. Log in as the root user.
2. Edit /etc/passwd and remove all the users except root and the pseudo-users. Make sure the password fields for the pseudo-users are a star (*). This prevents login as the pseudo-users.
3. Remove all lines that begin with a plus sign (+) or minus sign (-) from /etc/passwd and /etc/group. This disables the Network Information Service (NIS) and other name services for users and groups.
4. Edit /etc/inetd.conf to remove or comment out the lines for remote login, remote command execution, and file transfer daemons such as telnetd, rlogind, remshd, rexecd, ftpd, and tftp.
5. Reboot the system for the changes to take effect.

2.1.1.5 HP-UX

To configure single user mode for systems running an HP-UX operating system:

1. Log in as the root user.
2. Edit /etc/passwd and remove all the users except root and the pseudo-users. Make sure the password fields for the pseudo-users are a star (*). This prevents login as the pseudo-users.
3. Edit /etc/nsswitch.conf so that files is the only option for passwd and group. This disables the Network Information Service (NIS) and other name services for users and groups.
4. Edit /etc/inetd.conf to remove or comment out the lines for remote login, remote command execution, and file transfer daemons such as telnetd, rlogind, remshd, rexecd, ftpd, and tftp.
5. Reboot the system for the changes to take effect.

2.1.1.6 Wind River VxWorks

Wind River VxWorks operating systems are single user operating systems so no steps are required to configure single user mode.
2.2 Crypto-C ME Interfaces

Crypto-C ME is evaluated as a multi-chip, standalone module. The physical cryptographic boundary of the module is the case of the general-purpose computer or mobile device, which encloses the hardware running the module. The physical interfaces for Crypto-C ME consist of the keyboard, mouse, monitor, CD-ROM drive, floppy drive, serial ports, USB ports, COM ports, and network adapter(s).

The logical boundary of the cryptographic module is the set of library files (cryptocme2.dll, ccme_base.dll, ccme_ecc.dll, ccme_eccaccele.dll, and ccme_eccnistaccele.dll) and the signature file that comprise the module. The underlying logical interface to Crypto-C ME is the API, documented in the RSA BSAFE Crypto-C ME 3.0 Developer’s Guide. Crypto-C ME provides for Control Input through the API calls. Data Input and Output are provided in the variables passed with the API calls, and Status Output is provided through the returns and error codes that are documented for each call. This is illustrated in the following diagram (which features the Microsoft Windows libraries).

**Figure 1. Crypto-C ME Logical Interfaces**
2.3 Roles and Services

Crypto-C ME meets all FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements for roles and services, implementing both a User (User) role and Officer (CO) role. As allowed by FIPS 140-2, Crypto-C ME does not support user identification or authentication for these roles. Only one role can be active at a time and Crypto-C ME does not allow concurrent operators.

The following table describes the services accessible by the two roles.

Table 1. Crypto-C ME Roles and Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>The Officer has access to a superset of the services that are available to the User. The Officer role can also invoke the full set of self-tests inside the module.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User</td>
<td>The User can perform general security functions, as described in the RSA BSAFE Crypto-C ME Developer's Guide. The User can also call specific FIPS 140-2 module functions as defined in the Developer's Guide.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.1 Officer Role

An operator assuming the Officer role can call any Crypto-C ME function. The complete list of the functionality available to the Officer is outlined in "Services" on page 19.

2.3.2 User Role

An operator assuming the User role can use the entire Crypto-C ME API except for R_FIPS140_self_test_full(), which is reserved for the Officer. The complete list of Crypto-C ME functions is outlined in "Services" on page 19.

2.4 Cryptographic Key Management

Cryptographic key management is concerned with generating and storing keys, managing access to keys, protecting keys during use, and zeroizing keys when they are not longer required.

2.4.1 Key Generation

Crypto-C ME supports generation of DSA, RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public and private keys. Also, Crypto-C ME uses a FIPS 186-2-compliant random number generator as well as a Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator (Dual ECDRBG) and HMAC-DRBG in the generation asymmetric and symmetric keys used in algorithms such as AES, Triple DES, RSA, DSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECC, and HMAC.
2.4.2 **Key Storage**

Crypto-C ME does not provide long-term cryptographic key storage. If a user chooses to store keys, the user is responsible for storing keys exported from the module.

The following table lists all keys and CSPs in the module and where they are stored.

**Table 2. Key Storage**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key or CSP</th>
<th>Storage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hardcoded DSA Public Key</td>
<td>Persistent storage embedded in the module binary (encrypted).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardcoded AES key</td>
<td>Persistent storage embedded in the module binary (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES keys</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triple-DES keys</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC with SHA-1 and SHA-2 keys (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffie-Hellman Public/Private keys</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECC Public/Private keys</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA Public/Private keys</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA Public/Private keys</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPS 186-2 Seed</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPS 186-2 Key</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC DRBG entropy</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC DRBG S value</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC DRBG init_seed</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC DRBG entropy</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC DRBG V value</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC DRBG key</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC DRBG init_seed</td>
<td>Volatile memory only (plaintext).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4.3  **Key Access**

An authorized operator of the module has access to all key data created during Crypto-C ME operation.

**Note:** The User and Officer roles have equal and complete access to all keys

2.4.4  **Key Protection/Zeroization**

All key data resides in internally allocated data structures and can be output only using the Crypto-C ME API. The operating system protects memory and process space from unauthorized access. The operator should follow the steps outlined in the *RSA BSAFE Crypto-C ME Developer’s Guide* to ensure sensitive data is protected by zeroizing the data from memory when it is no longer needed.

2.5  **Cryptographic Algorithms**

Crypto-C ME supports a wide variety of cryptographic algorithms. To achieve compliance with the FIPS 140-2 standard, only FIPS 140-2-approved or allowed algorithms can be used in an approved mode of operation. The following table lists the FIPS 140-2-approved algorithms supported by Crypto-C ME.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES ECB, CBC, CFB (128), OFB (128), CTR (128, 192, and 256-bit key sizes), and CCM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES GCM (128, 192, 256-bit key sizes) and GMAC (128, 192, and 256-bit key sizes).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triple-DES ECB, CBC, CFB (64bit), and OFB (64 bit).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDSA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPS 186-2 Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) – Change Notice 1, with and without the mod q step.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual ECDRBG and HMAC-DRBG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA X9.31, PKCS#1 V.1.5, and PKCS#1 V.2.1 (SHA256 – PSS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA encrypt and decrypt.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validation Certificate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vendor affirmed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-approved (Allowed in FIPS 140-2 mode).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 and 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-approved (Allowed in FIPS 140-2 mode for key transport).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following algorithms are not FIPS 140-2-approved:

- DES
- MD2
- MD5
- HMAC MD5
- DES40
- RC2
- RC4
- RC5
- ECAES
- ECIES
- PBKDF1 SHA-1
- PBKDF2 HMAC SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
- RSA PKCS#1 V.2.0 (OAEP)
- Entropy RNG
- OTP RNG.

For more information about using Crypto-C ME in a FIPS 140-2-compliant manner, see "Secure Operation of Crypto-C ME" on page 15.

### 2.6 Self-tests

Crypto-C ME performs a number of power-up and conditional self-tests to ensure proper operation.

If the power-up self-test fails, the toolkit is disabled and the operation fails. The toolkit can only leave the disabled state by reloading the FIPS 140-2 module. If the conditional self-test fails, the operation fails but the toolkit is not disabled.
2.6.1 Power-up Self-test

Crypto-C ME implements the following power-up self-tests:

- AES, AES CCM, AES GCM, and AES GMAC Known Answer Tests (KATs)
- DES and Triple DES KATs
- SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 KATs
- HMAC SHA-1, HMAC SHA-224, HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, and HMAC SHA-512 KATs
- RSA Sign/verify test
- DSA Sign/verify test
- DH, EC-DH, and EC-DH with Components conditional test
- ECDSA Sign/verify test
- PRNG (FIPS 186-2, Dual ECDRBG, and HMAC–DRBG) KATs
- Software integrity test.

Power-up self-tests are executed automatically when Crypto-C ME is loaded into memory.

2.6.2 Conditional Self-tests

Crypto-C ME performs two conditional self-tests:

- A pair-wise consistency test each time Crypto-C ME generates a DSA, RSA, or EC public/private key pair.
- A Continuous Random Number Generation (CRNG) test each time the toolkit produces random data, as per the FIPS 186-2 standard. The CRNG test is performed on all approved and non-approved RNGs.

2.6.3 Critical Functions Tests

Depending on operating mode, Crypto-C ME performs the following known answer tests:

- In R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL mode, Crypto-C ME performs a known answer test for MD5 and HMAC-MD5.
- In R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_ECC mode, Crypto-C ME performs a known answer test for ECAES and ECIES.
- In R_FIPS140_MODE_SSL_ECC mode, a known answer test is performed for MD5, HMAC-MD5, ECAES, and ECIES.
2.6.4 Mitigation of Other Attacks

RSA key operations implement blinding, a reversible way of modifying the input data, so as to make the RSA operation immune to timing attacks. Blinding has no effect on the algorithm other than to mitigate attacks on the algorithm. Blinding is implemented through blinding modes, and the following options are available:

- Blinding mode off.
- Blinding mode with no update, where the blinding value is constant for each operation.
- Blinding mode with full update, where a new blinding value is used for each operation.

3 Secure Operation of Crypto-C ME

This section provides an overview of how to securely operate Crypto-C ME to be in compliance with the FIPS 140-2 standards.

3.1 Crypto Officer and User Guidance

The Crypto Officer and User must only use algorithms approved for use in a FIPS 140 mode of operation, as listed in Table 3 Crypto-C ME FIPS 140-2-approved Algorithms on page 12. The requirements for using the approved algorithms in a FIPS 140 mode of operation are as follows:

- The bit length for a DSA key pair must be 1024 bits.
- Bit lengths for an RSA key pair must be between 1024 and 4096 bits in multiples of 512.
- Bit lengths for an HMAC key must be between 80 and 4096 bits.
- EC key pairs must have named curve domain parameters from the set of NIST-recommended named curves (P192, P224, P256, P384, P521, B163, B233, B283, B409, B571, K163, K233, K283, K409, K571). The module limits possible curves for Dual EC DRBG to P256, P384, and P521 in accordance with SP 800-90.
- When using RSA for key wrapping, the strength of the methodology is between 80 and 150 bits of security.
- The Diffie-Hellman shared secret provides between 80 and 150 bits of encryption strength.
- EC Diffie-Hellman primitives must use curve domain parameters from the set of NIST-recommended named curves. Using NIST-recommended curves, the computed Diffie-Hellman shared secret provides between 80 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
- When using an approved RNG to generate keys, the requested security strength for the RNG must be at least as great as the security strength of the key being generated.
## 3.2 Roles

If a user of Crypto-C ME needs to operate the toolkit in different roles, then the user must ensure that all instantiated cryptographic objects are destroyed before changing from the Crypto User role to the Crypto Officer role, or unexpected results could occur.

The following table lists the roles a user can operate in.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R_FIPS140_ROLE_OFFICER</td>
<td>An operator assuming the Crypto Officer role can call any Crypto-C ME function. The complete list of the functionality available to the Crypto Officer is outlined in &quot;Services&quot; on page 19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_FIPS140_ROLE_USER</td>
<td>An operator assuming the Crypto User role can use the entire Crypto-C ME API except for R_FIPS140_self_test_full(), which is reserved for the Crypto Officer. The complete list of Crypto-C ME functions is outlined in &quot;Services&quot; on page 19.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 3.3 Modes of Operation

The following table lists and describes the available modes of operation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140</td>
<td>Provides the cryptographic algorithms listed in Table 3 Crypto-C ME FIPS 140-2-approved Algorithms on page 12. The default random number generator is the FIPS 186-2 PRNG. This is the Crypto-C ME default mode on start up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL</td>
<td>Provides the same algorithms as R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140, plus the MD5 message digest. This mode can be used in the context of the key establishment phase in the TLSv1 and TLSv1.1 protocol. For more information, see section 7.1 Acceptable Key Establishment Protocols in &quot;Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program&quot;. The implementation guidance disallows the use of the SSLv2 and SSLv3 versions. Cipher suites that include non-FIPS 140-2-approved algorithms are unavailable. This mode allows implementations of the TLS protocol to operate Crypto-C ME in a FIPS 140-2-compliant manner with the FIPS 186-2 PRNG as the default.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_ECC Not FIPS 140-2-approved.</td>
<td>Provides the same algorithms as R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140, plus ECAES and ECIA. The random number generator in this mode is the Dual ECDRBG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL_ECC Not FIPS 140-2-approved.</td>
<td>Provides the same algorithms as R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL, plus ECAES and ECIA. The random number generator in this mode is the Dual ECDRBG. The same restrictions with respect to protocol versions and cipher suites as in R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL apply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_FIPS140_MODE_NON_FIPS140 Not FIPS 140-2-approved.</td>
<td>Allows users to operate Crypto-C ME without any cryptographic algorithm restrictions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_FIPS140_MODE_DISABLED Not FIPS 140-2-approved.</td>
<td>Indicates that the FIPS140 library is disabled, usually due to an internal or caller's usage error. No future transition into other modes is permitted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In each mode of operation, the complete set of services, which are listed in this Security Policy, are available to both the Crypto Officer and User roles (with the exception of R_FIPS140_self_test_full(), which is always reserved for the Crypto Officer).

**Note:** Cryptographic keys must not be shared between modes. For example, a key generated in R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140 mode must not be shared with an application running in R_FIPS140_MODE_NON_FIPS140 mode.

### 3.4 Operating Crypto-C ME

Crypto-C ME operates in R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140 by default if the Crypto-C ME library is initialized with the `PRODUCT_DEFAULT_RESOURCE_LIST()`. The current Crypto-C ME mode can be determined calling `R_FIPS140_get_mode()`.

When changing the mode of operation to a FIPS-approved mode, the module must be re-initialized with the appropriate product resource list, (`PRODUCT_DEFAULT_RESOURCE_LIST()` or `PRODUCT_FIPS140_SWITCHRESOURCE_LIST()` for R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140, or `PRODUCT_FIPS140_SSL_SWITCHRESOURCE_LIST()` for R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL). This ensures that the module is reloaded and all power-up self-tests are properly executed. To change the module to a non-FIPS-approved mode, call `R_FIPS140_set_mode()` with one of the information identifiers listed in Table 5 Crypto-C ME Modes of Operation on page 16.

**Note:** `R_FIPS140_set_mode()` can only be used when changing to a non-FIPS-approved mode.
After setting Crypto-C ME into a FIPS 140-2-approved mode, Crypto-C ME enforces that only the algorithms listed in Table 3 Crypto-C ME FIPS 140-2-approved Algorithms on page 12 are available to operators. To disable FIPS 140-2 mode, call R_FIPS140_set_mode() with the R_FIPS140_MODE_NON_FIPS140 information identifier.

R_FIPS140_self_tests_full() is restricted to operation by the Crypto Officer.

The user of Crypto-C ME links with the static library for their platform, which loads the Crypto-C ME shared or dynamic link master and provider libraries at runtime. For more information, see "FIPS 140-2 Library and Modes of Operation" in the RSA BSAFE Crypto-C ME Developer’s Guide.

The current Crypto-C ME role can be determined calling R_FIPS140_get_role(). The role can be changed by calling R_FIPS140_set_role() with one of the information identifiers listed in Table 4 Crypto-C ME Roles on page 16.

### 3.5 Startup Self-tests

Crypto-C ME provides the ability to configure when power-up self-tests are executed. To operate Crypto-C ME in a FIPS 140-2-compliant manner, the default shipped configuration, which executes the self-tests when the module is first loaded, must be used.

For more information about this configuration setting, see the RSA BSAFE Crypto-C ME Installation Guide.

### 3.6 Random Number Generator

In FIPS 140-2 modes, Crypto-C ME provides a default RNG. For R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140 and R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL, Crypto-C ME provides a FIPS 186-2 PRNG for all operations that require the generation of random numbers. For R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_ECC and R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL_ECC, Crypto-C ME implements a Dual ECDRBG internally.

In all modes, users can choose to use an approved RNG other than the default RNG, including the FIPS 186-2 PRNG (with or without mod q), Dual ECDRBG, or HMAC DRBG when creating a RNG object and setting this object against the operation requiring random number generation (for example, key generation). However, when DSA is used, the RNG used internally is always the FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1 Option 1 with mod q PRNG.

This module also includes a non-approved Entropy RNG that is used to generate seed material for the approved PRNGs.
3.6.1 PRNG Seeding

In the FIPS 140-2 validated library Crypto-C ME implements deterministic random number generators that can be called to generate random data. The quality of the random data output from these RNGs depends on the quality of the supplied seeding (entropy). Crypto-C ME provides internal entropy collection (for example, from high precision timers) where ever possible, but it is strongly recommended to collect entropy from external sources. This is particularly critical if developing on embedded platforms where there are only limited internal entropy sources available. For more information on seeding PRNGs, see "Randomness Recommendations for Security" in RFC 1750.

Setting the R_CR_INFO_ID_RAND_ENTROPY_FUNC identifier specifies that additional entropy be available. R_CR_INFO_ID_RAND_ENTROPY_FUNC is set against the R_CR object, which encapsulates the random number generator, and takes a callback function that the random number generator then uses to gather additional entropy if needed. For more information on R_CR_INFO_ID_RAND_ENTROPY_FUNC, see the RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition Developer’s Guide.

4 Services

The following is the list of service provided by Crypto-C ME. For more information about these functions, see the RSA BSAFE Crypto-C ME Developer’s Guide.

- BIO_append_filename()
- BIO_clear_flags()
- BIO_clear_retry_flags()
- BIO_copy_next_retry()
- BIO_debug_cb()
- BIO_dump()
- BIO_dump_format()
- BIO_dup_chain()
- BIO_f_buffer()
- BIO_f_null()
- BIO_find_type()
- BIO_flags_to_string()
- BIO_flush()
- BIO_free()
- BIO_free_all()
- BIO_get_cb()
- BIO_get_cb_arg()
- BIO_get_close()
- BIO_get_context()  
- BIO_get_ctx()
- BIO_get_fp()
- BIO_get_retry_BIO()
- BIO_get_retry_flags()
- BIO_get_retry_reason()
- BIO_gets()
- BIO_method_name()
- BIO_method_type()
- BIO_new()
- BIO_new_file()
- BIO_new_fp()
- BIO_new_mem()
- BIO_open_file()
- BIO_pop()
- BIO_print_hex()
- BIO_printf()
- BIO_push()
- BIO_puts()
- BIO_read()
- BIO_read_filename()
- BIO_reference_inc()
- BIO_reset()
- BIO_retry_type()
- BIO_rw_filename()
- BIO_s_file()
- BIO_s_mem()
- BIO_s_null()
- BIO_seek()
- BIO_set_bio_cb()
- BIO_set_md()
- BIO_set_cb_arg()
- BIO_set_close()
- BIO_set_flags()
- BIO_set_fp()
- BIO_should_io_special()
- BIO_should_read()
- BIO_should_retry()
- BIO_should_write()
- BIO_tell()
- BIO_write()
- BIO_write_filename()
- PRODUCT_DEFAULT_RESOURCE_LIST()
- PRODUCT_FIPS140_ECC_SWITCH_RESOURCE_LIST()
- PRODUCT_FIPS140_SSL_ECC_SWITCH_RESOURCE_LIST()
- PRODUCT_FIPS140_SSL_SWITCH_RESOURCE_LIST()
- PRODUCT_FIPS140_SWITCH_RESOURCE_LIST()
- PRODUCT_LIBRARY_FREE()
- PRODUCT_LIBRARY_INFO()
- PRODUCT_LIBRARY_INFO_TYPE_FROM_STRING()
- PRODUCT_LIBRARY_INFO_TYPE_TO_STRING()
- PRODUCT_LIBRARY_NEW()
- PRODUCT_LIBRARY_VERSION()
- PRODUCT_NON_FIPS140_SWITCH_RESOURCE_LIST()
- R_CR_asym_decrypt()
- R_CR_asym_decrypt_init()
- R_CR_asym_encrypt()
- R_CR_asym_encrypt_init()
- R_CR_CTX_alg_supported()
- R_CR_CTX_free()
- R_CR_CTX_get_info()
- R_CR_CTX_ids_from_sig_id()
- R_CR_CTX_ids_to_sig_id()
- R_CR_CTX_new()
- R_CR_CTX_set_info()
- R_CR_decrypt()
- R_CR_decrypt_final()
- R_CR_decrypt_init()
- R_CR_decrypt_update()
- R_CR DEFINE_CUSTOM_CIPHER_LIST()
- R_CR DEFINE_CUSTOM_METHOD_TABLE()
- R_CR derive_key()
- R_CR digest()
- R_CR digest_final()
- R_CR digest_init()
• R_CR_set_info()
• R_CR_sign()
• R_CR_sign_final()
• R_CR_sign_init()
• R_CR_sign_update()
• R_CR_SUB_from_string()
• R_CR_SUB_to_string()
• R_CR_TYPE_from_string()
• R_CR_TYPE_to_string()
• R_CR_verify()
• R_CR_verify_final()
• R_CR_verify_init()
• R_CR_verify_mac()
• R_CR_verify_mac_final()
• R_CR_verify_mac_init()
• R_CR_verify_mac_update()
• R_CR_verify_update()
• R_CR_verify_update()
• R_ERROR_EXIT_CODE()
• R_FIPS140_free()
• R_FIPS140_get_default()
• R_FIPS140_get_failure_reason()
• R_FIPS140_get_failure_reason_string()
• R_FIPS140_get_info()
• R_FIPS140_get_interface_version()
• R_FIPS140_get_mode()
• R_FIPS140_get_role()
• R_FIPS140_get_supported_interfaces()
• R_FIPS140_library_free()
• R_FIPS140_library_init()
• R_FIPS140_load_module()
• R_FIPS140_MODE_from_string()
• R_FIPS140_MODE_to_string()
• R_FIPS140_RESULT_from_string()
• R_FIPS140_RESULT_to_string()
• R_FIPS140_ROLE_from_string()
• R_FIPS140_ROLE_to_string()
• R_FIPS140_self_tests_full()
• R_FIPS140_self_tests_short()
• R_FIPS140_set_info()
• R_FIPS140_set_interface_version()
• R_FIPS140_set_mode()
• R_FIPS140_set_role()
• R_FIPS140_STATE_from_string()
• R_FIPS140_STATE_to_string()
• R_LIB_CTX_new()
• R_LIB_CTX_set_info()
• R_lock_ctrl()
• R_lock_get_cb()
• R_lock_get_name()
• R_lock_num()
• R_lock_r()
• R_lock_set_c()
• R_lock_w()
• R_locked_add()
• R_locked_add_get_cb()
• R_locked_add_set_cb()
• R_lockid_new()
• R_lockids_free()
• R_malloc()
• R_PKEY_cmp()
• R_PKEY_CTX_free()
• R_PKEY_CTX_get_info()
• R_PKEY_CTX_get_LIB_CTX()
• R_PKEY_decode_pkcs8()
• R_PKEY_delete_device()
• R_PKEY_encode_pkcs8()
• R_PKEY_FORMAT_from_string()
• R_PKEY_FORMAT_to_string()
• R_PKEY_free()
• R_PKEY_from_binary()
• R_PKEY_from_bio()
• R_PKEY_from_file()
• R_PKEY_from_public_key_binary()
• R_PKEY_get_handle()
• R_PKEY_get_info()
• R_PKEY_get_num_bits()
• R_PKEY_get_num_primes()
• R_PKEY_CTX_get_PKEY_CTX()
• R_PKEY_CTX_set_private_handle()
• R_PKEY_get_public_handle()
• R_PKEY_get_purpose()
• R_PKEY_get_type()
• R_PKEY_iterate_fields()
• R_PKEY_METHOD_free()
• R_PKEY_METHOD_get_flag()
• R_PKEY_METHOD_get_name()
• R_PKEY_METHOD_get_type()
• R_PKEY_new()
• R_PKEY_PASSWORD_TYPE_from_string()
• R_PKEY_PASSWORD_TYPE_to_string()
• R_PKEY_pk_method()
• R_PKEY_print()
• R_PKEY_public_cmp()
• R_PKEY_public_to_bio()
• R_PKEY_public_to_file()
• R_PKEY_read_device()
• R_PKEY_reference_inc()
• R_PKEY_rsa_blinding_lib_start()
• R_PKEY_rsa_no_blinding_lib_start()
• R_PKEY_set_handle()
• R_PKEY_set_info()
• R_PKEY_set_private_handle()
• R_PKEY_set_public_handle()
• R_PKEY_set PURPOSE()
• R_PKEY_to_binary()
• R_PKEY_to_bio()
• R_PKEY_to_file()
• R_PKEY_to_public_key_binary()
• R_PKEY_TYPE_from_string()
• R_PKEY_TYPE_to_string()
• R_PKEY_write_device()
• R_realloc()
• R_remalloc()
• R_RES_LIST_get_item()
• R_RES_LIST_get_resource()
• R_RES_LIST_set_item()
• R_RES_LIST_set_resource()
• R_set_mem_functions()
• R_SKEY_delete_device()
• R_SKEY_free()
• R_SKEY_get_handle()
• R_SKEY_get_info()
• R_SKEY_new()
• R_SKEY_read_device()
• R_SKEY_set_handle()
• R_SKEY_set_info()
• R_SKEY_write_device()
• R_thread_id()
• R_thread_id_get_cb()
• R_thread_id_set_cb()
• R_TIME_cmp()
• R_TIME_CTX_free()
• R_TIME_CTX_new()
5 Acronyms and Definitions

The following table lists and describes the acronyms and definitions used throughout this document.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>Application Programming Interface.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Either a successful or unsuccessful attempt at breaking part or all of a cryptosystem. Various attack types include an algebraic attack, birthday attack, brute force attack, chosen ciphertext attack, chosen plaintext attack, differential cryptanalysis, known plaintext attack, linear cryptanalysis, and middleperson attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Cipher Block Chaining. A mode of encryption in which each ciphertext depends upon all previous ciphertexts. Changing the Initialization Vector (IV) alters the ciphertext produced by successive encryptions of an identical plaintext.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFB</td>
<td>Cipher Feedback. A mode of encryption that produces a stream of ciphertext bits rather than a succession of blocks. In other respects, it has similar properties to the CBC mode of operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRNG</td>
<td>Continuous Random Number Generation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTR</td>
<td>Counter mode of encryption that turns a block cipher into a stream cipher. It generates the next keystream block by encrypting successive values of a counter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>Data Encryption Standard. A symmetric encryption algorithm with a 56-bit key. See also Triple DES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffie-Hellman</td>
<td>The Diffie-Hellman asymmetric key exchange algorithm. There are many variants, but typically two entities exchange some public information (for example, public keys or random values) and combines them with their own private keys to generate a shared session key. As private keys are not transmitted, eavesdroppers are not privy to all of the information that composes the session key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>Digital Signature Algorithm. An asymmetric algorithm for creating digital signatures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRBG</td>
<td>Deterministic Random Bit Generator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual ECDRBG</td>
<td>Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Elliptic Curve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECAES</td>
<td>Elliptic Curve Asymmetric Encryption Scheme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>Electronic Codebook. A mode of encryption that divides a message into blocks and encrypts each block separately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>Elliptic Curve Cryptography.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDH</td>
<td>Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDSA</td>
<td>Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECIES</td>
<td>Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encryption</td>
<td>The transformation of plaintext into an apparently less readable form (called ciphertext) through a mathematical process. The ciphertext can be read by anyone who has the key that decrypts (undoes the encryption) the ciphertext.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPS</td>
<td>Federal Information Processing Standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCM</td>
<td>Galois/Counter Mode. A mode of encryption that combines the Counter mode of encryption with Galois field multiplication for authentication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMAC</td>
<td>Galois Message Authentication Code. An authentication only variant of GCM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC DRBG</td>
<td>HMAC Deterministic Random Bit Generator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Initialization Vector. Used as a seed value for an encryption operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAT</td>
<td>Known Answer Test.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key</td>
<td>A string of bits used in cryptography, allowing people to encrypt and decrypt data. Can be used to perform other mathematical operations as well. Given a cipher, a key determines the mapping of the plaintext to the ciphertext. The types of keys include distributed key, private key, public key, secret key, session key, shared key, subkey, symmetric key, and weak key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD5</td>
<td>A secure hash algorithm created by Ron Rivest. MD5 hashes an arbitrary-length input into a 16-byte digest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIST</td>
<td>National Institute of Standards and Technology. A division of the US Department of Commerce (formerly known as the NBS) which produces security and cryptography-related standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFB</td>
<td>Output Feedback. A mode of encryption in which the cipher is decoupled from its ciphertext.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Operating System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Personal Computer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>Personal Digital Assistant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>PowerPC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>privacy</td>
<td>The state or quality of being secluded from the view or presence of others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private key</td>
<td>The secret key in public key cryptography. Primarily used for decryption but also used for encryption with digital signatures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRNG</td>
<td>Pseudo-random Number Generator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC2</td>
<td>Block cipher developed by Ron Rivest as an alternative to the DES. It has a block size of 64 bits and a variable key size. It is a legacy cipher and RC5 should be used in preference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC4</td>
<td>Symmetric algorithm designed by Ron Rivest using variable length keys (usually 40-bit or 128-bit).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC5</td>
<td>Block cipher designed by Ron Rivest. It is parameterizable in its word size, key length, and number of rounds. Typical use involves a block size of 64 bits, a key size of 128 bits, and either 16 or 20 iterations of its round function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNG</td>
<td>Random Number Generator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Public key (asymmetric) algorithm providing the ability to encrypt data and create and verify digital signatures. RSA stands for Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, the developers of the RSA public key cryptosystem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>Secure Hash Algorithm. An algorithm that creates a unique hash value for each possible input. SHA takes an arbitrary input that is hashed into a 160-bit digest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-1</td>
<td>A revision to SHA to correct a weakness. It produces 160-bit digests. SHA-1 takes an arbitrary input that is hashed into a 20-byte digest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-2</td>
<td>The NIST-mandated successor to SHA-1, to complement the Advanced Encryption Standard. It is a family of hash algorithms (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512) that produce digests of 224, 256, 384 and 512 bits respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triple DES</td>
<td>A variant of DES that uses three 56-bit keys.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6 Contacting RSA

The RSA Web site contains the latest news, security bulletins and information about coming events.

The RSA BSAFE Web site contains product information.

The RSA Laboratories Web site contains frequently asked questions.

6.1 Support and Service

If you have any questions or require additional information, see RSA Support or RSA SecurCare Online.

6.2 Feedback

We welcome your feedback on the documentation produced by RSA. Please e-mail us at userdocs@rsa.com.