Security Policy for FIPS 140-2 Validation

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (cng.sys) in
Microsoft Windows 8.1 Enterprise
Windows Server 2012 R2
Windows Storage Server 2012 R2
Surface Pro 3
Surface Pro 2
Surface Pro
Surface 2
Surface
Windows RT 8.1
Windows Phone 8.1
Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry Enterprise
StorSimple 8000 Series

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1 Introduction

This document specifies the security policy for the Microsoft Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (CNG.SYS) as described in FIPS PUB 140-2.

Microsoft Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is a FIPS 140-2 Level 1 compliant, general purpose, software-based, cryptographic module residing at kernel mode level of the Microsoft Windows 8.1 Enterprise, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Storage Server 2012 R2, Surface Pro 3, Surface Pro 2, Surface Pro, Surface 2, Surface, Windows RT 8.1, Windows Phone 8.1, Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry Enterprise, and StorSimple 8000 Series (herein referred to as Windows 8.1 OEs) operating system. Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library runs as a kernel mode export driver, and provides cryptographic services, through their documented interfaces, to Windows 8.1 OEs kernel components.

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library encapsulates several different cryptographic algorithms in an easy-to-use cryptographic module accessible via the Microsoft CNG (Cryptography, Next Generation) API. It also supports several cryptographic algorithms accessible via a Fips function table request IRP (I/O request packet). Windows 8.1 OEs kernel mode components can use general-purpose FIPS 140-2 Level 1 compliant cryptography in Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library.

BitLocker and BitLocker to Go are a good example of usage of the Microsoft Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (CNG.SYS). In Figure 1 below, BitLocker functionality is contained in the Full Volume Encryption module (FVEVOL.SYS), which calls CNG.SYS for the actual cryptographic operations. FVEVOL.SYS does not implement any cryptographic operations in and of itself. BitLocker uses FVEVOL.SYS to encrypt/decrypt physical hard drives that are accessed via the MiniPort driver and Partition Manager. Similarly, Bitlocker to Go uses FVEVOL.SYS to encrypt/decrypt USB storage devices that are accessed via the USBStor driver and Partition Manager. The FVEVOL.SYS usage of CNG.SYS cryptographic operations is the same for both BitLocker and BitLocker to Go encrypted volumes.
1.1 List of Cryptographic Module Binary Executables
CNG.SYS – Versions 6.3.9600 and 6.3.9600.17042 for Windows 8.1 OEs

1.2 Brief Module Description
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is the kernel mode export driver for the Cryptography, Next Generation (CNG) API.

1.3 Validated Platforms
The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library component listed in Section 1.1 was validated using the following machine configurations:

1. Microsoft Windows 8.1 Enterprise (x86) running on a Dell PowerEdge SC440 without AES-NI;
2. Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry Enterprise (x86) running on a Dell PowerEdge SC440 without AES-NI;
3. Microsoft Windows 8.1 Enterprise (x86) running on a Dell Dimension E521 without AES-NI;
4. Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry Enterprise (x86) running on a Dell Dimension E521 without AES-NI;
5. Microsoft Windows 8.1 Enterprise (x86) running on an Intel Core i7 with AES-NI running on an Intel Maho Bay;
6. Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry Enterprise (x86) running on an Intel Core i7 with AES-NI running on an Intel Maho Bay;
7. Microsoft Windows 8.1 Enterprise (x86) running on an HP Compaq Pro 6305 with AES-NI;
8. Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry Enterprise (x86) running on an HP Compaq Pro 6305 with AES-NI;
9. Microsoft Windows 8.1 Enterprise (x64) running on a Dell PowerEdge SC440 without AES-NI;
10. Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry Enterprise (x64) running on a Dell PowerEdge SC440 without AES-NI;  
11. Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on a Dell PowerEdge SC440 without AES-NI;  
12. Microsoft Windows Storage Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on a Dell PowerEdge SC440 without AES-NI;  
13. Microsoft Windows 8.1 Enterprise (x64) running on a Dell Dimension E521 without AES-NI;  
14. Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry Enterprise (x64) running on a Dell Dimension E521 without AES-NI;  
15. Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on a Dell Dimension E521 without AES-NI;  
16. Microsoft Windows Storage Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on a Dell Dimension E521 without AES-NI;  
17. Microsoft Windows 8.1 Enterprise (x64) running on an Intel Core i7 with AES-NI running on an Intel Maho Bay;  
18. Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry Enterprise (x64) running on an Intel Core i7 with AES-NI running on an Intel Maho Bay;  
19. Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on an Intel Core i7 with AES-NI running on an Intel Maho Bay;  
20. Microsoft Windows Storage Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on an Intel Core i7 with AES-NI running on an Intel Maho Bay;  
21. Microsoft Windows 8.1 Pro (x64) running on an Intel x64 Processor with AES-NI running on a Microsoft Surface Pro;  
22. Microsoft Windows 8.1 Pro (x64) running on an Intel i5 with AES-NI running on a Microsoft Surface Pro 2;  
23. Microsoft Windows 8.1 Enterprise (x64) running on an HP Compaq Pro 6305 with AES-NI;  
24. Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry Enterprise (x64) running on an HP Compaq Pro 6305 with AES-NI;  
25. Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on an HP Compaq Pro 6305 with AES-NI;  
26. Microsoft Windows Storage Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on an HP Compaq Pro 6305 with AES-NI;  
27. Microsoft Windows RT 8.1 (ARMv7 Thumb-2) running on an NVIDIA Tegra 3 Tablet;  
28. Microsoft Windows RT 8.1 (ARMv7 Thumb-2) running on a Microsoft Surface RT;  
29. Microsoft Windows RT 8.1 (ARMv7 Thumb-2) running on a Microsoft Surface 2;  
30. Microsoft Windows RT 8.1 (ARMv7 Thumb-2) running on a Qualcomm Tablet;  
31. Microsoft Windows Phone 8.1 (ARMv7 Thumb-2) running on a Qualcomm Snapdragon S4 running on a Windows Phone 8.1;  
32. Microsoft Windows Phone 8.1 (ARMv7 Thumb-2) running on a Qualcomm Snapdragon 400 running on a Windows Phone 8.1;  
33. Microsoft Windows Phone 8.1 (ARMv7 Thumb-2) running on a Qualcomm Snapdragon 800 running on a Windows Phone 8.1;  
34. Microsoft Windows 8.1 Enterprise (x64) running on a Dell Inspiron 660s without AES-NI and with PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3;  
35. Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry Enterprise (x64) running on a Dell Inspiron 660s without AES-NI and with PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3;  
36. Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on a Dell Inspiron 660s without AES-NI and with PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3;  
37. Microsoft Windows Storage Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on a Dell Inspiron 660s without AES-NI and with PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3;
38. Microsoft Windows 8.1 Enterprise (x64) running on an Intel Core i5 with AES-NI and with PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3 running on a Microsoft Surface Pro 2;
39. Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry Enterprise (x64) running on an Intel Core i7 with AES-NI and with PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3 running on an Intel Maho Bay;
40. Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on an Intel Core i7 with AES-NI and with PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3 running on an Intel Maho Bay;
41. Microsoft Windows Storage Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on an Intel Core i7 with AES-NI and with PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3 running on an Intel Maho Bay;
42. Microsoft Windows 8.1 Enterprise (x64) running on an HP Compaq Pro 6305 with AES-NI and with PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3;
43. Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry Enterprise (x64) running on an HP Compaq Pro 6305 with AES-NI and with PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3;
44. Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on an HP Compaq Pro 6305 with AES-NI and with PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3;
45. Microsoft Windows Storage Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on an HP Compaq Pro 6305 with AES-NI and with PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3;
46. Windows Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on a Microsoft StorSimple 8100 with an Intel Xeon E5-2648L without AES-NI;
47. Windows Server 2012 R2 (x64) running on a Microsoft StorSimple 8100 with an Intel Xeon E5-2648L with AES-NI;
48. Microsoft Windows 8.1 Pro (x64) running on an Intel Core i7 with AES-NI and with PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3 running on a Microsoft Surface Pro 3

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library maintains FIPS 140-2 validation compliance (according to FIPS 140-2 PUB Implementation Guidance G.5) on the following platforms:

  x86 Microsoft Windows 8.1
  x86 Microsoft Windows 8.1 Pro

  x64 Microsoft Windows 8.1
  x64 Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 Datacenter

  x64-AES-NI Microsoft Windows 8.1
  x64-AES-NI Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 Datacenter

1.4 Cryptographic Boundary

The software binary that comprises the cryptographic boundary for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is CNG(SYS). The crypto boundary is also defined by the enclosure of the computer system, on which Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is to be executed. The physical configuration of Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library, as defined in FIPS-140-2, is multi-chip standalone.
2 Security Policy

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library operates under several rules that encapsulate its security policy.

- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is supported on Windows 8.1 OEs.
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library operates in FIPS mode of operation only when used with the FIPS approved version of Windows 8.1 OEs Winload OS Loader (winload.exe) validated to FIPS 140-2 under Cert. #2352 for Windows 8.1 OEs operating in FIPS mode.
- Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Storage Server 2012 R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows Phone 8.1, and Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry are operating systems supporting a “single user” mode where there is only one interactive user during a logon session.
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is only in its Approved mode of operation when Windows is booted normally, meaning Debug mode is disabled and Driver Signing enforcement is enabled.
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library operates in its FIPS mode of operation only when one of the following DWORD registry values is set to 1:
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\FIPSAIgorithmPolicy\Enabled
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration\SelfTestAlgorithms
- The registry security policy settings can be observed with the regedit tool to determine whether the module is in FIPS mode.
- All users assume either the User or Cryptographic Officer roles.
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library provides no authentication of users. Roles are assumed implicitly. The authentication provided by the Windows 8.1 OEs operating system is not in the scope of the validation.
- All cryptographic services implemented within Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library are available to the User and Cryptographic Officer roles.
- In order to invoke the approved mode of operation, the user must call FIPS approved functions.
The following diagram illustrates the master components of the module:

![Diagram of PC components](image)

**Figure 2 Master components of cng.sys crypto module**
2.1 FIPS 140-2 Approved Algorithms

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library implements the following FIPS-140-2 Approved algorithms.

- FIPS 180-4 SHS (SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) (Cert. #2373)
- FIPS 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 HMAC (Cert. #1773)
- Triple-DES (2 key\(^1\) and 3 key) in ECB, CBC, CFB8 and CFB64 modes (Cert. #1692)
- AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in ECB, CBC, CFB8, CFB128, and CTR modes (Cert. #2832)
- AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in CCM, CMAC, and GMAC modes (Cert. #2832)
- AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 GCM decryption (Cert. #2832)
- FIPS 186-4 RSA (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS) digital signatures (Certs. #1493 and #1519) and FIPS 186-4 RSA key-pair generation (Cert. #1487)
- FIPS 186-4 ECDSA with the following NIST curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 (Cert. #505)
- KAS – SP 800-56A (Cert. #47) Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement; key establishment methodology provides 80 bits\(^2\) and 112 bits of encryption strength
- KAS – SP 800-56A (Cert. #47) EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256-bits of encryption strength
- SP 800-90 AES-256 counter mode DRBG (Cert. #489)
- SP 800-90 Dual-EC DRBG (Cert. #523)
- SP 800-108 Key Derivation Function (KDF) (Cert. #30)
- SP 800-132 KDF (also known as PBKDF) (vendor affirmed)
- SP 800-135 IKEv1, IKEv2, and TLS KDF primitives (Cert. #323)

2.2 Non-Approved Algorithms

- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library implements the SHA-1 hash, which is disallowed for use in digital signature generation after December 31, 2013. It can be used for digital signature verification legacy-use. Its use is Acceptable for non-digital signature generation applications.
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library implements RSA 1024-bits for digital signature generation, which is disallowed after December 31, 2013. RSA 2048-bits and 3072-bits are also supported, which are Acceptable.
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library supports SP 800-56A Key Agreement using Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) with parameter FA (p=1024, q=160), which is disallowed after December 31, 2013. FB (p=2048, q=224) and FC (p=2048, q=256) are Acceptable.
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library supports the following non-Approved algorithms allowed for use in FIPS mode.
  - AES Key Wrap (AES Cert. #2832; key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)

\(^1\) Two-key Triple-DES is restricted and legacy-use according to NIST SP 800-131A. Users should start transitioning away from this algorithm to better, stronger choices.

\(^2\) DH with 80 bits of encryption strength is no longer allowed in FIPS mode. The minimum requirement has increased to 112 bits effective January 1, 2014.
• Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library has a non-approved algorithm implementation of AES GCM encryption.
• Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library implements Continuous Random Number Generator Tests (CRNGT) for the AES-CTR DRBG, Dual-EC DRBG, and the non-Approved RNG (entropy pool).
• Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library also supports the following non FIPS 140-2 approved algorithms, though these algorithms may not be used when operating the modules in a FIPS compliant manner.
  o RSA encrypt/decrypt
  o RC2, RC4, MD2, MD4, MD5, HMAC MD5.
  o DES in ECB, CBC, CFB8 and CFB64 modes
  o Legacy CAPI KDF (proprietary)
  o NDRNG

2.3 Cryptographic Bypass
Cryptographic bypass is not supported by Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library.

2.4 Machine Configurations
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library was tested using the machine configurations listed in Section 1.3 - Validated Platforms.

3 Operational Environment
The operational environment for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is Windows 8.1 OEs running on the software and hardware configurations listed in Section 1.3 - Validated Platforms. Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library services are available to all kernel mode components, which are part of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB).

4 Integrity Chain of Trust
The Windows OS Loader checks the integrity of Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library before starting it. This integrity check is based on the verification of an RSA signature over the binary using a 2048-bit key and a SHA-256 hash (Cert. #2373), and verifying that the signing certificate chains up to a known root authority.

5 Ports and Interfaces
As shown in Figure 3, the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library module is accessed through one of four logical interfaces. Kernel applications requiring cryptographic services use the BCRYPT or legacy Fips APIs detailed in Section 0. Entropy sources supply random bits to the random number generator

---

3 Applications may not use any of these non-FIPS algorithms if they need to be FIPS compliant. To operate the module in a FIPS compliant manner, applications must only use FIPS-approved algorithms.
through the entropy APIs. Finally, both kernel mode and user mode random number generators use the SystemPrng interface to obtain seed material for their PRNGs.

The following functions are used by Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library to expose cryptographic functionality to its callers.

- BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider
- BCryptCreateHash
- BCryptDecrypt
- BCryptDeriveKey
- BCryptDestroyHash
- BCryptDestroyKey
- BCryptDestroySecret
- BCryptDuplicateHash
- BCryptDuplicateKey
- BCryptEncrypt
- BCryptExportKey
- BCryptFinalizeKeyPair
- BCryptFinishHash
- BCryptFreeBuffer
- BCryptGenerateKeyPair
- BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey
- BCryptGenRandom
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library

- BCryptGetProperty
- BCryptHashData
- BCryptImportKey
- BCryptImportKeyPair
- BCryptKeyDerivation
- BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider
- BCryptSecretAgreement
- BCryptSetProperty
- BCryptSignHash
- BCryptVerifySignature
- SystemPrng

The following functions are exposed to entropy sources:
- EntropyRegisterSource
- EntropyUnregisterSource
- EntropyProvideData

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library has additional export functions described in subsequent sections.

5.1 Control Input Interface
The Control Input Interface for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library consists of the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library cryptographic export functions enumerated above. Options for control operations are passed as input parameters to these functions.

5.2 Status Output Interface
The Status Output Interface for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library consists of the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library export functions. For each function, the status information is returned to the caller as the return value from the function.

5.3 Data Output Interface
The Data Output Interface for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library consists of the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library export functions.

5.4 Data Input Interface
The Data Input Interface for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library consists of the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library export functions. Data and options are passed to the interface as input parameters to the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library export functions. Data Input is kept separate from Control Input by passing Data Input in separate parameters from Control Input.
5.5 Non-Security Relevant Interfaces

5.5.1 Configuration
These are not cryptographic functions. They are used to configure cryptographic providers on the system, and are provided for informational purposes. Please see http://msdn.microsoft.com for details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCryptEnumAlgorithms</td>
<td>Enumerates the algorithms for a given set of operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptEnumProviders</td>
<td>Returns a list of providers for a given algorithm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptRegisterConfigChangeNotify</td>
<td>This API differs slightly between User-Mode and Kernel-Mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptResolveProviders</td>
<td>This is the main API in Crypto configuration. It resolves queries against the set of providers currently registered on the local system and the configuration information specified in the machine and domain configuration tables, returning an ordered list of references to one or more providers matching the specified criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptUnregisterConfigChangeNotify</td>
<td>This API differs slightly between User-Mode and Kernel-Mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptGetFipsAlgorithmMode</td>
<td>Used by applications to determine whether Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is operating in FIPS mode. Some applications use the value returned by this API to alter their own behavior, such as blocking the use of some SSL versions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5.2 Non-approved APIs
The following table lists other non-security relevant or non-approved APIs exported from the crypto module.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCryptDeriveKeyCapi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptDeriveKeyPBKDF2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SslDecryptPacket</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SslEncryptPacket</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SslExportKey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SslFreeObject</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SslImportKey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SslLookupCipherLengths</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SslLookupCipherSuiteInfo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SslOpenProvider</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SslIncrementProviderReferenceCount</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6  Specification of Roles
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library provides User and Cryptographic Officer roles (as defined in FIPS 140-2). These roles share all the services implemented in the cryptographic module.

When a kernel mode component requests the crypto module to generate keys, the keys are generated, used, and deleted as requested. There are no implicit keys associated with a kernel component. Each kernel component may have numerous keys.

6.1  Maintenance Roles
Maintenance roles are not supported.

6.2  Multiple Concurrent Interactive Operators
There is only one interactive operator in Single User Mode. When run in this configuration, multiple concurrent interactive operators are not supported.

6.3  Operator Authentication
The module does not provide authentication. Roles are implicitly assumed based on the services that are executed.

7  Services
The following list contains all services available to an operator. All services are accessible to both the User and Crypto Officer roles.

7.1  Cryptographic Module Power Up and Power Down
7.1.1  DriverEntry
Each Windows 8.1 OEs driver must have a standard initialization routine DriverEntry in order to be loaded. The Windows 8.1 OEs Loader is responsible to call the DriverEntry routine. The DriverEntry routine must have the following prototype.

    NTSTATUS (*PDRIVER_INITIALIZE) (  
        IN    PDRIVER_OBJECT    DriverObject,  
        IN    PUNICODE_STRING   RegistryPath);  

The input DriverObject represents the driver within the Windows 8.1 OEs system. Its pointer allows the DriverEntry routine to set an appropriate entry point for its DriverUnload routine in the driver object.

The RegistryPath input to the DriverEntry routine points to a counted Unicode string that specifies a path to the driver's registry key \Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\CNG.
7.1.2 DriverUnload
It is the entry point for the driver's unload routine. The pointer to the routine is set by the DriverEntry
routine in the DriverUnload field of the DriverObject when the driver initializes. An Unload routine is
declared as follows:

```c
VOID (*PDRTER_UNLOAD) ( 
    IN PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject);
```
When the driver is no longer needed, the Windows 8.1 OEs Kernel is responsible to call the DriverUnload
routine of the associated DriverObject.

7.2 Algorithm Providers and Properties

7.2.1 BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider( 
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE *phAlgorithm, 
    LPCWSTR pszAlgId, 
    LPCWSTR pszImplementation, 
    ULONG dwFlags);
The BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider() function has four parameters: algorithm handle output to the
opened algorithm provider, desired algorithm ID input, an optional specific provider name input, and
optional flags. This function loads and initializes a CNG provider for a given algorithm, and returns a
handle to the opened algorithm provider on success.

Unless the calling function specifies the name of the provider, the default provider is used.

The calling function must pass the BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE_HMAC_FLAG flag in order to use an HMAC
function with a hash algorithm.

7.2.2 BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider( 
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm, 
    ULONG dwFlags);
This function closes an algorithm provider handle opened by a call to BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider() function.

7.2.3 BCryptSetProperty
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptSetProperty( 
    BCRYPT_HANDLE hObject, 
    LPCWSTR pszProperty, 
    UCHAR pInput, 
    ULONG cInput, 
    ULONG dwFlags);
The BCryptSetProperty() function sets the value of a named property for a CNG object. The CNG object is a handle, the property name is a NULL terminated string, and the value of the property is a length-specified byte string.

### 7.2.4 BCryptGetProperty

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptGetProperty(
    BCRYPT_HANDLE hObject,
    LPCWSTR pszProperty,
    PCHAR pbOutput,
    ULONG cbOutput,
    ULONG *pcbResult,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The BCryptGetProperty() function retrieves the value of a named property for a CNG object. The CNG object is a handle, the property name is a NULL terminated string, and the value of the property is a length-specified byte string.

### 7.2.5 BCryptFreeBuffer

```c
VOID WINAPI BCryptFreeBuffer(
    PVOID pvBuffer);
```

Some of the CNG functions allocate memory on caller’s behalf. The BCryptFreeBuffer() function frees memory that was allocated by such a CNG function.

### 7.3 Random Number Generation

#### 7.3.1 BCryptGenRandom

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptGenRandom(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
    PCHAR pbBuffer,
    ULONG cbBuffer,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The BCryptGenRandom() function fills a buffer with random bytes. There are two random number generation algorithms:

- **BCRYPT_RNG_ALGORITHM.** This is the AES-256 counter mode based random generator as defined in SP800-90.
- **BCRYPT_RNG_DUAL_EC_ALGORITHM.** This is the Dual-EC DRBG based random generator as defined in SP800-90.

During the function initialization, a seed is obtained from the output of the SystemPrng function. This provides the necessary entropy for the RNGs available through this function.

#### 7.3.2 SystemPrng

```c
BOOL SystemPrng(
```
The SystemPrng() function fills a buffer with random bytes. It generates these bytes by taking the output of a cascade of two SP800-90 AES-256 counter mode based DRBGs in kernel-mode and four cascaded SP 800-90 AES-256 DRBGs in user-mode; all are seeded from the Windows entropy pool. The Windows entropy pool is populated from the following sources:

- An initial entropy value provided by the Windows OS Loader at boot time.
- The values of the high-resolution CPU cycle counter at times when hardware interrupts are received.
- Random values gathered from the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), if one is available on the system.
- Random values gathered by calling the RDRAND CPU instruction, if supported by the CPU.

The Windows RNG infrastructure located in cng.sys continues to gather entropy from these sources during normal operation, and the DRBG cascade is periodically reseeded with new entropy.

### 7.3.3 EntropyRegisterSource

```c
NTSTATUS EntropyRegisterSource(
    ENTROPY_SOURCE_HANDLE * phEntropySource,
    ENTROPY_SOURCE_TYPE   entropySourceType,
    PCWSTR                entropySourceName);
```

This function is used to obtain a handle that can be used to contribute randomness to the Windows entropy pool. The handle is returned in the phEntropySource parameter. For this function, entropySource must be set to ENTROPY_SOURCE_TYPE_HIGH_PUSH, and entropySourceName must be a Unicode string describing the entropy source.

### 7.3.4 EntropyUnregisterSource

```c
NTSTATUS EntropyUnregisterSource(
    ENTROPY_SOURCE_HANDLE hEntropySource);
```

This function is used to destroy a handle created with EntropyRegisterSource().

### 7.3.5 EntropyProvideData

```c
NTSTATUS EntropyProvideData(
    ENTROPY_SOURCE_HANDLE hEntropySource,
    PCBYTE              pbData,
    SIZE_T              cbData,
    ULONG               entropyEstimateInMilliBits );
```

This function is used to contribute entropy to the Windows entropy pool. hEntropySource must be a handle returned by an earlier call to EntropyRegisterSource. The caller provides cbData bytes in the
buffer pointed to by pbData, as well as an estimate (in the entropyEstimateInMilliBits parameter) of how many millibits of entropy are contained in these bytes.

7.4 Key and Key-Pair Generation

7.4.1 BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE   hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE *phKey,
    UCHAR    pbKeyObject,
    ULONG    cbKeyObject,
    UCHAR    pbSecret,
    ULONG    cbSecret,
    ULONG    dwFlags);
```

The BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey() function generates a symmetric key object for use with a symmetric encryption or key derivation algorithm from a supplied key value. The calling application must specify a handle to the algorithm provider created with the BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider() function. The algorithm specified when the provider was created must support symmetric key encryption or key derivation.

7.4.2 BCryptGenerateKeyPair

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptGenerateKeyPair(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE   hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE *phKey,
    ULONG    dwLength,
    ULONG    dwFlags);
```

The BCryptGenerateKeyPair() function creates an empty public/private key pair. After creating a key using this function, call the BCryptSetProperty() function to set its properties. The key pair can be used only after BCryptFinalizeKeyPair() function is called.

7.4.3 BCryptFinalizeKeyPair

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptFinalizeKeyPair(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey,
    ULONG    dwFlags);
```

The BCryptFinalizeKeyPair() function completes a public/private key pair import or generation. The key pair cannot be used until this function has been called. After this function has been called, the BCryptSetProperty() function can no longer be used for this key.

7.4.4 BCryptDuplicateKey

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDuplicateKey(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE *phKey);
```
BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE  *phNewKey,
PUCHAR    pbKeyObject,
ULONG     cbKeyObject,
ULONG     dwFlags);
The BCryptDuplicateKey() function creates a duplicate of a symmetric key.

7.4.5  BCryptDestroyKey
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDestroyKey(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey);
The BCryptDestroyKey() function destroys a key.

7.5  Key Entry and Output
7.5.1  BCryptImportKey
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptImportKey(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hImportKey,
    LPCWSTR pszBlobType,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE *phKey,
    PUCHAR    pbKeyObject,
    ULONG     cbKeyObject,
    PUCHAR    pblInput,
    ULONG     cblInput,
    ULONG     dwFlags);
The BCryptImportKey() function imports a symmetric key from a key blob.

*hAlgorithm [in] is the handle of the algorithm provider to import the key. This handle is obtained by calling the BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider function.

*hImportKey [in, out] is not currently used and should be NULL.

*pszBlobType [in] is a null-terminated Unicode string that contains an identifier that specifies the type of BLOB that is contained in the pblInput buffer. pszBlobType can be one of BCRYPT_AES_WRAP_KEY_BLOB, BCRYPT_KEY_DATA_BLOB and BCRYPT_OPAQUE_KEY_BLOB.

*phKey [out] is a pointer to a BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE that receives the handle of the imported key that is used in subsequent functions that require a key, such as BCryptEncrypt. This handle must be released when it is no longer needed by passing it to the BCryptDestroyKey function.

*pbKeyObject [out] is a pointer to a buffer that receives the imported key object. The cbKeyObject parameter contains the size of this buffer. The required size of this buffer can be obtained by calling the BCryptGetProperty function to get the BCRYPT_OBJECT_LENGTH property. This will provide the size of the key object for the specified algorithm. This memory can only be freed after the phKey key handle is destroyed.
**7.5.2 BCRYPTImportKeyPair**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCRYPTImportKeyPair(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hImportKey,
    LPCWSTR pszBlobType,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE *phKey,
    UCHAR pblnput,
    ULONG cblnput,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The `BCRYPTImportKeyPair()` function is used to import a public/private key pair from a key blob.

- **hAlgorithm** [in] is the handle of the algorithm provider to import the key. This handle is obtained by calling the `BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider` function.
- **hImportKey** [in, out] is not currently used and should be NULL.
- **pszBlobType** [in] is a null-terminated Unicode string that contains an identifier that specifies the type of BLOB that is contained in the `pblnput` buffer. This can be one of the following values:
  - `BCRYPT_DH_PRIVATE_BLOB`, `BCRYPT_DH_PUBLIC_BLOB`, `BCRYPT_ECCPRIVATE_BLOB`, `BCRYPT_ECCPUBLIC_BLOB`, `BCRYPT_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB`, `BCRYPT_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB`, `BCRYPT_RSAPRIVATE_BLOB`, `BCRYPT_RSAPUBLIC_BLOB`, `LEGACY_DH_PUBLIC_BLOB`, `LEGACY_DH_PRIVATE_BLOB`, `LEGACY_RSAPRIVATE_BLOB`, `LEGACY_RSAPUBLIC_BLOB`.
- **phKey** [out] is a pointer to a `BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE` that receives the handle of the imported key. This handle is used in subsequent functions that require a key, such as `BCryptSignHash`. This handle must be released when it is no longer needed by passing it to the `BCryptDestroyKey` function.
7.5.3 BCRYPTExportKey

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCRYPTExportKey(
   BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey,
   BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hExportKey,
   LPCWSTR pszBlobType,
   PCHAR pbOutput,
   ULONG cbOutput,
   ULONG *pcbResult,
   ULONG dwFlags);

The BCRYPTExportKey() function exports a key to a memory blob that can be persisted for later use.

hExportKey [in, out] is not currently used and should be set to NULL.

pszBlobType [in] is a null-terminated Unicode string that contains an identifier that specifies the type of BLOB to export. This can be one of the following values: BCRYPT_AES_WRAP_KEY_BLOB, BCRYPT_DH_PRIVATE_BLOB, BCRYPT_DH_PUBLIC_BLOB, BCRYPT_ECCPRIVATE_BLOB, BCRYPT_ECCPUBLIC_BLOB, BCRYPT_KEY_DATA_BLOB, BCRYPT_OPAQUE_KEY_BLOB, BCRYPT_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB, BCRYPT_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB, BCRYPT_RSAPUBLIC_BLOB, LEGACY_DH_PRIVATE_BLOB, LEGACY_DH_PUBLIC_BLOB, LEGACY_RSAPUBLIC_BLOB.

pbOutput is the address of a buffer that receives the key BLOB. The cbOutput parameter contains the size of this buffer. If this parameter is NULL, this function will place the required size, in bytes, in the ULONG pointed to by the pcbResult parameter.

cbOutput [in] contains the size, in bytes, of the pbOutput buffer.

pcbResult [out] is a pointer to a ULONG that receives the number of bytes that were copied to the pbOutput buffer. If the pbOutput parameter is NULL, this function will place the required size, in bytes, in the ULONG pointed to by this parameter.

dwFlags [in] is a set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. No flags are defined for this function.

7.6 Encryption and Decryption

7.6.1 BCRYPTEncrypt

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCRYPTEncrypt(


The BCryptEncrypt() function encrypts a block of data of given length.

*hKey [in, out]* is the handle of the key to use to encrypt the data. This handle is obtained from one of the key creation functions, such as BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey, BCryptGenerateKeyPair, or BCryptImportKey.

*pInput [in]* is the address of a buffer that contains the plaintext to be encrypted. The cbInput parameter contains the size of the plaintext to encrypt. For more information, see Remarks.

cbInput [in] is the number of bytes in the pInput buffer to encrypt.

*pPaddingInfo [in, optional]* is a pointer to a structure that contains padding information. The actual type of structure this parameter points to depends on the value of the dwFlags parameter. This parameter is only used with asymmetric keys and authenticated encryption modes (i.e. AES-CCM and AES-GCM). It must be NULL otherwise.

*pIV [in, out, optional]* is the address of a buffer that contains the initialization vector (IV)\(^4\) to use during encryption. The cbIV parameter contains the size of this buffer. This function will modify the contents of this buffer. If you need to reuse the IV later, make sure you make a copy of this buffer before calling this function. This parameter is optional and can be NULL if no IV is used. The required size of the IV can be obtained by calling the BCryptGetProperty function to get the BCRYPT_BLOCK_LENGTH property. This will provide the size of a block for the algorithm, which is also the size of the IV.

cbIV [in] contains the size, in bytes, of the pIV buffer.

*pOutput [out, optional]* is the address of a buffer that will receive the ciphertext produced by this function. The cbOutput parameter contains the size of this buffer. For more information, see Remarks.

If this parameter is NULL, this function will calculate the size needed for the ciphertext and return the size in the location pointed to by the pcbResult parameter.

---

\(^4\) The IV being passed into the BCryptEncrypt() API needs to be generated by a validated cryptographic module or an approved DRBG.
cbOutput [in] contains the size, in bytes, of the pbOutput buffer. This parameter is ignored if the pbOutput parameter is NULL.

pcbResult [out] is a pointer to a ULONG variable that receives the number of bytes copied to the pbOutput buffer. If pbOutput is NULL, this receives the size, in bytes, required for the ciphertext.

dwFlags [in] is a set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. The allowed set of flags depends on the type of key specified by the hKey parameter. If the key is a symmetric key, this can be zero or the following value: BCRYPT_BLOCK_PADDING. If the key is an asymmetric key, this can be one of the following values: BCRYPT_PAD_NONE, BCRYPT_PAD_OAEP, BCRYPT_PAD_PKCS1.

7.6.2 BCryptDecrypt

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDecrypt(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey,
    PCHAR pbInput,
    ULONG cbInput,
    VOID *pPaddingInfo,
    PCHAR pbIV,
    ULONG cbIV,
    PCHAR pbOutput,
    ULONG cbOutput,
    ULONG *pcbResult,
    ULONG dwFlags);

The BCryptDecrypt() function decrypts a block of data of given length.

hKey [in, out] is the handle of the key to use to decrypt the data. This handle is obtained from one of the key creation functions, such as BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey, BCryptGenerateKeyPair, or BCryptImportKey.

pbInput [in] is the address of a buffer that contains the ciphertext to be decrypted. The cbInput parameter contains the size of the ciphertext to decrypt. For more information, see Remarks.

cbInput [in] is the number of bytes in the pbInput buffer to decrypt.

pPaddingInfo [in, optional] is a pointer to a structure that contains padding information. The actual type of structure this parameter points to depends on the value of the dwFlags parameter. This parameter is only used with asymmetric keys and authenticated encryption modes (i.e. AES-CCM and AES-GCM). It must be NULL otherwise.

pbIV [in, out, optional] is the address of a buffer that contains the initialization vector (IV) to use during decryption. The cbIV parameter contains the size of this buffer. This function will modify the contents of this buffer. If you need to reuse the IV later, make sure you make a copy of this buffer before calling this function. This parameter is optional and can be NULL if no IV is used. The required size of the IV can be
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obtained by calling the BCryptGetProperty function to get the BCRYPT_BLOCK_LENGTH property. This will provide the size of a block for the algorithm, which is also the size of the IV.

cbIV [in] contains the size, in bytes, of the pbIV buffer.

pbOutput [out, optional] is the address of a buffer to receive the plaintext produced by this function. The cbOutput parameter contains the size of this buffer. For more information, see Remarks.

If this parameter is NULL, this function will calculate the size required for the plaintext and return the size in the location pointed to by the pcbResult parameter.

cbOutput [in] is the size, in bytes, of the pbOutput buffer. This parameter is ignored if the pbOutput parameter is NULL.

pcbResult [out] is a pointer to a ULONG variable to receive the number of bytes copied to the pbOutput buffer. If pbOutput is NULL, this receives the size, in bytes, required for the plaintext.

dwFlags [in] is a set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. The allowed set of flags depends on the type of key specified by the hKey parameter. If the key is a symmetric key, this can be zero or the following value: BCRYPT_BLOCK_PADDING. If the key is an asymmetric key, this can be one of the following values: BCRYPT_PAD_NONE, BCRYPT_PAD_OAEP, BCRYPT_PAD_PKCS1.

7.7 Hashing and Message Authentication

7.7.1 BCryptCreateHash

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptCreateHash(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE *phHash,
    PUCHAR pbHashObject,
    ULONG cbHashObject,
    PUCHAR pbSecret,
    ULONG cbSecret,
    ULONG dwFlags);

The BCryptCreateHash() function creates a hash object with an optional key. The optional key is used for HMAC, AES GMAC and AES CMAC.

hAlgorithm [in, out] is the handle of an algorithm provider created by using the BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider function. The algorithm that was specified when the provider was created must support the hash interface.

phHash [out] is a pointer to a BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE value that receives a handle that represents the hash object. This handle is used in subsequent hashing functions, such as the BCryptHashData function. When you have finished using this handle, release it by passing it to the BCryptDestroyHash function.

pbHashObject [out] is a pointer to a buffer that receives the hash object. The cbHashObject parameter contains the size of this buffer. The required size of this buffer can be obtained by calling the
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BCryptGetProperty function to get the BCRYPT_OBJECT_LENGTH property. This will provide the size of the hash object for the specified algorithm. This memory can only be freed after the hash handle is destroyed.


pbSecret [in, optional] is a pointer to a buffer that contains the key to use for the hash. The cbSecret parameter contains the size of this buffer. If no key should be used with the hash, set this parameter to NULL. This key only applies to the HMAC, AES GMAC and AES CMAC algorithms.

cbSecret [in, optional] contains the size, in bytes, of the pbSecret buffer. If no key should be used with the hash, set this parameter to zero.

dwFlags [in] is not currently used and must be zero.

7.7.2 BCryptHashData

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptHashData(
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE hHash,
   PUCHAR pbInput,
   ULONG cbInput,
   ULONG dwFlags);

The BCryptHashData() function performs a one way hash on a data buffer. Call the BCryptFinishHash() function to finalize the hashing operation to get the hash result.

7.7.3 BCryptDuplicateHash

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDuplicateHash(
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE hHash,
   BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE *phNewHash,
   PUCHAR pbHashObject,
   ULONG cbHashObject,
   ULONG dwFlags);

The BCryptDuplicateHash() function duplicates an existing hash object. The duplicate hash object contains all state and data that was hashed to the point of duplication.

7.7.4 BCryptFinishHash

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptFinishHash(
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE hHash,
   PUCHAR pbOutput,
   ULONG cbOutput,
   ULONG dwFlags);

The BCryptFinishHash() function retrieves the hash value for the data accumulated from prior calls to BCryptHashData() function.
7.7.5 **BCryptDestroyHash**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDestroyHash(
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE hHash);
```

The BCryptDestroyHash() function destroys a hash object.

7.8 **Signing and Verification**

7.8.1 **BCryptSignHash**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptSignHash(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey,
    VOID *pPaddingInfo,
    PCHAR pbInput,
    ULONG cbInput,
    PCHAR pbOutput,
    ULONG cbOutput,
    ULONG *pcbResult,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The BCryptSignHash() function creates a signature of a hash value.

- **hKey** [in] is the handle of the key to use to sign the hash.
- **pPaddingInfo** [in, optional] is a pointer to a structure that contains padding information. The actual type of structure this parameter points to depends on the value of the dwFlags parameter. This parameter is only used with asymmetric keys and must be NULL otherwise.
- **pbInput** [in] is a pointer to a buffer that contains the hash value to sign. The cbInput parameter contains the size of this buffer.
- **cbInput** [in] is the number of bytes in the pbInput buffer to sign.
- **pbOutput** [out] is the address of a buffer to receive the signature produced by this function. The cbOutput parameter contains the size of this buffer. If this parameter is NULL, this function will calculate the size required for the signature and return the size in the location pointed to by the pcbResult parameter.
- **cbOutput** [in] is the size, in bytes, of the pbOutput buffer. This parameter is ignored if the pbOutput parameter is NULL.
- **pcbResult** [out] is a pointer to a ULONG variable that receives the number of bytes copied to the pbOutput buffer. If pbOutput is NULL, this receives the size, in bytes, required for the signature.
- **dwFlags** [in] is a set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. The allowed set of flags depends on the type of key specified by the hKey parameter. If the key is a symmetric key, this parameter is not used and should be set to zero. If the key is an asymmetric key, this can be one of the following values: BCRYPT_PAD_PKCS1, BCRYPT_PAD_PSS.
Note: this function accepts SHA-1 hashes, which according to NIST SP 800-131A is currently deprecated for digital signature generation and will be disallowed after the end of 2013. SHA-1 is currently legacy-use for digital signature verification.

7.8.2 **BCryptVerifySignature**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptVerifySignature(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey,
    VOID *pPaddingInfo,
    UCHAR pbHash,
    ULONG cbHash,
    UCHAR pbSignature,
    ULONG cbSignature,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The **BCryptVerifySignature**() function verifies that the specified signature matches the specified hash. 

- **hKey** [in] is the handle of the key to use to decrypt the signature. This must be an identical key or the public key portion of the key pair used to sign the data with the **BCryptSignHash** function.

- **pPaddingInfo** [in, optional] is a pointer to a structure that contains padding information. The actual type of structure this parameter points to depends on the value of the **dwFlags** parameter. This parameter is only used with asymmetric keys and must be NULL otherwise.

- **pbHash** [in] is the address of a buffer that contains the hash of the data. The **cbHash** parameter contains the size of this buffer.

- **cbHash** [in] is the size, in bytes, of the **pbHash** buffer.

- **pbSignature** [in] is the address of a buffer that contains the signed hash of the data. The **BCryptSignHash** function is used to create the signature. The **cbSignature** parameter contains the size of this buffer.

- **cbSignature** [in] is the size, in bytes, of the **pbSignature** buffer. The **BCryptSignHash** function is used to create the signature.

Note: this function accepts SHA-1 hashes, which according to NIST SP 800-131A is currently deprecated for digital signature generation and will be disallowed after the end of 2013. SHA-1 is currently legacy-use for digital signature verification.

7.9 **Secret Agreement and Key Derivation**

7.9.1 **BCryptSecretAgreement**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptSecretAgreement(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hPrivKey,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hPubKey,
    BCRYPT_SECRET_HANDLE *phAgreedSecret,
```


The BCryptSecretAgreement() function creates a secret agreement value from a private and a public key. This function is used with Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithms.

- **hPrivKey** [in] The handle of the private key to use to create the secret agreement value.
- **hPubKey** [in] The handle of the public key to use to create the secret agreement value.
- **phSecret** [out] A pointer to a BCRYPT_SECRET_HANDLE that receives a handle that represents the secret agreement value. This handle must be released by passing it to the BCryptDestroySecret function when it is no longer needed.
- **dwFlags** [in] A set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. This must be zero.

### 7.9.2 BCryptDeriveKey

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDeriveKey(
    BCRYPT_SECRET_HANDLE hSharedSecret,
    LPCWSTR pwszKDF,
    BCryptBufferDesc *pParameterList,
    PUCHAR pbDerivedKey,
    ULONG cbDerivedKey,
    ULONG *pcbResult,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The BCryptDeriveKey() function derives a key from a secret agreement value.

- **hSharedSecret** [in, optional] is the secret agreement handle to create the key from. This handle is obtained from the BCryptSecretAgreement function.
- **pwszKDF** [in] is a pointer to a null-terminated Unicode string that contains an object identifier (OID) that identifies the key derivation function (KDF) to use to derive the key. This can be one of the following strings: BCRYPT_KDF_HASH (parameters in pParameterList: KDF_HASH_ALGORITHM, KDF_SECRET_PREPEND, KDF_SECRET_APPEND), BCRYPT_KDF_HMAC (parameters in pParameterList: KDF_HASH_ALGORITHM, KDF_HMAC_KEY, KDF_SECRET_PREPEND, KDF_SECRET_APPEND), BCRYPT_KDF_TLS_PRF (parameters in pParameterList: KDF_TLS_PRF_LABEL, KDF_TLS_PRF_SEED), BCRYPT_KDF_SP80056A_CONCAT (parameters in pParameterList: KDF_ALGORITHMID, KDF_PARTYUINFO, KDF_PARTYVINFO, KDF_SUPPPUBINFO, KDF_SUPPPRIVINFO).
- **pParameterList** [in, optional] is the address of a BCryptBufferDesc structure that contains the KDF parameters. This parameter is optional and can be NULL if it is not needed.

Note: When supporting a key agreement scheme that requires a nonce, BCryptDeriveKey uses whichever nonce is supplied by the caller in the BCryptBufferDesc. Examples of the nonce types are found in Section 5.4 of [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56A/SP800-56A_Revision1_Mar08-2007.pdf](http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56A/SP800-56A_Revision1_Mar08-2007.pdf)
When using a nonce, a random nonce **should** be used. And then if the random nonce is used, the entropy (amount of randomness) of the nonce and the security strength of the DRBG has to be at least one half of the minimum required bit length of the subgroup order.

For example:

for KAS FFC, entropy of nonce must be 80 bits for FA, 112 bits for FB, 128 bits for FC.

for KAS ECC, entropy of the nonce must be 128 bits for EC, 182 for ED, 256 for EF.

`pbDerivedKey` [out, optional] is the address of a buffer that receives the key. The `cbDerivedKey` parameter contains the size of this buffer. If this parameter is NULL, this function will place the required size, in bytes, in the ULONG pointed to by the `pcbResult` parameter.

`cbDerivedKey` [in] contains the size, in bytes, of the `pbDerivedKey` buffer.

`pcbResult` [out] is a pointer to a ULONG that receives the number of bytes that were copied to the `pbDerivedKey` buffer. If the `pbDerivedKey` parameter is NULL, this function will place the required size, in bytes, in the ULONG pointed to by this parameter.

`dwFlags` [in] is a set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. This can be zero or `KDF_USE_SECRET_AS_HMAC_KEY_FLAG`. The `KDF_USE_SECRET_AS_HMAC_KEY_FLAG` value must only be used when `pwszKDF` is equal to `BCRYPT_KDF_HMAC`. It indicates that the secret will also be used as the HMAC key. If this flag is used, the `KDF_HMAC_KEY` parameter must not be specified in `pParameterList`.

### 7.9.3 `BCryptDestroySecret`

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDestroySecret(  
    BCRYPT_SECRET_HANDLE hSecret);
```

The `BCryptDestroySecret()` function destroys a secret agreement handle that was created by using the `BCryptSecretAgreement()` function.

### 7.9.4 `BCryptKeyDerivation`

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptKeyDerivation(  
    _In_  BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey,  
    _In_opt_ BCryptBufferDesc *pParameterList,  
    _Out_writes_bytes_to_(cbDerivedKey, *pcbResult) PUCHAR pbDerivedKey,  
    _In_  ULONG cbDerivedKey,  
    _Out_ ULONG *pcbResult,  
    _In_  ULONG dwFlags);
```
The BCryptKeyDerivation() function executes a Key Derivation Function (KDF) on a key generated with BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey() function. It differs from the BCryptDeriveKey() function in that it does not require a secret agreement step to create a shared secret.

*hKey [in]* is a handle to a key created with the BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey function.

*pParameterList [in]* is the algorithm-specific parameter list for the selected KDF.

*pbDerivedKey [out]* is the address of a buffer that receives the key. The cbDerivedKey parameter contains the size of this buffer.

*cbDerivedKey [in]* contains the size, in bytes, of the pbDerivedKey buffer.

*pcbResult [out]* is a pointer to a ULONG that receives the number of bytes that were copied to the pbDerivedKey buffer. If the pbDerivedKey parameter is NULL, this function will place the required size, in bytes, in the ULONG pointed to by this parameter.

*dwFlags [in]* is a set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. This must be zero.

### 7.10 Legacy Compatibility Interfaces

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library driver provides an additional set of interfaces for compatibility with legacy software written for previous versions of Windows. These interfaces are described in this section.

These legacy interfaces are not exported by the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library driver. A kernel mode user of the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library driver must be able to reference these functions before using them. The user needs to acquire the table of pointers to the legacy functions from the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library driver. The user accomplishes the table acquisition by building a Fips function table request IRP (I/O request packet) and then sending the IRP to the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library driver via the IoCallDriver function. Further information on IRP and IoCallDriver can be found on the Windows 8.1 Driver Development Kit.

#### 7.10.1 Key Formatting

The following functions provide interfaces to the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library module’s key formatting functions.

#### 7.10.1.1 FipsDesKey

VOID FipsDesKey(  
    DESTable * pDesTable,  
    UCHAR * pbKey)

Note that DES cannot be used in FIPS mode. Nevertheless, this interface is documented here for completeness. The FipsDesKey function formats a DES cryptographic session key into the form of a DESTable struct. It fills in the DESTable struct with the decrypt and encrypt key expansions. Its second
parameter points to the DES key of DES_BLOCKLEN (8) bytes. FipsDesKey zeroizes its copy of the key before returning to the caller.

### 7.10.2 Data Encryption and Decryption

The following functions provide interfaces to the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library module’s data encryption and decryption functions.

#### 7.10.2.1 FipsDes

```c
VOID FipsDes(
    UCHAR *        pbOut,
    UCHAR *        pbIn,
    void *         pKey,
    int            iOp)
```

Note that DES cannot be used in FIPS mode. Nevertheless, this interface is documented here for completeness. The FipsDes function encrypts or decrypts the input buffer pbIn using DES, putting the result into the output buffer pbOut. The operation (encryption or decryption) is specified with the iOp parameter. The pKey is a DESTable struct pointer returned by the FipsDesKey function. FipsDes zeroizes its copy of the DESTable struct before returning to the caller.

#### 7.10.2.2 Fips3Des

```c
VOID Fips3Des(
    UCHAR *       pbIn,
    UCHAR *       pbOut,
    void *        pKey,
    int           op)
```

The Fips3Des function encrypts or decrypts the input buffer pbIn using Triple DES, putting the result into the output buffer pbOut. The operation (encryption or decryption) is specified with the op parameter. The pKey is a DES3Table struct returned by the Fips3Des3Key function. Fips3Des zeroizes its copy of the DES3Table struct before returning to the caller.

#### 7.10.2.3 FipsCBC

```c
BOOL FipsCBC(
    void *         pKey,
    UCHAR *        pbIn,
    UCHAR *        pbOut,
    int            op)
```

The FipsCBC function encrypts or decrypts the input buffer pbIn using CBC mode. The operation (encryption or decryption) is specified with the op parameter. The pKey is a DES3Table struct returned by the Fips3Des3Key function. FipsCBC zeroizes its copy of the DES3Table struct before returning to the caller.
ULONG EncryptionType,
BYTE *output,
BYTE *input,
void * keyTable,
int op,
BYTE *feedback)

Note that DES cannot be used in FIPS mode. Nevertheless, the DES encryption type is documented here for completeness. The FipsCBC function encrypts or decrypts the input buffer input using CBC mode, putting the result into the output buffer output. The encryption algorithm (DES or Triple DES) to be used is specified with the EncryptionType parameter. The operation (encryption or decryption) is specified with the op parameter.

If the EncryptionType parameter specifies Triple DES, the keyTable is a DES3Table struct returned by the Fips3Des3Key function. If the EncryptionType parameter specifies DES, the keyTable is a DESTable struct returned by the FipsDesKey function.

This function encrypts just one block at a time and assumes that the caller knows the algorithm block length and the buffers are of the correct length. Every time when the function is called, it zeroizes its copy of the DES3Table or DESTable struct before returning to the caller.

7.10.2.4 FipsBlockCBC

BOOL FipsBlockCBC(
    ULONG EncryptionType,
    BYTE *output,
    BYTE *input,
    ULONG length,
    void * keyTable,
    int op,
    BYTE *feedback)

Note that DES cannot be used in FIPS mode. Nevertheless, the DES encryption type is documented here for completeness. Same as FipsCBC, the FipsBlockCBC function encrypts or decrypts the input buffer input using CBC mode, putting the result into the output buffer output. The encryption algorithm (DES or Triple DES) to be used is specified with the EncryptionType parameter. The operation (encryption or decryption) is specified with the op parameter.

If the EncryptionType parameter specifies Triple DES, the keyTable is a DES3Table struct returned by the Fips3Des3Key function. If the EncryptionType parameter specifies DES, the keyTable is a DESTable struct returned by the FipsDesKey function.

This function can encrypt/decrypt more than one block at a time. The caller specifies the length in bytes of the input buffer in the “length” parameter. So the input/output buffer length is the arithmetic product of the number of blocks in the input/output buffer and the block length (8 bytes). When the length is 8 (i.e. one block of input buffer), FipsBlockCBC is the same as FipsCBC.
Every time when the function is called, it zeroizes its copy of the DES3Table or DEStable struct before returning to the caller.

### 7.10.3 Hashing

The following functions provide interfaces to the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library module’s hashing functions.

#### 7.10.3.1 FipsSHAInit

```c
void FipsSHAInit(
    A_SHA_CTX * hash_context)
```

The FipsSHAInit function initiates the hashing of a stream of data. The output hash_context is used in subsequent hash functions.

#### 7.10.3.2 FipsSHAUpdate

```c
void FipsSHAUpdate(
    A_SHA_CTX * hash_context,
    UCHAR * pb,
    unsigned int cb)
```

The FipsSHAUpdate function adds data pb of size cb to a specified hash object associated with the context hash_context. This function can be called multiple times to compute the hash on long data streams or discontinuous data streams. The FipsSHAFinal function must be called before retrieving the hash value.

#### 7.10.3.3 FipsSHAFinal

```c
void FipsSHAFinal (
    A_SHA_CTX * hash_context,
    unsigned char [A_SHA_DIGEST_LEN] hash)
```

The FipsSHAFinal function computes the final hash of the data entered by the FipsSHAUpdate function. The hash is an array char of size A_SHA_DIGEST_LEN (20 bytes).

#### 7.10.3.4 FipsHmacSHAlnit

```c
void FipsHmacSHAInit(
    A_SHA_CTX * pShaCtx
    UCHAR * pKey,
    unsigned int cbKey)
```

The FipsHmacSHAlnit function initiates the HMAC hashing of a stream of data, with an input key provided via the pKey parameter. The size of the input key is specified in the cbKey parameter. If the key size is greater than 64 bytes, the key is hashed to a new key of size 20 bytes using SHA-1. The input key is EOR’ed with the ipad as required in the HMAC FIPS. The output pShaCtx is used in subsequent HMAC hashing functions. Every time when the function is called, it zeroizes its copy of the pKey before returning to the caller.
7.10.3.5 FipsHmacSHAUpdate
void FipsHmacSHAUpdate(
    A_SHA_CTX * pShaCtx,
    UCHAR * pb,
    unsigned int cb)

The FipsHmacSHAUpdate function adds data pb of size cb to a specified HMAC hashing object associated with the context pShaCtx. This function can be called multiple times to compute the HMAC hash on long data streams or discontinuous data streams. The FipsHmacSHAFinal function must be called before retrieving the final HMAC hash value.

7.10.3.6 FipsHmacSHAFinal
void FipsHmacSHAFinal(
    A_SHA_CTX * pShaCtx,
    UCHAR * pKey,
    unsigned int cbKey,
    UCHAR * hash)

The FipsHmacSHAFinal function computes the final HMAC hash of the data entered by the FipsHmacSHAUpdate function, with an input key provided via the pKey parameter. The size of the input key is specified in the cbKey parameter. If the key size is greater than 64 bytes, the key is hashed to a new key of size 20 bytes using SHA-1. The input key is EOR’ed with the opad as required in the HMAC FIPS. It is the caller’s responsibility to make sure that the input key used in FipsHmacSHAFinal is the same as the input key used in FipsHmacSHAInit. The final HMAC hash is an array char of size A_SHA_DIGEST_LEN (20 bytes). Every time when the function is called, it zeroizes its copy of the pKey before returning to the caller.

7.10.3.7 HmacMD5Init
void HmacMD5Init(
    MD5_CTX * pMD5Ctx,
    UCHAR * pKey,
    unsigned int cbKey)

Note that HMAC-MD5 cannot be used in FIPS mode. Nevertheless, this interface is documented here for completeness. The HmacMD5Init function initiates the HMAC hashing of a stream of data, with an input key provided via the pKey parameter. The size of the input key is specified in the cbKey parameter. If the key size is greater than 64 bytes, the key is hashed to a new key of size 16 bytes using MD5 as required in the HMAC FIPS. The input key is EOR’ed with the ipad. The output pMD5Ctx is used in subsequent HMAC hashing functions. Every time when the function is called, it zeroizes its copy of the pKey before returning to the caller.
7.10.3.8 HmacMD5Update

```c
void HmacMD5Update(
    MD5_CTX * pMD5Ctx,
    UCHAR * pb,
    unsigned int cb)
```

Note that HMAC-MD5 cannot be used in FIPS mode. Nevertheless, this interface is documented here for completeness. The HmacMD5Update function adds data pb of size cb to a specified HMAC hashing object associated with the context pMD5Ctx. This function can be called multiple times to compute the HMAC hash on long data streams or discontinuous data streams. The HmacMD5Update function must be called before retrieving the final HMAC hash value.

7.10.3.9 HmacMD5Final

```c
void HmacMD5Final(
    MD5_CTX *pMD5Ctx,
    UCHAR *pKey,
    unsigned int cbKey,
    UCHAR *pHash)
```

Note that HMAC-MD5 cannot be used in FIPS mode. Nevertheless, this interface is documented here for completeness. The HmacMD5Final function computes the final HMAC hash of the data entered by the HmacMD5Update function, with an input key provided via the pKey parameter. The size of the input key is specified in the cbKey parameter. If the key size is greater than 64 bytes, the key is hashed to a new key of size 16 bytes using MD5. The input key is EOR'ed with the opad as required in the HMAC FIPS. It is the caller’s responsibility to make sure that the input key used in HmacMD5Final is the same as the input key used in HmacMD5Init. The final HMAC hash is an array char of size A_MD5DIGESTLEN (16 bytes). Every time when the function is called, it zeroises its copy of the pKey before returning to the caller.

7.11 Deprecation

7.11.1 Bit Strengths of DH and ECDH

Through the year 2010, implementations of DH and ECDH were allowed to have an acceptable bit strength of at least 80 bits of security (for DH at least 1024 bits and for ECDH at least 160 bits). From 2011 through 2013, 80 bits of security strength is considered deprecated, and will be disallowed starting January 1, 2014. On that date, only security strength of at least 112 bits will be acceptable. ECDH uses curve sizes of at least 256 bits (that means it has at least 128 bits of security strength), so that is acceptable. However, DH has a range of 1024 to 4096 and that will change to 2048 to 4096 after 2013.
7.11.2 SHA-1
From 2011 through 2013, SHA-1 can be used in a deprecated mode for use in digital signature generation. On Jan. 1, 2014, SHA-1 will no longer be allowed for digital signature generation, and it will be allowed for legacy use only for digital signature verification.

7.12 Show Status Services
The User and Cryptographic Officer roles have the same Show Status functionality, which is, for each function, the status information is returned to the caller as the return value from the function.

7.13 Self-Test Services
The User and Cryptographic Officer roles have the same Self-Test functionality, which is described in Section 10 Self-Tests.

7.14 Service Inputs / Outputs
The User and Cryptographic Officer roles have service inputs and outputs as specified in Section 5 Ports and Interfaces and as described in detail above.

8 Authentication
See Section 6.3 Operator Authentication.
9 Security Relevant Data Items

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library crypto module manages the following security relevant data items.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Relevant Data Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</td>
<td>Keys used for AES or TDEA encryption/decryption. Key sizes for AES are 128, 192, and 256 bits, and key sizes for TDES are 168 and 112 bits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC keys</td>
<td>Keys used for HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384, and HMAC-SHA512.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Keys used for the verification of ECDSA digital signatures. Curve sizes are P-256, P-384, and P-521.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Private Keys</td>
<td>Keys used for the calculation of ECDSA digital signatures. Curve sizes are P-256, P-384, and P-521.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Keys used for the verification of RSA digital signatures. Key sizes are 2048 and 3072 bits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</td>
<td>Keys used for the calculation of RSA digital signatures. Key sizes are 2048 and 3072 bits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Seed</td>
<td>A secret value maintained internal to the module that provides the seed material for AES-CTR DRBG output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Entropy Input</td>
<td>A secret value maintained internal to the module that provides the entropy material for AES-CTR DRBG output.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG V</td>
<td>A secret value maintained internal to the module that provides the entropy material for AES-CTR DRBG output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG key</td>
<td>A secret value maintained internal to the module that provides the entropy material for AES-CTR DRBG output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUAL EC DRBG Seed</td>
<td>A secret value maintained internal to the module that provides the seed material for DUAL EC DRBG output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUAL EC DRBG Entropy Input</td>
<td>A secret value maintained internal to the module that provides the entropy material for DUAL EC DRBG output.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DUAL EC DRBG V</td>
<td>A secret value maintained internal to the module that provides the entropy material for DUAL EC DRBG output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUAL EC DRBG key</td>
<td>A secret value maintained internal to the module that provides the entropy material for DUAL EC DRBG output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DH Private and Public values</td>
<td>Private and public values used for Diffie-Hellman key establishment. Key sizes are 2048 to 4096 bits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDH Private and Public values</td>
<td>Private and public values used for EC Diffie-Hellman key establishment. Curve sizes are P-256, P-384, and P-521.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.1 Access Control Policy

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library crypto module allows controlled access to the security relevant data items contained within it. The following table defines the access that a service has to each. The permissions are categorized as a set of four separate permissions: read (r), write (w), execute (x), delete (d). If no permission is listed, the service has no access to the item. The User and Cryptographic Officer roles have the same access to keys so roles are not distinguished in the table.
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library crypto module

Service Access Policy

<table>
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<td>wd</td>
<td>wd</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Key Entry and Output</td>
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<tr>
<td>Signing and Verification</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

9.2 Key Material

When Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is loaded in the Windows 8.1 OEs Operating System kernel, no keys exist within it. A kernel module is responsible for importing keys into Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library or using Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library’s functions to generate keys.

9.3 Key Generation

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library can create and use keys for the following algorithms: RSA, DH, ECDH, ECDSA, RC2, RC4, DES, Triple-DES, AES, and HMAC. However, RC2, RC4, and DES cannot be used in FIPS mode.

Random keys can be generated by calling the BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey() and BCryptGenerateKeyPair() functions. Random data generated by the BCryptGenRandom() function is provided to BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey() function to generate symmetric keys. DES, Triple-DES, AES,
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library

RSA, ECDSA, DH, and ECDH keys and key-pairs are generated following the techniques given in SP 800-56A (Section 5.8.1).

The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy.

9.4 Key Establishment

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library can use FIPS approved Diffie-Hellman key agreement (DH), Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement (ECDH), RSA key transport and manual methods to establish keys. Alternatively, the module can also use Approved KDFs to derive key material from a specified secret value or password.

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library can use the following FIPS approved key derivation functions (KDF) from the common secret that is established during the execution of DH and ECDH key agreement algorithms:

- **BCRYPT\_KDF\_SP800056A\_CONCAT.** This KDF supports the Concatenation KDF as specified in SP 800-56A (Section 5.8.1).
- **BCRYPT\_KDF\_HASH.** This KDF supports FIPS approved SP800-56A (Section 5.8), X9.63, and X9.42 key derivation.
- **BCRYPT\_KDF\_HMAC.** This KDF supports the IPsec IKEv1 key derivation that is non-Approved but is an allowed legacy implementation in FIPS mode when used to establish keys for IKEv1 as per scenario 4 of IG D.8.
- **BCRYPT\_KDF\_TLS\_PRF.** This KDF supports the SSLv3.1 and TLSv1.0 key derivation that is non-Approved but is an allowed legacy implementation in FIPS mode when used to establish keys for SSLv3.1 or TLSv1.0 as specified in as per scenario 4 of IG D.8.

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library can use the following FIPS approved key derivation functions (KDF) from a key handle created from a specified secret or password:

- **BCRYPT\_SP800108\_CTR\_HMAC\_ALGORITHM.** This KDF supports the counter-mode variant of the KDF specified in SP 800-108 (Section 5.1) with HMAC as the underlying PRF.
- **BCRYPT\_SP800056A\_CONCAT\_ALGORITHM.** This KDF supports the Concatenation KDF as specified in SP 800-56A (Section 5.8.1).
- **BCRYPT\_PBKDF2\_ALGORITHM.** This KDF supports the Password Based Key Derivation Function specified in SP 800-132 (Section 5.3).
- **BCRYPT\_CAPI\_KDF\_ALGORITHM.** This KDF supports the proprietary KDF described at [http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379916.aspx](http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379916.aspx)
  Note that this KDF cannot be used in FIPS mode.

9.4.1 NIST SP 800-132 Password Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF)

There are two (2) options presented in NIST SP 800-132, pages 8 – 10, that are used to derive the Data Protection Key (DPK) from the Master Key. With the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library, it is up to the caller to select the option to generate/protect the DPK. For example, DPAPI uses option 2a. Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library provides all the building blocks for the caller to select the desired option.
The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library supports the following HMAC hash functions as parameters for PBKDF:

- SHA-1 HMAC
- SHA-256 HMAC
- SHA-384 HMAC
- SHA-512 HMAC

Keys derived from passwords, as shown in SP 800-132, may only be used in storage applications. In order to run in a FIPS approved manner, it is up to the user and application to pick strong passwords and use them only for storage applications. The password/passphrase length is enforced by the caller of the PBKDF interfaces and not the cryptographic module. In order to run in a FIPS approved manner, the password must be chosen in accordance with the guidelines in NIST SP 800-63 Electronic Authentication Guideline and SP 800-118 DRAFT Guide to Enterprise Password Management. The upper bound for the probability of having the password guessed at random is to be computed following the SP 800-63 and SP 800-118 guidelines. The decision for the minimum length of a password used for key derivation is to be based on the SP 800-63 and SP 800-118 guidelines.

### 9.5 Key Entry and Output

Keys can be both exported and imported out of and into Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library via BCryptExportKey(), BCryptImportKey(), and BCryptImportKeyPair() functions.

Symmetric key entry and output can also be done by exchanging keys using the recipient’s asymmetric public key via BCryptSecretAgreement() and BCryptDeriveKey() functions.

Triple DES keys can be imported into Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library via Fips3Des3Key(). DES3Table struct can be exported out of Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library via Fips3Des3Key(). DES3Table struct can be imported into Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library via Fips3Des() or FipsCBC().

HMAC keys can be imported into Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library via FipsHmacSHAInit and FipsHmacSHAFinal.

Exporting the RSA private key by supplying a blob type of BCRYPT_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB, BCRYPT_RSAFULLPRIVATE_BLOB, or BCRYPT_RSAPRIVATE_BLOB to BCryptExportKey() is not allowed in FIPS mode.

### 9.6 Key Storage

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library does not provide persistent storage of keys.
9.7 Key Archival

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library does not directly archive cryptographic keys. A user may choose to export a cryptographic key (cf. “Key Entry and Output” above), but management of the secure archival of that key is the responsibility of the user. All key copies inside Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library are destroyed and their memory location zeroized after used. It is the caller’s responsibility to maintain the security of Triple DES and HMAC keys when the keys are outside Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library.

9.8 Key Zeroization

All keys are destroyed and their memory location zeroized when the operator calls BCryptDestroyKey() or BCryptDestroySecret() on that key handle.

All Triple DES key copies, their associated DESTable and DES3Table struct copies, and HMAC key copies inside Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library are destroyed and their memory location zeroized after they have been used in Fips3Des or FipsCBC.

10 Self-Tests

10.1 Power-On Self-Tests

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library automatically performs the following power-on (startup) self-tests upon loading of the CNG.SYS driver through its default entry point (DriverEntry).

- HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
- HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Tests
- Triple-DES encrypt/decrypt ECB Known Answer Tests
- AES-128 encrypt/decrypt EBC Known Answer Tests
- AES-128 encrypt/decrypt CBC Known Answer Tests
- AES-128 CMAC Known Answer Test
- AES-128 encrypt/decrypt CCM Known Answer Tests
- AES-128 encrypt/decrypt GCM Known Answer Tests
- SP 800-108 KDF Known Answer Test
- SP 800-132 PBKDF Known Answer Test
- RSA sign/verify Known Answer Tests
- ECDSA sign/verify Known Answer Tests on P256 curve
- ECDH secret agreement Known Answer Test on P256 curve
- SP800-56A concatenation KDF Known Answer Tests (same as Diffie-Hellman KAT)
- SP800-90 AES-256 counter mode DRBG Known Answer Tests (instantiate, generate and reseed)
- SP800-90 Dual-EC DRBG Known Answer Tests (instantiate, generate and reseed)

In all cases for any failure of a power-on (startup) self-test, the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library module will not load and status will be returned. The only way to recover from the failure of a
power-on (startup) self-test is for the kernel to attempt to invoke DriverEntry, which will rerun the self-tests, and will only succeed if the self-tests pass.

10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library performs pair-wise consistency checks upon each invocation of RSA, ECDH, and ECDSA key-pair generation and import as defined in FIPS 140-2. A continuous RNG test (CRNGT) is used for the random number generators of this cryptographic module. All approved and non-approved RNGs have a CRNGT. If the conditional self-test fails, the module will not load and status will be returned. If the status is not STATUS_SUCCESS, then that is the indicator a conditional self-test failed.

- CRNGTs for SP800-90 AES-CTR DRBG, SP800-90 Dual-EC DRBG, and non-Approved RNG (entropy pool)
- Pairwise consistency test for RSA
- Pairwise consistency test for ECDSA key generation
- Pairwise consistency tests for Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman prime value generation
- Assurances for SP800-56A (According to sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and 5.6.3 of the standard)
- DRBG health test for SP800-90 AES-CTR
- DRBG health test for Dual-EC DRBGs

11 Design Assurance
The secure installation, generation, and startup procedures of this cryptographic module are part of the overall operating system secure installation, configuration, and startup procedures for the Windows 8.1 OEs. The various methods of delivery and installation for each product are listed in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Delivery and Installation Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Windows 8.1</td>
<td>• DVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pre-installed on the computer by OEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Download that updates Windows 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Server 2012 R2</td>
<td>• DVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pre-installed on the computer by OEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Download that updates Windows Server 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Storage Server 2012 R2</td>
<td>• Pre-installed by the OEM (Third party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Pro 3, Surface Pro 2, Surface Pro,</td>
<td>• Pre-installed by the OEM (Microsoft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface 2, Surface</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows RT 8.1</td>
<td>• Pre-installed on the device by OEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Download that updates Windows RT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows Phone 8.1</td>
<td>• Pre-installed on the device by OEM or mobile network operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Download that updates Windows 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After the operating system has been installed, it must be configured by enabling the "System cryptography: Use FIPS compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing" policy setting followed by restarting the system. This procedure is all the crypto officer and user behavior necessary for the secure operation of this cryptographic module.

An inspection of authenticity of the physical medium can be made by following the guidance at this Microsoft web site: http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/howtotell/default.aspx

The installed version of Windows 8.1 OEs must be verified to match the version that was validated. See Appendix A for details on how to do this.

For Windows Updates, the client only accepts binaries signed by Microsoft certificates. The Windows Update client only accepts content whose SHA-2 hash matches the SHA-2 hash specified in the metadata. All metadata communication is done over a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) port. Using SSL ensures that the client is communicating with the real server and so prevents a spoof server from sending the client harmful requests. The version and digital signature of new cryptographic module releases must be verified to match the version that was validated. See Appendix A for details on how to do this.

### 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The following table lists the mitigations of other attacks for this cryptographic module:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Protected Against</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHA1</td>
<td>Timing Analysis Attack</td>
<td>Constant Time Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cache Attack</td>
<td>Memory Access pattern is independent of any confidential data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA2</td>
<td>Timing Analysis Attack</td>
<td>Constant Time Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cache Attack</td>
<td>Memory Access pattern is independent of any</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13 Security Levels

The security level for each FIPS 140-2 security requirement is given in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Requirement</th>
<th>Security Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic Module Specification</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles, Services, and Authentication</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finite State Model</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Security</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic Key Management</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMI/EMC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Tests</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design Assurance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitigation of Other Attacks</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14 Additional Details
For the latest information on Microsoft Windows, check out the Microsoft web site at:

http://windows.microsoft.com

For more information about FIPS 140 evaluations of Microsoft products, please see:

15 Appendix A – How to Verify Windows Versions and Digital Signatures

15.1 How to Verify Windows Versions

The installed version of Windows 8.1 OEs must be verified to match the version that was validated using one of the following methods:

1. The ver command
   a. From Start, open the Search charm.
   b. In the search field type "cmd" and press the Enter key.
   c. The command window will open with a "C:\>" prompt.
   d. At the prompt, type "ver" and press the Enter key.
   e. You should see the answer "Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]".

2. The systeminfo command
   a. From Start, open the Search charm.
   b. In the search field type "cmd" and press the Enter key.
   c. The command window will open with a "C:\>" prompt.
   d. At the prompt, type "systeminfo" and press the Enter key.
   e. Wait for the information to be loaded by the tool.
   f. Near the top of the output, you should see:

      - OS Name: Microsoft Windows 8.1 Enterprise
      - OS Version: 6.3.9600 N/A Build 9600
      - OS Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation

If the version number reported by the utility matches the expected output, then the installed version has been validated to be correct.

15.2 How to Verify Windows Digital Signatures

After performing a Windows Update that includes changes to a cryptographic module, the digital signature and file version of the binary executable file must be verified. This is done like so:

1. Open a new window in Windows Explorer.
2. Type “C:\Windows\” in the file path field at the top of the window.
3. Type the cryptographic module binary executable file name (for example, “CNG.SYS”) in the search field at the top right of the window, then press the Enter key.
4. The file will appear in the window.
5. Right click on the file’s icon.
6. Select Properties from the menu and the Properties window opens.
7. Select the Details tab.
8. Note the File version Property and its value, which has a number in this format: x.x.xxxx.xxxxx.
9. If the file version number matches one of the version numbers that appear at the start of this security policy document, then the version number has been verified.
10. Select the Digital Signatures tab.
11. In the Signature list, select the Microsoft Windows signer.
12. Click the Details button.
13. Under the Digital Signature Information, you should see: “This digital signature is OK.” If that condition is true then the digital signature has been verified.