HPE OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module

I-HSS 01.08.01
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy

Version 2.3

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Open Call Business Unit

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This document is the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2 non-proprietary Security Policy for the HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE (HPE) OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module to meet FIPS 140-2 security Level One requirements. This Security Policy details the secure operation of the HPE OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module version I-HSS 01.08.01, developed by HPE as required in FIPS Publication 140-2 as published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of the United States Department of Commerce. The Federal Information Processing Standard Publication 140-2 (FIPS 140-2) is a U.S. government computer security standard used to accredit cryptographic modules. It was issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

1.1 Audience

This document is required as a part of the FIPS 140-2 validation process. It describes the HPE OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module in relation to FIPS 140-2 requirements. The companion document "OpenCall I-HSS/HLR Installation Guide[1]" provides the guidance for installing the the OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module. The companion document "HPE OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module User Guide[1]" is a technical reference for Service Providers using the OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module.

1.2 Product Description

The HPE OpenCall Home Location Register (HLR) is a centralized data repository of static and transient subscriber profile information that manages subscriber network access, availability, and location in wireless networks defined by European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). The ETSI-based HLR functionality is referred to as Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) and Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS).

The Authentication Center (AuC) functionality present in the HPE OpenCall HLR ensures that only legitimate subscribers obtain access to the GSM/UMTS.

The HPE OpenCall HLR protects sensitive subscriber data elements related to the information required to authenticate subscriber network access. The HPE OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module provides the cryptography required to protect the sensitive subscriber data elements. FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic algorithms (for example, AES-128 ECB) are used for cryptographic key protection, subscriber AV generation, and the protection of sensitive application data (for example, GSM/UMTS Ki values).

The HLR/AuC Call Processing component uses subscriber keys in conjunction with FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic algorithms to generate Authentication Vectors (AVs) for GSM/UMTS subscriber authentication. (An AV, in the context of this reference, is security context data that enables a UMTS/GSM wireless network to authenticate a UMTS/GSM wireless subscriber. The HPE OpenCall HLR utilizes a subscriber symmetric key present in both the HLR and the subscriber's user equipment (UE) to generate the authentication vector. The HPE OpenCall HLR and a Universal SIM (USIM) or Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) present in the UE contain the key value).

[1] The reference document is provided with the module.

2. Cryptographic Module Specification

This section describes the module and its functionality as part of the larger product.

2.1 Module Overview

The HPE OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module” or simply “CM”) is a multi-chip standalone software module running on a GPC. The module provides the cryptographic services (e.g. symmetric encryption and decryption, message digest, and SP800-90A random number generation) required to protect the sensitive subscriber data elements. The module is implemented as a shared library. The shared library defines the logical boundary as shown by the red box in the figure below.

The HPE OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module is comprised of the following files:

libCMOD, keymgrx, libcrypt, libOSSL, libSSLF

The following figure illustrates the HPE OpenCall HLR Cryptographic components. The figure references key material, key storage, utilities, and runtime components and depicts the relationships between the components and the OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module. Please note that the database files are not part of the cryptographic module boundary and are shown in the Diagram 2-1 and Table 2-1 for reference.



Figure 2-1: OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module

The following table provides a brief summary of the components contained within the Open Call HLR CM depicted in Figure 2-1.

Component	Brief Description
Data Key Material	An encrypted file generated by the Management Keys Generation Utility. The OpenCall HLR application uses the file to securely install KEKs and Master Seed Keys into the Data Management Keys data file.
Transport Key Material	An encrypted file generated by the Management Keys Generation Utility. The OpenCall HLR application uses the file to securely install KEKs into the Transport Management Keys data file and the first entry in the Transport Encryption Keys data file.
Management Keys Generation Utility	Used to generate KEKs and Master Seed Keys for the Data Management Keys data file and KEKs for the Transport Management Keys and Transport Encryption Keys data files.
Data Management Keys Utility	Uses the Data Key Material to install KEKs and Master Seed Keys into the Data Management Keys data file.

Data Encryption Key Generation Utility	Uses the active Master Seed Key from the Data Management Keys data file to generate cryptographic keys for the Data Encryption Keys data file. The utility uses the active KEK from the Data Management Keys data file to cover the generated cryptographic key stored in the Data Encryption Keys data file.
Transport Management Keys Utility	Uses the Transport Key Material to install KEKs into the Transport Management Keys data storage component and the first entry in the Transport Encryption Keys data storage component.
Key Manager	Distributes cryptographic keys, used to cover sensitive data attribute values, from the Data Encryption Keys data files. Also distributes cryptographic keys, used to cover sensitive data transmitted over the provisioning stream, from the Transport Encryption Keys file.
Key Provisioning	Manages the provisioning of subscriber AuC key values.
AV Generation API	Generates AVs for AuC related network traffic.
CM Library	Shared library which interfaces with the Key Manager to retrieve cryptographic keys and uses retrieved keys to encrypt and decrypt sensitive data elements stored in the Subscriber Data and SIM Data files as well as data elements transmitted over the provisioning stream. Also, provides routines that check the status of the CM module.
Cryptographic Library	Shared library which provides the cryptographic algorithms (e.g. AES and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)).
Data Management Keys	A data file that contains KEKs and Master Seed Keys used to respectively cover and generate cryptographic keys in the Data Encryption Keys data file.
Data Encryption Keys	A data file that contains cryptographic keys used by application components (e.g. HLR AC Call Processing) to protect sensitive data elements.
Transport Management Keys	A data file that contains KEKs used to cover the cryptographic keys stored in the Transport Encryption Keys data file.
Transport Encryption Keys	A data file that contains cryptographic keys used to cover sensitive data elements transported over the DPA provisioning stream. All cryptographic key entries cover sensitive data elements over the provisioning stream.
Subscriber Data SIM Data	Legacy data file that contains sensitive data elements (e.g. K) covered by a cryptographic key stored in the Data Encryption Keys data file.

Table 2-1: Brief Component Description

For the software module, the physical boundary is considered to be the surface of the case of the target platform as show below:



Figure 2-2: Physical Boundary

2.2 FIPS 140-2 Validation

For the purpose of the FIPS 140-2 validation, the module is a software-only, multi-chip standalone cryptographic module validated at overall security level 1. The table below shows the security level claimed for each of the eleven sections that comprise the FIPS 140-2 standard:

Security Component	Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services and Authentication	1
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	N/A
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1

EMI/EMC	1
Self Tests	1
Design Assurance	1
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

Table 2-2: Security Levels

Table 2-3 shows the platform on which the cryptographic module was tested on:

Manufacturer	Model	O/S & Version
HP	Integrity NonStop BladeSystem NB54000c with Intel Itanium Processor	HP NonStop v J06.18

Table 2-3: Platforms Tested

2.3 Modes of Operation

When installed, the module only operates in FIPS approved mode. The module provides cryptographic services to applications running in the user space of the underlying operating system through an application program interface (API). The module interacts with the operating system via system calls. The GSM/UMTS functionality within the HPE OpenCall HLR can utilize the cryptographic module operating in FIPS 140-2 approved mode.

The CM Library uses the data encryption key to either decrypt or encrypt data (for example, subscriber keys to generate AVs). To retrieve a new data encryption key, the Service Provider's personnel must configure the new system-level key index (Ki) and algorithm version values that the system uses as the basis for the generation of the new data encryption key.

The following table shows the FIPS-Approved algorithms that are supported by the module:

Algorithm/Modes	Standard/Usage	Key Lengths	Certificate Number
AES ECB, CTR modes	[SP800-38A] Encryption and Decryption	128 bits(ECB only), 256 bits	#3503
SHA-1, SHA-256	[FIPS180-4] Message Digest	N/A	#2890
HMAC SHA-1	[FIPS198-1] Message Integrity	112 bits	#2237
CTR_DRBG	[SP800-90A] Random Number Generation		#872

Table 2-4: FIPS-Approved Algorithms

3. Ports and Interfaces

As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. For the purpose of the FIPS 140-2 validation, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware on which it runs.

The logical interfaces are the application programming interface (API) through which applications request services (as show in the table below):

Logical Interface	Description
Control In	API function calls, API input parameters for control, CLI
Status Out	API return codes, API output parameters for status, CLI
Data In	API input parameters for data, CLI
Data Out	API output parameters for data, CLI

Table 3-1: Ports and Interfaces

The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API functions data received through the I/O system calls, and CLI. The Data Output interface consists of the output parameters of the API, and CLI. The Control Input interface consists of the API function calls the input parameters and the CLI used to control the behavior of the module. The Status Output interface includes the return values of the API functions, status sent through output parameters, and the CLI. The CLI is the command line interface provided by the utilities listed in table 2-1.

4. Roles, Services and Authentication

4.1 Roles

This section contains a table that identifies the CM components and the CM roles that have access to or run the components. Note that the roles are actually associated with the role number and the role names contained in the table are for illustrative purposes only.

#	Role	Description
1	Crypto Officer	The Crypto Officer role has the ability to install, update, and destroy the CM components. Note that the Crypto Officer role cannot run any of the CM components.
2	FIPS Mode Manager	The FIPS Mode Manager role has the ability to use the FIPS Indicator Utility to query the CM FIPS Mode indicator in the FIPS Info file as well as query and set the key limit threshold.
3	Management Key Generation	The Management Key Generation role has the ability to use the Management Keys Generation Utility to generate data and transport management key material.
4	Data Management Key Installation	The Data Management Key Installation role possesses the ability to use the Data Management Keys Utility to install data management keys in the Data Management Keys file and to re-encrypt entries in the Data Encryption Keys file with the latest Data Management Keys file KEK. The Data Management Key Installation role also has the ability to initiate the destruction of the Data Management Keys file.
5	Transport Management Key Installation	The Transport Management Key Installation role has the ability to use the Transport Management Keys Utility to install transport management keys in the Transport Management Keys file, to install a KEK in the Transport Encryption Keys file default record, and to re-encrypt the entries in the Transport Encryption Keys file. The Transport Management Key Installation role also has the ability to initiate the destruction of the Transport Management Keys and Transport Encryption Keys.
6	Data Encryption Key Generation	The Data Encryption Key Generation role has the ability to use the Data Encryption Key Generation Utility to generate Data Encryption Keys and place the generated keys in the Data Encryption Keys file. The Data Encryption Key Generation role also has the ability to initiate the destruction of the Data Encryption Keys files.
7	CM Operator	The CM Operator role has the ability to run the Key Manager and

#	Role	Description
		Transport Key Manager runtime processes.
8	Crypto Library User	The Crypto Library User role possesses the ability to use the libraries associated with the CM and runs the FIPS Command Utility.

Table 4-1: Cryptographic Module Roles

The following table illustrates the capabilities of each role in regard to each OpenCall HLR component. The end of the table contains a legend that identifies the abbreviations used in the cells of the table.

The numbers starting in column two of the header rows correlate with the role numbers specified in Table 4-1.

Component/Role #	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
FIPS Info File	PCRW	RW	R	R	R	R	RW	R
FIPS Status File	PCRW	R	RW	RW	RW	RW	RW	RW
Data Management Keys	PCRW			RW		R	RW	
Data Encryption Keys	PCRW			RW		RW	RW	
Transport Management Keys	PCRW				RW		RW	
Transport Encryption Keys	PCRW				RW		RW	
Subscriber Data	PCRW							RW
SIM Data	PCRW							RW
Data Key Material			WC	RPC				
Transport Key Material			WC		RPC			
FIPS Indicator Utility	PCRW	E						
Management Keys Generation Utility	PCRW		E					
Data Management Keys Utility	PCRW			E				
Data Encryption Key Generation Utility	PCRW					E		
Transport Management Keys Utility	PCRW				E			
FIPS Command Utility	PCRW							E
AuC Re-Encryption Utility	PCRW							WE
Key Manager	PCRW						WE_1	

Component/Role #	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
CM Library	PCRWE						E	E
Cryptographic Library	PCRW						E	E
Key Provisioning	PCRW						E	E
AV Generation API	PCRW						E	E
R – Read File Content W – Write, Delete, and Update File Content E – Execute File P – Purge File				C – Create File 1 – Restriction by executable and process name				

Table 4-2: Cryptographic Module Privileges by Role

Note: The components listed in column one of Table 4-2 represent all of the components of the cryptographic module with the addition of supporting components which interface with the module.

4.2 Services

The module provides services to users that assume one of the available roles. All services are described in detail in the user documentation.

The following table shows the available services, the roles that can request the service, the Critical Security Parameters involved and how they are accessed:

Service	Function	Role (Numbers from Table 4-1 Cryptographic Module Roles)	CSPs	Algorithm	Service Ports I-In, O-Out C-Command D-Data S-Status
CreateKey	Create a key material file	3	AES 128 Key, AES 256 DRBG Seed Key	AES, SHA-256, SP800-90A CTR_DRBG	CI, DI, SO
DEKAdd (Data Encryption Key Add)	Add a key to the Data Encryption Key DB	6	AES 128 Key	AES, SHA-256	CI, SO
DEKClear (Data Encryption Key Clear)	Clears the I-HSS registration for specified key index and algorithm version	1	AES 128 Key	AES, SHA-256	CI, SO
DEKDeactivate	Deactivate a key in the Data	1	AES 128 Key	AES, SHA-256	CI, SO

Service	Function	Role (Numbers from Table 4-1 Cryptographic Module Roles)	CSPs	Algorithm	Service Ports I-In, O-Out C-Command D-Data S-Status
(Data Encryption Key Deactivate)	Encryption Key DB				
DEKDestroy (Data Encryption Key Destroy)	Destroy a key from the Data Encryption Key DB	1	AES 128 Keys	N/A	CI, SO
DEKMigrate (Data Encryption Key Migrate)	Migrate the keys in the Data Encryption Key DB	7	AES 128 Key	AES, SHA-256	CI, SO
DEKReencrypt (Data Encryption Key Reencrypt)	Re-encrypt the keys in the Data Encryption Key DB	4	AES 128 Key	AES, SHA-256	DO, DI, CI, SO
DEKReport (Data Encryption Key Report)	Reports the keys in the Data Encryption Key database	6	N/A	N/A	DO, CI, SO
DEKUsageReport (Data Encryption Key Usage Report)	Reports the references to a Data Encryption Key for a specified Key Index and algorithm Version.	1	N/A	N/A	DO, CI, SO
DMKActivate (Data Management Key Activate)	Activate a key (or keys) in the Data Management Key DB	4	N/A	N/A	CI, SO
DMKAdd (Data Management Key Add)	Add a key to the Data Management Key DB	4	AES 128 Key	AES, SHA-256	CI, DI, SO
DMKDeativate (Data Management	Deactivate a key (or keys) in the Data Management	4	N/A	N/A	CI, SO

Service	Function	Role (Numbers from Table 4-1 Cryptographic Module Roles)	CSPs	Algorithm	Service Ports I-In, O-Out C-Command D-Data S-Status
Key Deactivate)	Key DB				
DMKDestroy (Data Management Key Destroy)	Destroy a key from the Data Management Key DB	1	AES 128 Keys	N/A	CI, SO
DMKReport (Data Management Key Report)	Reports the keys in the Data Management Key database	4	N/A	N/A	DO, CI, SO
KMDestroy (Key Material Desrtroy)	Destroy a key material file	1	AES 128 Key, DRBG Seed Key	N/A	CI, SO
TEKAdd (Transport Encryption Key Add)	Add a key to the Transport Encryption Key DB	5	AES 128 Key	N/A	CI, SO
TEKDestroy (Transport Encryption Key Destroy)	Destroy a key from the Transport Encryption Key DB	1	AES 128 Keys	N/A	CI, SO
TEKReencrypt (Transport Encryption Key Reencrypt)	Re-encrypt the keys in the Transfer Encryption Key DB	5	AES 128 Key	AES, SHA-256	DO, DI, CI, SO
TEKReport (Transport Encryption Key Report)	Reports the keys in the Transport Encryption Key database	5	N/A	N/A	DO, CI, SO
TMKActivate (Transport Management Key Activate)	Activate a key (or keys) in the Transport Management Key DB	5	N/A	N/A	CI, SO

Service	Function	Role (Numbers from Table 4-1 Cryptographic Module Roles)	CSPs	Algorithm	Service Ports I-In, O-Out C-Command D-Data S-Status
TMKAdd (Transport Management Key Add)	Add a key to the Transport Management Key DB	5	AES 128 Key	N/A	DI, CI, SO
TMKDeactivate (Transport Management Key Deactivate)	Deactivate a key (or keys) in the Transport Management Key DB	5	N/A	N/A	CI, SO
TMKDestroy (Transport Management Key Destroy)	Destroy a key from the Transport Management Key DB	1	AES 128 Keys	N/A	CI, SO
TMKReport (Transport Management Key Report)	Reports the keys in the Transport Management Key database	5	N/A	N/A	DO, CI, SO
CM APIs	Encrypt and decrypt data (via key index)	8	AES 128 Key	AES, SHA-256	DI, DO, SO
FIPS Command Utility	Initiate Self-Tests, Start and Stop Module	8	N/A	AES, SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-1, SHA-256, AES based SP800-90A CTR_DRBG	CI, SO
FIPS Indicator Utility	Get FIPS Status, Alter/Query key limit threshold	FIPS_MODE_MGR[2], All roles	N/A	N/A	CI, SO
Set up and Configure	Install module, create files and	1	N/A	N/A	CI, SO

[2]All roles can query the status but only the FIPS Mode Manager can alter the threshold for cryptographic keys that are about to expire.

Service	Function	Role (Numbers from Table 4-1 Cryptographic Module Roles)	CSPs	Algorithm	Service Ports I-In, O-Out C-Command D-Data S-Status
Module	roles				

Table 4-3: Module Services

4.3 Operator Authentication

The module does not implement authentication. The role is implicitly assumed based on the service requested.

5. Operational Environment

The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per the FIPS 140-2 specifications.

5.1 Operational Environment Policy

- The OS shall be restricted to a single operator at one time (i.e., concurrent operators are explicitly excluded).
- The applications that make calls to the CM are the single user of the CM, even when the application is serving multiple clients.
- The OS enforces authentication methods to prevent unauthorized access to CM services
- The applications using the module services consist of one or more processes in which each process is utilizing a separate copy of the instance data (no data is shared between instances).
- This module is implemented in FIPS-approved mode only.

6. Physical Security

This module is a security Level One software module and offers no specific physical security as none is required.

7. Cryptographic Key and CSP Management

This section defines the cryptographic keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) present in the system and how they are managed over their lifetime.

Key/CSP Type	Purpose	Location	Algorithm	Creation/ Input	Lifetime	Destruction
Data Encryption Keys	Encryption Key (EK)	Data Encryption Key DB	AES 128/ SHA-256	Locally generated, or imported via an encrypted file and shared key	Permanent in encrypted storage, ephemeral and zeroized after use when in plaintext	Destruction of KEK or record containing Key
Transport Encryption Keys	Encryption Key (EK)	Transport Encryption Key DB	AES 128/ SHA-256	Locally generated, or imported via an encrypted file and shared key	Permanent in encrypted storage, ephemeral and zeroized after use when in memory	Destruction of KEK or record containing Key
Data Management Key	KEK	Data Management Key DB	AES 128/ SHA-256	Manually input	Permanent in obfuscated plaintext storage, ephemeral and zeroized after use when in memory	Destruction of record containing Key
Transport Management Key	KEK	Transport Management Key DB	AES 128/ SHA-256	Manually input	Permanent in obfuscated plaintext storage, ephemeral and zeroized after use when in memory	Destruction of record containing Key
Data Management Master Seed Key	DRBG Seed	Data Management Key DB	AES-128/ SHA-256 for integrity and AES-128 for use in SP800-90A CTR_DRBG	Manually input	Permanent in obfuscated plaintext storage, ephemeral and zeroized after use when in plaintext	Destruction of KEK or record containing Key
SIM Data	CSP	SIM Data DB	AES-128/ SHA-256.	Imported via encrypted file and shared key	Permanent in encrypted storage, ephemeral and zeroized after use when in plaintext	Destruction of KEK or record containing Key

Subscriber Data (used for AV generation)	CSP	Subscriber Data DB	AES-128/ SHA-256.	Imported via encrypted file and shared key	Permanent in encrypted storage, ephemeral and zeroized after use when in plaintext	Destruction of KEK or record containing Key
SP 800-90A DRBG CSPs (seed, V)	symmet-ric keys, and random number genera-tion	RAM for the lifetime of DRBG instance	SP800-90A CTR_DRBG	Derived on use	Ephemeral and zeroized after use	Automatically destroyed after use
HMAC-SHA-1 keys for integrity checking	HMAC-SHA-1 keys	Executable file headers	HMAC-SHA-1	Embedded at file creation	Plaintext	N/A
HMAC-SHA-1 keys for integrity checking	HMAC-SHA-1 keys	Management Keys DB	HMAC-SHA-1	Derived on use	Obfuscated Plaintext	Destruction of record containing Key

Table 7-1: Keys and CSPs

7.1 Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG)

The module uses a hardware source of entropy to seed an approved DRBG. The continuous test is performed on both the seed source and the DRBG (SP800-90A AES-256 Counter (CTR) Mode) output. Additionally, the DRBG performs the health checks specified in section 11.3 of SP 800-90A, including:

- Known Answer Tests
- Instantiate Function Test
- Generate Function Test
- Reseed Function Test

The module uses NDRNG from the operational environment as the source of random numbers for DRBG seeds. The entropy source is outside the logical boundary of the software module but inside the physical boundary of the platform on which the software module is executed. The strength provided with each request from the NDRNG to seed the AES-256 CTR_DRBG is 384 bits.

7.2 Key Generation

AES keys are the only keys generated and are created using a SP800-90A compliant AES-256 CTR DRBG approved random number generator per FIPS 140-2 IG 7.8 Approved key generation method.

7.3 Key Entry and Output

Keys may be manually entered into the module in plaintext locally from the console terminal only. Those keys that are manually entered must be entered twice to verify integrity as required in FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2.

Keys may also be imported via an encrypted file under a shared key.

7.4 Key storage and Key Zeroization

Persistent keys are always stored in files which are SHA-256 hashed and encrypted (with the exception of the master keys which are stored as obfuscated plaintext). The master keys may be zeroized by using the Destroy commands (please see Table 4-3 for the Destroy commands); this effectively zeroizes all stored keys since the remaining keys are in files which were encrypted under the now zeroized master keys.

Ephemeral keys in memory are zeroized immediately after use.

The individual record containing a key may also be erased.

8. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)

The test platform that runs the Module meets the requirements of 47 CFR FCC PART 15, Subpart B, Class A (Business use).

9. Self-Tests

The HPE OpenCall components designated as part of the cryptographic module performs self-tests compliant with FIPS 140-2 Security Level One as described in section 4.9 of reference [2].

FIPS 140-2 security Level One compliance requires HPE to provide the ability to use power-up tests and conditional tests to validate the HPE OpenCall HLR CM components present in the Service Provider's environment.

If any instance associated with the CM fails the self-tests, the entire CM will enter the error state and post an error message via the FIPS Indicator Utility indicating that the CM is the error state. The CM will not provide cryptographic services while in the error state. The CM will also post a notice that can be automatically sent to subscribing administrators.

The FIPS Indicator Utility queries the FIPS 140-2 Mode Indicator value, and the Crypto period Expiration Warning Threshold, which is present in the FIPS Info data file.

The FIPS Command Utility interfaces with runtime Cryptographic Module (CM) components to initiate self-tests compliant with FIPS 140-2 Security Level One. It also queries the FIPS Status file to obtain the CM status. CM status provides information as to whether the components within the CM can provide cryptographic services. The utility presents the results of the initiated self-tests and the CM status query to the user.

The FIPS Command Utility Self-Test can act upon a categorical runtime component (e.g., provisioning or call processing) or the cryptographic module as a whole.

9.1 Power-Up Tests

The power-up tests that apply to the HPE OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module include the cryptographic algorithm test, the software integrity test, and the critical functions test.

The HPE OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module performs cryptographic algorithm Known Answer Tests (KAT) without user interaction to ensure the proper functioning of the encryption algorithms utilized by the HLR CM.

The following table shows the known answer tests (KAT) performed:

Algorithm	Test
AES	• AES ECB, encryption/decryption tested separately
SHS	• KAT SHA-256
HMAC	• KAT HMAC-SHA-1
DRBG	• KAT AES-256 CTR_DRBG

Table 9-1 – Self-Tests

Integrity verification is performed as part of power up tests.

During build time, the HMAC-SHA-1 value of the keymgrx executable, libCMOD, libcrypt, libOSSL, and libSSLF libraries are calculated and embedded in the cryptographic module. At load time the power-up tests are initiated by the module. The integrity test will compute the HMAC-SHA-1 of the module and compare them to the values generated during build. If the compared values differ, the module enters the error state. Once the module is in error state, all the cryptographic operations are prohibited and the only way to recover from this state is to reboot the module.

9.2 Conditional Tests

The conditional tests that apply to the HPE OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module include the software load test, the manual key entry test, and the continuous random number generator test.

Note that part of the implementation of this feature will involve an effort to determine any differences between the software load test specified as part of the conditional test and the software integrity test included as part of the power-up tests.

9.3 Continuous Tests

The standard FIPS 140-2 required continuous test is performed during operation on both the seed source and the DRBG.

10. Design Assurance

The HPE OpenCall HLR team adheres to internal coding practices defined for use by the HPE OpenCall HLR team. The software associated with the HPE OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module is isolated into specific software packages. APIs associated with the CM module provide external access to the cryptographic functions associated with the CM. The software in the CM does not share global data between CM module components or CM module components and entities external to the CM.

The software associated with the CM is either of block-structured or object oriented structure. The software is written in C or C++ and compiled with a C++ compiler.

The structure of the software is hierarchical. The software associated with the CM exists at a specific level (e.g. software package) in the overall software hierarchy. The functions and classes associated with the software perform specific tasks.

Software developed for the HPE OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module undergoes unit and independent-level testing.

10.1 Configuration management

HPE uses CollabNet to manage the software associated with the HPE OpenCall HLR Cryptographic Module. CollabNet is a leader in collaborative software development and the organization that supports the HPE software management website. CollabNet utilizes the CollabNet Enterprise Edition (CEE) software, which in turn utilizes the Subversion software configuration management (SCM) tool.

The CollabNet hosted solution encrypts all data stored on the external configuration management website. The encryption occurs on the database level and restricts data access to the CEE interface. The CEE limits software accessibility to users given visibility to the data stored on the website. Examples of accessibility range from read-only access to full read and write access with additional access limitations associated with groupings of software.

The configuration management structure of the HPE OpenCall HLR software, including the CM, involves supporting a main thread of software referred to as a trunk and branching from the trunk in order to support and manage releases of the HPE OpenCall HLR software. An HPE OpenCall HLR configuration management group manages branches associated with software provided for use by HPE customers.

10.2 Guidance

10.2.1 Secure installation

The module is provided with detailed instructions. For complete installation instructions please see companion document: “OpenCall I-HSS/I-HLR Installation Guide”

10.2.2 Secrets distributions

It is required that the customer will not synchronize the Data and Transport Management Keys files if they intend to operate the HPE OpenCall HLR in a FIPS 140-2 Security Level One compliant mode. The synchronization of the files, which are protected by obfuscating plain text cryptographic keys, creates a scenario that does not meet FIPS 140-2 Security Level One compliance. Rather the Data and Transport Management Keys must be manually entered at the console of each system.

10.2.3 Initialization and start-up

The module is provided with accompanied documentation that provides detailed information for complete installation instructions please see:

“OpenCall I-HSS/I-HLR Installation Guide”

10.2.4 Operational rules

10.2.4.1 The FIPS Status file must not be edited or modified manually.

10.2.4.2 Disabling Directory Browsing

The HPE HLR/AuC DPA provisioning will ensure that directory browsing is disabled prior to accepting HLR/AuC provisioning requests. See OpenCall I-HSS/I-HLR Installation Guide for instructions.

10.2.4.3 A firewall should be installed and configured to prevent unauthorized network access.

11. Mitigation of Other Attacks

No additional mitigations will be employed.

12. Acronyms

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
API	Application Programming Interface
AuC	Authentication Center
AV	Authentication Vector
CEE	CollabNet Enterprise Edition
CLI	Command Line Interface
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CM	Cryptographic Module
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
CTR	Counter
DB	Database
DPA	Dynamic Provisioning Architecture
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB	Electronic Code Book
EK	Encryption Key
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communications
GUI	Graphical User Interface
HMAC	Hash Message Authentication Code
HLR	Home Location Register
HP	Hewlett Packard
HPE	Hewlett Packard Enterprise
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
KAT	Known Answer Test
KEK	Key Encryption Key
Ki	Key Index
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
SCM	Software Configuration Management
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm

SHS	Secure Hash Standard
SIM	Subscriber Identity Module
SP	Security Policy
UMTS	Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
USIM	Universal SIM

13. References

The following references were utilized in preparing this SP.

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3. OpenCall I-HSS/HLR Installation Guide, Release ID: I-HSS 01.08.00, September 8, 2015.

4. HLR Security Administrators Guide, Release I-HSS 01.08.00, August 2015.

5. NIST, “Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program,” Initial Release: March 28, 2003, Last Update: August 8, 2015.

6. FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012 (link)

7. FIPS 198-1, The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), July 2008 (link)

8. NIST Special Publication 800-21, “Guideline for Implementing Cryptography In the Federal Government,” December 2005 (link)

9. NIST Special Publication 800-38A, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques”, December 2001 (link)

10. NIST Special Publication 800-57, “Recommendation for Key Management – Part 1: General (Revised),” March, 2007.

11. NIST Special Publication 800-90A – “Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators”, January 2012 (link)

12. IETF “Keyprov Status Pages” (http://tools.ietf.org/wg/keyprov/)