FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
for Aruba AP-204 and AP-205
Wireless Access Points

Version 2.2
January 2016
1 Introduction

This document constitutes the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Aruba AP-204 and AP-205 Wireless Access Points with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation from Aruba Networks. This security policy describes how the AP meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2, and how to place and maintain the AP in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation of the product.

FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Web-site at:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html

This document can be freely distributed.

1.1 Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>Advanced Encryption Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Access Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Cipher Block Chaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLI</td>
<td>Command Line Interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Crypto Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSec</td>
<td>Control Plane Security protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSEC</td>
<td>Communications Security Establishment Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Critical Security Parameter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECO</td>
<td>External Crypto Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMC</td>
<td>Electromagnetic Compatibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMI</td>
<td>Electromagnetic Interference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE</td>
<td>Fast Ethernet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>Gigabit Ethernet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHz</td>
<td>Gigahertz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC</td>
<td>Hashed Message Authentication Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hz</td>
<td>Hertz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKE</td>
<td>Internet Key Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPsec</td>
<td>Internet Protocol security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAT</td>
<td>Known Answer Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEK</td>
<td>Key Encryption Key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2TP</td>
<td>Layer-2 Tunneling Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAN</td>
<td>Local Area Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Light Emitting Diode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>Secure Hash Algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNMP</td>
<td>Simple Network Management Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOE</td>
<td>Serial &amp; Power Over Ethernet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEL</td>
<td>Tamper-Evident Label</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFTP</td>
<td>Trivial File Transfer Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLAN</td>
<td>Wireless Local Area Network</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2 Product Overview

This section introduces the various Aruba Wireless Access Points, providing a brief overview and summary of the physical features of each model covered by this FIPS 140-2 security policy.

The firmware version validated: ArubaOS 6.4.4-FIPS

2.1 AP-204

This section introduces the Aruba AP-204 Wireless Access Point (AP) with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation. It describes the purpose of the AP, its physical attributes, and its interfaces.

The innovative and aesthetically-designed 200 series indoor wireless access points deliver gigabit Wi-Fi performance to 802.11ac mobile devices. These compact and cost-effective dual-radio APs deliver wireless data rates of up to 867 Mbps to 5-GHz devices with 802.11ac technology leveraging two spatial MIMO streams while simultaneously supporting 2.4-GHz 802.11n clients with data rates of up to 300 Mbps.

2.4-GHz (300 Mbps max rate) and 5-GHz (867 Mbps max rate) radios, each with 2×2 MIMO and two combined, diplexed external RP-SMA antenna connectors.

When managed by Aruba Mobility Controllers, the 200 series offers centralized configuration, data encryption, policy enforcement and network services, as well as distributed and centralized traffic forwarding.

2.1.1 Physical Description

The Aruba AP-204 Access Point is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module consisting of hardware and software, all contained in a hard, opaque plastic case. The module contains 802.11 a/b/g/n/ac transceivers and supports external antennas through two N-type female connectors for external antennas.
The case physically encloses the complete set of hardware and software components and represents the cryptographic boundary of the module.

The module configuration validated during the cryptographic module testing included:

The hardware version is:
- HW: AP-204-F1

2.1.1.1 Dimensions/Weight

The AP has the following physical dimensions:
- 150 mm x 150 mm x 41.5 mm (W x D x H)
- 380 g

2.1.1.2 Interfaces

The module provides the following network interfaces:
- 10/100/1000BASE-T Ethernet network interface (RJ-45)
  - Auto-sensing link speed and MDI/MDX
  - 802.3az Energy Efficient Ethernet (EEE)
- 802.11a/b/g/n/ac Antenna interfaces (External)
- Serial console interface (disabled in FIPS mode by TEL)
- USB 2.0 host interface (Type A connector)
- Visual indicators (LEDs):
  - Power/system status
  - Ethernet link status (ENET)
  - Radio status (two; RAD0, RAD1)
- Reset button

The module provides the following power interfaces:
- Power-over-Ethernet (POE)
- 12V DC power interface
2.2 AP-205

This section introduces the Aruba AP-205 Wireless Access Point (AP) with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation. It describes the purpose of the AP, its physical attributes, and its interfaces.

The innovative and aesthetically-designed 200 series indoor wireless access points deliver gigabit Wi-Fi performance to 802.11ac mobile devices. These compact and cost-effective dual-radio APs deliver wireless data rates of up to 867 Mbps to 5-GHz devices with 802.11ac technology leveraging two spatial MIMO streams while simultaneously supporting 2.4-GHz 802.11n clients with data rates of up to 300 Mbps. 2.4-GHz (300 Mbps max rate) and 5-GHz (867 Mbps max rate) radios, each with 2×2 MIMO and four integrated omni-directional downtilt antennas.

When managed by Aruba Mobility Controllers, the 200 series offers centralized configuration, data encryption, policy enforcement and network services, as well as distributed and centralized traffic forwarding.

2.2.1 Physical Description

The Aruba AP-205 Access Point is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module consisting of hardware and software, all contained in a hard, opaque plastic case. The module contains 802.11 a/b/g/n/ac transceivers and supports internal antennas. The case physically encloses the complete set of hardware and software components and represents the cryptographic boundary of the module.

The hardware version is:

- HW: AP-205-F1

2.2.1.1 Dimensions/Weight

The AP has the following physical dimensions:
2.2.1.2 Interfaces

The module provides the following network interfaces:

- 10/100/1000BASE-T Ethernet network interface (RJ-45)
  - Auto-sensing link speed and MDI/MDX
  - 802.3az Energy Efficient Ethernet (EEE)
- 802.11a/b/g/n/ac Antenna interfaces (Internal)
- USB 2.0 host interface (Type A connector)
- Serial console interface (disabled in FIPS mode by TEL)
- Visual indicators (LEDs):
  - Power/system status
  - Ethernet link status (ENET)
  - Radio status (two; RAD0, RAD1)
- Reset button

The module provides the following power interfaces:

- Power-over-Ethernet (POE)
- 12V DC power interface

Module Objectives

This section describes the assurance levels for each of the areas described in the FIPS 140-2 Standard.

2.3 Security Levels

Table 1 - Security Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Section Title</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cryptographic Module Specification</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Roles, Services, and Authentication</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Finite State Model</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Physical Security</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cryptographic Key Management</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>EMI/EMC</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Self-tests</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Design Assurance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mitigation of Other Attacks</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Overall module validation level</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4 Physical Security

The module is a scalable, multi-processor standalone network device and is enclosed in a robust plastic housing. The module enclosure is resistant to probing (please note that this feature has not been validated as part of the FIPS 140-2 validation) and is opaque within the visible spectrum. The enclosure of the module has been designed to satisfy FIPS 140-2 Level 2 physical security requirements.

2.4.1 Applying TELs

The Crypto Officer must apply Tamper-Evident Labels (TELs) to the module to allow detection of the opening of the device, and to block the serial console port (on the bottom of the device). The TELs shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. Vendor provides FIPS 140 designated TELs which have met the physical security testing requirements for tamper evident labels under the FIPS 140-2 Standard. TELs are not endorsed by the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). Aruba provides double the required amount of TELs with shipping and additional replacement TELs can be obtained by calling customer support and requesting part number 4011570-01.

The Crypto Officer is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused tamper evident labels. If evidence of tampering is found with the TELs, the module must immediately be powered down and the administrator must be made aware of a physical security breach. The Crypto Officer should employ TELs as follows:

- Before applying a TEL, make sure the target surfaces are clean and dry.
- Do not cut, trim, punch, or otherwise alter the TEL.
- Apply the wholly intact TEL firmly and completely to the target surfaces.
- Ensure that TEL placement is not defeated by simultaneous removal of multiple modules.
- Allow 24 hours for the TEL adhesive seal to completely cure.
- Record the position and serial number of each applied TEL in a security log.
- To obtain additional or replacement TELs, please order Aruba Networks part number: 4011570-01.
- Please visit support.arubanetworks.com for online assistance and contact information.

Once applied, the TELs included with the module cannot be surreptitiously broken, removed or reapplied without an obvious change in appearance:

Each TEL has a unique serial number to prevent replacement with similar label. To protect the device from tampering, TELs should be applied by the Crypto Officer as pictured below:

2.4.2 TEL Placement

This section displays all the TEL locations on each module. Each module requires a minimum of 3 TELs to be applied as follows:
1) One Tel (1 & 2) wrapped around each of the opposite edges of the module to prevent separation of the case halves (Figures 3, 4 & 5).

2) One TEL covering the console port on the bottom (3) (Figure 6)
2.4.3 Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms

Table 2 - Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical Security Mechanism</th>
<th>Recommended Test Frequency</th>
<th>Guidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tamper-evident labels (TELs)</td>
<td>Once per month</td>
<td>Examine for any sign of removal, replacement, tearing, etc. See images above for locations of TELs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opaque module enclosure</td>
<td>Once per month</td>
<td>Examine module enclosure for any evidence of new openings or other access to the module internals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.5 Operational Environment

The FIPS 140-2 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the module is designated as a non-modifiable operational environment. The module only allows the loading of trusted and verified firmware that is signed by Aruba.
2.6 Logical Interfaces

The physical interfaces are divided into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2 as described in the following table.

Table 3 - Logical Interfaces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface</th>
<th>Module Physical Interface</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data Input Interface</td>
<td>• 10/100/1000 Ethernet Port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 802.11a/b/g/n/ac Antenna Interfaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• USB 2.0 Interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Output Interface</td>
<td>• 10/100/1000 Ethernet Port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 802.11a/b/g/n/ac Antenna Interfaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• USB 2.0 Interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Input Interface</td>
<td>• 10/100/1000 Ethernet Port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 802.11a/b/g/n/ac Antenna Interfaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reset button</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status Output Interface</td>
<td>• 10/100/1000 Ethernet Port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 802.11a/b/g/n/ac Antenna Interfaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• USB 2.0 Interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Interface</td>
<td>• DC Power Input</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Power-over-Ethernet (POE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data input and output, control input, status output, and power interfaces are defined as follows:

- Data input and output are the packets that use the networking functionality of the module.
- Control input consists of manual control inputs for power and reset through the power interfaces (DC power supply or POE). It also consists of all of the data that is entered into the access point while using the management interfaces. A reset button is present which is used to reset the AP to factory default settings.
- Status output consists of the status indicators displayed through the LEDs, the status data that is output from the module while using the management interfaces, and the log file.
  - LEDs indicate the physical state of the module, such as power-up (or rebooting), utilization level, and activation state. The log file records the results of self-tests, configuration errors, and monitoring data.
- The module may be powered by an external power supply which plugs in the bottom of the module. Operating power may also be provided via Power Over Ethernet (POE) device when connected. The power is provided through the connected Ethernet cable.
- Console port is disabled when operating in FIPS mode by TEL (Tamper-Evident Label).

The module distinguishes between different forms of data, control, and status traffic over the network ports by analyzing the packet headers and contents.
3 Roles, Authentication and Services

3.1 Roles
The module supports the roles of Crypto Officer and User; no additional roles (e.g., Maintenance) are supported. Administrative operations carried out by the Aruba Mobility Controller map to the Crypto Officer role. The Crypto Officer has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration, loading, and zeroization of CSPs. The Crypto Officer role is responsible for installing the Tamper-Evident Labels.

There is only one FIPS approved mode of operation, which is called “Control Plane Security (CPSec) Protected AP FIPS mode”. Please refer to section 7 in this document for more information.

In Control Plane Security (CPSec) Protected AP FIPS mode:

- Crypto Officer role: the Crypto Officer is the manager of Aruba Mobility Controller that has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration, loading, and zeroization of CSPs.
- User role: the User shares the same services and authentication techniques as the Mobility Controller in the Crypto Officer.

3.1.1 Crypto Officer Authentication
The module implements the Crypto Officer role. Connections between the module and the mobility controller are protected using IPSec. Crypto Officer Authentication is accomplished via RSA/ECDSA certificate in IKEv2 implementation.

3.1.2 User Authentication
When the module is configured in FIPS mode, the User role is authenticated via the same IKEv2 RSA/ECDSA certificate that is used by the Crypto Officer role.

3.1.3 Strength of Authentication Mechanisms
The following table describes the relative strength of each supported authentication mechanism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4 - Strength of Authentication Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authentication Mechanism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA Certificate based authentication (CO/User role)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3.2 Services

The module provides various services, detailed as below.

#### 3.2.1 Crypto Officer Services

The CO role in FIPS mode supports the following services.

**Table 5 - Crypto Officer Services**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>CSPs Accessed</th>
<th>CO can configure various operational parameters that do not relate to security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIPS mode enable/disable</td>
<td>The CO selects/de-selects FIPS mode as a configuration option.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Management</td>
<td>The CO can cause the module to generate the SKEYSEED.</td>
<td>1 (write/delete))</td>
<td>12(read/write/delete) 18, 19, 20, 21 (write/delete)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SKEYSEED is a key derivation key used in IKEv2. Please refer to the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>descriptions and methods described in table 6 below. The RSA and ECD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA private keys are protected by non-volatile memory and cannot be read</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by the CO.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remotely reboot module</td>
<td>The CO can remotely trigger a reboot</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power On Self-Tests (POSTs)</td>
<td>The CO can trigger a programmatic reset leading to POSTs and initialization</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Update module firmware</td>
<td>The CO can trigger a module firmware update</td>
<td>12(read/write/delete)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Configure non-security related module parameters</td>
<td>CO can configure various operational parameters that do not relate to security</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>CSPs Accessed (see table 6 below for a complete description to each CSP and the associated cryptographic algorithms)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creation/use of secure management session between module and CO</td>
<td>The module supports use of IPSec for securing the management channel.</td>
<td>14(read/write/delete), 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 (read/write)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Status</td>
<td>CO may view system status information through the secured management channel</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeroization</td>
<td>The cryptographic keys stored in SDRAM memory can be zeroized by rebooting the module. The cryptographic keys stored in the flash can be zeroized by using command ‘ap wipe out flash’ or by overwriting with a new one.</td>
<td>All CSPs will be destroyed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.2.2 User Services

The User services defined in the FIPS mode shares the same services with the Crypto Officer role. Please refer to Section 3.2.1, “Crypto Officer Services”.

#### 3.2.3 Unauthenticated Services

The module provides the following unauthenticated services, which are available regardless of role.

- System status – module LEDs
- Reboot module by removing/replacing power
- Self-test and initialization at power-on.

#### 3.2.4 Service Available in Non-FIPS Mode

- IPSec/IKE with Diffie-Hellman 768/1024-bit modulus and MD5.

**Notes:**

- If the keys used in IPSec/IKE (IKE session encryption key and IPSec session encryption keys defined in table 6) were derived by Diffie-Hellman 768/1024-bit modulus and MD5, then the keys won’t be used in FIPS mode.
- Please note that all CSPs will be zeroized automatically when switching from FIPS mode to non-FIPS mode, or from non-FIPS mode to FIPS mode.
4 Cryptographic Algorithms

The firmware (ArubaOS 6.4.4-FIPS) in each module contains the following cryptographic algorithm implementations/crypto libraries to implement the different FIPS approved cryptographic algorithms that will be used for the corresponding security services supported by the module in FIPS mode:

- ArubaOS OpenSSL Module algorithm implementation
- ArubaOS Crypto Module algorithm implementation
- ArubaOS UBootloader algorithm implementation

The firmware supports the following cryptographic implementations:

- ArubaOS OpenSSL Module algorithm implementation supports the following FIPS approved algorithms:\n  - AES (Cert. #3176)
  - DRBG (Cert. #660)
  - ECDSA (Cert. #580)
  - HMAC (Cert. #2004)
  - RSA (Cert. #1613)
  - SHS (Cert. #2629)
  - Triple-DES (Cert. #1812)

- ArubaOS Crypto Module algorithm implementation supports the following FIPS approved algorithms:
  - AES (Cert. #3177)
  - CVL (Cert. #423)\(^2\)
  - ECDSA (Cert. #581)
  - HMAC (Cert. #2005)
  - RSA (Cert. #1614)
  - SHS (Cert. #2630)
  - Triple-DES (Cert. #1813)

- ArubaOS UBOOT Bootloader algorithm implementation supports the following FIPS approved algorithms:
  - RSA (Cert. #1615)
  - SHS (Cert. #2631)

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\(^1\) Note: The module implements the power-up self-test service to AES (Cert. #3176), DRBG (Cert. #660), ECDSA (Cert. #580), HMAC (Cert. #2004), RSA (Cert. #1613), SHS (Cert. #2629) and Triple-DES (Cert. #1812) algorithms that are supported by ArubaOS OpenSSL Module algorithm implementation. Except for DRBG (Cert. #660) called by cryptographic keys generation, the module doesn’t use the rest of the algorithms in other security services at this time.

\(^2\) Only the IKEv2 KDF is active on the module.
Non-FIPS Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms

- Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
- EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 128 or 192 bits of encryption strength)
- NDRNG

Non-FIPS Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

- Diffie-Hellman (less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
- MD5

NOTE: IKEv2 protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
## 5 Critical Security Parameters

The following Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) are used by the module:

**Table 6 - Critical Security Parameters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Algorithm/Key Size</th>
<th>Generation/Use</th>
<th>Storage</th>
<th>Zeroization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Keys/CSPs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Key Encryption Key (KEK)</td>
<td>Triple-DES (192 bits)</td>
<td>Hardcoded during manufacturing. Used only to protect keys stored in the flash, not for key transport.</td>
<td>Stored in Flash memory (plaintext)</td>
<td>Zeroized by using command ‘ap wipe out flash’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>DRBG entropy input</td>
<td>SP 800-90a CTR_DRBG (512 bits)</td>
<td>Entropy inputs to DRBG function used to construct the DRBG seed.</td>
<td>Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext)</td>
<td>Zeroized by rebooting the module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>DRBG seed</td>
<td>SP 800-90a CTR_DRBG (384-bits)</td>
<td>Input to the DRBG that determines the internal state of the DRBG. Generated using DRBG derivation function that includes the entropy input from the entropy source.</td>
<td>Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext)</td>
<td>Zeroized by rebooting the module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DRBG Key</td>
<td>SP 800-90a CTR_DRBG (256 bits)</td>
<td>This is the DRBG key used for SP 800-90a CTR_DRBG.</td>
<td>Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext)</td>
<td>Zeroized by rebooting the module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DRBG V</td>
<td>SP 800-90a CTR_DRBG V (128 bits)</td>
<td>Internal V value used as part of SP 800-90a CTR_DRBG.</td>
<td>Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext)</td>
<td>Zeroized by rebooting the module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Diffie-Hellman private key</td>
<td>Diffie-Hellman Group 14 (224 bits)</td>
<td>Generated internally by calling FIPS approved DRBG (Cert. #660) to derive Diffie-Hellman shared secret used in</td>
<td>Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext)</td>
<td>Zeroized by rebooting the module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diffie-Hellman public key</td>
<td>Diffie-Hellman Group 14 (2048 bits)</td>
<td>Derived internally in compliance with Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme. Used for establishing DH shared secret.</td>
<td>Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext)</td>
<td>Zeroized by rebooting the module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>EC Diffie-Hellman private key</td>
<td>EC Diffie-Hellman (Curves: P-256 or P-384).</td>
<td>Generated internally by calling FIPS approved DRBG (Cert. #660) during EC Diffie-Hellman Exchange. Used for establishing ECDH shared secret.</td>
<td>Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext)</td>
<td>Zeroized by rebooting the module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>EC Diffie-Hellman public key</td>
<td>EC Diffie-Hellman (Curves: P-256 or P-384).</td>
<td>Derived internally in compliance with EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme. Used for establishing ECDH shared secret.</td>
<td>Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext)</td>
<td>Zeroized by rebooting the module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Factory CA Public Key</td>
<td>RSA (2048 bits)</td>
<td>This is FIPS 186-4 RSA public key. Loaded into the module during manufacturing. Used for Firmware verification.</td>
<td>Stored in Flash encrypted with KEK</td>
<td>Zeroized by using command ‘ap wipe out flash’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Algorithm</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Storage Location</td>
<td>Zeroization Method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>SKEYSEED key</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA-1/256/384</td>
<td>This is a key derivation key used for the key expansion step defined in SP800-135, section 4.1.2. It was derived by using Diffie-Hellman shared secret and other non-secret values through a key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2). It will be used for deriving other keys in IKEv2 protocol.</td>
<td>Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext)</td>
<td>Zeroized by rebooting the module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>IKE session authentication key</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA-1/256/384</td>
<td>The IKE session (IKE Phase I) authentication key. This key is derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2). Used for IKEv2 payload integrity verification.</td>
<td>Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext)</td>
<td>Zeroized by rebooting the module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>IKE session encryption key</td>
<td>Triple-DES (192 bits) AES (128/192/256 bits)</td>
<td>The IKE session (IKE Phase I) encrypt key. This key is derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2). Used for IKE payload protection.</td>
<td>Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext)</td>
<td>Zeroized by rebooting the module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>IPSec session encryption keys</td>
<td>Triple-DES (192 bits) / AES and AES-GCM (128/192/256 bits)</td>
<td>The IPsec (IKE phase II) encryption key. This key is derived via a key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2). Used for IPSec traffics protection.</td>
<td>Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext)</td>
<td>Zeroized by rebooting the module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>IPSec session authentication keys</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA-1 (160 bits)</td>
<td>The IPsec (IKE Phase II) authentication key. This key is derived via using the KDF defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2). Used for IPSec traffics integrity verification.</td>
<td>Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext)</td>
<td>Zeroized by rebooting the module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IKE RSA Private Key</td>
<td>RSA private key (2048 bits)</td>
<td>This is the FIPS 186-4 RSA private key. This key is generated by the module in compliance with FIPS 186-4 RSA key pair generation method. In IKEv2, DRBG (Cert. #660) is called for key generation. It is used for RSA signature signing in IKEv2.</td>
<td>Stored in Flash memory encrypted with KEK</td>
<td>Zeroized by using command 'ap wipe out flash'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>IKE RSA public key</td>
<td>RSA public key (2048 bits)</td>
<td>This is the FIPS 186-4 RSA public key. This key is derived in compliance with FIPS 186-4 RSA key pair generation method in the module. It is used for RSA signature verification in IKEv2.</td>
<td>Stored in Flash memory encrypted with KEK</td>
<td>Zeroized by using command 'ap wipe out flash'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>IKE ECDSA Private Key</td>
<td>ECDSA (Curves: P-256 or P-384)</td>
<td>This is the FIPS 186-4 ECDSA private key. This key is generated by the module in compliance with FIPS 186-4 ECDSA key pair generation method. In IKEv2, DRBG (Cert. #660) is called for key generation. It is used for ECDSA signature signing in IKEv2.</td>
<td>Stored in Flash memory encrypted with KEK</td>
<td>Zeroized by using command ‘ap wipe out flash’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>IKE ECDSA Public Key</td>
<td>ECDSA (Curves: P-256 or P-384)</td>
<td>This is the FIPS 186-4 ECDSA public key. This key is derived in compliance with FIPS 186-4 ECDSA key pair generation method in the module. It is used for ECDSA signature verification in IKEv2.</td>
<td>Stored in Flash memory encrypted with KEK</td>
<td>Zeroized by using command ‘ap wipe out flash’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that:

- AES GCM IV generation is performed in compliance with the Implementation Guidance A.5 scenario 2. FIPS approved DRBG (Cert. #660) is used for IV generation and 96 bits of IV is supported.

- Key size of DH Group 1 (768 bits) and Group 2 (1024 bits) are not allowed in FIPS mode.
6 Self Tests

The module performs Power On Self-Tests regardless the modes (non-FIPS mode or FIPS mode). In addition, the module also performs Conditional tests after being configured into the FIPS mode. In the event any self-test fails, the module enters an error state, logs the error, and reboots automatically.

The module performs the following power-up self-tests:

- ArubaOS OpenSSL Module algorithm implementation power on self-tests:
  - AES encrypt KAT
  - AES decrypt KAT
  - DRBG KAT (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP 800-90A Section 11.3 are performed)
  - ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test
  - HMAC (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384 and HMAC-SHA512) KATs
  - RSA sign KAT
  - RSA verify KAT
  - SHS (SHA1, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512) KATs
  - Triple-DES encrypt KAT
  - Triple-DES decrypt KAT

- ArubaOS Crypto Module algorithm implementation power on self-tests:
  - AES encrypt KAT
  - AES decrypt KAT
  - ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test
  - HMAC (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384 and HMAC-SHA512) KATs
  - RSA sign KAT
  - RSA verify KAT
  - SHS (SHA1, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512) KATs
  - Triple-DES encrypt KAT
  - Triple-DES decrypt KAT

- ArubaOS Uboot Bootloader Module algorithm implementation power on self-tests:
  - Firmware Integrity Test: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048 bits) signature verification with SHA-1

The following Conditional Tests are performed in the module:

- CRNG Test to NDRNG
- ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- Firmware Load Test - RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048 bits) signature verification

These self-tests are run for the ArubaOS cryptographic module implementation and ArubaOS Uboot BootLoader module implementation.
In the event of a KATs failure, the AP logs different messages, depending on the error.
7 Secure Operation

The module can be configured to be in the following FIPS approved mode of operations via corresponding
Aruba Mobility Controllers that have been certificated to FIPS level 2:

- Control Plane Security (CPSec) protected AP FIPS mode – When the module is configured as a
Control Plane Security protected AP it is intended to be deployed in a local/private location (LAN,
WAN, MPLS) relative to the Mobility Controller. The module provides cryptographic processing
in the form of IPSec for all Control traffic to and from the Mobility Controller.

In addition, the module also supports a non-FIPS mode – an un-provisioned AP, which by default does not
serve any wireless clients. The Crypto Officer must first enable and then provision the AP into a FIPS AP
mode of operation.

This section explains how to place the module in the FIPS mode and how to verify that it is in FIPS mode.
The access point is managed by an Aruba Mobility Controller in FIPS mode, and access to the Mobility
Controller’s administrative interface via a non-networked general purpose computer is required to assist in
placing the module in FIPS mode. The controller used to provision the AP is referred to below as the
“staging controller”. The staging controller must be provisioned with the appropriate firmware image for
the module, which has been validated to FIPS 140-2, prior to initiating AP provisioning. The Crypto
Officer shall perform the following steps:

1. Apply TELs according to the directions in section 2.4
2. Log into the administrative console of the staging controller
3. Configure the staging controller with CPSec under Configuration > Controller > Control Plane
   Security tab. AP will authenticate to the controller using certificate based authentication (IKEv2)
   to establish IPSec. The AP is configured with an RSA key pair at manufacturing. The AP’s
certificate is signed by Aruba Certification Authority (trusted by all Aruba controllers) and the
AP’s RSA private key is stored in non-volatile memory (TPM). Refer to the “Configuring Control
Plane Security” section in the ArubaOS User Manual for details on the steps.
4. Enable FIPS mode on the controller. This is accomplished by going to the Configuration >
   Network > Controller > System Settings page (this is the default page when you click the
   Configuration tab), and clicking the FIPS Mode for Mobility Controller Enable checkbox.
5. Enable FIPS mode on the AP. This accomplished by going to the Configuration >
   Wireless > AP Configuration > AP Group page. There, you click the Edit
   button for the appropriate AP group, and then select AP > AP System Profile. Then, check the
   “FIPS Enable” box, check “Apply”, and save the configuration.
6. If the staging controller does not provide PoE, either ensure the presence of a PoE injector for the
   LAN connection between the module and the controller, or ensure the presence of a DC power
   supply appropriate to the particular model of the module
7. Connect the module via an Ethernet cable to the staging controller; note that this should be a direct
   connection, with no intervening network or devices; if PoE is being supplied by an injector, this
   represents the only exception. That is, nothing other than a PoE injector should be present between
   the module and the staging controller.
8. Once the module is connected to the controller by the Ethernet cable, navigate to the
   Configuration > Wireless > AP Installation page, where you should see an entry for the AP.
   Select that AP, click the “Provision” button, which will open the provisioning window. Now
   provision the CPSEC Mode by filling in the form appropriately. Detailed steps are listed in Section
   “Provisioning an Individual AP” of Chapter “The Basic User-Centric Networks” of the Aruba OS
   User Guide. Click “Apply and Reboot” to complete the provisioning process.
   a. For CPSEC AP mode, the AP always uses certificate based authentication to establish
      IPSec connection with controller. AP uses the RSA key pair assigned to it at
manufacturing to authenticate itself to controller during IPSec. Refer to “Configuring Control Plane Security” Section in Aruba OS User Manual for details on the steps to provision an AP with CPSeq enabled on controller.

9. Via the logging facility of the staging controller, ensure that the module (the AP) is successfully provisioned with firmware and configuration
10. Terminate the administrative session
11. Disconnect the module from the staging controller, and install it on the deployment network; when power is applied, the module will attempt to discover and connect to an Aruba Mobility Controller on the network.

7.1.1 Verify that the module is in FIPS mode
For all the approved modes of operations in CPSeq protected AP FIPS mode, do the following to verify the module is in FIPS mode:

1. Log into the administrative console of the Aruba Mobility Controller
2. Verify that the module is connected to the Mobility Controller
3. Verify that the module has FIPS mode enabled by issuing command “show ap ap-name <ap-name> config”
4. Terminate the administrative session