



**StarSign Crypto-USB Token S powered by  
Sm@rtCafé Expert 7.0 Secure Element**

**FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module  
Non-Proprietary Security Policy**

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## References

Acronym	Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2]	NIST, <i>Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules</i> , May 25, 2001
[GlobalPlatform]	GlobalPlatform Consortium: <i>GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.2.1</i> , January 2011, <a href="http://www.globalplatform.org">http://www.globalplatform.org</a> GlobalPlatform Consortium: <i>GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.2 Amendment A, Confidential Card Content Management, Version 1.0</i> , October 2007
[ISO 7816]	ISO/IEC 7816-1:2011 <i>Identification cards -- Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts -- Part 1: Physical characteristics</i> ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007 <i>Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 2: Dimensions and location of the contacts. ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007.</i> ISO/IEC 7816-3:2006 <i>Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 3: Electrical interface and transmission protocols. ISO/IEC 7816-3:2006.</i> ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 <i>Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange.</i>
[JavaCard]	<i>Java Card 3 Platform Runtime Environment (JCRE) Specification, Classic Edition. Version 3.0.4</i> <i>Java Card 3 Platform Virtual Machine (JVM) Specification, Classic Edition. Version 3.0.4</i> <i>Java Card 3 Platform Application Programming Interface, Classic Edition. Version 3.0.4</i> Published by Oracle, September 2011
[SP800-131A]	<i>Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths</i> , January 2011
[ANS X9.31]	American Bankers Association, <i>Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA)</i> , ANSI X9.31-1998 - Appendix A.2.4.
[SP 800-67]	NIST Special Publication 800-67, <i>Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher</i> , version 1.2, July 2011
[FIPS113]	NIST, <i>Computer Data Authentication</i> , FIPS Publication 113, 30 May 1985.
[FIPS197]	NIST, <i>Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)</i> , FIPS Publication 197, November 26, 2001.
[PKCS#1]	<i>PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard</i> , RSA Laboratories, June 14, 2002
[FIPS 186-4]	NIST, <i>Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</i> , FIPS Publication 186-4, July, 2013
[SP 800-56A]	NIST Special Publication 800-56A, <i>Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography</i> , March 2007
[FIPS 180-4]	NIST, <i>Secure Hash Standard</i> , FIPS Publication 180-4, March 2012
[SP800-108]	NIST, <i>Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised)</i> , October 2009
[SP800-38F]	NIST, <i>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping</i> , December 2012
[IG]	NIST, <i>Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program</i> , last updated 2 March 2015.
[RS]	Irving S. Reed, Gustave Solomon: <i>Polynomial codes over certain finite fields</i> . In: <i>Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics</i> , SIAM J. 8, 1960, ISSN 0036-1399, p. 300–304.

**Table 1 – References**

## Acronyms and definitions

Acronym	Definition
APDU	Application Protocol Data Unit, see [ISO 7816]. A logical data packet.
API	Application Programming Interface
ATR	Answer To Reset
CSP	Critical Security Parameter, see [FIPS 140-2]
DAP	Data Authentication Pattern, see [GlobalPlatform]
DPA	Differential Power Analysis
GP	GlobalPlatform
IC	Integrated Circuit
ISD	Issuer Security Domain, see [GlobalPlatform]
KAT	Known Answer Test
NVM	Non-volatile memory
PCT	Pairwise Consistency Test
QFN	Quad Flat Non-Leaded Package
SCP	Secure Channel Protocol, see [GlobalPlatform]
SPA	Simple Power Analysis

**Table 2 – Acronyms and Definitions**

# 1 Introduction

This document defines the Security Policy for the Giesecke+Devrient StarSign Crypto-USB Token S powered by Sm@rtCafé Expert 7.0 Secure Element cryptographic module, hereafter denoted *the module*. The module, validated to FIPS 140-2 overall Level 3, is a single chip module implementing the GlobalPlatform operational environment, with Card Manager and a Demonstration Applet.

The Demonstration Applet is available only to demonstrate the complete cryptographic capabilities of the module for FIPS 140-2 validation, and is not intended for general use. The term *platform* herein is used to describe the chip and operational environment, not inclusive of the Demonstration Applet.

The module is a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The module includes a firmware load function to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.

The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the module are as follows:

Security Requirement	Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	3
Roles, Services, and Authentication	3
Finite State Model	3
Physical Security	3
Operational Environment	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	3
EMI/EMC	3
Self-Tests	3
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	3

**Table 3 – Security Level of Security Requirements**

## 1.1 Versions, Configurations and Modes of operation

**Hardware:** SLE78CUFX5000PH (M7893 B11)

**Firmware:** Sm@rtCafé Expert 7.0, Demonstration Applet V1.0

**Packaging:** P/PG-VQFN-32-13

The chip and firmware are identical in all configurations. The chip design is a superset of all possible interface options; unused options are disabled during production.

The module is always issued in Approved mode; the explicit indicator of Approved mode is given in the ATR: the value 0x46 ('F') in Historical Byte 9 indicates the Approved mode.

interface bytes

3B F9 96 00 00 81 31 FE 45

historical bytes

53 43 45 37 20 0E 00 20 46


S C E 7

F

## 2 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary


The module hardware and physical cryptographic boundary of the module is depicted in Figure 1. The cryptographic boundary is the surface and edges of the package as shown in the figure below (depicted by the red line). The module may be used in two configurations:

- ISO 7816 embedded SMD, denoted “SMD” in this document. In this configuration, intended for use in mobile devices, or similar end use devices, the module provides a fully compliant ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface.
- A USB Token configuration. In this configuration, intended for use in USB tokens, the module provides a fully compliant USB 2.0 interface.



**Figure 1 – Hardware and physical cryptographic boundary of the module**

Figure 2 shows how the module is used in a USB Token configuration. In this case the module is soldered on a PCB and is connected to the USB connector via USB interface. The PCB is enclosed by a token housing. The module may also be connected via an LED of the token via a general purpose output line.



**Figure 2 – Module in a USB Token Configuration**




Figure 3 shows how the module in a USB Token configuration could be mounted in a USB housing.



**Figure 3 – Example of the USB form factor**

Figure 4 shows the layout of the module with the different ports and interfaces.



**Figure 4 – Layout of Module**

Table 4 describes the different ports of the module.


Port	Description	Logical Interface Type
GND	Ground	Power
VCC	Supply voltage	Power
D+, D-	USB Input/output	Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out (USB Token configuration only)
ISO_IO	ISO 7816: Input/output	Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out (SMD configuration only)
ISO_RST	ISO 7816: Reset	Control-in (SMD configuration only)
ISO_CLK	ISO 7816: Clock	Control-in (SMD configuration only)
USBCAP	Connected to GND for USB operation	External buffer capacitor (USB configuration only)
GPIO	Signals the token LED. (output only)	General purpose output (USB configuration only)
NC	Not connected	

**Table 4 – Ports and Interfaces**

In the *USB Token* configuration the module uses the USB interface for control/data input and status/data output. In the *SMD* configuration the module uses the ISO 7816 interface for control/data input and status/data output. ISO/IEC 7816-4 APDUs (logical data packets) are used for communication in both module configurations, SMD and USB Token.

## 2.1 Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary

Figure 5 depicts the module operational environment.



**Figure 5 – Module Block Diagram**

The JavaCard, GlobalPlatform and G&D APIs are internal interfaces available only to applets and security domains (i.e., Card Manager). Only applet services are available at the card edge (the interfaces that cross the cryptographic boundary). Section 3 describes applet functionality in greater detail.

The NVM is separated into segments with different access rules, enforced by the hardware MMU. The MMU is initialized with the correct settings by startup code, and verified by the operating system each time the system starts. The MMU settings cannot be changed at run time. All code is executed from ROM and NVM.

### 3 Cryptographic Functionality

The module implements the Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed in Tables 5 and 6 below.

Algorithm	Description	Cert #
DRBG	[SP 800-90A] AES-256 CTR_DRBG; without prediction resistance.	455
Triple-DES	[SP 800-67] Triple Data Encryption Algorithm. The module supports 3-Key keys only, and CBC and ECB modes.	1637
Triple-DES MAC	[FIPS113] Triple-DES MAC, vendor affirmed based on Cert. 1637.	1637
AES	[FIPS 197] Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm. The module supports AES-128, AES-192- and AES-256 keys, and ECB and CBC modes.	2721
AES CMAC	[SP800-38B] AES-256 CMAC. The module supports AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 keys.	2720
SHA-1	SHA-1	2290
SHA-2	[FIPS 180-4] Secure Hash Standard compliant one-way (hash) algorithms; SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	2289
SHA-2	SHA-256	2288
RSA	[FIPS 186-4] RSA key generation, signature generation and verification. The module supports 2048-bit RSA keys.	1506
RSA CRT	[FIPS 186-4] RSA key generation and signature generation. The module supports 2048-bit RSA keys.	1507
DSA	[FIPS 186-4] DSA key generation, signature generation and verification. The module supports 2048 bit keys.	837
ECDSA	[FIPS 186-4] Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. The module supports the NIST defined P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 curves for key pair generation, signature and signature verification.	476
KDF	[SP 800-108] CMAC-based KDF with AES-128, AES-192, AES-256.	18
CVL	[SP 800-56A] The Section 5.7.1.2 ECC CDH Primitive only (as used by the PIV specification). The module supports the NIST defined P-224 P-256, P-384 and P-521 curves.	177

**Table 5 – Approved Cryptographic Functions**

Algorithm	Description
TRNG	Hardware TRNG used to seed the FIPS approved DRBG.
Key Wrap	AES (Cert.#2721, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 128 to 256 bits of encryption strength)

**Table 6 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions**

### 3.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys

All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this section. In the tables below, the OS prefix denotes operating system, the SD prefix denotes the GlobalPlatform Security Domain, the DAP prefix denotes the GlobalPlatform Data Authentication Protocol, and the DEM prefix denotes a Demonstration Applet CSP.

CSP	Description / Usage
OS-RNG-STATE	384 bit value; the current RNG state.
SD-KENC	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Master key used to generate SD-SENC.
SD-KMAC	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Master key used to generate SD-SMAC.
SD-KDEK	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Sensitive data decryption key used to decrypt CSPs.
SD-SENC	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Session encryption key used to encrypt / decrypt secure channel data.
SD-SMAC	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Session MAC key used to verify inbound secure channel data integrity.
SD-SRMAC	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Session MAC key used to verify response secure channel data integrity.
DAP-SYM	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 authentication key used by the <i>Manage Content</i> service.
DEM-AUTH	An 8 byte PIN value allowing all 256 values for each byte, used by the <i>PIN Authentication</i> service. The module always checks all 8 bytes of the PIN.
DEM-KAP-PRI	EC P-256 private key used to demonstrate the ECC CDH shared secret generation. The <i>Key Agreement Primitive</i> service allows any of the valid EC curves to be used.
DEM-MAC	3-Key Triple-DES ENC or MAC key used by the <i>Message Authentication</i> service.
DEM-SGV-PRIV	DSA 2048 bit, ECDSA P-256 or RSA 2048 bit private key used by the <i>Digital Signature</i> service.

**Table 7 – Critical Security Parameters**

Key	Description / Usage
DAP-PUB	RSA 2048 new firmware signature verification key.
DEM-KAP-PUB	EC P-256 ECDSA public key used by the <i>Key Agreement Primitive</i> service.
DEM-SGV-PUB	DSA 2048 bit, EC P-256 ECDSA or RSA 2048 bit public key used by the <i>Digital Signature</i> service.

**Table 8 – Public Keys**

## 4 Roles, Authentication and Services

The module:

- Does not support a maintenance role.
- Clears previous authentications on power cycle.
- Supports GlobalPlatform SCP logical channels, allowing concurrent operators in a limited fashion.

Authentication of each operator and their access to roles and services is as described below, independent of logical channel usage. Only one operator at a time is permitted on a channel. Applet de-selection (including Card Manager), card reset or power down terminates the current authentication; re-authentication is required after any of these events for access to authenticated services. Authentication data is encrypted during entry (by SD-KDEK), and is only accessible by authenticated services.

Table 9 lists all operator roles supported by the module.

Role ID	Role Description
CO	Cryptographic Officer – role that manages module content and configuration, including issuance and management of module data via the ISD. Authenticated as described in <i>Secure Channel Protocol Authentication</i> in Section 4.1 below.
User	User – role for use in Demonstration applet. Authenticated as described in <i>Demonstration Applet Authentication</i> in Section 4.2 below.

**Table 9 – Roles Supported by the Module**

### 4.1 Secure Channel Protocol Authentication Method

The Secure Channel Protocol authentication method is provided by the *Secure Channel* service. The SD-KENC and SD-KMAC keys are used to derive the SD-SENC and SD-SMAC keys, respectively. The SD-SENC key is used to create a cryptogram; the external entity participating in the mutual authentication also creates this cryptogram. Each participant compares the received cryptogram to the calculated cryptogram and if this succeeds, the two participants are mutually authenticated (the external entity is authenticated to the module in the CO role).

The probability that a random attempt will succeed using this authentication method is:

- $1/2^{128} = 2.9E-39$  (for any of AES-128/192/256 SD-KENC/SD-SENC, assuming a 128-bit block)

The module enforces a maximum of fifteen (15) consecutive failed SCP authentication attempts. The probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one minute interval is:

- $15/2^{128} = 4.4E-38$  (for any of AES-128/192/256 SD-KENC/SD-SENC, assuming a 128-bit block)

### 4.2 Demonstration Applet Authentication Method

The Demonstration Applet Authentication method is provided by the *Secure Channel* service combined with the *Authenticate* service. The module accepts an 8 byte PIN value and compares all 8 bytes to a stored reference, with no restriction on character space (each character can be any value from 0-255). The probability that a random attempt will succeed using this authentication method is:

- $1/256^8 = 5.4E-20$

The module enforces a maximum of three (3) consecutive failed authentication attempts. The probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one minute interval is:

- $3/256^8 = 1.6E-19$ .

### 4.3 Services

All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below.

Service	Description
Context	Selects an applet or manage logical channels.
Module Info (Unauthenticated)	Reads unprivileged data objects, e.g., module configuration or status information.
Module Reset	Power cycles or resets the module. Includes Power-On Self-Test.

**Table 10 – Unauthenticated Services**

Service	Description	CO	User
Lifecycle	Modifies the card or applet life cycle status.	X	
Manage Content	Loads and installs application packages and associated keys and data.	X	
Module Info (Authenticated)	Reads module configuration or status information (privileged data objects).	X	
Secure Channel	Establishes and uses a secure communications channel.	X	X
PIN Authentication	Demonstrates PIN authentication with OwnerPIN.		X
Manage Applet Content	Creates uninitialized key objects for use by the demo applet's cryptographic services. Deletes on-card key objects, arrays, signature objects.		X
Keys	Generates keys and initializes symmetric and asymmetric key objects for the cryptographic services.		X
Digital Signature	Demonstrates DSA, RSA, and ECDSA digital signature generation and verification.		X
Key Agreement Primitive	Demonstrates Approved ECC CDH primitive (SP 800-56A Section 5.7.1.2).		X
Message Authentication	Demonstrates Triple-DES encryption, decryption and MAC.		X
Message Digest	Demonstrates secure message digest (hash) generation (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512).		X

**Table 11 – Authenticated Services**

CSPs												
Service	OS-RNG-STATE	SD-KENC	SD-KMAC	SD-KDEK	SD-SENC	SD-SMAC	SD-SRMAC	DAP-SYM	DEM-AUTH	DEM-KAP-PRI	DEM-MAC	DEM-SGV-PRIV
Context	--	--	--	--	Z	Z	Z	--	--	--	--	--
Module Info (Unauthenticated)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Module Reset	GEW	--	--	--	Z	Z	Z	--	--	--	--	--
Lifecycle <sup>1</sup>	Z	Z	Z	Z	E	E	E	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z
Manage Content <sup>2</sup>	--	W	W	W	E	E	E	EW	Z	Z	Z	Z
Module Info (Authenticated)	--	--	--	--	E	E	E	--	--	--	--	--
Secure Channel	EW	E	E	--	GE	GE	GE	--	--	--	--	--
PIN Authentication	--	--	--	--	E	E	--	--	E	--	--	--
Manage Applet Content	--	--	--	--	E	E	--	--	--	C	C	C
Keys	EW	--	--	--	E	E	--	--	--	GZ	GZ	GZ
Digital Signature	EW	--	--	--	E	E	--	--	--	--	--	GE
Key Agreement Primitive	EW	--	--	--	E	E	--	--	--	GE	--	--
Message Authentication	--	--	--	--	E	E	--	--	--	--	E	--
Message Digest	--	--	--	--	E	E	--	--	--	--	--	--

**Table 12 – Access to CSPs by Service**

- G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
- C = Create: The module uninitializes key objects for signature and cipher algorithms.
- R = Read: The module reads the CSP (read access to the CSP by an outside entity).
- E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
- W = Write: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is imported into the module or when the module overwrites an existing CSP.
- Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP. For the Context service, SD session keys are destroyed on applet deselect (channel closure)
- -- = Not accessed by the service.

<sup>1</sup> Zeroize in this row corresponds to card termination.

<sup>2</sup> Zeroize in this row corresponds to the Demonstration Applet deletion.



## 5 Self-test

### 5.1 Power-On Self-tests

On power-on or reset, the module performs self-tests as described in Table 13 below. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. If one of the KATs fails, the system emits an error code (0x6666) and enters the SELF-TEST ERROR state.

Test Target	Description
Firmware Integrity	16 bit Reed-Solomon EDC performed over all code in the cryptographic boundary.
DRBG	Performs a fixed input KAT.
Triple-DES	Performs separate encrypt and decrypt KATs using 3-Key Triple-DES in ECB mode.
AES	Performs a decrypt KAT using an AES-128 key in ECB mode.
SP 800-108 KDF	Performs a KAT of SP 800-108 KDF. This self-test is inclusive of AES CMAC and AES encrypt function self-test.
RSA	Performs separate RSA signature and verify KATs using an RSA 2048-bit key.
RSA CRT	Performs RSA CRT signature KATs using an RSA 2048-bit key.
ECDSA	Performs pairwise consistency test using the P-521 curve.
SHA-1	Performs a fixed input KAT.
SHA-256	Performs a fixed input KAT.
SHA-256 (2)	Performs a fixed input KAT for the 2 <sup>nd</sup> SHA-256 implementation.
SHA-512	Performs a fixed input KAT.
DSA	Performs a pairwise consistency test using a DSA 2048-bit key.
ECC CDH	Primitive “Z” Computation KAT for [SP 800-56A] Section 5.7.1.2 ECC CDH Primitive using the P-521 curve.

**Table 13 – Power-On Self-Test**

### 5.2 Conditional Self-tests

On every call to the DRBG, the module performs the AS09.42 continuous RNG test to assure that the output is different than the previous value. If the continuous RNG test fails, the module enters the SELF-TEST ERROR state. The TRNG hardware includes a continuous comparison test, such that each word formed is compared to the previous value; a duplicate value is discarded, and the TRNG status indicates not ready.

When an RSA, DSA or ECDSA key pair is generated the module performs a pairwise consistency test. If the pairwise consistency test fails, the module enters the SELF-TEST ERROR state.

When new firmware is loaded into the module using the *Manage Content* service, the module verifies the integrity of the new firmware (applet) using MAC verification with the SD-SMAC key. Optionally, the module may also verify a signature of the new firmware (applet) using the DAP-SV-PUB public key or the DAP-SYM key; the signature block in this scenario is generated by an external entity using the private key corresponding to DAP-SV-PUB or the symmetric DAP-SYM. Failure to verify the new firmware results in the BAD APDU error state; the module returns an error specific to the situation (MAC failure or DAP failure).

## 6 Physical Security Policy

The module is a single-chip implementation available in SMD packaging that meets commercial-grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, and shock/vibrations. The module was tested at ambient temperature only.

The module is intended to be mounted in additional packaging as described in Section 2. Physical inspection of the die for tamper evidence is typically not practical after packaging.

## 7 Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility (EMI/EMC)

The module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by part 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B.

## 8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

The module implements defenses against:

- Physical fault induction, such as laser, light, clock glitch or similar attacks
- Side-channel attacks (SPA/DPA and timing analysis)
- Differential fault analysis (DFA)

## 9 Security Rules and Guidance

The module implementation also enforces the following security rules:

- No additional interface or service is implemented by the module which would provide access to CSPs.
- Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
- There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
- The module does not support manual key entry, output plaintext CSPs, or output intermediate key values.
- Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.