HGST Ultrastar® SSD800MH.B, SSD1600MM and SSD1600MR TCG Enterprise SSD
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Protection of Data at Rest

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1 Module Overview

HGST Ultrastar SSD800MH.B, SSD1600MM and SSD1600MR TCG Enterprise SSDs, hereafter referred to as “Ultrastar SSD800/1600” or “the Cryptographic Module” are multi-chip embedded Cryptographic Modules. They comply with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security. They also comply with the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) SSC: Enterprise Specification. The drive enclosure is the cryptographic boundary.

Figure 1 Cryptographic Boundary Hardware Version (0003)

1.1 Models

The Ultrastar SSD800/1600 is available in several models that vary in performance and storage capacities. Table 1 enumerates the models and characteristics, which include the hardware and firmware versions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Number (Hardware Version)</th>
<th>Capacity (GB)</th>
<th>Firmware Version</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HUSMH8080BSS205 (0003)</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>D326, D327, D370, D371, K326, K370, P326, P33G, P344, P370, Q4CB</td>
<td>SSD800MH.B, 2.5”, 12 Gb/s, SAS, High Endurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUSMH8040BSS205 (0003)</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>D326, D327, D370, D371, K326, K370, P326, P33G, P344, P370, Q4CB</td>
<td>SSD800MH.B, 2.5”, 12 Gb/s, SAS, High Endurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUSMH8020BSS205 (0003)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>D326, D327, D370, D371, K326, K370, P326, P33G, P344, P370, Q4CB</td>
<td>SSD800MH.B, 2.5”, 12 Gb/s, SAS, High Endurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUSMH8010BSS205 (0003)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>D326, D327, D370, D371, K326, K370, P326, P33G, P344, P370, Q4CB</td>
<td>SSD800MH.B, 2.5”, 12 Gb/s, SAS, High Endurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUSMM1616ASS205 (0003)</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>D326, D327, D370, D371, K326, K370, P326, P33G, P344, P370, Q4CB</td>
<td>SSD1600MM, 2.5”, 12 Gb/s, SAS, Mainstream Endurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUSMM1680ASS205 (0003)</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>D326, D327, D370, D371, K326, K370, P326, P33G, P344, P370, Q4CB</td>
<td>SSD1600MM, 2.5”, 12 Gb/s, SAS, Mainstream Endurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUSMM1640ASS205 (0003)</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>D326, D327, D370, D371, K326, K370, P326, P33G, P344, P370, Q4CB</td>
<td>SSD1600MM, 2.5”, 12 Gb/s, SAS, Mainstream Endurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUSMM1620ASS205 (0003)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>D326, D327, D370, D371, K326, K370, P326, P33G, P344, P370, Q4CB</td>
<td>SSD1600MM, 2.5”, 12 Gb/s, SAS, Mainstream Endurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUSMR1619ASS235 (0003)</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>R1C0</td>
<td>SSD1600MR, 2.5”, 12 Gb/s, SAS, Read Intensive, 3DW/D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.2 Security Level

The cryptographic module meets all requirements applicable to FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements Section</th>
<th>FIPS 140-2 Security Level Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic Module Specification</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Module Ports and Interfaces</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles, Services and Authentication</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finite State Model</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Security</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic Key Management</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMI/EMC</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Tests</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design Assurance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitigation of Other Attacks</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification
2 Modes of Operation

2.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation

The Cryptographic Module has a single FIPS Approved mode of operation. The Cryptographic Module enters FIPS Approved Mode after successful completion of the Initialize Cryptographic service instructions. The FIPS mode bit is set to 1 after the Crypto Officer executes the Set Makers.Enabled = FALSE instruction. The Cryptographic Officer shall not enable the Maker Authority after the cryptographic module enters FIPS Approved mode. If the Cryptographic Officer enables the Maker Authority after the module enters FIPS Approved mode the Cryptographic Officer must also zeroize the module by executing the TCG Revert Method. The Cryptographic Officer shall not exercise the Disable Zeroize service after the cryptographic module enters FIPS Approved mode.

The chapter titled FIPS 140 Cryptographic Officer Instructions within the Ultrastar SSD800MH.B SSD1600MM SSD1600MR Product Manual provides information on how to execute the Initialize Cryptographic service as well as the TCG Revert Method.

2.2 Approved Algorithms

The cryptographic module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms. All algorithms and key lengths comply with NIST SP 800-131A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIPS Approved Algorithm</th>
<th>CAVP Certificate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SP800-90A CTR-DRBG</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardware AES ECB-128,256, XTS-128, 256 Encryption and Decryption</td>
<td>2067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note: XTS is used for storage applications only. XTS-128 was tested but is not used.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES ECB-256 Encryption, Decryption and Key Wrap</td>
<td>2365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA 2048 PSS Verify</td>
<td>1220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-256</td>
<td>2037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC-SHA-256 Used in SP 800-132 KDF</td>
<td>1468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP800-132 KDF</td>
<td>Vendor Affirmed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 - FIPS Approved Algorithms

The Cryptographic Module supports the following non-Approved but Allowed algorithms:

- Hardware NDRNG for seeding the Approved SP800-90A DRBG. The NDRNG provides a minimum of 256 bits of entropy for key generation.

1 The length of data unit for XTS-AES does not exceed 2^30 blocks.
3  Ports and Interfaces

Table 4 below identifies its ports and interfaces of the cryptographic module. A maintenance access interface is not provided.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIPS 140-2 Interface</th>
<th>Cryptographic Module Ports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Power connector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Input</td>
<td>SAS connector, Serial connector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status Output</td>
<td>SAS connector, Serial connector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Input</td>
<td>SAS connector, Serial connector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Output</td>
<td>SAS connector, Serial connector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 - Ultrastar SSD800/1600 Pins and FIPS 140-2 Ports and Interfaces

The SAS (Serial Attached SCSI) connector is an industry defined standard [SAS], and the Serial connector is a two wire port, signal and ground. The Serial Connector is enabled only at HGST facilities; it is disabled before the Cryptographic Module is delivered to customers.

4  Identification and Authentication Policy

The cryptographic module enforces the following FIPS140-2 operator roles.

4.1  Cryptographic Officer

4.1.1  Secure ID (SID) Authority

This TCG authority initializes the cryptographic module. Section 11.3.1 of the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification defines this role.

4.1.2  EraseMaster Authority

This TCG authority can selectively zeroize bands within the cryptographic module. Section 11.4.1 of the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification defines this role. It may also disable User roles and erase LBA bands (user data regions).

4.2  User

User roles correspond to Bandmaster Authorities. Section 11.4.1 of the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification provides a definition. They are authorized to lock/unlock and configure LBA bands (user data regions) and to issue read/write commands to the SED. The TCG EraseMaster authority can disable Users.

4.3  Anybody

Services are provided that do not require authentication. With one exception, these do not disclose, modify, or substitute Critical Security Parameters, use an Approved security function, or otherwise affect the security of the Cryptographic Module. The excepted service is the Generate Random service, which provides output from an instance of the SP800-90A DRBG.
4.4 Maker

For failure analysis purposes, Out-of-scope services are available to the vendor to configure and perform failure analysis within the vendor’s facilities after the cryptographic module exits FIPS Approved mode. Maker is disabled when the Cryptographic Officer invokes the Initialize Cryptographic Module service.

The following table maps TCG authorities to FIPS 140-2 roles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TCG Authority</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Authentication Type</th>
<th>Authentication Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SID Authority</td>
<td>A Cryptographic Officer role that initializes the Cryptographic Module and authorizes Firmware download.</td>
<td>Role-based</td>
<td>CO Identity (TCG SID Authority) and PIN (TCG SID Authority PIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EraseMaster</td>
<td>A Cryptographic Officer role that zeroizes Media Encryption keys and disables Users.</td>
<td>Role-based</td>
<td>CO Identity (TCG EraseMaster Authority) and PIN (TCG EraseMaster PIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BandMasterN</td>
<td>A User role that controls read/write access to LBA Bands.</td>
<td>Role-based</td>
<td>User Identity (TCG BandMaster Authority) and PIN (TCG BandMaster PIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 0 to 3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anybody</td>
<td>A role that does not require authentication.</td>
<td>Unauthenticated</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maker (Disabled)</td>
<td>A TCG Authority which is not available upon completion of the Initialize Cryptographic Module service</td>
<td>Role-based</td>
<td>User Identity (TCG Maker Authority) and PIN (HGST Maker PIN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication

The cryptographic module enforces role separation by requiring a role identifier and an authentication credential (Personal Identification Number or PIN).
TCG Credentials are 256 bits, which provides $2^{256}$ possible values. The probability that a random attempt succeeds is 1 chance in $2^{256}$ (approximately $8.64 \times 10^{-78}$) which is significantly less than 1/1,000,000 ($1 \times 10^{-5}$).

Multiple, successive authentication attempts can only occur sequentially (one at a time) and only when the failed authentication Tries count value does not exceed the associated TriesLimit value. Any authentication attempt consumes at least approximately 750 microseconds. Hence, at most, approximately 80,000 authentication attempts are possible in one minute. Thus, the probability that a false acceptance occurs a one minute interval is approximately $6.91 \times 10^{-73}$ which is significantly less than 1 chance in 100,000 ($1 \times 10^{-5}$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authentication Mechanism</th>
<th>Mechanism Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TCG Credential (PIN)</td>
<td>TCG Credentials are 256 bits, which provides $2^{256}$ possible values. The probability that a random attempt succeeds is 1 chance in $2^{256}$ (approximately $8.64 \times 10^{-78}$) which is significantly less than 1/1,000,000 ($1 \times 10^{-5}$). Multiple, successive authentication attempts can only occur sequentially (one at a time) and only when the failed authentication Tries count value does not exceed the associated TriesLimit value. Any authentication attempt consumes at least approximately 750 microseconds. Hence, at most, approximately 80,000 authentication attempts are possible in one minute. Thus, the probability that a false acceptance occurs a one minute interval is approximately $6.91 \times 10^{-73}$ which is significantly less than 1 chance in 100,000 ($1 \times 10^{-5}$).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 - Authentication Mechanism Strengths

5 Access Control Policy

5.1 Roles and Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Role(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initialize Cryptographic Module</td>
<td>Cryptographic Officer provisions the Cryptographic Module from organizational policies</td>
<td>CO (SID Authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authenticate</td>
<td>Input a TCG Credential for authentication</td>
<td>CO, Users, Maker (SID Authority, EraseMaster, BandMasters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lock/Unlock Firmware Download Control</td>
<td>Deny/Permit access to Firmware Download service</td>
<td>CO (SID Authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firmware Download</td>
<td>Load and verify by RSA2048 an entire firmware image. If the new self-tests complete successfully, the SED executes the new code. The Firmware Download Control shall be unlocked before Firmware can be downloaded.</td>
<td>CO (SID Authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disable Zeroize</td>
<td>Disable TCG Revert method</td>
<td>CO (SID Authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Role(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set</td>
<td>Write data structures; access control enforcement occurs per data structure field. PINs can be changed using this service.</td>
<td>CO, Users, Maker (SID Authority, EraseMaster, BandMasters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set TCG Credential</td>
<td>Inputs authentication data and replaces stored hashed PIN data.</td>
<td>CO, Users (SID Authority, EraseMaster), (BandMasters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set LBA Band</td>
<td>Set the starting location, size, and attributes of a set of contiguous Logical Blocks</td>
<td>Users (BandMasters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lock/Unlock LBA Band</td>
<td>Deny/Permit access to a LBA Band</td>
<td>Users (BandMasters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set Data Store</td>
<td>Write a stream of bytes to unstructured storage</td>
<td>Users (BandMasters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erase LBA Band</td>
<td>Band cryptographic-erasure by changing LBA band encryption keys to new values. When the EraseMaster erases a LBA band, the TCG Credential is set to the default value.</td>
<td>CO (EraseMaster)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set Vendor Data</td>
<td>A Non-Approved service that is unavailable after the Initialize Cryptographic Module service completes</td>
<td>Maker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 - Authenticated CM Services

### 5.2 Unauthenticated Services

The cryptographic module provides these unauthenticated services:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reset Module</td>
<td>Power on Reset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Test</td>
<td>The CM performs self-tests when the module powers up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status Output</td>
<td>TCG (IF-RECV) protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get FIPS Mode</td>
<td>TCG ‘Level 0 Discovery’ method outputs the FIPS mode of the Cryptographic Module.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start Session</td>
<td>Start TCG session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End Session</td>
<td>End a TCG session by clearing all session state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate Random</td>
<td>TCG Random method generates a random number from the SP800-90A DRBG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get</td>
<td>Reads a data structure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 5.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)

The Cryptographic Module contains the following CSPs. Zeroization of CSPs complies with [SP800-88] media sanitization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PIN - TCG Credential</td>
<td>256-bit authentication data</td>
<td>Authenticates the Cryptographic Officer and User roles. This is provided as input into the PBKDF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6 total)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEK - Media Encryption Key</td>
<td>XTS-AES-256 (512 bits)</td>
<td>Encrypts and decrypts LBA Bands. Note: This key only associated with one key scope.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4 total - 1 per LBA band)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEK – Key Encrypting Key</td>
<td>SP 800-132 PBKDF (256 bits)</td>
<td>Keys derived from BandMaster PINs and 256-bit KEK salt which wrap the MEKs using an AES Key Wrap. Note: Keys protected by this SP 800-132 PBKDF derived key shall not leave the module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4 total)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDRNG</td>
<td>256-byte Entropy output</td>
<td>Entropy source for DRBG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRBG</td>
<td>Internal CTR_DRBG state</td>
<td>All properties and state associated with the SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.4 Definition of Sensitive Security Parameters

The module contains the following public keys:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSAFW</td>
<td>RSA 2048 public key</td>
<td>Verify firmware download</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 8 - Unauthenticated Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Get Data Store</td>
<td>Read a stream of bytes from unstructured storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeroize</td>
<td>TCG Revert method to return the Cryptographic Module to its original manufactured state; authentication data (PSID) is printed on the external label</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCSI</td>
<td>[SCSI Core] and [SCSI Block] commands to function as a standardized storage device. See Table 12 - SCSI Commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write Data</td>
<td>Transform plaintext user data to ciphertext and write in a LBA band</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read Data</td>
<td>Read ciphertext from a LBA band and output user plaintext data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 9 - CSPs and Private Keys

### Table 10 - Sensitive Security Parameters
5.5 **SP800-132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations**

- The Cryptographic Module deploys a [SP800-132] Key Derivation Function (KDF). The Cryptographic Module tracks TCG Credentials (PINs) by hashing a 256-bit salt and User PIN and storing the SHA256 digest in the Reserved Area.
- The cryptographic module complies with SP800-132 Option 2a.
- KEKs (SP800-132 Master Keys) derive from passing a User PIN and 256-bit salt though an SP800-132 KDF. The cryptographic module creates a unique KEK for each LBA Band.
- Each salt is a random number generated using the [SP800-90A] DRBG.
- Each KEK has a security strength of 128-bits against a collision attack.
- Security policy rules set the minimum User PIN length at 32 bytes. The cryptographic module allows values from 0x00 to 0xFF for each byte of the User PIN.
- The upper bound for the probability of guessing a User PIN is $1/2^{256}$.
- The difficulty of guessing the User PIN is equivalent to a brute force attack.
- The sole use of the KEKs is to wrap and unwrap the Media Encryption Keys (MEKs).

5.6 **Definition of CSP Modes of Access**

Table 11 defines the relationship between access to Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:

- **G = Generate**: The Cryptographic Module generates a CSP from the SP800-90A DRBG, derives a CSP with the Key Derivation Function or hashes authentication data with SHA-256.
- **E = Execute**: The module executes using the CSP.
- **W = Write**: The Cryptographic Module writes a CSP. The write access is performed after the Cryptographic Module generates a CSP.
- **Z = Zeroize**: The Cryptographic Module zeroizes a CSP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>CSPs and Keys</th>
<th>Type of CSP Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initialize Cryptographic Module</td>
<td>CO PIN and User PIN and DRBG and KEK and MEK</td>
<td>E,W, E,W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authenticate</td>
<td>CO PIN or User PIN</td>
<td>E, E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lock/Unlock Firmware Download Control</td>
<td>CO PIN</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firmware Download</td>
<td>CO PIN and RSAFW</td>
<td>E, E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disable Zeroize</td>
<td>CO PIN</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>CSPs and Keys</td>
<td>Type of CSP Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>CO PIN or User PIN or Maker PIN</td>
<td>E, E, E</td>
</tr>
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<td>CO PIN or User PIN</td>
<td>W, W</td>
</tr>
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<td>Set LBA Band</td>
<td>User PIN</td>
<td>E, E, E</td>
</tr>
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<td>Lock/Unlock LBA Band</td>
<td>User PIN and KEK and MEK</td>
<td>E, G</td>
</tr>
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<td>MEK</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Read Data</td>
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<td>Set Data Store</td>
<td>User PIN</td>
<td>E, E, E</td>
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<td>Erase LBA Band</td>
<td>CO PIN and KEK and MEK</td>
<td>E, G, Z, G, W</td>
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<td>Self-Test</td>
<td>NDRNG and DRBG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Status Output</td>
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<td>Get FIPS mode</td>
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<td>Start Session</td>
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<td>End Session</td>
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<td>Generate Random</td>
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<td>Get Data Store</td>
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Table 11 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services

6 Operational Environment

The Cryptographic Module operating environment is non-modifiable. While the Cryptographic Module is operational, the environment cannot be modified; the code working set cannot be added, deleted, or
modified. Firmware can be upgraded (replaced in entirety) with an authenticated download service. If the download operation is successfully authorized and verified, then the Cryptographic Module will begin operating with the new code working set.

7 Security Rules
The Ultrastar SSD800/1600 enforces applicable FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security requirements. This section documents the security rules that the Cryptographic Module enforces.

7.1 Invariant Rules

- The Cryptographic Module supports two distinct types of operator roles: Cryptographic Officer and User. The module also supports an additional role, the Maker role. Initialization disables the Maker role.
- Cryptographic Module power cycles clear all existing authentications.
- When the Cryptographic Module has successfully completed self-tests and has been initialized, it is in FIPS mode, and the FIPS mode indicator is set to 1.
- When the module is unable to authenticate TCG Credentials, operators do not have access to any cryptographic service other than the unauthenticated Generate Random service.
- The Crypto Officer shall not activate the Disable Zeroize service.
- The cryptographic module performs the following tests. Upon failure of any test, the Cryptographic Module enters a soft error state; the error condition is reported via the [SCSI] protocol. Functional commands are not permitted until a reset or power on reset occurs.

1) Power up Self-Tests

   a) Firmware Integrity 32-bit EDC
   b) Hardware AES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs, Cert #2067
   c) Firmware AES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs, Cert #2365
   d) RSA Verify KAT, Cert #1220
   e) SHA-256 KAT, Cert #2037
   f) DRBG Health Test
   g) DRBG KAT
   h) HMAC-SHA-256 KAT, Cert #1468

2) Conditional Tests

   a) Continuous Random Number Generator test is performed on the DRBG and the hardware NDRNG entropy source.
   b) Firmware Download Check using RSA 2048 with SHA-256.

- An operator can command the module to perform the power-up self-test by power cycling the device.
- If a power-up self-tests fails, the drive will report a UEC that shows which test failed. After reporting the failure data, the drive will transition to a soft error state.
- Power-up self-tests do not require operator action.
- Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
• Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused, could compromise the module.
• There are no restrictions on which plaintext keys or CSPs the zeroization service deletes.
• The module does not support a maintenance interface or maintenance role.
• The module does not support manual key entry.
• The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
• The module does not output plaintext CSPs.
• The module does not output intermediate key values.
• The module does not support concurrent operators.
• The End Session service deletes the current operator authentication. The Cryptographic Module requires operators to re-authenticate upon execution of the End Session service.
• The Cryptographic Officer shall not enable the Maker Authority after the cryptographic module enters FIPS Approved mode.
• The Crypto Officer shall assure that all host issued User PINs are 32-bytes in length.

7.2 Initialization Rules
The Cryptographic Officer shall follow the instructions in Section 18.17 FIPS140 Cryptographic Officer Instructions of the Ultrastar SSD800MH.B SSD1600MM SSD1600MR Product Manual and the Delivery & Operation (Cryptographic Officer’s) Manual for acceptance and end of life procedures. Acceptance instructions include:
• Establish authentication data for the TCG Authorities
• Establish the LBA Bands, which causes the Cryptographic Module to generate Media Encryption Keys
• Disable Maker Authority
• Lock the Firmware Download service control

7.3 Zeroization Rules
Zeroization is performed by the Cryptographic Officer with the TCG Revert Method. Revert includes zeroization of all Critical Security Parameters:
• Operator authentication data (CO PIN, User PIN)
• Key Encryption Key
• Media Encryption Keys
• NDRNG state
• DRBG state
8 Physical Security Policy

8.1 Mechanisms

The Cryptographic Module does not make claims in the Physical Security area beyond FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2.

![Figure 2 Large Tamper-Evident Label on Top Surface](image)

8.1.1 Hardware version (0003)

- All components are production-grade materials with standard passivation.
- The enclosure is opaque.
- Engineering design satisfies opacity requirements.
- Tamper-evident sealant is applied to screw heads by HGST during manufacturing.
- The tamper-evident sealant cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without evidence of tampering.

8.2 Operator Responsibility

The Cryptographic Officer and/or User shall inspect the Cryptographic Module enclosure for evidence of tampering a minimum of once a year.

If signs of tamper are detected, the module should be returned to HGST, Inc.

8.2.1 Hardware version (0003)

To inspect tamper evidence, the Cryptographic Officer and/or User shall:

1. Lift the top label as shown Figure 3.
2. Inspect the four screws for evidence of tampering as shown in Figure 4. Inspection includes both visual and mechanical methods. In the absence of tampering, the sealant shall show no visible disturbance and shall adhere to the screw when touched.
9 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

The Cryptographic Module is not designed to mitigate any attacks beyond FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2 requirements.

10 Definitions

- **Allowed**: NIST approved, i.e., recommended in a NIST Special Publication, or acceptable, i.e., no known security risk as opposed to deprecated, restricted and legacy-use. [SP800-131A] for terms
- **Anybody**: A formal TCG term for a role that is not authenticated. [TCG Core]
- **Approved**: [FIPS140] approved or recommended in a NIST Special Publication.
- **Approved mode of operation**: A mode of the cryptographic module that employs only Approved security functions. [FIPS140]
- **Authenticate**: Prove the identity of an Operator or the integrity of an object.
- **Authorize**: Grant an authenticated Operator access to a service or an object.
- **Confidentiality**: A cryptographic property that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized parties.
- **Credential**: A formal TCG term for data that is used to authenticate an Operator. [TCG Core]
- **Critical Security Parameter (CSP)**: Security-related information (e.g., secret and private cryptographic keys, and authentication data such as credentials and PINs) whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a cryptographic module. [FIPS140]
- **Cryptographic Boundary**: An explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds of a cryptographic module and contains all the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of a cryptographic module. [FIPS140]
- **Cryptographic key (Key)**: An input parameter to an Approved cryptographic algorithm
- **Cryptographic Module**: The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implement Approved security functions and is contained within the cryptographic boundary. [FIPS140]
- **Cryptographic Officer**: An Operator performing cryptographic initialization and management functions. [FIPS140]
- **Ciphertext**: Encrypted data transformed by an Approved security function.
- **Data at Rest**: User data residing on the storage device media where the storage device is powered off.
- **Discovery**: A TCG method that provides the properties of the TCG device. [TCG Enterprise]
- **Integrity**: A cryptographic property that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorized and undetected manner.
- **Interface**: A logical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that provides access to the cryptographic module for logical information flows. [FIPS140]
- **Key Derivation Function (KDF)**: An Approved cryptographic algorithm by which one or more keys are derived from a shared secret and other information.
- **Key Encrypting Key (KEK)**: A cryptographic key that is used to encrypt or decrypt other keys.
- **Key management**: The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys and other related security parameters (e.g., authentication data) during the entire life cycle of the Cryptographic Module.
- **Key Wrap**: An Approved cryptographic algorithm that uses a KEK to provide Confidentiality and Integrity.
- **LBA Band**: A formal [TCG Core] term that defines a contiguous logical block range (sequential LBAs) to store encrypted User Data; bands do not overlap and each has its own unique encryption key and other settable properties.
- **Method**: A TCG command or message. [TCG Core]
- **Manufactured SID (MSID)**: A unique, default value that vendors assign to each SED during manufacturing; it is typically printed on an external label and is readable with the TCG protocol; it is the initial and default value for all TCG credentials. [TCG Core]
- **Operator**: A consumer, either human or automation, of cryptographic services that is external to the Cryptographic Module. [FIPS140]
- **Personal Identification Number (PIN)**: A formal TCG term designating a string of octets that is used to authenticate an identity. [TCG Core]
- **Plaintext**: Data that is not encrypted.
- **Port**: A physical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that provides access to the Cryptographic Module for physical signals. [FIPS140]
- **Public Security Parameters (PSP)**: Public information whose modification can compromise the security of the cryptographic module (e.g., a public key of a key pair).
- **Read Data**: An external request to transfer User Data from the SED. [SCSI Block]
- **Reserved Area**: Private data on the Storage Medium that is not accessible outside the Cryptographic Boundary.
- **Session**: A formal TCG term that envelops the lifetime of an Operator's authentication. [TCG Core]
- **Security Identifier (SID)**: A TCG authority used by the Cryptographic Officer. [TCG Core]
- **Self-Encrypting Drive (SED)**: A storage device that provides data storage services.
- **Storage Medium**: The non-volatile, persistent storage location of a SED; it is partitioned into two disjoint sets, a User Data area and a Reserved Area.
- **User**: An Operator that consumes cryptographic services. [FIPS140]
- **User Data**: Data that is transferred from/to a SED using the Read Data and Write Data commands. [SCSI Block]
- **Write Data**: An external request to transfer User Data to a SED. [SCSI Block]
- **Zeroize**: Invalidate a Critical Security Parameter. [FIPS140]

### 11 Acronyms

- **CO**: Cryptographic Office [FIPS140]
- **CSP**: Critical Security Parameter [FIPS140]
- **DRBG**: Deterministic Random Bit Generator
- **DRAM**: Dynamic Random Access Memory
- **HDD**: Hard Disk Drive
- **EMI**: Electromagnetic Interference
- **FIPS**: Federal Information Processing Standard
- **KAT**: Known Answer Test
- **LBA**: Logical Block Address
- **MEK**: Media Encryption Key
- **MSID (Manufactured Security Identifier)**: a public, drive-unique value that is created during manufacturing and is used as default PIN credential values
- **NDRNG**: Non-deterministic Random Number Generator that is the source of entropy for the DRBG
- **NIST**: National Institute of Standards and Technology
- **PIN**: Personal Identification Number
- **PSID (Physical Security Identifier)**: a SED unique value that is printed on the Cryptographic Module's label and is used as authentication data and proof of physical presence for the Zeroize service
- **PSP**: Public Security Parameter
- **SAS**: Serial Attached SCSI
- **SCSI**: Small Computer System Interface
- **SED**: Self encrypting Drive
- **SID**: TCG Security Identifier, the authority representing the Cryptographic Module owner
- **TCG**: Trusted Computing Group
- **UEC**: Universal Error Code
- **XTS**: A mode of AES
12 References

12.1 NIST Specifications

- [AES] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, NIST, 2001, November
- [DSS] Digital Signature Standard, FIPS PUB 186-4, NIST, 2013, July
- [FIPS140] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS PUB 140-2, NIST, 2002 December
- [SHA] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, NIST, 2015, August
- [SP800-38E] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, SP800-38E, NIST, 2010 January
- [SP800-38F] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, NIST, 2012 December
- [SP800-57] Recommendation for Key Management – Part I General (Revision 4), NIST, 2016 January
- [SP800-88] Guidelines for Media Sanitization (Revision 1), NIST, 2014 December
- [SP800-90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revision 1), NIST, 2015 June
- [SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths (Revision 1), NIST, 2015 November
- [SP800-132] Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, NIST, 2010 December

12.2 Trusted Computing Group Specifications

- [TCG Core] TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Version 2.0 Revision 1.0 (April 20, 2009)
- [Enterprise] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification, Version 1.00 Revision 3.00 (January 10, 2011)
- [TCG App Note] TCG Storage Application Note: Encrypting Storage Devices Compliant with SSC: Enterprise, Version 1.00 Revision 1.00 Final
- [TCG Opal] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification, Version 2.00 Final Revision 1.00 (February 24, 2012)

12.3 International Committee on Information Technology Standards T10 Technical Committee Standards

- [SCSI Core] SCSI Primary Commands-4 Rev 15 (SPC-4)
- [SCSI Block] SCSI Block Commands Rev15 (SBC-3)
- [SAS] Serial Attached SCSI-2 Rev 13 (SAS-2)

12.4 HGST Documents

- HGST Ultrastar SSD800/1600 SSD Product Specification, (October 22, 2014)
- Delivery & Operation (Cryptographic Officer) Manual, version 0.6 (Nov, 31 2014)
12.5 SCSI Commands

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<thead>
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<th>Description</th>
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Table 12 - SCSI Commands