



MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS

Motorola GGM 8000 Gateway

FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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1 Introduction

This document defines the Security Policy for the Motorola GGM 8000 Gateway, hereafter denoted the Module. The Module is a modular purpose-built gateway that can easily be configured to support a variety of public safety network applications. The Module meets FIPS 140-2 overall Level 2 requirements.

Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations

	Module	HW P/N and Version	FW Version
1	GGM 8000 Base Unit	CLN1841F Rev AB	KS 16.9.0.48
2	GGM 8000 AC Power Supply option	CLN1850A Rev G	N/A
3	GGM 8000 DC Power Supply option	CLN1849C Rev AA	N/A
4	FIPS Kit	CLN8787A, Rev. B	N/A

The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require FIPS 140-2 validated network appliances. The Module is a multi-chip standalone embodiment; the cryptographic boundary is the gateway’s enclosure which includes all components, and one of the power supply options (AC or DC) identified in Table 1.

The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:

Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements

Security Requirement	Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
Finite State Model	2
Physical Security	2
Operational Environment	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	2
EMI/EMC	2
Self-Tests	2
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

The Module implementation is compliant with:

- FIPS 140-2
- FIPS 197
- SP 800-38A
- SP 800-90A
- FIPS 198-1
- SP 800-135
- FIPS 186-4
- FIPS 180-4
- SP 800-20
- SP 800-56A

1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary

The physical cryptographic boundary of the Module is depicted in Figure 1. In the photo, there is a slot that can hold an optional expansion module for increased device connectivity. The optional expansion module is not included within the Motorola GGM 8000 Gateway cryptographic boundary.




Figure 1 – Motorola GGM 8000 Gateway with Ports

Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces

Port	Description	Logical Interface Type
Ethernet (Qty. 4)	LAN ports that provide connection to Ethernet LANs using either 10BASE-T, 100BASE-TX, or 1 Gigabit Ethernet	Control in Data in Data out Status out
T1/E1 (Qty. 2)	T1/E1 interfaces that support T1/E1 CSU/DSU	Control in Data in Data out Status out
Console (Qty. 1)	RS-232 interface	Control in Status out
Backplane interface Supports expansion module containing optional interface cards (expansion module not part of cryptographic boundary)	High-speed multifunction serial interfaces that provide connection to industry-standard V.35, Data Communications Equipment (DCE) or Data Terminal Equipment (DTE) serial devices	Control in Data in Data out Status out
AC power plug		Power

Port	Description	Logical Interface Type
-OR- DC power entry connectors (Qty. 1 or 2)	External AC power input port -OR- External DC power input ports	Power
LEDs (Qty. 7)	Provide Module status for traffic and module power.	Status out

1.2 Modes of Operation

The module supports both an Approved and non-Approved mode of operation. To enter FIPS mode, the Crypto-Officer must follow the procedure outlined in Table 4 below. For details on individual gateway commands, use the online help facility or review the *Enterprise OS Software User Guide* and the *Enterprise OS Software Reference Guide*.

Table 4 – FIPS Approved Mode Configuration

Step	Description
1.	Check if FIPS mode is enabled using the show -SYS FIPS command. If FIPS = ON , go to next step. If FIPS = OFF , issue SETD -SYS FIPS=ON command.
2.	Configure the parameters for the IKE negotiations using the IKEProfile command. For FIPS mode, only the following values are allowed: Diffie-Hellman Group (Group 14 required for 112-bit key strength, Group 19 for 128-bit key strength or Group 20 for 192-bit key strength), Encryption Algorithm (AES or Triple-DES), Hash Algorithm (SHA, SHA-256 or SHA-384), and Authentication Method (PreSharedKey, RSA-Signature, ECDSA-256 or ECDSA-384).
3.	If PreSharedKey is used as Authentication Method, electronically establish via the local console port the pre-shared key (PSK) to be used for the IKE protocol using: ADD -CRYPTO FipsPreSharedKey <peer_ID> <pre-shared_key> <pre-shared_key> For FIPS mode, minimum key length is 14 bytes.
4.	If RSA-Signature, ECDSA-256 or ECDSA-384 is used as Authentication Method: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Unlock PKI database using: SETD -PKI CONTROL = Unlocked b. Generate key pair using: ADD -PKI KeyPair [<profile>] [<RSA ECDSA>] <256 384 2048> c. Set identity of the device by executing at least one of the following commands: SETD -PKI DNSName = <dns-name> SETD -PKI IPADDRESS = <ip-address> SETD -PKI EmailADDRESS = <email-address> SETD -PKI SubjectName = <subject-name> d. Generate CSR using: ADD -PKI CertReq <certreq-profile> e. Use external CA to generate certificate from CSR f. Install chain of certificates using: ADD -PKI CERTIFICATE <profile> <Self TrustedCA UnTrusted> InputFile <local-file-name> g. Lock PKI database using: SETD -PKI CONTROL = Locked

Step	Description
5.	If IPsec is used, configure IPsec transform lists using the ADD -CRYPTO TransformList command. For FIPS mode, only the following values are allowed: Encryption Transform (ESP-3DES, or ESP-AES) and Authentication Transform (ESP-SHA).
6.	If FRF.17 is used, configure FRF.17 transform lists using the ADD -CRYPTO TransformList command. For FIPS mode, only the following values are allowed: Encryption Transform (FRF-3DES, or FRF-AES) and Authentication Transform (FRF-SHA).
7.	For each port for which encryption is required, bind a dynamic policy to the ports using: ADD [!<portlist>] -CRYPTO DynamicPOLicy <policy_name> <priority> <mode> <selcrlst_name> <xfrmlst_name> [<pfs>] [<lifetime>] [<preconnect>] To be in FIPS mode, the selector list and transform list names must be defined as in previous steps.
8.	If PIM authentication is enabled, configure Manual Key set using the ADD -CRYPTO ManKeySet command. For FIPS mode, minimum authentication key length is 14 bytes.
9.	If SNMPv3 is enabled, configure authentication and encryption passphrases for all SNMP users with AuthPriv privileges. For FIPS mode, minimum authentication passphrase length is 14 bytes.
10.	If SSHv2 is enabled, generate RSA 2048 bit keys using GenSshKey RSA 2048 .
11.	For each port for which encryption is required, enable encryption on that port using: SETDefault [!<portlist>] -CRYPTO CONTrol = Enabled
12.	DSA keys must not be used in FIPS mode.
13.	Use the Show -SYS SwSignatureAlgorithm command to verify that firmware signing algorithm is set to SHA2withRSA2048. If not use the SetD -SYS SwSignAlgorithm = SHA2withRSA2048 command to change signing algorithm.
14.	FIPS-140-2 mode achieved.

2 Cryptographic Functionality

The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed in the table(s) below.

Table 5 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions

Algorithm	Description	Cert #
AES (Hardware Implementation)	[FIPS 197, SP 800-38A] Functions: Encryption, Decryption Modes: ECB, CBC, CTR Key sizes: 128, 256 bits	962

Algorithm	Description	Cert #
AES (Firmware Implementation)	[FIPS 197, SP 800-38A] Functions: Encryption, Decryption Modes: ECB, CBC, CFB128, CTR Key sizes: 128 (ECB, CBC, CFB128, CTR), 192 (ECB, CBC, CTR), 256 (ECB, CBC, CTR) bits	3993
DRBG	[SP 800-90A] Functions: Hash DRBG Security Strengths: 128 bits	1184
ECDSA	[FIPS 186-4] Functions: Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification Curves: P-256, P-384	887
HMAC (Hardware Implementation)	[FIPS 198-1] Functions: Generation, Verification SHA sizes: SHA-1 Key Size: 160 bits	1487
HMAC (Firmware Implementation)	[FIPS 198-1] Functions: Generation, Verification SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 Key Size: minimum 112 bits	2606, 2607
KAS Component (All except KDF)	[SP 800-56A] Functions: Key Pair Generation, Full Validation Modes: ECC Roles: Initiator, Responder Parameter sets: P-256 with SHA-256, P-384 with SHA-384	CVL #816
KDF, Existing Application-Specific (CVL)	[SP 800-135] Functions: SSH KDF, SNMP KDF, IKE v1 KDF, IKEv2 KDF	817, 818, 819
KTS	[SP800-38F §3.1] Functions: Key Unwrap Modes: AES-CTR + HMAC-SHA-1, AES-CBC + HMAC-SHA-1	AES #3993 HMAC #2606, #2607
RSA	[FIPS 186-4, PKCS #1 v2.1 (PKCS1.5)] Functions: Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification Key sizes: 1024 (RSA Verify only), 2048 bits	2049

Algorithm	Description	Cert #
SHA (Hardware Implementation)	[FIPS 180-4] Functions: Message Digest SHA sizes: SHA-1	933
SHA (Firmware Implementation)	[FIPS 180-4] Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification, non-Digital Signature Applications SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384	3295
Triple-DES (TDEA) (Hardware Implementation)	[SP 800-20] Functions: Encryption, Decryption Modes: TCBC Key sizes: 3-key	757
Triple-DES (TDEA) (Firmware Implementation)	[SP 800-20] Functions: Encryption, Decryption Modes: TCBC Key sizes: 3-key	2192

Table 6 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation

Algorithm	Description
KAS	[SP 800-56A] Modes: KAS Component (CVL #816) + KDF (CVL #817 [SSH] or CVL #819 [IKE])

Table 7 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions

Algorithm	Description
Non-SP 800-56A Compliant DH	[IG D.8] Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
Non-SP 800-38F Compliant Key Wrap	[IG D.9 – Allowed, bullet #2] AES-ECB Key Wrap and Key Unwrap (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of encryption strength)
NDRNG	[Annex C] Hardware Non-Deterministic RNG; minimum of 256 bits per access. The NDRNG output is used to seed the FIPS Approved DRBG.

Table 8 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode

Protocol	Description
IKE v1	[IG D.8 and SP 800-135] Cipher Suites: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oakley Group 14 DH key agreement or Oakley Group 19 and 20 ECDH key agreement • PreSharedKey, RSA-Signature, ECDSA-256 or ECDSA-384 authentication • AES or Triple-DES CBC encryption • SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-384 hashing • HMAC as PRF
IKE v2	[IG D.8 and SP 800-135] Cipher Suites: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oakley Group 14 DH key agreement • PreSharedKey authentication • AES or Triple-DES CBC encryption • HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-384 integrity and PRF
SNMPv3	[IG D.8 and SP 800-135] Allowed only with the <i>SP 800-135</i> SNMP KDF and AES encryption/decryption
SSH v2	[IG D.8 and SP 800-135] Cipher Suites: RSA 2048 DH group 14 SHA-1 key transport, AES CBC or CTR encryption, HMAC-SHA-1 MAC

Note: these protocols have not been reviewed or tested by CMVP or CAVP

Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-Approved mode only:

- DES
- Triple-DES (2-Key)
- FIPS 186-2 RSA Signature Generation: 4096 bit keys with SHA-2
- MD5
- HMAC-MD5
- HMAC-SHA-1-96
- DSA 1024-bit – for public/private key pair generation and digital signatures (non-compliant)
- RSA 1024 – for key transport within SSH v2
- Non approved SW RNG: Provides random numbers for networking functions (non-compliant)
- Diffie-Hellman Group 1, 2 and 5

2.1 Critical Security Parameters

All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module (including all CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in Section 3.

Table 9 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)

CSP	Description / Usage
KEK	This is the master key that encrypts persistent CSPs stored within the module. KEK-protected keys include PSK and passwords. Encryption of keys uses AES128ECB
IKE Preshared Keys	Used to authenticate peer to peer during IKE session
PKI private key	2048-bit RSA or 256/384-bit ECDSA key used for certificate request signing and IKEv1 authentication
SKEYID	HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-384 (minimum 112 bit key), used in IKE to provide for authentication of peer router. Generated for IKE Phase 1 by hashing preshared keys with responder/receiver nonce
SKEYID_d	Phase 1 key used to derive keying material for IKE SAs
SKEYID_a	Key used for integrity and authentication of the phase 1 exchange
SKEYID_e	Key used for Triple-DES or AES data encryption of phase 1 exchange
SKEYSEED	Seed value is generated from initiator and responder nonce values and DH – pre-shared key. Used in IKEv2 IKE_SA
SK_d	Key used to derive keying material for the CHILD_SAs established with IKEv2 IKE_SAs
SK_ai	Key used by initiator as a key to the integrity protection algorithm for authenticating the component messages in IKEv2 IKE_SA
SK_ar	Key used by responder as a key to the integrity protection algorithm for authenticating the component messages in IKEv2 IKE_SA
SK_ei	Key used by initiator for encrypting and decrypting all subsequent exchanges in IKEv2 IKE_SA
SK_er	Key used by responder for encrypting and decrypting all subsequent exchanges in IKEv2 IKE_SA
SK_pi	Key used by initiator when generating an AUTH payload in IKEv2 IKE_SA
SK_pr	Key used by responder when generating an AUTH payload in IKEv2 IKE_SA
Ephemeral DH Phase-1 private key (a)	Generated for IKE Phase 1 key establishment
Ephemeral ECDH Phase-1 private key	Generated for IKEv1 Phase 1 key establishment
Ephemeral DH Phase-2 private key (a)	Phase 2 Diffie-Hellman private keys used in PFS for key renewal
Ephemeral ECDH Phase-2	Phase 2 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman private keys used in PFS for key renewal

CSP	Description / Usage
private key	
IPsec Session Enc Key	128/192/256-bit AES-CBC and 168-bit Triple-DES keys are used to encrypt IPsec ESP packets
IPsec Session Auth Key	160-bit key is used to authenticate IPsec ESP packets
FRF.17 Session Enc Key	168-bit Triple-DES-CBC and 128/192/256-bit AES-CBC keys are used to encrypt FRF.17 Mode 2
FRF.17 Session Auth Key	160-bit key is used to authenticate FRF.17 Mode 2
SSH-RSA Private Key	Key used to authenticate oneself to peer
SSH Session Enc Key	128/192/256-bit AES-CBC or AES-CTR keys are used to encrypt SSH packets
SSH Session Auth Key	160-bit HMAC-SHA-1 key is used to authenticate SSH packets
SSH DH Private Key	Generated for SSH key establishment
SNMPv3 Passphrases	Passphrases used in generation of SNMPv3 session keys
SNMPv3 Session Keys	128-bit keys used to encrypt and authenticate SNMPv3 packets
RADIUS Secret	Used for authentication of packets sent/received to RADIUS Server, up to 32 characters.
Hash-DRBG Seed	Initial seed for FIPS-Approved DRBG
Hash-DRBG Internal State	Internal state/context for FIPS-Approved DRBG. The critical security parameters are the values V and C.
Passwords <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crypto-Officer (Super User) • Network Manager • Admin • User 	7 (to 15) character password used to authenticate to the module

2.2 Public Keys

Table 10 – Public Keys

Key	Description / Usage
RSA Firmware Load Key	RSA 2048 bit key used for firmware authentication
SSH-RSA Key	(RSA 2048-bit) Distributed to peer, used for SSH authentication
SSH Known Host Keys	(RSA 1024 and 2048-bit) Distributed to module, used to authenticate peer
IKE DH public key (g^a)	(2048-bit) Generated for IKE Phase 1 key establishment
IKE ECDH public key	(256/384-bit) Generated for IKEv1 Phase 1 key establishment
IKE DH phase-2 public (g^a) key	(2048-bit) Phase 2 Diffie-Hellman public keys used in PFS for key renewal (if configured)
IKE ECDH phase-2 public key	(256/384-bit) Phase 2 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman public keys used in PFS for key renewal (if configured)
SSH DH Key	(2048-bit) Generated for SSH key establishment
PKI public key	(RSA 2048-bit or ECDSA 256/384-bit) Generated for IKEv1 authentication

3 Roles, Authentication and Services

3.1 Assumption of Roles

The module supports seven distinct operator roles, Cryptographic Officer (Super User), Admin, Network Manager, User, MotoAdmin, MotoMaster, and MotoInformA/B. The cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles using Role-based authentication. The Crypto Officer and Network Manager roles can drop down to the User privilege level without a password.

Table 9 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The Module supports concurrent operators. Each operator has an independent session with the gateway, either through SSH (via Ethernet port), via the console, or over SNMPv3 (via Ethernet port) when specified. Once authenticated to a role, each operator can access only those services for that role. In this way, separation is maintained between the role and services allowed for each operator.

Table 11 – Roles Description

Role ID	Role Description	Authentication Type	Authentication Data
Crypto-Officer (Super User)	The owner of the cryptographic module with full access to services of the module.	Role-based operator authentication.	Username and Password
Network Manager (NM)	An operator of the module with almost full access to services of the module.	Role-based operator authentication.	Username and Password
Admin	An assistant to the Crypto-Officer that has read only access to a subset of module configuration and status indications.	Role-based operator authentication.	Username and Password
User	A user of the module that has read only access to a subset of module configuration and status indications.	Role-based operator authentication.	Username and Password
MotoAdmin (MO)	A SNMPv3 user who can issue any command from the SNMP V3 User Manager menu.	Role-based operator authentication.	Passphrase
MotoMaster (MM)	A SNMPv3 user who can change its own passphrases from the SNMP V3 User Manager menu.	Role-based operator authentication.	Passphrase

Role ID	Role Description	Authentication Type	Authentication Data
MotoInformA/B (MI)	A SNMPv3 user who receives and transmits reliable messages over SNMPv3.	Role-based operator authentication.	Passphrase

3.2 Authentication Methods

Username and Password

Passwords are alphanumeric strings consisting of 7 to 15 characters chosen from the 94 standard keyboard characters. The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is $1/94^7$ which is less than $1/1,000,000$. After three consecutive unsuccessful login attempts, an operator is locked out for two minutes, ensuring that the probability is less than one in 100,000 per minute, that random multiple attempts will succeed or a false acceptance will occur.

Passphrase

Each SNMPv3 user has its own pair of encryption and authentication passphrases. The SNMPv3 user authentication or encryption passphrase must be 8-64 characters long and may contain uppercase and lowercase alphabetic characters (A-Z) and (a-z); numeric characters (0-9); and any of the following special characters (! " % & " () * + , - . / : ; < = > ?).

The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is $1/81^8$ which is less than $1/1,000,000$. The timing of the SNMPv3 authentication protocol as implemented limits the probability of randomly guessing a SNMPv3 passphrase in 60 seconds to less than 1 in 100,000. Assuming 1 ms for processing each authentication attempt, the probability that a false acceptance will occur in a one minute period is $60000/81^8 = 3.24/10^{11}$ and it is less than $1/10^5$. One authentication attempt takes about 100 ms in real-life scenario.

3.3 Services

All services implemented by the Module are listed in the tables below. Each service description also describes all usage of CSPs by the service.

Table 12 – Authenticated Services

Service	Description	CO	NM	Admin	User	MO	MM	MI
Firmware Update	Load firmware images digitally signed by RSA (2048 bit) algorithm	X	X					
Key Entry	Enter Pre-Shared Keys (PSK)	X	X					
User Management	Add/Delete and manage operator passwords	X	X					
Reboot	Force the module to power cycle via a command	X	X					

Service	Description	CO	NM	Admin	User	MO	MM	MI
Zeroization	Actively destroy all plaintext CSPs and keys	X	X					
Crypto Configuration	Configure IPsec and FRF.17 services	X	X					
IKE	Key establishment utilizing the IKE protocol	X	X					
PKI	Peer to peer authentication for IKEv1	X	X					
IPSec Tunnel Establishment	IPsec protocol	X	X					
FRF.17 Tunnel Establishment	Frame Relay Privacy Protocol	X	X					
Alternating Bypass	Provide some services <i>with</i> cryptographic processing and some services <i>without</i> cryptographic processing	X	X					
SSHv2	For remote access to the gateway	X	X					
Network Configuration	Configure networking capabilities	X	X					
SNMPv3	Network management, including traps and configuration	X	X			X	X	X
Enable Ports	Apply a security policy to a port	X	X					
File System	Access file system	X	X					
Authenticated Show Status	Provide status to an authenticated operator	X	X	X	X			
Access Control	Provide access control for Crypto-Officer, Network Manager, Admin, and User	X	X	X	X			

Table 13 – Unauthenticated Services

Service	Description
Unauthenticated Show Status	Provide the status of the cryptographic module – the status is shown using the LEDs on the front panel
Power-up Self-tests	Execute the suite of self-tests required by FIPS 140-2 during power-up (by Reboot service, or by physically power cycling the module)

All Services available in FIPS Approved mode are also available in FIPS Non-Approved mode. The Approved mode is defined by the correct configuration.

Table 14 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:

- G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
- R = Read: The module reads the CSP. The read access is typically performed before the module uses the CSP.
- E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
- W = Write: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is imported into the module, when the module generates a CSP, or when the module overwrites an existing CSP.
- Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.

Table 14 – CSP Access Rights within Services

CSP	Firmware Update	Key entry	User Management	IKE	PKI	IPsec tunnel establishment	FRF.17 tunnel establishment	SSHv2	Reboot	Zeroization	Crypto Configuration	Network Configuration	SNMPv3	Alternating Bypass	Enable Ports	File System*	Authenticated Show Status	Access Control
KEK	-	-	E	-	-	-	-	-	E	Z	GE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IKE Pre-shared Key	-	W	-	E	-	-	-	-	-	Z	RW	-	-	-	-	REW	E	-
PKI private key	-	-	-	R	EG	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	RW	-	-
SKEYID	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	Z	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SKEYID_d	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SKEYID_a	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SKEYID_e	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SKEYSEED	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	Z	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SK_d	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SK_ai	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SK_ar	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

SK_ei	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SK_er	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SK_pi	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SK_pr	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ephemeral DH Phase-1 private key (a)	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ephemeral ECDH Phase-1 private key	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ephemeral DH Phase-2 private key (a)	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ephemeral ECDH Phase-2 private key	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IPsec Session Enc Key	-	-	-	EG	-	E	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IPsec Session Auth Key	-	-	-	EG	-	E	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FRF.17 Session Enc Key	-	-	-	EG	-	-	E	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FRF.17 Session Auth Key	-	-	-	EG	-	-	E	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SSH-RSA Private Key	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	EG	-	Z	EG	-	-	-	-	RW	-	-
SSH Session Enc Key	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	EG	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SSH Session Auth Key	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	EG	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SSH DH Private Key	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	EG	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Passwords	-	-	EW	-	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	RW	-	E
RADIUS Secret	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	RW	-	EW
SNMPv3 Passphrase	-	-	EW	-	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	E	-	-	RW	-	-
SNMPv3 Session Keys	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	EGZ	-	-	-	-	-
DRBG Seed	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DRBG Internal State	-	-	-	EG	-	-	-	-	-	Z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

*For the “File System” service, access to all available keys is limited to the input and output of the ciphertext key block (encrypted with KEK) and password bank (checksums only) as well as on-module backup and restoration.

4 Self-tests

Each time the Module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power up self-tests are available on demand by power cycling the module.

On power up or reset, the Module performs the self-tests described in Table 15 below. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails, the Module enters the error state. KAT failure is indicated by the Encryption LED being unlit when test fails. Device is not able to power up if self-test fails.

Table 15 – Power Up Self-tests

Test Target	Description
Firmware Integrity	16 bit CRC performed over all code in flash
AES (Hardware implementation)	KATs: Encryption, Decryption Modes: CBC Key sizes: 128 bits
AES (Firmware implementation)	KATs: Encryption, Decryption Modes: ECB, CBC, CTR Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
DRBG	KATs: HASH DRBG Security Strengths: 256 bits
DRBG Health Checks	Performed on power-up per SP 800-90 Section 11.3. Required per IG C.1.
HMAC (Hardware implementation)	KATs: Generation, Verification SHA sizes: SHA-1 Includes hardware SHA-1 KAT
HMAC (Firmware implementation)	KATs: Generation, Verification SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 Performed independently for HMAC Cert. #2606 and for HMAC Cert. #2607
RSA	KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification Key sizes: 2048 bits
ECDSA	KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification: Curves: P-256, P-384
SHA	KATs: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384
Triple-DES (Hardware implementation)	KATs: Encryption, Decryption Modes: TCBC, Key sizes: 3-key
Triple-DES (Firmware)	KATs: Encryption, Decryption Modes: TCBC,

Test Target	Description
implementation)	Key sizes: 3-key

Table 16 – Conditional Self-tests

Test Target	Description
NDRNG	NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the NDRNG.
DRBG	DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG.
Firmware Load	RSA 2048 signature verification performed when firmware is loaded.
RSA Pairwise Consistency	Pair-wise consistency test for public and private key generation (RSA)
ECDSA key validation	ECDSA Full Validation (as specified in SP 800-56A) for peer’s ephemeral public key. It is performed by recipient during key agreement and just after ECDSA key pair is generated.
Bypass Test	Bypass Test performed when the service Alternating Bypass is called.

5 Physical Security Policy

The Motorola GGM 8000 Gateway is composed of industry standard production-grade components. To meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements, the Motorola GGM 8000 Gateway must have the three (there is a 4th seal that is optional) tamper-evident seals applied as described in Section 10. It is the responsibility of the Crypto-Officer to maintain the tamper seals. The seals should be inspected for evidence of tamper every three (3) months. If evidence of tamper has been identified, the module should be considered compromised and Customer Service should be contacted for further instructions. The tamper evident seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. Please see Section 10 for specific instructions on installation of the tamper labels.

Note: A FIPS label kit can be ordered by using part number CLN8787A, Rev. B.

6 Operational Environment

The Module is designated as a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.

7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

The Motorola GGM 8000 Gateway has not been designed to mitigate against other attacks outside the scope of

8 Security Rules and Guidance

The Module design corresponds to the Module security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 2 module.

1. The Motorola GGM 8000 Gateway provides seven distinct operator roles: Crypto-Officer (Super User), Admin, Network Manager, User, MotoAdmin, MotoMaster, and MotoInformA/B. The Crypto-Officer role uses the Super User account.
2. The module shall provide role-based authentication.
3. The module shall clear previous authentications on power cycle.
4. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to any cryptographic services.
5. The operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power up self-tests by cycling power or resetting the module.
6. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output shall be inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
11. The module does not support manual key entry.
12. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
13. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
14. The module does not output intermediate key values.

The module is distributed to authorized operators wrapped in plastic with instructions on how to securely install the module. On initial installation, perform the following steps:

1. Power on the module and verify successful completion of power up self-tests from console port or inspection of log file. The following message will appear on the console interface: “power-on self-tests passed”.
2. Authenticate to the module using the default operator acting as the Crypto-Officer with the default password and username.
3. Verify that the Hardware and Firmware P/Ns and version numbers of the module are the FIPS Approved versions.
4. Change the Crypto-Officer and User passwords using the **SysPassWord** command.
5. Initialize the Key Encryption Key (KEK) with the **KEKGenerate** command. Account passwords and certain keys are persistent across reboots and are encrypted with the Key Encryption Key (KEK). This key can be

reinitialized at any time.

6. Configure the module as described in Section 1.2.

The module supports a minimum password length of 7 characters and a maximum length of 15 characters. The Crypto-Officer controls the minimum password length through the **PwMinLength** parameter: **SETDefault -SYS PwMinLength = <length>**, where **<length>** specifies the minimum length.

The Zeroization Service should also be invoked to zeroize all CSPs prior to removing a gateway from service for repair.

9 References and Definitions

The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.

Table 17 – References

Abbreviation	Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2]	<i>Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules</i> , May 25, 2001
[SP800-131A]	<i>Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths</i> , January 2011

Table 18 – Acronyms and Definitions

Acronym	Definition
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CA	Certificate Authority
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CLI	Command Line Interface
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
CSR	Certificate Signing Request
CTR	Counter
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
ECB	Electronic Codebook
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESP	Encapsulating Security Payload
FRF	Frame Relay Forum
FRF.17	Frame Relay Privacy Implementation Agreement
FRPP	Frame Relay Privacy Protocol
HMAC	Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE	Internet Key Exchange
IP	Internet Protocol
IPsec	Internet Protocol Security

Acronym	Definition
KAS	Key Agreement Scheme
KAT	Known Answer Test
KDF	Key Derivation Function
KEK	Key Encrypting Key
MNR	Motorola Network Router
NDRNG	Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OSPF	Open Shortest Path First
PFS	Perfect Forward Secrecy
PIM	Protocol Independent Multicast
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PSK	Pre-Shared Key
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH	Secure Shell
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
Tanapa	The part number that is built and stocked for customer orders

10 GGM 8000 GATEWAY TAMPER EVIDENCE LABEL INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS

Follow these steps to install tamper evidence labels on the GGM 8000 gateway:

The surface to which the labels will be attached must be at a temperature of at least +10°C (+50°F), and the surface must be clean and dry. Clean any grease, dirt, oil, or adhesive residue from the areas to which the labels are to be attached before applying the tamper evidence labels. If you are replacing tamper evidence labels (after a repair, for example), remove the old labels and any adhesive residue with isopropyl alcohol (99% concentration) prior to applying the new labels.

1. Wipe the surface clean with isopropyl alcohol (99% concentration) to remove surface contaminants. Please note that using a solution with an isopropyl alcohol concentration less than 99% is not acceptable.
2. **Do not allow excess alcohol to air dry.** Use a clean paper towel or cotton cloth to completely remove any excess alcohol, thereby removing any residual contaminants.
3. Apply tamper evidence labels 1, 2, and 3 (optional) to secure the GGM 8000 base module and blank filler panel on the front of the chassis.

Do not push labels 1, 2, and 3 all the way up under the top cover overhang or tuck the labels into the

gap between the front panel and the top cover overhang. As shown in Detail A in [Figure 2](#) the labels should come out at approximately a 45 degree angle from where they are affixed to the front panel to where they wrap around and over the top cover.

- a. Remove the Kraft liner from the back of label 1 and attach the label as illustrated in [Figure 2](#) (GGM 8000 base unit (base module and blank filler panel)) Center the silver portion of the label between the rightmost cooling hole and the Encrypt, Run, Load, and Test LEDs, with the Motorola logo on the label lined up with the top of the Load LED. Starting from the short edge of the label that is positioned on the front panel, affix the label by applying pressure while pushing the label up the front panel and onto the top cover.
- b. Remove the Kraft liner from the back of label 2 and attach the label as illustrated in [Figure 2](#) (GGM 8000 base unit (base module and blank filler panel)). Position the Motorola logo edge of the label directly above the top edge of connector "5B" with the left edge of the clear portion of the label aligned with the edge of the thumbscrew. Starting from the short edge of the label that is positioned on the front panel, affix the label by applying pressure while pushing the label up the front panel and onto the top cover.

Note: Label 3 is optional and is not required for a FIPS-approved configuration. The additional tamper evidence label provides additional tamper evidence beyond the module cryptographic boundary.


- c. Remove the Kraft liner from the back of label 3 and attach the label as illustrated in [Figure 2](#).

Position the label approximately in the middle of the blank panel with the perforation between the "T" and the "O" aligned with the edge of the top cover. Starting from the short edge of the label that is positioned on the front panel, affix the label by applying pressure while pushing the label up the front panel and onto the top cover.

- d. Rub the labels on the front and top of the chassis for two (2) seconds to ensure that the labels have adhered.


Figure 2 – Applying Tamper Evidence Labels 1, 2, and 3 to Secure the GGM 8000 Base Unit (Base Module and Blank Filler Panel in Expansion Module Slot)

If labels 1, 2, and 3 are applied correctly, the perforation between the "T" and the "O" aligns with the edge of the cover




See DETAIL A

Do NOT tuck the label under the top cover overhang



DETAIL A



4. Apply tamper evidence **label 4** to secure the GGM 8000 power supply module on the rear of the chassis.

Note: These instructions apply to a GGM 8000 equipped with either an AC or a DC power supply module.

- a. Remove the Kraft liner from the back of the label and position the label as illustrated in Figure 2.

Note: Figure 2 illustrates the label placement for the AC power supply module. The label placement for the DC power supply module is the same.

Position the Motorola logo edge of the label directly above the mounting screw, with the right edge of the silver portion of the label aligned with the right edge of the power supply module. Starting from the short edge of the label that is positioned on the rear panel, affix the label by applying pressure while pushing the label up the rear panel and onto the top cover.

- b. Rub the label on the top and rear of the chassis for 2 seconds to ensure that the label has adhered.
5. Secure the unit in a restricted area.
 6. Allow the applied labels to cure for at least 4 hours; do not touch the labels during this time.

If you need to re-apply the tamper evidence labels to the GGM 8000, repeat steps 1-6.