Revision History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Revision</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 22, 2002</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Snapshot Draft Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 8, 2002</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Snapshot Draft 2 Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 15, 2002</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Snapshot Draft 3 Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14, 2002</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Trial Evaluation Draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6, 2002</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Evaluation Draft: Expanded acronyms, Win2K Service Pack 1, Finite State Model updated, Fixed copyright, Crypto Boundary figure clarified, Added Win ME, Skipjack is now “approved”, Added modes (CBC, OFB, etc), clarified listing of approved Encryption / Signing alg, EDC need not be in a protected location. Corrected name of FIPS RNG object, Stated PGP uses 2048 bit keys for signing /verification. Clarified key generation information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 27, 2002</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Incorporated CygnaCom comments (CEAL Comments 2 dated 6/21/2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 26, 2002</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Incorporated CygnaCom comments (CEAL Comments 3 dated 7/9/2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 16, 2002</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Incorporated CygnaCom comments (CEAL Comments 4 dated 8/2/2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16, 2002</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Added RNG test to Power on self test, increment v# and date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 2003</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Incorporated NIST/CSE comments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7, 2003</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Fixed copyright notice, Module Interfaces, and Roles and Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 27, 2003</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Incorporated more NIST/CSE comments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 13, 2003</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Incorporated NIST/CSE verbal comments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 26, 2003</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Changed static library to DLL. Draft sent to CEAL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 27, 2003</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Fixed previous version. 2nd draft sent to CEAL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 2003</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3rd draft sent to CEAL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 8, 2003</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Incorporated CEAL’s comments dated 7/7/03. Removed DES and SHA-2 algorithms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 16, 2003</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>Incorporated CEAL’s comment dated 7/16/03. Added CBC-MAC/TDES in section 8.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 11, 2003</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Incorporated NIST/CSE comments dated 8/1/03.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SECURITY POLICY
FIPS 140-2 LEVEL 1 VALIDATION
CRYPTO++ LIBRARY

1. Introduction

1.1. Purpose
This document specifies the Security Policy for the Crypto++ library. This Security Policy was produced as part of the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 Level 1 validation of the Crypto++ library version 5.0.4. This document is non-proprietary.

1.2. Documents
The Crypto++ Security Policy is provided as part of the following submission package:

- Security Policy contains:
  - Security Policy
  - Master Components List (in Appendix)
  - Finite State Model (in Appendix)
- Crypto Officer and User Guide contains:
  - Crypto Officer Guide
  - User Guide
  - Source Code Description (in Appendix)
- Vendor Evidence
- API Reference
- Source Code

A Protection Profile is not required or provided as supporting documentation for this validation.

1.3. Crypto++ Library
Crypto++ is a free open source C++ class library of general-purpose cryptographic algorithms and schemes. It provides a C++ Application Programming Interface (API) for cryptographic functionality such as digital signing and verification, encryption and decryption, hashing, key agreement schemes, key derivation functions, secret sharing, random number generation, and more. The library may be compiled for a number of platforms and operating systems, including Microsoft Windows 95/98/NT/2000/XP, MacOS, Linux, FreeBSD, and other Unix-type operating systems. However only the Windows DLL version has undergone the FIPS 140-2 validation process. For more information, please refer to http://www.cryptopp.com.
2. Module Specification

For the purposes of FIPS 140-2 validation, the Crypto++ library version 5.0.4 is provided as a dynamic link library (DLL), available as cryptopp.dll with build version 5.0.4.0, running on Microsoft Windows operating systems. Henceforth, the DLL package of Crypto++ will simply be referred to as the “Crypto++ library” (or for brevity, just “library”).

2.1. Module

In FIPS 140-2 terminology, the Crypto++ library is classified as a multi-chip standalone Module. The library was validated as meeting all FIPS 140-2 level 1 physical security and operating system requirements on Microsoft Windows 2000 in single-user mode. The Crypto++ source code and compilations of the Crypto++ source code that have not undergone FIPS validation are not considered FIPS validated. Only version 5.0.4 of the library is FIPS validated.

The Crypto++ library contains only Approved cryptographic algorithms. Non-Approved algorithms implemented in the Crypto++ product are not included in the FIPS validated DLL package. Section 4.2 Services provides a list of implemented Approved algorithms. The APIs to these functions are exported from the DLL so they can be used by a calling application.

2.2. Boundary

The physical boundary for the Module is defined as the enclosure of the computer system on which the functions of the Module execute. The logical boundary contains the software modules that comprise the Crypto++ library.

2.3. Hardware Platform

For FIPS 140-2 testing, the library was installed and tested on a Dell OptiPlex GX1 Personal Computer system with:

- an Intel Pentium III 450 MHz processor
- 128 MB system RAM (DIMM)
- 2 serial ports and 1 parallel port
- 4.3 GB hard drive

The hardware platform enclosure completely surrounds the entire Module. The enclosure material is standard production-grade material customarily used for this purpose.
2.4. Module Block Diagram
The following block diagram shows the keyboard and mouse ports as physical ports for data or control input, and the monitor port as the physical port for data and status output.

2.5. Software Environment
The software environment in which the Module was validated is the Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional operating system.

The execution platform is a standard commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) computing platform running the Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system. For level 1 Operating System Security, the software Module remains compliant with the FIPS 140-2 validation when operating on any general purpose computer (GPC) since the software of the Module does not require modification when ported (excluding platform specific configuration modifications).

Although not officially tested by the FIPS testing laboratory, the FIPS validated Crypto++ library can also execute (without modification) on Windows ’95, ’98, NT, 2000, and XP. The library does not require use of specialized cryptographic hardware.

2.6. Approved Mode of Operation
No special configuration is required to operate the Module in a FIPS 140-2 mode. The Module performs only Approved cryptographic algorithms and security functions. Therefore the Module is in the Approved mode of operation at all times. The list of implemented Approved security functions are described in Section 4.2 Services.
3. Module Ports and Interfaces

The *logical interfaces* to the Module consist of a C++ Application Programming Interface (API) exported by the Crypto++ DLL. The *physical interfaces* are standard I/O ports found on a computer for connecting external devices such as monitors and keyboards. (Note: These external devices are outside the physical boundary of the crypto Module and are not part of the Crypto++ validation.)

The following table describes the *logical interfaces* and *physical ports* in more detail:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interface</th>
<th>Logical Interface</th>
<th>Physical Port</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data Input</td>
<td>Data passed to the API calls to be used by the Module.</td>
<td>Standard Input Port (e.g. Keyboard)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Output</td>
<td>Data returned from API calls, generated by the Module</td>
<td>Standard Output Port (e.g. Monitor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Input</td>
<td>Exported API calls</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status Output</td>
<td>C++ exceptions and the GetPowerUpSelfTestStatus() function</td>
<td>Standard Output Port (e.g. Monitor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supplied by PC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data entered into and output from the Module are kept separated throughout the software of the Module. The software design maintains separation of the Module’s *logical paths*. These *logical paths* are used for output data exiting the Module during functions such as key generation and zeroization of cryptographic keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs).

The *Crypto++ API Reference* document identifies separate parameters (objects and functions) that behave as the Module’s *control input* and *status output*.

4. Roles, Services, and Authentication

The Security Policy states the security rules and operations by which the Module operates. By specifying roles, access controls, services, and security-relevant data items, the Security Policy defines the data items that operators can access while performing specific services in specific roles.

4.1. Roles

The Module supports a *User* role and a *Crypto Officer* role as defined in FIPS 140-2 standard as follows:

**User**  The User is any entity that can access services provided by the Module. The User role is implicitly selected when a process calls any API function in the Module.

**Crypto Officer**  The Crypto Officer is any entity that can install the Module onto the computer system, configure the operating system, or access services
provided by the Module. The Crypto Officer may access all services, the same as a User. The Crypto Officer has no special access to any keys or data. The Crypto Officer role is implicitly selected when installing the Module or configuring the operating system.

The Module does not support a *Maintenance* role.

### 4.2. Services

The following table provides information about the services available within the Module. To see the detailed interface descriptions for these services, look up the respective implementation object class of function in the *Crypto++ API Reference*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Type</th>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>FIPS</th>
<th>Implementation Object Class or Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symmetric Cipher</td>
<td>AES</td>
<td>FIPS 197</td>
<td>ECB_Mode&lt;AES&gt;, CTR_Mode&lt;AES&gt;, CBC_Mode&lt;AES&gt;, CFB_Mode&lt;AES&gt;, OFB_Mode&lt;AES&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triple DES (2-key)</td>
<td>FIPS 46-3</td>
<td>ECB_Mode&lt;DES_EDE2&gt;, CTR_Mode&lt;DES_EDE2&gt;, CBC_Mode&lt;DES_EDE2&gt;, CFB_Mode&lt;DES_EDE2&gt;, OFB_Mode&lt;DES_EDE2&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triple DES (3-key)</td>
<td>FIPS 46-3</td>
<td>ECB_Mode&lt;DES_EDE3&gt;, CTR_Mode&lt;DES_EDE3&gt;, CBC_Mode&lt;DES_EDE3&gt;, CFB_Mode&lt;DES_EDE3&gt;, OFB_Mode&lt;DES_EDE3&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skipjack</td>
<td>FIPS 185</td>
<td>ECB_Mode&lt;SKIPJACK&gt;, CTR_Mode&lt;SKIPJACK&gt;, CBC_Mode&lt;SKIPJACK&gt;, CFB_Mode&lt;SKIPJACK&gt;, OFB_Mode&lt;SKIPJACK&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA Signature</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>RSASSA&lt;PKCS1v15, SHA&gt;¹</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>FIPS 186-2</td>
<td>DSA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDSA</td>
<td>FIPS 186-2</td>
<td>ECDSA&lt;ECP, SHA&gt;, ECDSA&lt;EC2N, SHA&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message Digest</td>
<td>SHA-1</td>
<td>FIPS 180-2</td>
<td>SHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC-MAC/TDES</td>
<td>FIPS 113</td>
<td>CBC_MAC&lt;DES_EDE2&gt;, CBC_MAC&lt;DES_EDE3&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC/SHA-1</td>
<td>FIPS 198</td>
<td>HMAC&lt;SHA&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Number Generator</td>
<td>ANSI X9.31-1998 - Appendix A</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>AutoSeededX917RNG&lt;DES_EDE3&gt;²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Establishment</td>
<td>Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>DH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA Key Transport</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>RSAES&lt;OAEP&lt;SHA&gt; &gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Functions</td>
<td>Self-Test</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>DoPowerUpSelfTest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The RSA signature algorithm implemented is specified in PKCS #1 version 2.0 as RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
² The RNG is seeded using the CryptGenRandom API provided by the Windows operating system’s CryptoAPI library.
The following table identifies CSPs and types of available access for the supported services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Cryptographic Keys and CSPs</th>
<th>Type(s) of Access (e.g., RWE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANSI X9.31-1998 - Appendix A Random Number Generation</td>
<td>Seed value, seed key, random number</td>
<td>No operator access to the seed, which is generated internally. RW access to the random number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES, TDES, Skipjack Encryption and Decryption</td>
<td>Secret key</td>
<td>RW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA, DSA, ECDSA Signing</td>
<td>Private key</td>
<td>RW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA, DSA, ECDSA Verification</td>
<td>Public Key</td>
<td>RW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA Key Transport, DH Key Agreement</td>
<td>Private and Public Keys</td>
<td>RW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-1 Hashing</td>
<td>Checksum</td>
<td>RW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC-MAC/TDES, HMAC/SHA-1 Generation</td>
<td>Secret key and checksum</td>
<td>RW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is presently no Approved secret sharing algorithm.

4.3. Authentication

Within the constraints of FIPS 140-2 level 1, the Module does not directly implement User authentication; it depends on the operating system for operator authentication.

5. Finite State Model

See “APPENDIX B: Finite State Model”.

6. Physical Security

The Module was tested while executing on a standard Intel-compatible personal computer platform. This platform (and other Intel compatible platforms) and the executing software comprise a multi-chip standalone Module that includes standard, production grade components, standard passivation, and an enclosure of production grade strength, meeting all FIPS 140-2 level 1 physical security requirements.

7. Operational Environment

7.1. Operating System Requirements

Each user process in the operating system has its own virtual address space with its own copy of the executable code. When a process loads the Crypto++ DLL (Module), it maps the Module into its own virtual address space and then calls the DLL’s exported functions. The Module uses and allocates memory from the virtual address space of the calling process.

The Module is completely independent and in its own process. The Module itself does not communicate with other processes, for example, using any operating system interprocess communication mechanisms. So no other process can access private and secret keys or other CSPs.
The Module is restricted to a *Single Operator Mode of Operation*, per FIPS requirements. The operating system is responsible for multitasking operations so that other processes cannot intervene when the Module is active at a particular instance in time.

### 7.2. Module Integrity

The security of the Module does not depend on secrecy of the code contained in the Module. Being open source, the library’s code is accessible to all. However, the integrity of the validated Module is verified through the self-tests described in Section 9 “Self-Tests”. These tests limit opportunities for keys or other CSPs to be disclosed inadvertently.

### 7.3. Other Assumptions

Proper FIPS configuration and usage of the Module requires following instructions in the *Crypto Officer Guide* and *User Guide*, and following the rules described in Section 4 “Roles, Services, and Authentication”.

### 8. Cryptographic Key Management

All keys in the Module may be either imported into the Module or internally generated using the Module’s random number generator (RNG). The Module itself keeps these keys in memory only and does not store them in persistent media.

#### 8.1. Key Generation

The Module generates keys per FIPS requirements, using the Module’s Approved RNG (specified in ANSI X9.31–1998, Appendix A), in the following manner:

- DSA keys are generated according to procedures described in FIPS 186-2.
- ECDSA keys are generated according to procedures described in ANSI X9.62.
- RSA keys are generated according to procedures described in ANSI X9.31.
- The remaining keys (AES, TDES, CBC-MAC/TDES, Skipjack, HMAC/SHA-1) are generated using the Module’s Approved RNG (by generating a random octet string of suitable size).

Intermediate key generation values are not output from the Module during the key generation process. The Crypto++ API header files (*rsa.h*, *dsa.h*, and *rng.h*) provide more information on key formats and structures.

#### 8.2. Key Establishment

In the absence of a FIPS-approved key establishment method, FIPS (Annex D to FIPS 140-2) allows the following commercially available methods to be used in Approved mode of operation: RSA Key Transport and Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement. Crypto++ provides APIs for the calling application to use these algorithms.
8.3. Key Entry and Output
Keys are entered into and output from the Module in plaintext form through the C++ API. The Module also provides APIs for a calling application to wrap keys for output using RSA key transport. APIs are also provided for a calling application to sign and verify signatures on keys. The module does not create certificates for keys.

The module generates seeds and seed keys for its random number generator using the CryptGenRandom API provided by the Windows operating system’s CryptoAPI library. Neither Users nor Crypto Officers have any direct control over generation and entry of these seeds and seed keys.

8.4. Key Storage
The Module does not store or archive keys in any persistent storage media.

8.5. Key Destruction
The Module stores keys while they are in use in memory only. When the C++ object that encapsulates a key is destroyed, the Module automatically zeroizes the key.

It is possible that the operating system may swap memory that contains keys to disk. To zeroize those keys, the User must wipe the swap files. One way to accomplish this is to reformat the hard drive(s) containing the swap file.

9. Self-Tests
The Crypto++ library implements both power-up and conditional self-tests to ensure proper operation of the Approved cryptographic algorithms and security functions.

9.1. Power-up Self-tests
When the Crypto++ DLL is loaded into a process, it performs a suite of power-up self-tests to ensure the integrity and correct operation of the cryptographic services. The self-tests always run automatically when the DLL is loaded, and do not require any inputs from or actions by the operator. If any self-test fails, the Module enters an error state and prevents any cryptographic operation from being performed. “APPENDIX B: Finite State Model” provides detail of the state transitions. This section describes the power-up self-tests implemented by the Module.

9.1.1. Cryptographic Algorithm Test
The Module performs known answer tests for AES, TDES, Skipjack, SHA-1, HMAC/SHA-1, and RSA Signature. For each algorithm, the tests operate on known values, comparing plaintext, ciphertext, and intermediate data to determine whether the algorithms perform in the Approved manner. A known answer test for the RNG sets all input parameters to specified values and checks for a specific output value.

9.1.2. Software Integrity Check
The read-only data section of the Crypto++ DLL contains an HMAC/SHA-1 secret key and value. The value is computed by applying an HMAC over the DLL image, excluding
the stored HMAC value in the DLL. During the software integrity self-test, this value is recomputed and verified to match the value stored in the DLL.

9.1.3. **Pair-wise Consistency Test**

The Module performs pair-wise consistency tests on DSA and ECDSA as described in Section 9.2.1. In contrast to the conditional testing, this power-up self-test verifies the operations on fixed (hard-coded) key pairs. (Since the output of the RSA Signature algorithm is deterministic, it is tested as part of the known answer test described in Section 9.1.1.)

9.1.4. **On-Demand Self-test**

The Module exports an API routine, `DoPowerUpSelfTest`, which can be called to initiate the self-tests on demand. Minimally, Users can manually initiate the power up self-tests by resetting (restarting) the application.

9.2. **Conditional Tests**

In addition to the power-up self-tests described above, the Module performs on-going tests during execution as described below. If any of these conditional tests fails, the Module throws an exception.

9.2.1. **Pair-wise Consistency Test**

The Module runs a pair-wise consistency test (as specified in FIPS 140-2, section 4.9.2) each time an asymmetric key pair is generated. For the signature keys (i.e., DSA, ECDSA, RSA signature), the Module signs a message using the private key and verifies the signature using the corresponding public key. For key transport keys (i.e., RSA encryption), the Module encrypts a message with the public key, verifies that the ciphertext differs from the plaintext, decrypts the ciphertext with the private key, and verifies that the decrypted value equals the original message. For key agreement keys (i.e., DH), the Module creates a second compatible keypair, performs both sides of the key agreement algorithm, and verifies that the resulting secret keys are equal.

9.2.2. **Continuous Random Number Generator Test**

The Module implements a continuous RNG test (as specified in FIPS 140-2, section 4.9.2) that runs each time the Approved RNG is called.

During the test, the previously generated random number is stored as a variable in memory (not on persistent media). The variable is protected by standard operating system protection mechanisms. As the Module’s RNG consistently generates fewer than 16 bits (typically as low as 8 bits), the test runs as follows:

1. It stores the first 128 bits for comparison against the next 128 generated bits.
2. It compares each subsequently generated 128 bits against the previously generated 128 bits.
3. It fails if two compared 128-bit sequences are equal.
10. Design Assurance
The Module is designed, developed, and deployed in a manner that protects its integrity throughout the process. Guidance is provided to Crypto Officers and Users of the Module.

10.1. Configuration Management

10.1.1. Source Code Management System
The vendor uses a secure configuration management system, Microsoft Visual SourceSafe 6.0, to ensure the integrity of the Module throughout its development. The system stores distinct versions of the Module’s source code. While in storage, files are protected against unauthorized modification, with password-based authentication required. Currently, only authorized developers at Groove Networks, Inc. are allowed modification access to the source files.

10.1.2. Versioning

Internal. Whenever a new version of a file is stored in the configuration management system, it is labeled with a unique version number. These version numbers are used internally to allow developers to roll back to previous versions of a Module, if necessary. These internally managed version numbers are not seen by end-users.

FIPS Testing. A FIPS testing laboratory is provided with a zip file containing the Crypto++ DLL, the test application, source code and other supporting documents serving evaluation needs. The file name of each submitted zip container file contains the date and time stamp. All contained files are considered to be of that version. Evaluators can use the date/time stamp attribute of individual files to determine whether an individual file has been modified. Documentation files will have a date and revision number on the title page.

User Delivery. Each public release of the product carries a unique product version number. This allows users to distinguish the validated product from other product versions. The product uses a conventional version numbering scheme (for example “version 5.0.4”) in which major releases are noted by incrementing the unit digit and minor updates to a release are noted by incrementing the decimal digit(s). A change log available with each product version describes the associated changes made for that release.

10.2. Delivery and Operation
The Source Code Description and Crypto++ API Reference documents provide more information on the design and implementation of the Module.

In addition to understanding the versioning information provided in the previous section, application developers should ensure that the proper version of the Module is delivered by verifying a Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) signature on the Crypto++ DLL. The Crypto
Officer Guide explains how to verify the signature on the library. The following fingerprint$^3$ identifies the PGP (2048-bit RSA) public key that is used to sign the library:

\[ \text{F1F2 7D64 0CAA 3C65 763D 2508 F190 1AEB 0454 9843} \]

10.3. Guidance Documents

The Crypto Officer Guide instructs Crypto Officers to properly install, configure, and maintain the Module. The User Guide and Crypto++ API Reference explain the proper and complete use of the library’s Approved cryptographic services and functions.

11. Mitigation of Other Attacks

The Module does not provide security mechanisms to defend against attacks beyond those required by FIPS 140-2 level 1 for monitoring the integrity of the Module.

12. References

For more information about the Crypto++ library, please visit the product website at http://www.cryptopp.com. The following documents were used to support validation of the Crypto++ library.

3. FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
4. FIPS 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES)

$^3$ A fingerprint is a SHA1 hash of a public key. It uniquely identifies the key and is easier for humans to read than the public key value that is much longer.
APPENDIX A: Master Components List

The Crypto++ library is software that is intended to operate as part of an application on a personal computer platform under the Windows® 2000 Professional operating system. The Module includes the validated Crypto++ DLL and the hardware elements of the personal computer platform. Neither the operating system nor the calling application is a component of the Module.

A.1. Hardware Components

The following listed hardware elements are components of the Module. The components are standard production-quality integrated circuits or components designed to meet commercial-grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, shock, vibration, and so on.

- The PC enclosure
- The central processing unit (CPU)
- The hard drive
- Memory
- CD-ROM drive
- Floppy disk drive

A.2. Software Components

The following listed software elements are components of the Module.

- The Crypto++ 5.0.4 DLL

The Source Code Description lists all the software Modules that make up the Crypto++ DLL.

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4 See Section 2.5 Software Environment for other qualified operating systems.
APPENDIX B: Finite State Model

This section describes the finite state model of the Crypto++ library. The Module can be in only one state at a time. State transitions are driven by various software events or actions.

Crypto Officer operations are outside the scope of this state model.

B.1. Diagram
B.2. Descriptions

B.2.1. Not Loaded
The Module is in the *Not Loaded* state when it has not been loaded into memory. The *Not Loaded* state corresponds to the *Power-Off* state defined in FIPS 140-2.

B.2.2. Loaded
The *Loaded* state corresponds to the *Power-On* state defined in FIPS 140-2.

In the *Loaded* state, the Module is running but the power-on self-test has not yet run. The Module immediately runs the power-on self-test and automatically transitions to the next state. If the self-test runs successfully, the Module transitions to the *Initialized* state. On self-test failure, the Module transitions to the *Self-Test Error* state.

B.2.3. Load Failure
The Module enters the *Load Failure* state for any load failure such as file not found, incorrect parameter passed or other error.

B.2.4. Self-Test Error
The Module enters the *Self-Test Error* state if any self-test fails, setting a global self-test error flag. This flag lets the application detect the *Self-Test Error* state and handle the error, performing (for instance) a graceful program termination if that is the appropriate action.

If the application does not check the flag and tries to perform a cryptographic operation, an exception is thrown and the Module enters the *Self-Test Exception Handling* state.

B.2.5. Initialized
The Module enters the *Initialized* state after all self-tests pass. In this state, the Module is idle, waiting for an operation from the calling application. Successful operations return the Module to this state.

B.2.6. Operation Error Exception Handling
The Module enters the *Operation Error Exception Handling* state by throwing a C++ exception after any security operation fails. In this state the calling application may attempt to catch the exception. If the exception is caught, then the Module transitions back to the *Initialized* state. Otherwise the Module transitions to the *Uncaught Exception* state.

B.2.7. Self-Test Error Exception Handling
The Module enters the *Self-Test Error Exception Handling* state by throwing a C++ exception when the calling application attempts to perform a security operation while the
Module is in the *Self-Test Error* state. In this state, the calling application may attempt to catch the exception. If the exception is caught, the Module transitions back to the *Self-Test Error* state. Otherwise the Module transitions to the *Uncaught Exception* state.

### B.2.8. Uncaught Exception

The Module enters the *Uncaught Exception* state when the calling application fails to catch the C++ exception thrown by the Module when it entered the *Operation Error Exception Handling* state or the *Self-Test Error Exception Handling* state. In this state, the Module throws the exception up the stack until it is caught and handled by a higher layer in the stack or it is not caught and the program exits.

### B.2.9. Application Exit

The Module enters the *Application Exit* state when the user exits the application normally from the *Initialized* state. Abnormal conditions causing transitions to this state are uncaught exceptions, and self-test errors.

### B.3. Transition Conditions and Events

This section describes the conditions or events that cause transitions (numbered) in the State Diagram.

1. Load fails due to file not found error, incorrect parameter, or other error.
2. Load succeeds.
3. Self-test succeeds. This transition occurs when all self-tests pass.
4. Self-test fails. This transition occurs when any self-test fails.
5. User operation succeeds.
6. User exits application.
7. User operation failure due to invalid key, algorithm parameters, or other error. Exception thrown.
8. User operation exception caught.
10. Operation attempted while in *Self-Test error* state. Exception thrown.
12. User operation exception not caught.
13. Self-test error exception not caught.
15. Automatic Transition. Program unloaded from memory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current State</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Next State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not Loaded</td>
<td>Load Failure</td>
<td>Load Failure Error Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not Loaded</td>
<td>Load Success</td>
<td>Load Success Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Loaded</td>
<td>Run self-test automatically.</td>
<td>Self-Test Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Loaded</td>
<td>Run self-test automatically.</td>
<td>Self-Test Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Initialized</td>
<td>Cryptographic operation</td>
<td>Operation success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Initialized</td>
<td>User exits program</td>
<td>Operation success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Initialized</td>
<td>Cryptographic operation</td>
<td>Operation failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operation Error ExceptionHandling</td>
<td>Catch exception</td>
<td>Exception caught</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Self-Test Error Exception Handling</td>
<td>Catch exception</td>
<td>Exception caught</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Self-Test Error</td>
<td>Attempt Cryptographic operation</td>
<td>Throw Exception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Self-Test Error</td>
<td>Check Self-Test Error Flag</td>
<td>Error flag detected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Operation Error ExceptionHandling</td>
<td>Not catch exception</td>
<td>Exception not caught</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Self-Test Error Exception Handling</td>
<td>Not catch exception</td>
<td>Exception not caught</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Uncaught Exception</td>
<td>Automatic transition</td>
<td>No output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Application Exit</td>
<td>Automatic transition</td>
<td>Application and crypto Module unloaded from memory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>