RSA BSAFE®

Crypto-J

Security Policy (jsafeJCE)

Version 3.5
March 2, 2006

Cryptographic Components for Java
Contact Information
See our Web sites for regional Customer Support telephone and fax numbers.

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1. Introduction

This is a non-proprietary cryptographic module security policy for RSA Security, Inc.’s RSA BSAFE Crypto-J Toolkit Module version 3.5 (Crypto-J Module). This security policy describes how the Crypto-J Module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2, and how to securely operate the Crypto-J Module. This policy was prepared as part of the level 1 FIPS 140-2 validation of the Crypto-J Module.

The Crypto-J distribution includes two API interfaces, which are packaged as follows:

- jsafefips.jar "JSAFE" application programmer interface to the Crypto-J Module
- jsafejCEFIPS.jar "JCE" application programmer interface to the Crypto-J Module

This security policy deals only with the JCE interface to the Crypto-J Module. For details of how the FIPS 140-2 evaluation applies to the JSAFE module, please refer to the document entitled "RSA BSAFE® Crypto-J Security Policy(jsafe)"


1.1. References

This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the Crypto-J Module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the Crypto-J Module and the entire RSA BSAFE product line:

- The RSA website contains information on their full line of products and services at http://www.rsasecurity.com.
- An overview of the Crypto-J Module is located at http://www.rsasecurity.com/node.asp?id=1204
- The RSA BSAFE product overview is provided at http://www.rsasecurity.com/node.asp?id=1202
- For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contact details in section6 at the back of this document.

1.2. Terminology

In this document the Crypto-J Module will sometimes be referred to as the module. There are two application programmer interfaces to the Crypto-J Module included in Crypto-J 3.5. All references to the Crypto-J Module apply to both interfaces unless explicitly noted.

1.3. Document Organization

The Security Policy document is one document in complete FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the complete Submission Package contains:
This document explains the Cryptographic Module’s FIPS 140-2 relevant features and functionality. This first section, Introduction, provides an overview and introduction to the Security Policy. Cryptographic Module on page 6 describes the Cryptographic Module and how it meets FIPS 140-2 requirements. Secure Operation of the Crypto-J Module on page 11 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation. Services on page 13 list all of the functions provided by the Cryptographic Module. Acronyms on page 14 lists the definitions for the acronyms used in this document.

With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Certification Submission Documentation is RSA Security-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact RSA Security.
2. Crypto-J Module

This section provides an overview of the Crypto-J Module. The following topics are discussed:

- Introduction
- Cryptographic Module
- Module Interfaces
- Roles and Services
- Cryptographic Key Management
- Cryptographic Algorithms
- Self-Test

2.1. Introduction

More than one half billion copies of the RSA BSAFE technology are embedded in today’s most popular software applications and hardware devices. Encompassing the most widely-used and richest sets of cryptographic algorithms and secure communications protocols, RSA BSAFE software is a set of complementary security products relied-upon by developers and manufacturers worldwide.

The Crypto-J Module is the world’s most trusted Java-language cryptography component and is at the heart of the RSA BSAFE product line. It includes a wide range of data encryption and signing algorithms, including Triple-DES, the high-performing RC5, the RSA Public Key Cryptosystem, the DSA government signature algorithm, MD5 and SHA1 message digest routines, and more. Its software libraries, sample code and complete standards-based implementation enable near-universal interoperability for your networked and e-business applications. Any programmer using the RSA BSAFE Crypto-J tools can easily create secure applications without a background in cryptography, mathematics or number theory.

2.2. Cryptographic Module

This Cryptographic Module is classified as a multi-chip standalone module for FIPS 140-2 purposes. As such, the module must be tested upon a particular operating system and computer platform. The cryptographic boundary thus includes the Cryptographic Module running on selected platforms running selected operating systems while configured in “single user” mode. The Cryptographic Module was validated as meeting all FIPS 140-2 level 1 security requirements, including cryptographic key management and operating system requirements. The Crypto-J Module is packaged in a Java Archive (JAR) file, which contains all the code for the module. Additionally, the RSA BSAFE Crypto-J toolkit relies on the physical security provided by the host PC in which it runs.
The JCE application programmer interface to the Crypto-J Module is provided in the jsafeJCEFIPS.jar file.

The RSA BSAFE Crypto-J toolkit was tested on the following platforms:

- **Microsoft Windows**
  - Microsoft Windows XP (SP2) – Sun JDK 1.4.2 (32 bit)

Compliance is maintained on platforms for which the binary executable remains unchanged including (but not limited to):

- **Microsoft Windows**
  - Microsoft Windows NT 4 Sun JDK 1.1.8/1.3.1/1.4.2/1.5, IBM JDK 1.4.2
  - Microsoft Windows 2000 Service Pack 4 Sun JDK 1.1.8/1.3.1/1.4.2/1.5, IBM JDK 1.4.2
  - Microsoft Windows XP (SP1) Sun JDK 1.1.8/1.3.1/1.4.2/1.5, IBM JDK 1.4.2
  - Microsoft Windows 2003 Server. Sun JDK 1.1.8/1.3.1/1.4.2/1.5, IBM JDK 1.4.2

- **Sun Microsystems**
  - Sun Microsystems Solaris 8, Sparc v9 (32-bit) Sun JDK 1.3.1/1.4.2/1.5(32 bit)
  - Sun Microsystems Solaris 8, Sparc v9 (64-bit) Sun JDK 1.5 (64 bit)
  - Sun Microsystems Solaris 9, Sparc v9 (32-bit) Sun JDK 1.3.1/1.4.2/1.5(32 bit)
  - Sun Microsystems Solaris 9, Sparc v9 (64-bit) Sun JDK 1.5 (64 bit)
  - Sun Microsystems Solaris 10, Sparc v9 (32-bit) Sun JDK 1.3.1/1.4.2/1.5(32 bit)
  - Sun Microsystems Solaris 10, Sparc v9 (64-bit) Sun JDK 1.5 (64 bit)
  - Sun Microsystems Solaris 10, Intel x86 (32-bit) Sun JDK 1.3.1/1.4.2/1.5(32 bit)

- **Red Hat Linux 7.2 x86 (32-bit)**
  - Red Hat Linux 7.2 x86 (32-bit) Sun JDK 1.3.1/1.4.2/1.5
  - Red Hat Advanced Server 3.0 x86 (32-bit). Sun JDK 1.3.1/1.4.2/1.5

- **HP-UX 11 (32-bit)**
  - HP-UX 11.0 PA-RISC 1.1 (32-bit) HP JDK 1.4.2
  - HP-UX 11.0 PA-RISC 2.0 (32-bit) HP JDK 1.4.2
  - HP-UX 11.22 Itanium2 (32-bit) HP JDK 1.4.2
  - HP-UX 11.23 Itanium2 (32-bit) HP JDK 1.4.2

- **IBM AIX 5L v5.3 (32bit)**
  - IBM AIX 5L v5.3, PowerPC (32-bit) IBM JDK 1.4.2

Refer to the NIST document, *Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program*, for resolution on the issue of “Multi user” modes. This document is located at: http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/FIPS1402IG.pdf.

### 2.3. Module Interfaces

As a multi-chip standalone module, the Crypto-J Module’s physical interfaces consist of the keyboard, mouse, monitor, serial ports, network adapters, etc. However, the underlying logical interface to the module is the Application Program Interface (API) documented in the *RSA BSAFE Crypto-J Developer’s Guide*. The module provides for Control Input through the API calls. Data Input and Output are provided in the variables passed with API calls, and Status Output is provided in the returns and error codes that are documented for each call.
2.4. Roles and Services

The Crypto-J Module meets all FIPS140-2 level 1 requirements for Roles and Services, implementing both a User role and Crypto-Officer (CO) role. As allowed by FIPS 140-2, the Crypto-J Module does not require user identification or authentication for these roles. Only one role may be active at a time and the Crypto-J Module does not allow concurrent operators.

The application programmer interfaces for control of the module are via the “CryptoJ” class.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JARFILE</th>
<th>PREFIX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>jsafeJCEFIPS.jar</td>
<td>com.rsa.jsafe.crypto</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4.1. Crypto Officer Role

An operator may assume the Crypto-Officer role by invoking `<PREFIX>.CryptoJ.setRole() method with the argument CRYPTO_OFFICER_ROLE.

Once in the Crypto-Officer role, the operator has the ability to start the power-up self-tests on demand by calling the `<PREFIX>.CryptoJ.runSelfTests() method.

The CO can perform this operation manually by going to the command prompt, navigating to the directory containing the appropriate jar file, and typing:

```
java -cp <JARFILE> <PREFIX>.CryptoJ -testAll
```

or programmatically by calling:

```
<PREFIX>.CryptoJ.runSelfTests();
```

When Crypto-J is loaded, the power-up self-tests are automatically run. Once the integrity check is passed, it will not be run again unless the Crypto-J module is unloaded and then reloaded. Thus, after the initial loading of the module, calling the self-tests on demand only results in the power up known answer tests and pairwise consistency checks being performed.

2.4.2. User Role

By default, an operator is in the User role. However, an operator may explicitly assume the User role by invoking the `<PREFIX>.CryptoJ.setRole() method with the argument USER_ROLE.

The Crypto-J API and its functions and capabilities are documented in the RSA BSAFE Crypto-J Developer’s Guide. A full list of services is also provided on page 13.

2.5. Cryptographic Key Management

2.5.1. Key Generation

The Crypto-J Module supports generation of the DSA, RSA, and Diffie-Hellman (DH) public and private keys. Furthermore, the module employs a FIPS 186-2 compliant random number generator for generating
asymmetric and symmetric keys used in algorithms such as AES, DES\(^1\), TDES, RSA, DSA or Diffie-Hellman.

### 2.5.2. Key Storage

The Crypto-J Module does not provide long-term cryptographic key storage. If a User chooses to store keys, the User is responsible for storing keys exported from the module.

Volatile (short term) memory storage of cryptographic keys and CSPs employed by the cryptographic module is handled in the following manner:

- The User & Crypto Officer roles have equal and complete access to all keys & CSPs listed in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Storage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES keys</td>
<td>In volatile memory only (plaintext)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES(^1) keys</td>
<td>In volatile memory only (plaintext)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triple DES keys</td>
<td>In volatile memory only (plaintext)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC with SHA1 and SHA2 keys</td>
<td>In volatile memory only (plaintext)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffie-Hellman public key</td>
<td>In volatile memory only (plaintext)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffie-Hellman private key</td>
<td>In volatile memory only (plaintext)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA public key</td>
<td>In volatile memory only (plaintext)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA private key</td>
<td>In volatile memory only (plaintext)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA public key</td>
<td>In volatile memory only (plaintext)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA private key</td>
<td>In volatile memory only (plaintext)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRNG seeds(FIPS 186-2)</td>
<td>In volatile memory only (plaintext)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.5.3. Key Protection

All key data resides in internally allocated data structures and can only be output using the module’s defined API. The operating system and Java Runtime Environment protects memory and process space from unauthorized access.

### 2.5.4. Key Zeroization

All key data resides in internally allocated data structures that are “cleaned up” by the Java Virtual Machine’s (JVM) garbage collector. Because Java often handles memory in ways that are unpredictable and transparent to the User, a User can take additional steps to ensure sensitive data is properly zeroized by making use of the clearSensitiveData method for clearing sensitive data. Guidelines for clearing sensitive data are available in the “Clearing Sensitive Data” section of the RSA BSAFE Crypto-J Developer’s Guide.

### 2.6. Cryptographic Algorithms

The Crypto-J Module supports a wide variety of cryptographic algorithms. FIPS 140-2 requires that FIPS-defined algorithms be used whenever there is an applicable FIPS standard when the module is operated in FIPS mode. Thus, as the following table summarizes, only a subset of the algorithms provided by the Crypto-J Module may be used in compliance with FIPS 140-2 requirements.

---

\(^1\) For legacy system use only; transitional phase only – valid until May 19th, 2007
For more information on using Crypto-J in a FIPS compliant manner refer to Secure Operation of the Crypto-J Module on page 11.

Table 2. Crypto-J FIPS approved algorithms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Certificate Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES – ECB, CBC, CFB (128), OFB (128) – [128, 192, 256 bit key sizes]</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES - ECB, CBC, CFB (64bit), and OFB (64 bit) (for legacy use only; transitional phase only – valid until May 19th, 2007)</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement</td>
<td>Non-Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPS 186-2 General Purpose (x-Change Notice(SHA-1)</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC-SHAx (where x is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSASSA-PSS (sign, verify) (SHA-1)</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (sign/verify) (SHA-1,SHA-224,SHA-256,SHA-384,SHA-512)</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure Hash Standard (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triple DES - ECB, CBC, CFB (64 bit), and OFB (64 bit)</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA X9.31 (keygen, sign, verify)</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Crypto-J non-FIPS approved algorithms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DESX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Number Generators (ANSI X9.31, MD5Random, SHA1Random)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The RC2® block cipher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The RC4® stream cipher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The RC5® block cipher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBEWithSHA1And3DES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA OAEP for key transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw RSA encryption and decryption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA Keypair Generation MultiPrime (2 or 3 primes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIPEMD160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC-MD5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.7. Self-Test

The Crypto-J Module performs a number of power-up and conditional self-tests to ensure proper operation. If any of these tests fails, the module throws a SecurityException, providing status output, and aborts the operation that caused the conditional self-tests to fail.

#### 2.7.1. Power-Up Self-Tests

The power-up self-tests implemented in the Crypto-J module are:

- PRNG KATs
- AES KATs
- DES KATs
- TDES KATs
Secure Operation of the Crypto-J Module

- SHA-1 KATs
- SHA-224 KATs
- SHA-256 KATs
- SHA-384 KATs
- SHA-512 KATs
- HMAC SHA-1 KATs
- HMAC SHA-224 KATs
- HMAC SHA-256 KATs
- HMAC SHA-384 KATs
- HMAC SHA-512 KATs.
- pairwise consistency checks for DSA and RSA
- software/firmware integrity check

Power-up self-tests are executed automatically when the module is loaded by the Java Runtime Environment (JRE).

2.7.2. Conditional Self-Tests

The Crypto-J Module performs two conditional self-tests: a pair-wise consistency tests each time the module generates a DSA or RSA public/private key pair, and a continuous random number generator test each time the module produces random data per the FIPS 186-2 standard.

2.7.3. Mitigation of Other Attacks

RSA key operations implement blinding by default, providing a defense against timing attacks. Blinding is implemented through blinding modes, and the following options are available:

- Blinding mode off
- Blinding mode with no update, where the blinding value is constant for each operation
- Blinding mode with full update, where a new blinding value is used for each operation.

3. Secure Operation of the Crypto-J Module

The Crypto-J Module does not require any special configuration to operate in conformance with FIPS 140-2 requirements. However, the following guidance must be followed to achieve a FIPS mode of operation.

3.1. Crypto-Officer Guidance

The Crypto-Officer is responsible for installing the module. Guidance for installation of the module can be found in the RSA BSAFE Crypto-J Installation Guide.

The module’s state is set to FIPS_MODE by default, and Crypto-Officers must not take the module out of FIPS_MODE.

3.2. User Guidance

The User must only use algorithms approved for use in a FIPS mode of operation. Table 2 details the list of approved algorithms. The FIPS-approved bit length for a DSA key pair must be between 512-1024 bits in multiples of 64, and the FIPS-approved RNGs must be seeded with values of at least 160 bits in length.
The FIPS-approved bit lengths for an RSA\(^2\) key pair must be between 1024 – 4096 bits in multiples of 512. The FIPS-approved bit lengths for the Diffie-Hellman\(^3\) key agreement must be between 1024-2048 bits. The FIPS-approved bit lengths for an HMAC key must be between 80-4096 bits.

If RSA Key generation is requested in FIPS mode, the module always uses the FIPS approved RSA X9.31 key generation procedure.

The module’s state is set to FIPS_MODE by default, and Users must not take the module out of FIPS_MODE.

Users should take care to zeroize CSPs when they are no longer needed. Please follow the procedure for clearing sensitive data as outlined in the “Clearing Sensitive Data” section of the RSA BSAFE Crypto-J Developer’s Guide.

---

\(^2\) When used for transporting keys and using the minimum allowed modulus size; the minimum strength of encryption provided is 80 bits.

\(^3\) Using the minimum allowed modulus size; the minimum strength of encryption provided is 80 bits.
4. Services

The Crypto-J Module meets all FIPS 140-2 level 1 requirements for Roles and Services, implementing both a User role and Crypto-Officer (CO) role. As allowed by FIPS 140-2, the Crypto-J Module does not require user identification or authentication for these roles. Only one role may be active at a time and the Crypto-J Module does not allow concurrent operators.

The following table details the services provided by the Crypto-J module in terms of the interface into the module. For more detailed information on each function please refer to the RSA BSAFE Crypto-J Developer’s Guide.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CryptoJ.runSelfTests*</td>
<td>AlgorithmParameters</td>
<td>Mac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CryptoJ.setRole</td>
<td>AlgorithmParameterGenerator</td>
<td>MessageDigest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CryptoJ.getRole</td>
<td>Cipher</td>
<td>SecretKeyFactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CryptoJ.setMode</td>
<td>KeyAgreement</td>
<td>SecureRandom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CryptoJ.getMode</td>
<td>KeyFactory</td>
<td>Signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CryptoJ.getState</td>
<td>KeyGenerator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CryptoJ.selfTestPassed</td>
<td>KeyPairGenerator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only available to the Crypto Officer role.
## 5. Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>Advanced Encryption Standard. A fast block cipher with a 128-bit block, and keys of lengths 128, 192 and 256 bits. This will replace DES as the US symmetric encryption standard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>Application Programming Interface.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Either a successful or unsuccessful attempt at breaking part or all of a cryptosystem. Various attack types include an algebraic attack, birthday attack, brute force attack, chosen ciphertext attack, chosen plaintext attack, differential cryptanalysis, known plaintext attack, linear cryptanalysis, and middleperson attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Cipher Block Chaining. A mode of encryption in which each ciphertext depends upon all previous ciphertexts. Changing an IV alters the ciphertext produced by successive encryptions of an identical plaintext.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFB</td>
<td>Cipher Feedback. A mode of encryption that produces a stream of ciphertext bits rather than a succession of blocks. In other respects, it has similar properties to the CBC mode of operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Cryptographic Service Provider.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>Data Encryption Standard. A symmetric encryption algorithm with a 56-bit key. See also Triple DES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffie-Hellman</td>
<td>The Diffie-Hellman asymmetric key exchange algorithm. There are many variants, but typically two entities exchange some public information (for example, public keys or random values) and combines them with their own private keys to generate a shared session key. As private keys are not transmitted, eavesdroppers are not privy to all of the information that composes the session key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>Digital Signature Algorithm. An asymmetric algorithm for creating digital signatures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>Electronic Code Book. A mode of encryption in which identical plaintexts are encrypted to identical ciphertexts, given the same key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encryption</td>
<td>The transformation of plaintext into an apparently less readable form (called ciphertext) through a mathematical process. The ciphertext may be read by anyone who has the key that decrypts (undoes the encryption) the ciphertext.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPS</td>
<td>Federal Information Processing Standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAT</td>
<td>Known Answer Test.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key</td>
<td>A string of bits used in cryptography, allowing people to encrypt and decrypt data. Can be used to perform other mathematical operations as well. Given a cipher, a key determines the mapping of the plaintext to the ciphertext. Various types of keys include: distributed key, private key, public key, secret key, session key, shared key, subkey, symmetric key, and weak key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD5</td>
<td>A secure hash algorithm created by Ron Rivest. MD5 hashes an arbitrary-length input into a 16-byte digest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIST</td>
<td>National Institute of Standards and Technology. A division of the US Department of Commerce (formerly known as the NBS) which produces security and cryptography-related standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFB</td>
<td>Output Feedback. A mode of encryption in which the cipher is decoupled from its ciphertext.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Operating System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Personal Computer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private key</td>
<td>The secret key in public key cryptography. Primarily used for decryption but also used for encryption with digital signatures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRNG</td>
<td>Pseudo Random Number Generator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC2</td>
<td>Block cipher developed by Ron Rivest as an alternative to the DES. It has a block size of 64 bits and a variable key size. It is a legacy cipher and RC5 should be used in preference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC4</td>
<td>Symmetric algorithm designed by Ron Rivest using variable length keys (usually 40 bit...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC5</td>
<td>Block cipher designed by Ron Rivest. It is parameterizable in its word size, key length and number of rounds. Typical use involves a block size of 64 bits, a key size of 128 bits and either 16 or 20 iterations of its round function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNG</td>
<td>Random Number Generator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Public key (asymmetric) algorithm providing the ability to encrypt data and create and verify digital signatures. RSA stands for Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, the developers of the RSA public key cryptosystem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>Secure Hash Algorithm. An algorithm which creates a unique hash value for each possible input. SHA takes an arbitrary input which is hashed into a 160-bit digest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-1</td>
<td>A revision to SHA to correct a weakness. It produces 160-bit digests. SHA-1 takes an arbitrary input which is hashed into a 20-byte digest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-2</td>
<td>The NIST-mandated successor to SHA-1, to complement the Advanced Encryption Standard. It is a family of hash algorithms (SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512) which produce digests of 256, 384 and 512 bits respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES</td>
<td>Triple-DES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Contacting RSA Security

The RSA Security Web site contains the latest news, security bulletins and information about coming events.

The RSA BSAFE Web site contains product information.

The RSA Laboratories Web site contains frequently asked questions.

6.1. Support and Service

If you have any questions or require additional information, see RSA Support or RSA SecurCare Online.

6.2. Purchasing Printed Product Documentation

All documentation for your RSA Security product is included in electronic format on the CD or in the download you have received. You can print product documentation directly from these files if you require a hard copy.

RSA Security also offers customers the option to purchase printed and bound copies of key documents for some products. More information is available at Documentation.

6.3. Feedback

We welcome your feedback on RSA Security documentation. Please e-mail bsafeuserdocs@rsasecurity.com.