Alcatel-Lucent

Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall Brick 50

Hardware Version: 50; Firmware Version: 9.1.299

FIPS 140-2
Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Level 2 Validation
Document Version 3.1

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## Revision History

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<td>2007-05-01</td>
<td>Ben Greenberg</td>
<td>Initial version</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2007-06-15</td>
<td>Xiaoyu Ruan</td>
<td>Revision</td>
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<td>2007-07-19</td>
<td>Xiaoyu Ruan</td>
<td>Added figure of temper-evidence label</td>
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<td>2007-08-06</td>
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<td>2007-09-11</td>
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<td>Darryl Johnson</td>
<td>Added instructions for tamper-evident label placement in Section 2.6.</td>
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<td>3.1</td>
<td>2008-07-11</td>
<td>Xiaoyu Ruan</td>
<td>Added Sections 3.6 and 3.7</td>
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1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose

This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall Brick 50 (Hardware version: 50; Firmware version: 9.1.299) from Alcatel-Lucent. This Security Policy describes how the Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall Brick 50 meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 and how the module is run in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module.


The Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall Brick 50 is referred to in this document as the Brick, the cryptographic module, or the module.

1.2 References

This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:

- The Alcatel-Lucent website (http://www.alcatel-lucent.com) contains information on the full line of products from Alcatel-Lucent.
- The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html) contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.

1.3 Document Organization

The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains:

- Vendor Evidence document
- Finite State Machine
- Other supporting documentation as additional references

This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security, Inc. under contract to Alcatel-Lucent. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Documentation is proprietary to Alcatel-Lucent and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Alcatel-Lucent.
2 Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall Brick 50

2.1 Overview

The Alcatel-Lucent Virtual Private Network (VPN) Firewall Brick product line offers a broad range of enterprise and carrier-class security solutions to protect corporate and service provider networks delivering mission-critical Internet Protocol (IP) applications to headquarter employees, branch offices, trading partners, road warriors and customers. Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall solutions can help stretch Information Technology (IT) budgets with superb price and performance and a low total cost of ownership. Leading-edge technology can simplify deployment and management of diverse applications including:

- Advanced security services
- VPN services for site-to-site and remote access
- Bandwidth management capabilities
- Secure data center, web and application hosting
- Storage network secure solution
- Mobile data security
- Packet Data Gateway and Packet Data Interworking
- Functions for Dual-Mode Wireless/WiFi VPN and VoIP/Data Security

The Lucent VPN Firewall Bricks deliver the performance needed to provide vital security and VPN services for thousands of enterprise users. High-capacity packet processing capabilities help maximize user efficiency and productivity with up to 1.7 Gbps VPN throughput and a full 4.75 Gbps firewall throughput. A general deployment scenario for the Bricks is depicted in Figure 1 below. All administration of the Bricks is performed by the Lucent Security Management Server (LSMS) software which is described in Lucent Security Management Server 1.2.

![Figure 1 – Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall Brick Deployment](image-url)
2.2 Lucent Security Management Server

The LSMS is a component to any VPN Firewall Brick deployment. All administration of the Brick is performed via the LSMS. The operators should identify the firmware version of the Brick and use a compatible version of LSMS.

The LSMS software provides advanced carrier-grade IP services management at a low total ownership cost. Teaming with Lucent’s award-winning VPN Firewall Brick® portfolio, Lucent Security Management Server lets administrators rapidly provision and manage high-return services for thousands of users in a single console. It integrates firewall, VPN, Quality of Service (QoS), Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) and virtual firewall policy management; provides industry-leading scalability and availability; delivers robust monitoring, logs and reports; and gives you flexible deployment options — all without the costly additional modules or recurring license fees that competitive products require.

The LSMS provides the following features:

- Fully integrates firewall, VPN, QoS, VLAN, and virtual firewall management
- Comprehensive remote management capabilities with role-based administration
- Flexible management model: controls policies at global, customer, device, interface, VLAN and IP address range levels
- High scalability: supports 20,000 Lucent VPN Firewall Brick units and up to 500,000 simultaneously connected VPN users from one Lucent Security Management Server console.
- Carrier-class reliability: distributable across up to four network operations centers (NOCs) for active/active network redundancy with no single point of failure
- Real time monitoring, robust logging, and customized reporting
- Multiple IP services deployment options: premises-based, network-based, tiered, and data-center architectures

Note that the LSMS software is not included as part of this FIPS 140-2 validation.

2.3 Cryptographic Module Specification

The Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall Brick 50 is considered to be a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module and is validated at the following levels for each FIPS 140-2 section:

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<th>Section</th>
<th>Section Title</th>
<th>Level</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Physical Security</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Self-tests</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Design Assurance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Brick comes in a desktop systems form factor. A Brick 50 device measures 8.50" (W) x 5.90" (D) x 1.10" (H) and can be positioned on a desktop or other flat surface. The Brick 50 is pictured below:

![Brick 50](image)

**Figure 2 – Brick 50**

### 2.4 Module Interfaces

The Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall Brick 50 is a multi-chip standalone module that meet overall level 2 FIPS 140-2 requirements. The cryptographic boundary of the Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall Brick 50 is defined by the hard metal chassis of the Brick.

The following is a list of the physical ports and interfaces of the Brick 50.

- Ethernet ports (x3)
- Serial port (console)
- Universal Serial Bus (USB) port
- Light Emitting Diodes (LED)
- Power connector

The front of Brick 50 device contains a number of LEDs. There is a power LED indicator which is solid green as long as power is being provided, a hard drive (HD) activity LED which flashes green upon HD activity, and a single LED for each 10/100baseTX Ethernet port (Eth0, Eth1, and Eth2) supported by the Brick that reflects combined link/activity. The Ethernet port LEDs flash green when activity is detected on the port and remain solid green as long as a link is established. If there is no link, the light is off.

The rear of the device contains a barrel-style connector for the power cord (identified as 5V with the DC symbol), a USB connector, a DB9 serial port, and three 10/100baseTX Ethernet ports with RJ-45 connectors, labeled Eth2, Eth1, and Eth0, respectively. Note that the USB connector is covered by a tamper-evident label. The use of the USB connector is not allowed when in FIPS-Approved mode of operation.

The following table maps the Brick 50 interfaces with the FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface</th>
<th>Brick 50 Port/Interface</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Data Input</td>
<td>Ethernet ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Output</td>
<td>Ethernet ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Input</td>
<td>Ethernet ports, serial port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status Output</td>
<td>Ethernet ports, serial port, LEDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Power connector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.5 Roles and Services

The Brick supports role-based authentication. There are two roles in the module (as required by FIPS 140-2) that operators may assume: a Crypto Officer role and a User role.

2.5.1 Crypto Officer Role

Whenever a Crypto Officer makes a change to information in the LSMS that affects a configured Brick, that change has to be applied to the affected Brick. Although the changes may be saved in the LSMS database, they will not take effect until they are applied to the device.

As a general rule, a Crypto Officer has to apply any updated information that has been downloaded to a Brick. For example, Brick zone rulesets are assigned to Brick ports; if a Crypto Officer assigns a new ruleset to a port, then that change has to be applied to the Brick.

Similarly, if a Crypto Officer adds a new rule to a ruleset, or changes an existing rule, then that change has to be applied to every Brick to which the ruleset has been assigned.

If a Crypto Officer creates a new Brick zone ruleset, then it is applied automatically when the Crypto Officer applies the ruleset assignment.

Similarly, if a Crypto Officer adds a new user account or create a new user group, the Crypto Officer does not have to perform an apply. However, when the Crypto Officer creates a rule that uses the new user group, then the Crypto Officer has apply the ruleset.

There are a number of ways to perform an apply. See “How to Apply Changes” in the Administration Guide. Regardless of which LSMS window is displayed, a Crypto Officer can perform any apply, except a LAN-LAN or client tunnel, from the Utilities menu. In addition, there are other ways to perform each of the apply actions.

See the table below for descriptions of the services available to the Crypto Officer role. “tvpc” is the Brick operating system. It can be either in compressed form, tvpc.zip, or uncompressed form, tvpc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Key/ Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bootstrap (serial port method)</td>
<td>Load configuration information onto Brick flash</td>
<td>configuration information</td>
<td>Status of commands and configuration data</td>
<td>Brick certificate (write); Brick name (write); Brick private key (write); Diffie-Hellman groups (write); LSMS public key (write) access; Serial port password (write)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Load tvpc.zip boot image and initial configuration information onto Brick flash</td>
<td>tvpc.zip boot image and initial configuration information</td>
<td>Status of commands and configuration data</td>
<td>Brick certificate (write); Brick name (write); Brick private key (write); Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) checksum for tvpc (write); CRC checksum for tvpc.zip (write); Diffie-Hellman groups (write); LSMS public key (write) access; Serial port password (write)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Non-serial port bootstrap method services are not authenticated and are not available after the Crypto Officer has installed and configured the Brick according to “Secure Operation” procedures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Key/ Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Access</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TLS (using AES)</td>
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<td>TLS key establishment parameters, TLS inputs and data</td>
<td>TLS outputs and data</td>
<td>Brick certificate (read access using protocol messages); Diffie-Hellman groups (read access using protocol messages); LSMS public key (read access using protocol messages); TLS session keys (read access using protocol messages); Ruleset (read access using protocol messages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Provide authenticated and encrypted remote management sessions while using LSMS management interfaces.</td>
<td>TLS key establishment parameters, TLS inputs and data</td>
<td>TLS outputs and data</td>
<td>Brick certificate (read access using protocol messages); Diffie-Hellman groups (read access using protocol messages); LSMS public key (read access using protocol messages); TLS session keys (read access using protocol messages); Ruleset (read access using protocol messages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy file update</td>
<td>Load Brick ruleset.</td>
<td>Commands and configuration data</td>
<td>Status of file update</td>
<td>Ruleset (write)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Config file update</td>
<td>Load Brick configuration information.</td>
<td>Commands and configuration data</td>
<td>Status of file update</td>
<td>Diffie-Hellman groups (write); LAN-LAN data authentication key; LAN-LAN data encryption key (write); Pre-shared key for client tunnels (write); Pre-shared key for LAN-LAN tunnels (write)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPN certificate update</td>
<td>Load Brick VPN certificate.</td>
<td>Commands and configuration data</td>
<td>Status of file update</td>
<td>Brick VPN certificate (write); Brick VPN private key (write)</td>
</tr>
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<td>VPN Certification Authority (CA) certificate update</td>
<td>Load external CA certificate.</td>
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<td>CA certificates (write)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPN Certificate Revocation List (CRL) update</td>
<td>Load external CA CRL.</td>
<td>Commands and configuration data</td>
<td>Status of file update</td>
<td>CA CRLs (write)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2 LSMS Navigator Window and Menu Bar interfaces to configure Brick zone rulesets that result in policy file updates on the Brick can be found in the Policy Guide. Corresponding LSMS command-line interfaces can be found in the Tools and Troubleshooting Guide.

3 LSMS Navigator Window and Menu Bar interfaces to configure Brick ports, host groups, domain name groups, service groups, application filters, network address translation, dependency mask, user authentication, LAN-LAN tunnels, and client tunnels that result in config file updates on the Brick can be found in the Administration and Policy Guides. Corresponding LSMS command-line interfaces can be found in the Tools and Troubleshooting Guide.
### 2.5.2 User Role

The User role can access secured and unsecured network traffic services. See the table below for descriptions of the services available to the User role. IPsec/IKE stands for IP Security and Internet Key Exchange protocols.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Key/CSP Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IPsec/IKE (client tunnels)</td>
<td>Access Brick IPsec/IKE services to secure network traffic.</td>
<td>IKE key establishment parameters, IPsec/IKE inputs and data</td>
<td>IPsec/IKE outputs and data</td>
<td>IKE session keys (read access using protocol messages); IPsec data authentication session keys (read access using protocol messages); IPsec data encryption session keys (read access using protocol messages); Ruleset (read access using protocol messages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPsec/IKE (LAN-LAN tunnels)</td>
<td>Access Brick IPsec/IKE services to secure network traffic.</td>
<td>IKE key establishment parameters, IPsec/IKE inputs and data</td>
<td>IPsec/IKE outputs and data</td>
<td>IKE session keys (read access using protocol messages); IPsec data authentication session keys (read access using protocol messages); IPsec data encryption session keys (read access using protocol messages); Ruleset (read access using protocol messages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPsec (LAN-LAN tunnels)</td>
<td>Access Brick IPsec services to secure network traffic.</td>
<td>IPsec inputs and data</td>
<td>IPsec outputs and data</td>
<td>IPsec data authentication session keys (read access using protocol messages); IPsec data encryption session keys (read access using protocol messages); Ruleset (read access using protocol messages)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4 Interfaces to manage Brick configuration information can be found in the *Tools and Troubleshooting Guide.*
## 2.5.3 Authentication

### 2.5.3.1 TLS Authentication

Crypto Officers can establish authenticated TLS connections with Bricks using certificates. Crypto Officers log into LSMS using LSMS usernames and passwords. LSMS has a built-in CA which generates certificates for Crypto Officers that have logged into LSMS. LSMS establishes TLS connections with Bricks on behalf of Crypto Officers to perform policy file updates, config file updates, VPN certificate updates, VPN CA certificate updates, VPN CRL updates, and tvpc updates. The authentication in TLS (as well as IKE) relies on 1024-bit DSA, which provides 80 bits of security. The probability of success with a single attempt is $2^{-80}$, which is less than 1 in $10^6$. To exceed a 1 in $10^5$ probability of a successful random attempt, an attacker would have to be capable of $10^{-5}/2^{-80}$ attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities that any Brick model can support.

### 2.5.3.2 Password-Based Authentication

Crypto Officers can log into the Brick serial port console using a password, which implicitly identifies the operator as a Crypto Officer. Crypto Officers can input commands and configuration data using the serial console. Passwords are required to be at least 6 characters long. The Brick enforces the minimum password length. Passwords are obscured with an asterisk * character as they are entered. Numeric, alphabetic (upper and lower case), and punctuation characters (., ? ~ ! @ $ % ^ & - _ + = < > ^ % $ # &) can be used, which gives a total of 83 characters to choose from. The number of potential 6-character passwords is $83^6$. The probability of success with a single attempt is $83^6$, which is less than 1 in $10^6$. The Brick imposes a 3-second delay after a failed serial port console password attempt, which means a maximum of 20 attempts per minute. The probability of success with multiple consecutive attempts in one minute is $20 \times 83^6$, which is less than 1 in $10^5$.

### 2.5.3.3 IKE Pre-shared-Key-Based Authentication

Users can establish authenticated IKE/IPsec connections with the Brick using pre-shared keys. IPsec connections that have been established using IKE pre-shared key-based authentication can be used to secure network traffic. Pre-shared keys are required to be at least 8 characters long. The Brick enforces the minimum pre-shared key length. Valid characters include a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and the 15 following special characters (.:! @ $ % ^ & - _ + = < > ^ % $ # &) which gives a total of 77 characters to choose from. The number of potential 8-character passwords is $77^8$. The probability of success with a single attempt is $77^8$, which is less than 1 in $10^5$. To exceed a 1 in $10^5$ probability of a successful random attempt, an attacker would have to be capable of $10^5/77^8$ pre-shared key attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities that any Brick model can support.

### 2.5.3.4 IKE Certificate-Based Authentication

Users can establish authenticated IKE/IPsec connections with the Brick using certificates. The strength of the IKE certificate-based authentication mechanism is the same as the TLS authentication mechanism. User certificate distinguished name attributes are parsed by the Brick from the certificate and sent to LSMS for checking. Crypto Officers must configure a minimum set of required attributes to check. User certificate distinguished name email (or other configured attribute) is parsed by the Brick from the certificate and sent to LSMS for checking (when passwords are required as a second authentication factor). The Brick then verifies users’ certificates by building and verifying certificate paths and checking CRLs, according to configuration.
2.5.4 Bypass Mode

The Brick supports an alternating bypass. The Crypto Officer can configure the Brick to encrypt and decrypt data for certain IP addresses and also configure the module to send plaintext data for certain IP addresses using the Brick Zone Ruleset. The Brick is running in non-bypass mode when its configured Ruleset only contains rules defined with “Action” of “VPN” to determine how the encryption and decryption of IPsec packets will occur. The Brick is running in bypass mode when its Ruleset contains only other rules. The Brick is running in alternating bypass mode when its Ruleset contains one or more rules defined with “Action” of “VPN” and one or more other rules.

2.6 Physical Security

The module was tested and found conformant to the Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) requirements specified by Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (i.e., for business use).

Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall Brick 50 is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The entire contents of the module, including all hardware, firmware and data are enclosed in a metal case. Its case is opaque and does not have any ventilation openings. It is sealed using tamper-evident labels in order to prevent the case cover from being removed without signs of tampering. All circuits in the module are coated with commercial standard passivation.

It uses tamper-evident labels. Labels are placed in different locations, as described in the following sections. There are tamper-evident labels that Crypto Officers must apply. The tamper-evident labels must be installed during Brick installation and configuration according to “Secure Operation” procedures. Tamper-evident labels that Crypto Officers must apply will be packed with each Brick.

2.6.1 Factory-Installed Labels

There is a single factory-installed tamper-evident label on the left-hand side of the appliance chassis that does not need to be removed or replaced. The label spans the top half of the chassis and the bottom half of the chassis (the top half is removable).

2.6.2 Crypto Officer-Installed Labels

There are Crypto Officer-installed tamper-evident labels that must be installed as depicted in the figures below:

![Figure 3 – Crypto Officer Label Placement for the Rear of the Brick 50](image-url)
Figure 4 – Crypto Officer Label Placement for the Left Side of the Brick 50

The labels must be installed according to the guidance provided in the following table. Note that if there are existing stickers, they must either be replaced by new stickers or the new stickers must be placed to either immediate side of the existing sticker.

Table 5 – Brick 50 Label Placement Guidance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label #</th>
<th>Description of Label Placement Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Covers the USB port on the rear of the chassis entirely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Spans the top chassis cover and the side of the chassis. Spans the top chassis cover and the side of the chassis. Note that if there are existing stickers, they must either be replaced by new stickers or the new stickers must be placed to either immediate side of the existing sticker.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.7 Operational Environment

The operational environment requirements do not apply to the Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall Brick 50. The module does not provide a general purpose Operating System (OS) and only allow the updating of image components after checking a Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) signature on new software images. Crypto Officers can install a new firmware image on a Brick by downloading the new image to the Brick via USB. This image is signed by a DSA private key (which never enters the module) and includes the matching public key certificate as part of the download. The Brick verifies the signature on the new firmware image using the public key in the embedded certificate. If the verification passes, the upgrade is allowed. Otherwise the upgrade process fails and the old image is reused.

Notice that the USB ports can only be used during installation. The USB ports are required to be covered with tamper-evident seals after installation.
2.8 Cryptographic Key Management

2.8.1 Cryptographic Algorithms

The cryptographic module implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:

**Implemented in Software:**

- AES (CBC mode, 128, 192, 256 key sizes) Certificates #672
- TDES (CBC mode 3-key, 2 implementations) Certificates #617 and #620
- Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-1 (byte oriented, 2 implementations) Certificates #705 and #708
- Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)- SHA-1 (key size = block size, block size = 20 bytes 2 implementations) Certificates #356 and #359
- DSA (sign/verify 1024, 2 implementations) Certificates #253 and #256
- FIPS 186-2 PRNG (K-Org, SHA-1, seed key = 64 bytes) Certificate #391

**Implemented in Hardware:**

- AES (CBC mode 128, 192, 256 key sizes) Certificate #671
- SHA-1 (byte oriented) Certificate #704
- TDES (CBC mode 3 key) Certificate #616
- HMAC-SHA-1 (key size = block size, block size = 20 bytes) Certificate #355

The cryptographic module also contains the following non-Approved algorithms:

- Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 80 and 112 bits of encryption strength); allowed in FIPS mode
- Non-Approved Random Number Generator (RNG)
- Symmetric Key Algorithms – DES, ARC4
- Hashing Algorithms –MD5
- ElGamal
- RSA (non-compliant)

2.8.2 CSPs

The module features the following critical security parameters:

2.8.2.1 Brick Certificate and Brick Private Key

The Brick certificate is an X.509 certificate (1024-bit DSA with SHA-1) that is generated by the LSMS built-in CA after LSMS first generates the key pair (the corresponding private key is called the “Brick private key”) during Brick installation. The Brick certificate is presented by the Brick to LSMS as authentication data when establishing a TLS connection. The Brick certificate and the Brick private key are both stored in plaintext in configuration files in Brick flash. The Brick certificate and the Brick private key are both loaded during bootstrap. The Brick certificate is output during TLS (either using AES or TDES) key establishment. The Brick private key is not output.

2.8.2.2 LSMS Public Key

The LSMS public key is a copy of the 1024-bit DSA public key of the LSMS built-in CA that is generated during LSMS installation. The LSMS public key is used to build and verify certificate paths involving LSMS CA-issued certificates. LSMS public key is stored in plaintext in configuration files in Brick flash. The LSMS public key is loaded during bootstrap. The LSMS public key is not output.
2.8.2.3 Brick Name

The Brick name is the subject name of the Brick certificate. It can be used to effectively revoke the Brick certificate by changing its value using LSMS, since the LSMS built-in CA does not generate revocation lists. The Brick name is stored separately than the Brick certificate in plaintext in configuration files in Brick flash. The Brick name is loaded during bootstrap. The Brick name is not output.

2.8.2.4 Serial Port Password

The serial port password is the password used to authenticate Crypto Officers to the Brick using the Brick serial port console interfaces. It is used to implicitly identify the operator as a Crypto Officer. The serial port password is stored in plaintext in configuration files in Brick flash. The serial port password is loaded during bootstrap. The serial port password is not output.

2.8.2.5 Brick VPN Certificate and Brick VPN Private Key

The Brick VPN certificate is an X.509 certificate (1024-bit DSA with SHA-1) that is generated by an external CA after LSMS first generates the key pair and corresponding certificate request during Brick installation. The Brick VPN certificate is presented by the Brick to User operators’ IPsec client applications or to another Brick as authentication data when IKE has been configured in either or both cases to use certificate-based authentication. The Brick VPN certificate and the Brick VPN private key are both stored in plaintext in configuration files in Brick flash. The Brick VPN certificate and the Brick VPN private key are loaded during VPN certificate update. The Brick VPN certificate is output during IPsec/IKE (either client or LAN-LAN tunnels when configured for certificate authentication). The Brick VPN private key is not output.

2.8.2.6 CA Certificates and CA CRLs

The CA certificates are issuing and intermediate external CA X.509 certificates (1024-bit DSA with SHA-1). External CA certificates and CRLs are used to build and verify certificate paths involving external CA-issued certificates when IKE has been configured for client tunnels to use certificate-based authentication. The external CA certificates and CRLs are stored in plaintext in configuration files in Brick flash. The external CA certificates are loaded during VPN CA certificate update. The CRLs are loaded during VPN CRL update.

2.8.2.7 Pre-shared Key for Client Tunnels

The pre-shared key for client tunnels is presented by User operators’ IPsec client applications as authentication data when IKE has been configured to use pre-shared key-based authentication. The pre-shared key for client tunnels is stored in plaintext in configuration files in Brick flash. The pre-shared key for client tunnels is loaded during config file update. The pre-shared key for client tunnels is not output.

2.8.2.8 Pre-shared Key for LAN-LAN Tunnels

The pre-shared key for LAN-LAN tunnels is presented by one Brick to another LAN as authentication data when IKE has been configured to use pre-shared key-based authentication. There is one pre-shared key for LAN-LAN tunnel for each LAN-LAN tunnel. IPsec/IKE is configured separately for client and for LAN-LAN tunnels. The pre-shared key for LAN-LAN tunnels is stored in plaintext in configuration files in Brick flash. The pre-shared key for LAN-LAN tunnels is loaded during config file update. The pre-shared key for LAN-LAN tunnels is not output.

2.8.2.9 LAN-LAN Data Encryption Key

The LAN-LAN data encryption key is a 128/192/256-bit AES or 168-bit TDES key. If Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP) data encryption has been configured, it is used to encrypt data in a LAN-LAN configuration when IKE has not been configured for use with IPsec. Crypto Officers enter this key into the LSMS Graphical User
Interface (GUI), and LSMS in turn sends the key to the Brick after a TLS connection has been established. The LAN-LAN data encryption key is stored in plaintext in configuration files in Brick flash. The LAN-LAN data encryption key is loaded during config file update. The LAN-LAN data encryption key is not output.

### 2.8.2.10 LAN-LAN Data Authentication Key

The LAN-LAN data authentication key is a 160-bit HMAC-SHA-1 key. If either Authentication Header (AH) or ESP data authentication has been configured, it is used to authenticate data in a LAN-LAN configuration when IKE has not been configured for use with IPsec. Crypto Officers enter this key into the LSMS GUI, and LSMS in turn sends the key to the Brick after a TLS connection has been established. The LAN-LAN data authentication key is stored in plaintext in configuration files in Brick flash. The LAN-LAN data authentication key is loaded during config file update. The LAN-LAN data authentication key is not output.

### 2.8.2.11 Crypto Officer Public Key

The Crypto Officer Public key is a 1024-bit DSA public key used to verify the integrity of the tvpc file during tvpc upgrade. After the validity of the Crypto Officer Public key certificate is verified (using the LSMS public key), the module will use the Crypto Officer Public key to verify the signature of the tvpc file. The Crypto Officer Public key is loaded each time during tvpc upgrade and not stored within the module.

### 2.8.2.12 CRC Checksums

The CRC checksums are 32-bit checksums that are used by the Brick to compare against the calculated checksum of the tvpc or the tvpc.zip when the Brick boots. It is generated at the factory and provided as part of the tvpc file included with the LSMS distribution. The CRC checksum is appended to the tvpc file (either the uncompressed tvpc or the compressed tvpc.zip or both depending on configuration) in Brick flash. The CRC checksum is loaded during bootstrap and during tvpc update. The CRC checksum is not output.

### 2.8.2.13 Diffie-Hellman Group and Parameters

The Diffie-Hellman Oakley groups are used by Brick TLS and IKE Diffie-Hellman implementations to establish TLS protocol and IKE 128-bit AES or 168-bit TDES ephemeral session keys. The Brick supports 1024-bit, 1536-bit, and 2048-bit Diffie-Hellman using the exponent defined for IKE Group 2, Group 5, and Group 14, respectively. The configured Diffie-Hellman group and its parameters are stored in plaintext in configuration files in Brick flash. The configured Diffie-Hellman group and its parameters are loaded during config file update. The configured Diffie-Hellman group and its parameters are not output.

### 2.8.2.14 TLS Session Keys

The TLS session key is a 128-bit AES or 168-bit TDES ephemeral session key where AES is used only for audit channels. It is established using Diffie-Hellman. It is used to encrypt LSMS-Brick communication. The TLS session key is stored in plaintext in Brick Random Access Memory (RAM).

### 2.8.2.15 IKE Session Keys

The IKE session key is a 128/192/256-bit AES or 168-bit TDES ephemeral session key. It is established using Diffie-Hellman. It is used to encrypt AH and ESP Security Association (SA) negotiation messages when establishing client tunnels (and/or LAN-LAN tunnels if IKE has been configured for use with IPsec for LAN-LAN tunnels). It is generated while negotiating the ISAKMP SA. The IKE session key is stored in plaintext in Brick RAM.
2.8.2.16 IPsec Data Encryption Session Keys

The IPsec data encryption session key is a 128/192/256-bit AES or 168-bit TDES ephemeral session key. It is established as a result of ESP SA negotiation messages. It is used to encrypt client tunnels (and/or LAN-LAN tunnels if IKE has been configured for use with IPsec for LAN-LAN tunnels). It is generated while negotiating the ISAKMP SA. The IPsec data encryption session key is stored in plaintext in Brick RAM.

2.8.2.17 IPsec Data Authentication Session Keys

The IPsec data authentication session key is a 160-bit HMAC-SHA-1 ephemeral session key. It is established as a result of AH (or ESP, if data authentication has been configured) SA negotiation messages. It is used to authenticate (data, not operators) client tunnels (and/or LAN-LAN tunnels if IKE has been configured for use with IPsec for LAN-LAN tunnels). It is generated while negotiating the ISAKMP SA. The IPsec data encryption session key is stored in plaintext in Brick RAM.

2.8.2.18 Ruleset

The ruleset can be input or upgraded by Crypto Officers via LSMS GUI. The ruleset is stored in the policy file in plaintext. The policy file is stored in plaintext in Brick flash. The ruleset is loaded during policy file update. The ruleset is not output.5

2.8.2.19 PRNG Seed-Key

The PRNG seed-key is a value that is generated by Brick hardware used as input to the FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.2 PRNG. The PRNG seed-key is stored in plaintext in Brick RAM. The PRNG seed-key is not output.

2.8.3 CSP Zeroization

2.8.3.1 Persistent CSPs

After the Brick has been zeroized, CSPs will have been overwritten, the “tvpc” boot image (if there was one as the result of an upgrade) will have been deleted, and the original “tvpc.zip” that had been installed on the Brick at the factory will have been restored, overwriting any tvpc.zip that had been installed on the Brick previously. The Brick VPN secret key is not zeroized. However, it is not considered a key/CSP.

2.8.3.2 Ephemeral CSPs

All ephemeral CSPs such as session keys are zeroized when the sessions are over. They can also be zeroized on demand by rebooting the Brick.

2.9 Self-Tests

The Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall Brick 50 perform the following self-tests at power-up:

- Firmware integrity test
- Known Answer Test (KAT) on AES (encrypt/decrypt)
- KAT on TDES (encrypt/decrypt)
- KAT on SHA-1

5 LSMS maintains a copy of the ruleset each time it sends it to the Brick.
• KAT on HMAC-SHA-1
• DSA pairwise consistency test (sign/verify)
• Diffie-Hellman pairwise consistency test
• KAT on the FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.2 PRNG

The Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall Brick 50 perform the following conditional self-tests:

• Continuous random number generator test for the FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.2 PRNG
• Continuous random number generator test for the non-Approved RNG
• Firmware load test
• Bypass test

### 2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module does not claim to mitigate other attacks in a FIPS mode of operation.
3 Secure Operation

The Alcatel-Lucent VPN Firewall Brick 50 meet Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to place and keep the module in a FIPS-approved mode of operation.

3.1 Initial Setup

3.1.1 Installing the Brick

First, the Crypto Officer must unpack and inspect the Brick according to the User’s Guide. Installation and configuration instructions for the Bricks can also be found in the User’s Guide. Each model of Brick has its own User’s Guide which contains installation instructions, maintenance information, safety tips, and more.

Next, the Crypto Officer must load a Brick boot image using a non-serial port bootstrap method, which consists of copying files generated by LSMS to either a floppy or a flash disk and then loading them onto the Brick.

Warning: There is a bootstrap method option to use the serial port, but this method must not be used, it does not copy FIPS validated executable files onto the Brick, only configuration files.

Finally, the Crypto Officer must apply the supplied tamper-evident labels as described in Section 2.6 of this document. Note that labels require 12 hours to cure.

3.1.2 Setting up LSMS

The Crypto Officer is responsible for the proper initial setup of the LSMS software and the VPN Firewall Bricks. Setup of the LSMS software is done by installing the software on an appropriate Windows or Solaris server. Specific instructions for initial setup can be found in Section 1 of Lucent Security Management Server Administrative Guide.

3.2 Module Initialization and Configuration

3.2.1 Configuring LSMS-Brick Communication

The Crypto Officer is responsible for configuring the Brick to work in the FIPS mode of operation. FIPS mode can only be enabled or disabled using the LSMS software.

To enable FIPS mode, in LSMS, go to the Configuration Assistant window and edit the “FIPS” parameter. Check the “Enable FIPS 140-2 Mode” box.

3.2.2 Initializing the Brick

The Crypto Officer must perform the initial configuration. The version indicated on the cover page is the only allowable image; no other images may be loaded. Specific instructions for Brick initialization and configuration can be found in Section 2 of Lucent Security Management Server Administrative Guide.

Only non-serial port bootstrap methods are allowed in the FIPS mode of operation. The Crypto Officer must not use serial port to bootstrap the Brick. The Crypto Officer needs to protect disk/flash regardless of whether or not password is used to encrypt the flash image. To create a new bootstrap image, the Crypto Officer can use either serial or non-serial port methods. For detailed instructions on the initialization and configuration process, please see Section 3 of the Lucent Security Management Server Administration Guide.

The Crypto Officer must not perform the “upgrade” operation after installation and configuration, unless the Crypto Officer is upgrading the Brick to a newer FIPS 140-2 validated version.
3.2.3 Configuring the Brick Serial Port

If you intend to use the Brick serial port to access the command line interface, go to the Options tab and click the Enable Serial Port checkbox, and enter a password twice, once in the Remote Password field and again in the Verify Password field. The password can be from 6 to 72 characters (letters and numbers). The password is case sensitive, so capitalization must be consistent. To access the command line interface, you can connect a terminal or a modem to the Brick serial port. Serial port parameters are 115,200 baud, no parity, 8 data bits and 1 stop bit.

3.3 IPsec Requirements and Cryptographic Algorithms

3.3.1 IPsec/IKE Requirements

The Crypto Officer must select from the following settings during Brick configuration to configure it to operate in FIPS mode.

Client tunnels allow the use of following approved and allowed cryptographic functions:

- **IKE**
  - User authentication methods allowed: either pre-shared keys or certificates (DSA with SHA-1)
  - Phase 1 Main Mode and Aggressive Mode key establishment: Diffie-Hellman Group 2, Group 5, or Group 14
  - Phase 2 Quick Mode MAC: HMAC-SHA-1
  - Phase 2 Quick Mode symmetric key generation: AES CBC 128/192/256-bit or TDES CBC 168-bit

- **IPsec - AH**
  - MAC: HMAC-SHA-1

- **IPsec - ESP**
  - MAC, if configured: HMAC-SHA-1
  - Symmetric key encryption: AES CBC 128/192/256-bit or TDES CBC 168-bit

LAN-LAN tunnels allow the use of following approved and allowed cryptographic functions:

- **IKE**
  - User authentication methods allowed: either pre-shared keys or certificates
  - Phase 1 Main Mode and Aggressive Mode key establishment: Diffie-Hellman Group 2, Group 5, or Group 14
  - Phase 2 Quick Mode MAC: HMAC-SHA-1
  - Phase 2 Quick Mode symmetric key generation: AES CBC 128/192/256-bit or TDES CBC 168-bit

- **IPsec - AH**
  - MAC: HMAC-SHA-1

- **IPsec - ESP**
  - MAC, if configured: HMAC-SHA-1
  - Symmetric key encryption: AES CBC 128/192/256-bit or TDES CBC 168-bit

LAN-LAN tunnels also allow the use of following approved and allowed cryptographic functions using manual key entry (ESP symmetric keys are entered into the LSMS then loaded onto each Brick by LSMS):

- **IPsec - AH**
  - MAC: HMAC-SHA-1

- **IPsec - ESP**
  - MAC, if configured: HMAC-SHA-1
  - Symmetric key encryption: AES CBC 128/192/256-bit or TDES CBC 168-bit
3.3.2 External CA Requirements

The Brick relies on an external CA to provide certificates for use with IPsec tunnels operating in the approved encrypting modes when certificate-based IKE authentication is used. These certificates are called VPN certificates. Each Brick can be configured with its own VPN certificate. Only Brick VPN certificates that use DSA with SHA-1 are supported for IKE certificate-based authentication when the Brick is operating in FIPS mode. The Brick provides built-in support for Entrust and VeriSign CAs. For more information about supported CAs see Section 10 of Lucent Security Management Server Policy Guide. LSMS generates new Brick VPN key pairs and corresponding certificate requests and sends them to external CAs. Instructions to generate a new Brick VPN key pair and certificate request can be found in Section 10 of Lucent Security Management Server Policy Guide. Notice that the sizes for DSA scheme used must be at least 1024 bits. Instructions to import a VPN certificate (and issuing CA certificate, and CRLs) into LSMS and assign the imported VPN certificate to the Brick and then load it on the Brick can be found in Section 10 of Lucent Security Management Server Policy Guide.

3.3.3 Configuring LAN-LAN Tunnels

Instructions to configure two Bricks such that they are operating in a LAN-LAN configuration can be found in Section 11 of Lucent Security Management Server Policy Guide. The Policy Guide document explains how to set up a LAN-LAN tunnel between two devices so that hosts behind both devices will be able to communicate securely with one another over a public network such as the Internet. Step-by-step instructions to set up a LAN-LAN tunnel in LSMS can be found in “How to Set Up a LAN-LAN Tunnel” in Section 10 of Lucent Security Management Server Policy Guide.

3.3.4 Configuring Client Tunnels

The Brick supports IKE v1 and v2 and IPsec v1 and v2 client tunnels (IPsec connections between client users and the Brick) that operate in approved encrypting modes. The Brick supports pre-shared key and certificate-based user authentication in approved encrypting modes, according to configuration. The Brick supports username and password, RADIUS, and SecurID second factor authentication mechanisms as well, according to configuration. Instructions to configure a Brick such that it can be used to establish client tunnels can be found in Section 12 of Lucent Security Management Server Policy Guide. The Policy Guide document explains how to set up a client tunnel endpoint so that users of the Lucent IPsec Client application (or a compatible IPsec client application) can establish a tunnel between their hosts and a Brick. If certificates are used for authentication for client tunnels, they must be obtained before the Brick can be configured to support client tunnels that use certificate-based authentication. Creating client tunnels using LSMS includes creating a certificate-based authentication service, creating a client tunnel (which includes configuring IPsec services such that they operate in an approved encrypting mode), and then creating client tunnel users. Note that when a non-Entrust CA is used as the external CA, client tunnel users must be configured to use the LSMS local password service.

3.4 Zeroizing Keys and CSPs

CSPs stored in the flash can be zeroized by initializing the flash. CSPs in all Brick models are zeroized using the same procedures. Zeroization consists of connecting to the Brick using a serial terminal and issuing an “initialize flash” command. Use the following instructions to zeroize CSPs:

1. Power up the Brick.

---

6 Minimally CA certificates in addition to basic constraints indicating the certificate is for a CA, and subject and authority key identifiers, must include digital signature, non-repudiation, key encipherment, data encipherment, certificate sign, and CRL sign extensions
2. Connect to the Brick’s serial port. Log in using the Brick general command “login” as described in section 13 of the Tools and Troubleshooting Guide.
3. Disconnect all Ethernet cables from the Brick.
4. Wait until the console displays the error message “EUA Connection to Brick IP address here lost”.
5. Enter the following Brick command: “initialize flash” and then press the <return> key.
6. Enter “y” then press the <return> key when prompted “This will cause the Brick to return to factory state. Proceed (y/n)”.
7. Enter “y” then press the <return> key when prompted “Brick will initialize flash and reboot immediately. Are you sure? (y/n)”.
8. Verify that the console displays the message “Initializing flash, Please wait…”.
9. After the “initialize flash” command completes, the Brick will automatically reboot. After the Brick reboots, verify that the console displays the message “date/time stamp – This Brick is in factory-ship state. Bootstrap the Brick”.

3.5 Identifying the Error State

The error messages are sent to the console interface. The console interface in Brick 50 is defined as the serial port. Other status output interfaces in general are not used to indicate FIPS-related status information.

3.6 Maintaining Physical Security

See Section 2.6 of this document for locations of tamper-evident labels. The operator shall examine the enclosure regularly and see if there are signs of tamper attempts. If damage to tamper-evident labels is found, then the device is not considered operating in the FIPS mode of operation. The device must be returned to factory for service before it can operate in the FIPS mode of operation again.

3.7 Determining the FIPS Mode of Operation

If and only if the device has been configured according to the instructions in Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 of this document, it is operating in the FIPS mode of operation.
4 Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Alternating Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>Advanced Encryption Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH</td>
<td>Authentication Header</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Address Resolution Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Certification Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Cipher Block Chaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLI</td>
<td>Command Line Interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMVP</td>
<td>Cryptographic Module Validation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Cyclic Redundancy Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRL</td>
<td>Certificate Revocation List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Critical Security Parameter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPU</td>
<td>Central Processing Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Direct Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>Digital Signature Algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMC</td>
<td>Electromagnetic Compatibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMI</td>
<td>Electromagnetic Interference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>Encapsulating Security Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>Digital Encryption Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPS</td>
<td>Federal Information Processing Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBIC</td>
<td>Gigabit Interface Converter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUI</td>
<td>Graphical User Interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>Hard Drive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC</td>
<td>Hashed Message Authentication Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>High Speed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKE</td>
<td>Internet Key Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Internet Protocol</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPSec</td>
<td>IP Security</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAT</td>
<td>Known Answer Tests</td>
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<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Light Emitting Diodes</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSMS</td>
<td>Lucent Security Management Server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Media Access Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIST</td>
<td>National Institute of Standards and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Operating System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKCS</td>
<td>Public Key Cryptography Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Public Key Infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRNG</td>
<td>Pseudo Random Number Generator</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAM</td>
<td>Random Access Memory</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNG</td>
<td>Random Number Generator</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Rivest Shamir and Adleman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Security Association</td>
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<td>SFP</td>
<td>Small Form-factor Pluggable</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>Secure Hash Algorithm</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDES</td>
<td>Triple Digital Encryption Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLS</td>
<td>Transport Layer Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USB</td>
<td>Universal Serial Bus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VLAN</td>
<td>Virtual Local Area Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPN</td>
<td>Virtual Private Network</td>
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