

# FIPS 202 and Keccak-Derived Functions

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<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf>

[http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/secure\\_hashing.html](http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/secure_hashing.html)

# FIPS 202 is Out!

- We ran a competition for a new *cryptographic hash function* from 2007-2012.
  - 63 submissions from all over the globe.
  - Winner was ***Keccak*** from a Belgian/Italian team.
- After extensive discussions with designers and lots of interaction with community, standardized it
- FIPS 202 out earlier this year.

# The Swiss Army Knife of Crypto

- Hash functions are used \*everywhere\* in crypto, even in places where they're not really appropriate.
- **Digital signatures** (code signing)
- **Message authentication** codes (HMAC)
- **Key derivation** and key agreement schemes (TLS KDF)
- **Proof of knowledge** and timestamping (digital timestamps)
- **Proof of work** and consistency (Bitcoin)
- **Cryptographic pseudorandom bit generation** (HMAC-DRBG)

# So, What's in FIPS 202?

- SHA3 functions: fixed-length hash functions just like SHA2
  - **SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512**
  - Number after hyphen is length of output
  - "Drop-in replacements" for SHA2
- Shake functions: extendable-output functions
  - **Shake128, Shake256**
  - Number is security level
- All based on *Keccak* algorithm that won competition

# What's Next?

- Keccak has a bunch of nice features that allow new functions to be derived from it
- In the pipeline now: (more on the way later)
- **KMAC**: keyed hash construction, like HMAC, but more efficient and with variable-length output.
- **Fast Parallel Hash**: takes advantage of parallelism to get faster, without losing security.
- **TupleHash**: hashes a sequence of strings together in a sensible way.

# New Features

- **Domain-separated:** You can't compute KMAC from SHA3 or Shake
- **Customization string:** You can "name" an instance of any function to domain-separate it from all other uses of SHA3-derived functions
- **Variable output length:** specify any output length-- get a byte string of whatever length you ask for

# KMAC = Keyed Hashing

## **KMAC128(K,X,96)**

- Three security levels: KMAC128, KMAC256, KMAC512
- Variable-length output
- Different output lengths give unrelated outputs
- Domain-separated and customizable

# TupleHash = Hashing a List of Strings

**TupleHash([s1, s2, s3], 192)**

- Always 256-bit security level
- Any or all strings may be empty, but list may not be empty
- Variable length
- Different lengths give unrelated outputs
- Domain-separated and customizable

# Fast Parallel Hash


## Hash big messages in parallel

**FPH128(message, blocksize, output\_length)**

- Two security levels: FPH128 and FPH256
- Variable length output, different output lengths give unrelated outputs
- Domain separated and customizable

*There's also a SHA2-derived version which works very differently, and has different properties. I'm not talking about it here.*

# Fast Parallel Hash



- Break long message into blocks
  - Blocksize in bytes, between  $2^8$  and  $2^{40}$ .
- Hash each block and store result
- Finally hash all the results together sequentially

# Wrapup

- Keccak has a bunch of nice features built in and provided by designers.
- We plan to make use of them in our Keccak-derived standards
  - **KMAC**
  - **TupleHash**
  - **FPH**
- All with **customization strings** and **variable-length output**
- We hope to have the first of these out for public comment soon!

# Bonus Slides for Questions

# Domain Separated

- This means you can't compute KMAC by calling SHAKE or SHA3 or TupleHash or FPH
  - NOTE: Very different from how HMAC works!
- Outputs of different functions ***completely unrelated***
- This should make it a little harder to shoot yourself in the foot with these functions

# Customization Strings

**This is domain separation controlled by the user**

- $\text{KMAC}[\text{"KDF"}](K, X)$

***is completely unrelated to***

- $\text{KMAC}[\text{"Message Block"}](K', X')$

*Like strong typing for uses of a hash function*


# Customization Strings

- All new Keccak-derived functions will support "customization strings" to let users further domain-separate them
- We plan to introduce a new SP to allow customization strings for Shakes and SHA3, too


# Variable Length

- The Shakes are variable length, but different output lengths give related outputs.
- $\text{Shake128}(X, 96) = \mathbf{ABC}$
- $\text{Shake128}(X, 128) = \mathbf{ABCD}$
- KMAC, TupleHash, and FPH are variable length, and different output lengths give unrelated outputs
- $\text{KMAC128}(K, X, 96) = \mathbf{EFG}$
- $\text{KMAC128}(K, X, 128) = \mathbf{HIJK}$
- This is easier to use--harder for a designer to shoot himself in the foot

# Keccak looks nothing like MD4



# No More MD: Keccak is a Sponge



- ▶ Security based on fixed-length permutation  $f$
- ▶  $r$  bits of message XORed into state at a time
- ▶  $c$  bits left untouched
- ▶ Can generate arbitrary number of output bits

# Hash Function = "digital fingerprint" of a message

- **Collision-resistance:** It should be very hard to find  $X, Y$  so that


$$\text{hash}(X) = \text{hash}(Y)$$

- **Preimage-resistance:** Given some target  $T$ , it should be even harder to find an  $X$  so that

$$\text{hash}(X) = T$$


- **Pseudorandomness:** If you don't know all the bits of  $X$ ,  $\text{hash}(X)$  should look very random to you.

# Capacity and Security



- ▶ A sponge has collision and preimage resistance of  $c/2$  bits.
- ▶ Finding a collision or preimage is equally hard

# Security/Performance Tradeoff



- ▶ Bigger  $c \rightarrow$  smaller  $r \rightarrow$  slower hashing
- ▶ The choice of  $c$  is a tunable parameter in Keccak
- ▶ Allows a security/performance tradeoff
- ▶ Security level is  $c/2$ .