

Certificates in the Internet: State, Issues, and Futures

Andrew Nash
Director, PKI Technologies and Standards
RSA Security, Inc.

Presentation Scope

- **Understand status and directions of Internet certificate usage, from standards perspective**
 - Certification infrastructure work
 - Application usage topics
 - Identify questions under discussion
 - What's coming next?


Where Does Internet Certificate Standards Work Stand?

- **PKIX X.509 certificate profile and core protocols defined and largely stable**
- **Reference implementations distributed, interoperability testing performed**
- **Major applications adopting PKIX results**
- **Infrastructures and products being deployed**
- **Current PKI work emphasizing**
 - **enhancements**
 - **additional services**
 - **application integration**

IETF-PKIX Proposed Standards

- 1999 was a very busy year...
- Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile (RFC 2459, January)
- Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols (RFC 2510, March)
- Internet X.509 Certificate Request Message Format (RFC 2511, March)
- Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols - LDAPv2 (RFC 2559, April)
- Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP (RFC 2585, May)
- Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure LDAPv2 Schema (RFC 2587, June)
- X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP (RFC 2560, June)

Where the PKIX RFCs Fit



Recent Active Topics

- **Certificate Profile Issues**
- **Management Protocol Alternatives (CMP, CMC)**
- **Validation Protocol Alternatives (OCSP, DCS, SCVP, OCSP-X)**
- **Attribute Certificates**
- **Qualified Certificates**
- **Timestamping and Data Certification**
- **Application Integration (S/MIME, IPsec, LDAP)**

Profiling X.509 for Internet use: Some Aspects

- **Naming**
 - subjectAltNames containing Internet-form names
 - name constraint processing admits DNs, subjectAltNames, or both
- **authorityInfoAccess extension**
 - enables reference to named objects providing CA information and services, accessible via specified methods
 - enables linkage to non-CRL revocation data

Algorithm Usage

- **RFC-2459 profiles certificate signatures:**
 - for hash algorithm, SHA-1 recommended, MD5 and MD2 also recognized
 - for signatures, RSA or DSA
- **RFC-2459 profiles certificates' subjectPublicKeys:**
 - RSA
 - Diffie-Hellman
 - DSA
- **RFC-2459 does not mandate use of the profiled choices, and allows other algorithms; additional profiling applied in per-application documents**

Certificate Management

- **CMP (RFC-2510)**

- Workshops have verified cross-vendor interoperability
- Some implementors' agreements were needed and discussed
- Can layer over TCP, SMTP, HTTP
- Incorporates CRMF formats

- **CMC**

- “Certificate Management Messages over CMS” draft proposes alternative approach, layered on S/MIME work
- Has passed PKIX WG Last-Call
- Can carry CRMF, also supports PKCS#10 registration

Validation Approaches

- **Standards-track PKIX approaches:**
 - **CRLs:** “traditional” PKI revocation checking method
 - **OCSP:** on-line query for revocation status
- **Other working proposals providing on-line validation: DCS, SCVP, OCSP-X**
- **Issue: what validation elements to delegate from client to a central service?**
- **Issue: Which will work best in large operational environments?**

More on CRLs

- **Full CRLs may grow large, incurring costs to propagate information where it's not needed**
- **Many facilities defined and discussed, usage models evolving**
 - **Delta CRLs: changes rather than full CRL; less transferred data, more processing complexity**
 - **CRL Distribution Points: certificate identifies its corresponding DP**
 - **CRL Scopes: CRL identifies the certificates it covers**
- **Revocation responsiveness limited (e.g., days)**

More on on-line validation

- **OCSP provides on-line status query service**
 - responder may be backed by CRLs or CA's repository, so MAY have faster responsiveness than CRLs
 - CA delegates authority to OCSP responder, which returns signed responses to queries
 - Core scope constrained to revocation status, but response extension facility available
- **DCS, SCVP, and OCSP-X propose different sets of broader server-provided functionality, such as**
 - path construction
 - path validation
 - data certification

Non-Repudiation

- Intent is to distinguish transactions (and accompanying certificates) with long-term accountability
- Legal frameworks are emerging
- PKI provides technical facilities supporting a broader service beyond the scope of PKIX standards
- Semantics, and relation between NR and other usage indicator bits within certificates, are contentious
 - PKIX profile allows NR bit to coexist with other key usage bits; not all X.509 profiles agree
- Qualified certificates, time stamping, data certification work items contribute to enhanced non-repudiation support

Qualified Certificates

- **PKIX Qualified Certificates (QC) draft's goal is a further profile of X.509 certificates for personal authentication of human users**
 - suitable for high assurance
 - suitable for legal recognition (e.g., EU directive)
- **Naming attributes constrained for unmistakable identification of an individual; pseudonyms being incorporated**
- **User's QC could be placed on smart card; strong desire to serve multiple consuming applications**

Timestamping

- **PKIX draft document specifies Timestamp Authority (TSA) service**
- **Systems requesting timestamps hash data objects, pass the hashes to TSA**
- **TSA uses reserved key to sign timestamps; corresponding certificate contains extendedKeyUsage identifying as TSA**
- **Patent issues are an identified concern for draft advancement**

Data Certification

- **PKIX draft document defines Data Validation and Certification Server (DVCS), offering choice of services**
 - Certification of claim of possession of data (hash of actual data presented); comparable to TSA service
 - Certification of possession of data (actual data presented)
 - Validation of digitally signed document
 - Validation of public-key certificates
- **Returned validation certificate contains timestamped results**

Attribute Certificates

- **ISO Certificate Extensions (F)PDAM has extensive discussion of Attribute Certificates (ACs)**
- **Current activity in PKIX, with Internet AttributeCertificate Profile for Authorization draft**
- **ACs linked to associated PKCs, chained to delegate access rights**
- **Usage will require integration into consumer protocols; accommodated for S/MIME, drafted for TLS**

Non-X.509 Certification Activities

- **Simple Public-Key Infrastructure (SPKI)**
 - SPKI Requirements, RFC-2692 (Experimental)
 - SPKI Certificate Theory, RFC-2693 (Experimental)
 - Uses S-expression syntax
 - Avoids global naming, emphasizes certified authorization
- **OpenPGP (OPGP) Message Format**
 - RFC-2440 (Proposed Standard)
 - Certification and cross-certification performed by users, not CAs
 - Key servers provide repositories to publish keys

PKIX Adoption by Applications

- **PKIX-specified facilities are being profiled for operational use in applications, satisfying needs of those applications and their environments**
- **Tradeoff: application-tailored attributes and extensions vs. common, multi-use certificates**
- **Tradeoff: profiling by protocol vs. profiling by operational environment**

Certificates in LDAP Directories

- **X.509's certificate-based authentication was originally defined for directory access purposes**
- **Today, LDAP provides a primary access method for PKI-related data within directories**
 - **PKIX-specified attributes and object classes represent basic security objects within schema**
 - **CAs provide certificates and CRLs for storage into attributes**
 - **Certificate users apply LDAP search and read operations to obtain needed objects**

Certificate Usage: SSL/TLS

- **Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) widely used; Transport Layer Security (TLS) its standards-track successor**
- **Broad use of SSL server-side certificates**
 - enables useful “secured pipe” from client to server, encapsulating HTTP and other protocols
 - number of certified entities is constrained
- **Currently narrower usage of client-side certificates, client authentication**
 - increased demand for client certification a driver for infrastructure growth

Certificate Usage: IPsec

- **Core Internet Key Exchange (IKE) authentication modes are certificate-based**
- **PKIX Profile for IKE draft exists:**
 - assumes certificate for device, not necessarily for user
 - extendedKeyUsage element designates IKE entities
 - some naming refinements, divergences from PKIX
 - does not mandate particular certificate enrollment mechanism
- **Vendor interoperability workshops testing with certificates**
- **Some concerns about extending PKI to endpoints; interest in hybridizing with other authentication techniques**

Certificate Usage: S/MIME

- **S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling (RFC-2632) specifies additional procedures beyond PKIX**
 - practices for sending and processing transmitted certificate sets and CRLs
 - support for E-mail address forms, usage of other extensions
- **S/MIME Certificate Distribution Specification draft concerns publication in directories**
- **Special concerns include off-line determination of recipients' capabilities (e.g., supported algorithms)**

Internet Certificates: Next Standardization Steps

- **PKIX Certificate Profile to Draft Standard, other documents to follow**
- **Progression and convergence on**
 - management protocol alternatives
 - certificate validation alternatives
 - time stamping and data certification
 - qualified certificates
 - attribute certificates

Internet Certificates: Next Usage Steps

- **Lessons to learn as more applications integrate certificates**
 - Usage models and profile elements will be validated or refined
- **Lessons to learn as infrastructures scale to support more users**
 - Operational experience will inform choices on certificate validation
- **Broadening usage towards non-repudiation and authorization support**