Formal Methods in Cryptography

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Presented at the NIST Crypto Reading Club, 2024-April-17 (virtual)

Outline

1. What are Formal Methods?

2. Tools in Formal Methods

3. Use in Cryptography

Is the Code you Wrote Correct?

Whenever we program something, how can we be sure what it returns is correct? Can we always trust that every programmer everywhere has done their due diligence and written bug-free code?

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Of course not!

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There were 6 incidents from 1985 to 1987 in which patients were exposed to extremely high levels of radiation, and ended up dying as a result or were severely injured. A commission found *several* issues with the construction of the Therac-25, some of which we list on the next slide.

Problems with the Therac-25

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2. Several error messages merely displayed the word"MALFUNCTION" followed by a number from 1 to 64. The user manual did not explain or even address the error codes, nor give any indication that these errors could pose a threat to patient safety.
3. The software set a flag variable by incrementing it, rather than by setting it to a fixed non-zero value. Occasionally an arithmetic overflow occurred, causing the flag to return to zero and the software to bypass safety checks.

How to Avoid Bugs in the First Place

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P	Q	$P \implies Q$
$\top$	$\top$	$\top$
$\top$	$\bot$	$\bot$
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We discuss what these are and examples of them next.

Interactive Theorem Provers

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Some examples of interactive theorem provers include Coq, Lean, Agda, and Isabelle. Some of these ITPs differ significantly in the logic they employ. For example, Isabelle employs higher-order logic, and Coq is built on the Calculus of Inductive Constructions, which is a higher-order typed lambda calculus.

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Within Isabelle, the Law of Excluded Middle holds, but it does not within Coq–this creates a very different method for proofs.

Some Coq Code

A proof that is fairly easy (maybe not at first glance though!) in Coq is that given two types (which we can think of as sets), d and d', is that there is a bijection between $d \times d'$ and $d' \times d$.

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homSetIso.v

```
Require Import List.
Import ListNotations.
Require Import Permutation.
Require Import FunctionalExtensionality.

(*composition of morphisms between two elements of Set*)
Definition comp {A B C : Type}(g : B -> C)(f : A -> B): A -> C :=
  fun a => g(f a).

(*defining when two morphisms are inverse to one another*)
Definition inv {X Y: Type}(f: X-> Y)(g: Y -> X) : Prop :=
  comp f g = id /\ comp g f = id.

(*defining when two types are isomorphic, want to use this in Set*)
Definition iso (X Y : Type) : Prop :=
  exists (f: X-> Y)(g:Y->X), inv f g.

(*the objects X *Y and Y*X are isomorphic in Set*)
Lemma isoSymProd : forall (d d' : Set),
  iso (d *d') (d' *d).
Proof.
  intros. unfold iso.
  exists (fun x : d *d' => (snd x, fst x)).
  exists (fun y : d' *d => (snd y, fst y)).
  unfold inv. split.
  - unfold comp. simpl. apply functional_extensionality.
    intros. unfold id. symmetry. apply surjective_pairing.
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Qed.
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```
type vec (a:Type) : nat -> Type =
  | Nil : vec a 0
  | Cons : #n:nat -> hd:a -> tl:vec a n -> vec a (n + 1)
```

SMT Solvers

Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) is a the problem of determining whether or not a mathematical formula is satisfiable. The name comes from the fact that these formulas are interpreted within ("modulo") a certain formal theory in first-order logic with equality. Then SMT solvers aim to solve SMT for a practical subset of inputs.

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Examples of commonly used SMT solvers include Z3, CVC5, Yices, and Boolector. These are integrated into the next tool we will talk about.

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A very common pair of tools used in the cryptographic community is Cryptol and the Software Analysis Workbench (SAW). Cryptol and SAW really rely on SMT solvers to do the heavy lifting, but provide a clear space to work in: Cryptol is a domain-specific language to write clear cryptographic specifications and SAW can take these specifications to produce proofs that an implementation is correct.

Multiplication in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{12}}$ in C for mceliece38864

An example of code we might want to verify is correct is the C code for multiplication in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{12}}$ (represented as the quotient ring $\mathbb{F}_2[z]/(z^{12} + z^3 + 1)$) for mceliece38864 in the NIST reference implementation. This code is us everywhere in mceliece38864, and correctness of multiplication in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{12}}$ is essential to correctness of the algorithm.

Multiplication in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{12}}$ in C for mceliece38864

```c
gf gf_mul(gf in0, gf in1)
{
    int i;

    uint32_t tmp;
    uint32_t t0;
    uint32_t t1;
    uint32_t t;

    t0 = in0;
    t1 = in1;

    tmp = t0 * (t1 & 1);

    for (i = 1; i < GFBITS; i++)
        tmp ^= (t0 * (t1 & (1 << i)));

    t = tmp & 0x7FC000;
    tmp ^= t >> 9;
    tmp ^= t >> 12;

    t = tmp & 0x3000;
    tmp ^= t >> 9;
    tmp ^= t >> 12;

    return tmp & ((1 << GFBITS)-1);
}
```

Protocol Analyzers

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Examples of these tools include Tamarin and Verifpal. An example of a protocol these tools can verify is the following message that was exchanged using Diffie-Hellman.

Protocol Analyzers



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1. Providing a formal proof that an implementation of a cryptographic algorithm is correct
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3. Translating mathematics into the language of an interactive theorem prover to provide a formal proof it is correct

We look at some examples of these.

Correctness of an implementation

We saw how multiplication in the field $\mathbb{F}_{2^{12}}$ was implemented in C for mceliece38864, and multiplication in this field is used everywhere within this algorithm, so how sure are we it's correct? Cryptol and SAW!

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```
gf_mul : gf_t -> gf_t -> gf_t
gf_mul in0 in1 = (drop tmp'') && GFMASK
  where
    t0 = zext in0 : [32]
    t1 = zext in1 : [32]
    zs = [zero] # [z ^ (t0 * (t1 && (1 << i))) | z <- zs | i <- [0 .. <GFBITS_t]]
    tmp = last zs
    t = tmp && (zext 0x7FC000)
    tmp' = ((tmp ^ (t >> 9)) ^ (t >> 12))
    t' = tmp' && (zext 0x3000)
    tmp'' = ((tmp' ^ (t' >> 9)) ^ (t' >> 12))
```

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How do we verify the implementation in C is correct? That's where we use the lower level Cryptol code! We use the C code, the low-level Cryptol code, and use SAW to produce a proof artifact that the implementation is correct.

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Simple Protocol

```
attacker[active]
principal Alice[
  generates a
  ga = G^a
]
Alice → Bob: ga
principal Bob[
  knows private m1
  generates b
  gb = G^b
  ss_a = ga^b
  e1 = AEAD_ENC(ss_a, m1, gb)
]
Bob → Alice: gb, e1
principal Alice[
  ss_b = gb^a
  e1_dec = AEAD_DEC(ss_b, e1, gb)?
]
```

Correctness of a Protocol

In the last line, we are asking Verifpal if everything goes as planned when we decrypt our encrypted message with the correct parameters. Verifpal can also tell us when protocols will be susceptibile to things like a man-in-the-middle attack.

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There is also projects where people have translated the informally written mathematics of cryptographic algorithms, such as CRYSTALS-Kyber, into an ITP, such as Isabelle.

Are Formal Methods Used in Cryptographic Algorithm Development?

The short answer to this is no, at least publicly. There have been some attempts by the NTRU Prime and the Classic McEliece teams to either make their specifications and implementations more amenable to formal verification, but there is no large scale effort in cryptography to include formal methods, or even consider its use after development.

The End



Thank you!