

Secure and Efficient Masking of Lightweight Ciphers in Software and Hardware (with Application to the Spook AEAD) —Lightweight Cryptography Workshop 2020—

Olivier Brochain, Gaëtan Cassiers, François-Xavier Standaert

ICTEAM/ELEN/Crypto Group, UCL, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

Security against side-channel attacks has been explicitly mentioned by the NIST as a target in the ongoing standardization process for lightweight cryptography. Many candidates to the competition took this criteria into account by minimizing the number of non-linear operations (e.g., AND gates) in their algorithms, which is in general beneficial to the masking countermeasure.

In this talk, we will discuss:

- The gains that lightweight ciphers can offer over the AES for masking,
- The various challenges that the secure implementation of masking raises in software and in hardware, and tracks to solve them efficiently.

For this purpose, we will leverage state-of-the-art results from the masking literature [1, 2] and illustrate them thanks to the side-channel cryptanalysis challenge against masked Spook implementations that is (resp., was) running for CHES 2021 (resp., 2020). See <https://ctf.spook.dev/> for the details.

We will conclude by discussing the extent to which similar conclusions hold for other lightweight ciphers with similar non-linear complexity, and suggesting directions for a fair evaluation and comparison of masked implementations.

References

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2. Gaëtan Cassiers, Benjamin Grégoire, Itamar Levi, and François-Xavier Standaert. Hardware private circuits: From trivial composition to full verification. *IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.*, 2020:185, 2020.