Brief: On the need for threshold post-quantum (signature) schemes

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Threshold signatures

- Cryptocurrencies
- Server-assisted signature schemes
  - The reason of my interest in this area: SplitKey® digital signature product of Cybernetica
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- Cryptocurrencies
- Server-assisted signature schemes
  - The reason of my interest in this area: SplitKey® digital signature product of Cybernetica
- In order to give standardized signatures, you can only use RSA or ECDSA
- When a sufficiently powerful quantum computer will be built, RSA and ECDSA will become weak, but the application scenarios requiring threshold signatures will still be there.
Two parallel standardization processes

- Threshold Schemes for Cryptographic Primitives (NISTIR 8214A)
- Post-Quantum Cryptography (NISTIR 8309)
Two parallel standardization processes

- Threshold Schemes for Cryptographic Primitives (NISTIR 8214A)
- Post-Quantum Cryptography (NISTIR 8309)
- Unfortunately, they do not overlap.
- NISTIR 8214A: "Although interesting, these cases are not considered in scope here for standardization, since the proposed conventional non-threshold primitives are still under security evaluation."
PQ schemes thresholdize poorly

- Daniele Cozzo and Nigel P. Smart. "Sharing the LUOV: threshold post-quantum signatures." has mostly discouraging results.
- The same authors have also studied CSI-FiSh signature scheme that shows some promise, but currently only has a version with a specific short key length.
The need for threshold post-quantum schemes

- Classical asymmetric threshold schemes are not quantum-resistant.
- Thresholdizability is a property that rarely appears magically for the schemes that were not explicitly developed with this requirement in mind.
- RSA and Schnorr schemes appear to be rare exceptions.
- Thus we need a special effort to get schemes that would be quantum-resistant and have efficient threshold versions.
Thank you!

- For ideas, suggestions and discussions on threshold post-quantum (signature) schemes, contact jan.willemsen@cyber.ee.