# FIPS 201 Update:

Federation, PIV, and Derived PIV

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
#### What is federation?

A process that allows the conveyance of identity and authentication information across a set of networked systems.

- NIST SP 800-63-3 Appendix A




# Federation protocols




## Federation agreements

- How does the RP trust the IdP?
- How does the IdP trust the RP?
- How does the user trust any of this?
- Who gets in trouble when something goes wrong?


# Point to point connection



# **Federation Authority**



# Is it just like authentication?




## Not the same process


- In Authentication
  - Subscriber presents authenticators to the RP
- In Federation:
  - Subscriber presents authenticators to the IdP
  - IdP provides identity assertion to the RP




### Authenticators are here



### Authenticators are NOT here



## Assertions are here



#### What is an assertion?

A statement from a IdP to an RP that contains information about a subscriber's authenticated state at the IdP. Assertions may also contain verified attributes about the subscriber.



#### What's in an assertion

#### **Authentication Event Information**

- Validity period of assertion
- Target of the assertion
- Issuer of the assertion
- Type of authenticator(s)
- Time of authentication
- Key references

#### **Subscriber Information**

- Identifier
- Proofing level
- Name
- Email
- Profile
- Roles and rights

Cryptographic protection



## What's in an assertion (minimal edition)

#### **Authentication Event Information**

- Validity period of assertion
- Target of the assertion
- Issuer of the assertion

#### **Subscriber Information**

Identifier

Cryptographic protection



# Why does this matter?

Technology	SP 800-63-2	SP-800-63-3
Browser cookies	Assertion	
X.509 certificate	Assertion?	
Kerberos ticket	Assertion	
SAML	Assertion	
OIDC ID Token	Assertion (Probably)	



# Why does this matter?

Technology	SP 800-63-2	SP-800-63-3	
Browser cookies	Assertion	Session management	
X.509 certificate	Assertion?	Authenticator	
Kerberos ticket	Assertion	"Not truly federation"	
SAML	Assertion	Assertion	
OIDC ID Token	Assertion (Probably)	Assertion	




#### In other words:

Derived PIV (and other PKI) used to be considered "federation" but it now falls under the "authenticator" umbrella.

But you can federate with PIV through a federation protocol.



## Federation with PIV




# Why federate?


- Abstraction layer
- Attribute disclosure
- Timeliness
- Cross-boundary
- RP Control




# Abstraction layer across authenticators




### Selective attribute disclosure




## Time-bound




## Can cross boundaries




# Can work internally



# RP maps subscriber to local user




#### RP controls session and re-authentication




## Federation in parallel with authenticators


- Different classes of users
  - Eg., External vs. internal
- Combine authenticators for users
- Bind external accounts









Shared secret authenticator



(Deprecated 2<sup>nd</sup> factor out of band authenticator over SMS sshhh....)

Hardware based cryptographic authenticator smartcard





Federation (mostly SAML)

#### **Assurance Levels**

- IAL: How strongly someone is proofed for an account
- AAL: How trustworthy the authentication event is
- FAL: How strongly an assertion is conveyed between federated systems using a federated protocol

#### **FAL Considerations**

- Aspects of the federation protocol
  - Protection of the assertion
  - Protection of subscriber attributes
- Requirements change based on how assertions are presented
- Does not account for federation agreement



# Federation Assurance Level (FAL)

	FAL1	FAL2	FAL3
Assertion type	Signed	Signed & Encrypted	Signed, Encrypted, & Holder-of-Key
Subscriber attributes	Yes (if backchannel)	Yes	Yes
Examples	OIDC SAML artifact binding	OIDC with encrypted ID token SAML with encrypted assertion	OIDC or SAML plus secondary key- based authenticator (certificate, FIDO, etc)



#### Which FAL?

#### FAL1 is good for most use cases

- Requires signatures, audience restriction, replay protection, etc.
- Especially when subscriber attributes are sent in the backchannel, separate from the assertion
- FAL2 increases audience restriction
  - At the cost of key management
- FAL3 is forward-looking
  - Multiple keys and presentations
  - Hard to reach (by design)

## Interoperability

- In the past: interoperable authenticators
- Now: interoperable federation profiles



## Using federation protocols

- OpenID Connect (OIDC)
  - Supports browser and mobile
  - iGov profile from OIDF
- Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
  - Profile available for browsers
  - eGov profile from Kantara

#### iGov

- OpenID Foundation draft standard
- Increase security and interoperability of OIDC
- Require all clients to have and use keys
- Restrict less secure options (implicit flow, URL matching)
- Require discovery and registration support



#### eGov

- Kantara Initiative profile
- Increase security and interoperability of SAML
- Require metadata for discovery
- Require signatures and verification



## Are you federating today?

- Which protocol and profile are you using?
  - As an IdP or an RP or both?
- What is the trust agreement?
- Do you comply with SP 800-63-3 C?
  - If so, at which FALs?

# Moving forward


What would a USG/FIPS-specific federation profile contain?




# Questions?




## Users are here



# **Dynamic Registration**



# **Identity Broker**



# One example of FAL3

