# cisco

### Entry-level Cyber Cyber Security Analyst Skill Development


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
### **Overview**

- Security Analyst Challenge
- Security Analyst skill Development
  - Competency areas
  - Facilitation of Knowledge
- Complex job of a Security Analyst
  - Tools used by Security Investigators
- Course development process
- Lab infrastructure
- Lessons Learned

### IAT Roles & Relationships



### **Security Analyst Challenge**



Perimeter security stops many threats but sophisticated Cyber threats evade existing security constructs

Fingerprints of threats are often found in network fabric


# **Security Analyst Skills**

- What Skills to Develop? Major areas of competency
  - Understanding security policy
  - Data & Traffic Analysis
  - Identifying Security Events -> How & when to alarm
  - Incident Response


#### Foundation/Background

- Network infrastructure knowledge
- Diverse device configuration ability
- Security configuration knowledge
- Data management & teamwork
- Challenge is Arming Security Investigators
  - Not tied to a product or solution
  - Complex knowledge Not one specific process is correct or product solution
  - Diverse set of skills are needed

### **Security Investigation Process**



# **Functional Model for Security Analyst**



# Example: SIEM tool identifying a Worm

	<ul> <li>Filter</li> <li>Domain :</li> <li>Time : February 1, 2012</li> <li>Host : 10.40.10.254</li> <li>Identification</li> <li>Alarms</li> <li>Security</li> <li>CI Events</li> <li>Top Active Flows</li> <li>Identity, DHCP &amp; Host Notes</li> <li>Exporter Interface</li> </ul>			
	Alarm Counts – 1 record Appliance	¢ Criti	cal 🗢	Major 🔽
IP Address	FlowCollector01 (10.192.0.192)			5(0) 🥱
Alarms - 21 records				
	Start Active Time 💙	Alarm 🗢	Source	Details 🗘
Alarm indicating this host touched another host which then began exhibiting the same suspicious behavior	Feb 1, 2012 8:39:30 PM (12 days 19 hours 27 minutes ago)	Worm Propagation	10.40.10.254	Worm propagated from Source Host using ms-rpc (135/(tcp) (Double-click for details)
	Feb 1, 2012 7:40:00 PM (12 days 20 hours 26 minutes ago)	New Flows Initiated	10.40.10.254	Observed 1.07k flows. Policy maximum allows up to 1k flows.
	Feb 1, 2012 7:39:30 PM (12 days 20 hours 27 minutes ago)	Worm Propagation	10.40.10.254	Worm propagated from Source Host using ms-rpc (135/tcp) (Double-click for details)
Suspicious activity that triggered the alarm	Feb 1, 2012 6:40:00 PM (12 days 21 hours 26 minutes ago)	New Flows Initiated	10.40.10.254	Observed 1.12k flows. Policy maximum allows up to 1k flows.
	Feb 1, 2012 6:39:30 PM (12 days 21 hours 27 minutes ago)	Worm Propagation	10.40.10.254	Worm propagated from Source Host using ms-rpc (135/tcp) (Double-click for details)
	Feb 1, 2012 5:40:00 PM (12 days 22 hours 26 minutes ago)	New Flows Initiated	10.40.10.254	Observed 1.04k flows. Policy maximum allows up to 1k flows.

### Goal – Train IAT & Security Analysts

- IAT Information Assurance Technicians
   Also known as Network & Security Analysts
   Assess the state of the network based on established policies
   Work in Network & Security Planning, Operations, Audit, and IRTs
- These are not entry level positions
   Requires base knowledge of network and computer operations
   Launching pad to many roles in IT
   IT need in .mil, .gov, & .com environments
- The Challenge of being a Vendor & Practitioner Cisco develops and sells routers, switches, & network equipment Cisco has well established IT, NOC, SOC, PSIRT, & CSIRT

### **Complex Threat Puzzle**



### Example of a Complex Threat Visibility Concept

### Leveraging Netflow to investigate a potential IT policy violation

Attack bypasses perimeter and traverses network



Netflow at the access layer provides greater granularity

ACTIVE FLOWS: 23,892

SRC/65.32.7.45 DST/171.54.9.2/US : HTTP DST/34.1.5.78/China : HTTPS DST/165.1.4.9/Uzbekistan : FTP DST/123.21.2.5/US : AIM DST/91.25.1.1/US : FACEBOOK Cisco Threat Context Grid – Automating Context Collection

SRC/65.32.7.45 DST/165.1.4.9/Uzbekistan : FTP

**Context:** User /ORG = Pat Smith, R&D Client = Dell XYZ100 DST = Poor Reputation

### The need for visibility could/should drive information sharing!

### Key Challenges: Complex Threat Visibility

#### • Breached but How, Where and Who?

Often very difficult to find High value assets – major consequences Network flow analysis is central to this process—throughout the network

### Context is Critical

No single system provides all data to decipher an attack Related threats, identity, reputation, vulnerability, device type...

### • Disparate Data Sources, Manual Assembly

Analysts collect and assemble contextual information from a variety of systems Requires expensive analysts—round-the-clock coverage

# What did Cisco Learn?

- Complex problem
- Sources of Data and Baseline
- Deep Packet Analysis needed
- Levels of Skill Associate vs. Professional
- Log Analysis with correlation
- Where on the network to Monitor? (Key)
- Operational Process tied into Monitoring
- Incident classifying



# What did Cisco Learn? - continued

- Investigating Security Incidents Structure, process, and tools
- Necessary tools

Packet analysis, SIEM, Flow Analysis

Collaboration & Teaming

Mix of COTS & Open Source

### Mentoring during the Learning process

- Using PCAP files with known complex threats
- Netflow outputs tied to investigations
- Historical threat signatures and packet payloads to develop individual capabilities



### Conclusion

- Security Analyst competency areas Key
- Skillset complexity (Where to Look)
- Course Development Process
- Labs Build skills with a mix of COTS and open source tools
- Lessons Learned





# **Questions/Discussion?**

Thank You

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