





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Assistant Head of
Information Security
(Policy)



Fall Forum 2017
Mitre, McLean VA
2017-08-29

Ian Bryant



**Trustworthy
Software
Foundation**

Standards
Development
Advisor

[UK/MOD/DAIS/Pol/2017/B/041]

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UK Ministry of Defence (MOD)

- As a National Defence organisation, MOD is perceived through 3 main “Lenses”:

- From the view of Government Department



- From the view of Military Organisation




- From the view of large acquisition and delivery organisation[†]




- All aspects of operation need to be tailored to best meet (sometimes divergent) requirements of these differing Lenses




Problem Space



Problem Solving



DAIS Policy Branch




CSO = Chief Security Officer
DAIS = Defence Assurance and Information Security
DCPP = Defence Cyber Protection Partnership
dSIRO = delegated Senior Information Risk Owner

DSIRO = Departmental Senior Information Risk Owner
DSR = Defence Security & Resilience
Pol = Policy Branch




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Stakeholders



Policy Reuse

- Wherever possible seek not to “re-invent the wheel”
- Monitor and/or seek external information / inspiration
- Need for Departmental Wrap[†] will vary from a simple link to an extensive re-interpretation

Policy

- Sources typically Cabinet Office or NATO

Advice & Guidance

- Sources to include NCSC, GDS, and Allies
- Includes Products and Services


Good Practice

- Wide variety of sources including SDOs and peer relationships

[†] Cabinet Office, Cyber and Government Security Directorate (CGSD) terminology



Partnering



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Context for Outputs

“Act in haste, repent at leisure”

The Old Batchelour

William Congreve (1693)

"Regulations made in haste or without sufficient assessment have a greater potential for adverse effects or unintended consequences"

Regulatory Policy in Perspective

OECD (2015)




Output Streams

Stakeholder Engagement	Nil	Limited	Comprehensive
Timescale			
Needed <1 week from Identification	Advice	x	x
Needed <3 months from Identification	x	Guidance	x
Can wait >3 months from Identification	x	x	Policy



Outputs



- JSP440 – Defence Manual of Security
- ISN – Industrial Security Notices
- DICyPN – Defence Info-Cyber Protection Notices
- DefStan 05-138 – Cyber Security for Defence Suppliers




Market Segmentation

Segment		Treatment	Approach
(No requirement)		TL0	✘
Mass Market / Implicit Need (M/I)	Mass Market / Explicit Need (M/E)	TL1 – Fundamental Practices	→ Commodity
		TL2 – Structured Practices	
	Niche Market / Explicit Need (N/E)	TL3 – Enhanced Practices	Custom
		TL4 – Specialist Practices	



Commodity Marketplace – 2 Views

- Trustworthiness of Organisations in the Supply Chain
 - Defence Cyber Protection Partnership (DCPP)
 - Cyber Security Model (CSM) defined in DefStan 05-138 at Very Low and Low Risk Profiles
 - Linked to Defence Assurance Risk Tool (DART)
- Trustworthiness of Products and Services arising from the Supply Chain
 - Working with BSI and Trustworthy Systems Foundation (TSFdn) to update BS PAS754:2014 (Trustworthy **Software**) to BS10754 series (Trustworthy **Systems**)
 - BS 10754 series will include Baseline Controls (aka TS Essentials)
 - Defence Info-Cyber Protection Advisory Group (DICyPAG) to review and endorse Assured OTS solutions with any necessary Departmental Wrap
 - Challenge area: how to review and endorse Non-Assured OTS solutions



Custom Marketplace – 2 Views

- Trustworthiness of Organisations in the Supply Chain
 - Defence Cyber Protection Partnership (DCPP)
 - Cyber Security Model (CSM) defined in DefStan 05-138 at **Medium** and **High** Risk Profiles, **supported by Accreditation**
 - Linked to Defence Assurance Risk Tool (DART)
- Trustworthiness of Products and Services arising from the Supply Chain
 - Working with BSI and Trustworthy Systems Foundation (TSFdn) to update BS PAS754:2014 (Trustworthy **Software**) to BS10754 series (Trustworthy **Systems**), **with Pathway in DART for custom Applications**
 - Based on BS 10754 series will include **Comprehensive** Controls
 - Defence Info-Cyber Protection Advisory Group (DICyPAG) to review and endorse Assured OTS solutions with any necessary Departmental Wrap
 - **DICyPAG working with wider Government (JSaRC, NCSC) to identify Gaps**



Non-Assured OTS – Possible Approach

- Looking at a formalised approach to monitoring and promulgating the trustworthiness – or lack thereof – of Commodity / Off The Shelf Products and Services
- Proof of Concept S3T (Surveillance Scheme for Solution Trustworthiness)
 - SCA = Supplier Capability Assessment
 - STA = Solution Trustworthiness Assessment
 - Resultant Risk Classes
 - White = Known Good
 - Grey = Not Known Bad
 - Black = Known Bad



Any Questions?

Any Questions ?



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