

# PIV Business Requirements Meeting: *Authenticators*

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# Status Quo

PIV standards/guidelines and guiding policies recognize two authenticators:

- ***PIV Cards***

- AAL3 (mostly)
- *PIV Usage Guides:*  
<https://piv.idmanagement.gov/>

- ***Derived PIV Credentials***

- Usually AAL2
- By policy, limited to mobile devices where use of PIV cards is impractical
- *NCCoE Derived PIV Practice Guide:*  
<https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/piv-credentials>



# Agency and Public Feedback

## Calls for greater flexibility in selection and use of authenticators

- Not all products and services can use PKI credentials natively
- Not all devices support PIV cards or have strong hardware/software/API support for PKI credentials
- Deployment of Derived PIV limited by the availability of commercial service providers

### **Draft OMB Identity Memo:**

*Update NIST SP 800-157, Guidelines for Derived PIV Credentials, to align with NIST SP 800-63 and develop a process to identify innovative technologies and authenticators (where applicable) that can leverage the PIV process for derived credentialing for logical and physical access;*

# Proposed Changes in FIPS 201-3

- Broadly allow alternative authenticators to be derived from PIV credentials
  - Specify requirements in new Special Publication
  - **AAL2** and **AAL3**, based on Digital Identity Risk Management
  - Rely on SP 800-63B as the basis for security requirements
  - Facilitate interoperability through federation, not authenticator standards



# Considerations/Issues

- Authenticator Assurance Levels
- Product Validation
- Interoperability
- Authenticator Binding
- Revocation/Status Information

# Authenticator Assurance Levels

	AAL2	AAL3
Types	Combinations providing multifactor authentication: OTP, Out-of-Band, Look-up Secrets, software crypto	Hardware cryptographic authenticators (multifactor authenticators or combinations)
Examples	Passwords with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Push notifications,</li> <li>• OTP/SecureID</li> <li>• FIDO U2F</li> </ul> Software-based Derived PIV	PIV cards* Hardware-based Derived PIV* FIDO with Token Binding + password
MitM Resist.	<b>Required</b>	<b>Required</b>
Verifier Impersonation Resist.	Not Required	<b>Required</b>
Verifier Compromise Resist.	Not Required	<b>Required</b>
Auth. Intent	Recommended	<b>Required</b>

*What authenticators are suitable for government use?*

# Product Validation

- We anticipate a need for some form of “Approved Products List” for alternative authenticators
  - Could leverage future SP 800-63 accreditation program(s) under consideration
  - Will consider existing industry-driven testing programs for suitability
- Agency *verification* of authenticator product validation is challenging in Bring-Your-Own-Authenticator scenarios
  - Limited technical solutions, such as attestation, practically available
  - May need to be addressed through policy or physical procedures



*What are agency requirements for product validation?*

# Interoperability

- **Objectives**
  - Support interagency reuse and acceptance
  - Facilitate technical interoperability with applications
- Many non-PKI authenticators are for use with a single CSP/Verifier
  - Limits need for authenticator-based interoperability
- Shift interoperability focus to federation
  - Provides abstraction layer to support multiple authenticators
  - Can simplify authenticator management
- **WebAuthn/FIDO**
  - FIDO/WebAuthn guidance could promote security facilitate compatibility between gov't servers and industry authenticators

WebAuthn

*Would this address agency interoperability needs?*



# Authenticator Binding

- SP 800-63-3 distinguishes different authenticator registration processes:
  - Registration at new CSPs involves a proofing process
  - Registration as existing CSP is post-enrollment binding
- Typical use-case involves binding additional authenticators as derived credentials
  - Under SP 800-63B, this can be done remotely a user-authenticated session without impacting IAL/AAL
  - Under current SP 800-157, LoA-4 requires in-person registration
- Will address derived credentialing and authenticator binding with new technical guidelines based on SP 800-63-3 and SP 800-157
- **Threat:** Binding derived credentials with stolen authenticators

*Can the risks of remote registration of authenticators be effectively managed at all levels?*

# Revocation/Status Information

- Non-PKI authenticators lack centralized revocation capabilities (e.g., no CRLs)
  - Challenge handling lost/stolen authenticators
  - No way to communicate employee status information through use of the authenticator
- Federated architectures could provide timely status information

*What are agency needs/concerns regarding revocation and employee status information?*

# Discussion Topics

- What assurance levels and authenticator types are appropriate for government use?
  - e.g., restricted authenticators, like SMS-based OTP
- What are agency requirements for authenticator product validation programs?
- Will the proposed plan address interoperability need?
- Can the risks of remote registration of authenticators be effectively managed at all levels?
- What are agency needs/concerns regarding revocation and employee status information?

# Questions?



## Contact Information

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