

Lightweight Trusted Computing

NIST Lightweight Cryptography Workshop

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Tom Broström

Research Technical Director

Cyber Pack Ventures, Inc.

Imagine...

- 2025
- 8B Humans
- 75B Connected Things

In the News

 **NETWORKWORLD**
FROM IDG

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INSIDER

Microsoft finds Russia-backed attacks that exploit IoT devices

Microsoft says default passwords, unpatched devices, poor inventory of IoT gear led to exploits against companies by Russia's STRONTIUM hacking group.

 **ZDNet**

CLOUD AI INNOVATION SECURITY MORE NEWSLETTERS ALL WRITERS

Five nightmarish attacks that show the risks of IoT security

The Internet of Things is not going away -- and neither are the attacks that exploit device vulnerabilities. Here are five incidents that illustrate how to prevent breaches.

Forbes Billionaires Innovation Leadership Money Business Small Business

Cyberattacks On IOT Devices Surge 300% In 2019, 'Measured In Billions', Report Claims

 **BANKINFO SECURITY**

DDoS Protection , Fraud Management & Cybercrime , Governance

Massive Botnet Attack Used More Than 400,000 IoT Devices

Researchers at Imperva Say Incident Mimicked Mirai-Style DDoS Attack

 **TechRepublic**


Kaspersky honeypots find 105 million attacks on IoT devices in first half of 2019

 **FORTINET**

BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY

IoT Exploit Activity has Quadrupled - Are You Prepared?

IoT Markets



Source: Infineon Technologies | graphics are courtesy of Infineon

IoT Defenses




Source: Infineon Technologies | graphics are courtesy of Infineon

Verified vs. Measured Boot

- Both compute a measurement
- Both verify measurement against known good


| | VERIFICATION PERFORMED | | | MEASUREMENTS |
|---------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| | WHEN | WHERE | WITH | |
| VERIFIED BOOT | Before executed | Booting device | Decrypted copy from signature | Discarded |
| MEASURED BOOT | After booted | Measurement Assessment Authority | Golden measurements | Retained in Event Log |

Boot Process




IMMUTABLE,
TRUSTED

MUTABLE, UNTRUSTED



1. LOAD
2. MEASURE
3. EXTEND
4. EXECUTE



TRUSTED
PLATFORM
MODULE

ROOTS OF TRUST:

- STORAGE
- REPORTING

Enter the TCG

- Global non-profit consortium
- Creates open technical specifications
- Building block trust and security technologies
 - Endpoint devices: servers to IoT
 - Storage devices
 - Networking elements & protocols



Board of Directors



Contributor
Advisors:



46 Contributor
17 Adopter

Trusted Platform Module



- Capabilities
 - Roots of Trust for Storage & Reporting
 - Shielded Storage
 - Algorithm Agility
- Use Cases
 - Non-spoofable device identification
 - Non-spoofable device health attestation
 - Secure generation & storage of keys
 - NVRAM for Certificate Storage, etc.





IoT Problem

- Connected Things, 75B by 2025
 - No TPM
 - no RTS/RTR
 - Nothing to protect M&A resources
 - No Asymmetric Crypto
- Solution:
 - Integrate minimal RTS/RTR in microcontroller
 - Symmetric attestation



MSP430





Embedded Systems Working Group

MARS Subgroup

Measurement and Attestation
RootS

“The Tiniest TPM”

- RTS
 - TPM2_PCR_Extend
 - TPM2_PCR_Read
- RTR
 - TPM2_Quote
- Need lightweight hashing and symmetric signing
- Would LOVE to have lightweight asym signing

MARS activities

- Use Cases
 - Identity
 - Integrity measuring, storing, reporting
 - Seal, Unseal
- Profile
 - Requirements to construct MARS
- Provisioning, rekeying, zeroizing, ...

MICRO-CONTROLLER (SoC?)




Research w/ UMBC



- FPGA Prototype
- Project Radicle
- ARM + RoT
- Encrypt = Simon

- ASIC Prototype
- RISC-V + RoT



Results

- Intel/Altera Cyclone V FPGA resources
 - Adaptive Logic Modules (ALM)
 - Block Memory Bits (BMB)

| APPROACH | ENGINE | CORE | WRAPPER | TOTAL |
|--------------|---------|------------|---------|------------|
| CONVENTIONAL | SHA-256 | 1009\ 384 | 256\0 | 1265\ 384 |
| | AES-256 | 648\75776 | 186\0 | 834\75776 |
| | Total | 1657\76160 | 442\0 | 2099\76160 |
| OPTIMIZED | Simon | 106\ 0 | 165\0 | 271\ 0 |

ALM\BMB Consumption of Conventional and Optimized Prototypes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to the Laboratory for Advanced Cybersecurity Research in the National Security Agency's Research Directorate who sponsored this work.





Thanks!

Q & A


mars-chair@trustedcomputinggroup.org

Hash Methods

CONVENTIONAL



OPTIMIZED




- $V_i = E_{M_i}(V_{i-1}) \oplus V_{i-1}$
- Davies–Meyer Compression
- SHA-3 Semi-finalists
 - SHAvite-3
 - SIMD

EXTEND Methods

CONVENTIONAL

$$PCR_i = H(\dots H(H(0 \parallel D_1) \parallel D_2) \dots \parallel D_i)$$
$$PCR_i = H(PCR_{i-1} \parallel D_i)$$



OPTIMIZED

$$PCR_i = H(D_1 \parallel D_2 \dots \parallel D_i)$$

- Eliminates redundant hash initializations and padding
- “digest of digests”
- Simplified state machine

