The Oribatida Family of Lightweight Authenticated Encryption Schemes

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1 Introduction

This work proposes the Oribatida family of permutation-based authenticated-encryption schemes.

Oribatida Is Lightweight. As a keyed permutation-based mode of operation, Oribatida has to store neither the state of the permutation (plus a small overhead) nor subkeys or tweaks. Authentication and encryption can be performed fully online and impose no need on buffering the input. For instantiations, we employ a lightweight family of permutations SimP that is very close to the block-cipher variants SIMON-96-96 or SIMON-128-128 and their respective key schedules. As a result, the instances of SimP possess a low state size of only 192 and 256 bits, respectively.

Oribatida Is Performant. For a security level of 128 bits, Oribatida provides a rate of $1/2$ (two calls to a permutation for processing $n$-bit message material) for authentication and encryption even with a small permutation size of only $n = 192$ or $n = 256$ bits due to the way it masks ciphertext blocks.

Oribatida Alleviates Its Usage Across Different Platforms. Our proposed instantiations of Oribatida with the SimP family of permutations can be implemented with only the basic operations AND, rotations, and XOR. Since SimP avoids the use of S-boxes, implementations can split the state flexibly according to the target platforms’ needs.

Oribatida Is Based on Well-known Components. The design of Oribatida is based on the well-known duplex mode. Therefore, it founds on well-established results. Since SimP is very close to the design of SIMON, it can profit from the existing cryptanalysis, and rely on its already well-understood permutation design.

Oribatida Is Secure. The design of Oribatida inherits the minimal security guarantees of the duplex mode. Moreover, Oribatida augments the usual sponge by a ciphertext masking that boosts the security. While this specification omits tedious proof details, all members of the Oribatida family are expected to provide 128-bit security for encryption and integrity.

Oribatida Is Robust under Release of Unverified Plaintexts. While authenticated encryption can be realized in an online manner, proper authenticated decryption must be offline. However, resource-constrained devices can hardly buffer long messages until the authentication tag is verified, which can lead to a complete loss of privacy and integrity. The ciphertext masking of Oribatida limits the security damage in such cases. In the case of accidental misuse, Oribatida provides integrity also in the case that plaintext material leaks from invalid ciphertexts.

2 Notations

General Notations. We use uppercase letters (e.g., $X$, $Y$) for functions and variables, lowercase letters (e.g., $x$, $y$) for indices and lengths, as well as calligraphic uppercase letters $\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}$ for sets and spaces. We write $\mathbb{F}_2$ for the field of characteristic 2 and $\mathbb{F}_2^n = \{0, 1\}^n$ for the set of vectors over $\mathbb{F}_2$, i.e., strings of $n$ bits. $|X|$ denotes the number of bits of $X$. Given $X \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$, we write $X[i]$ for the $i$-th (least significant) bit of $X$, and define the bit order by $X = (X[n-1] \parallel \ldots \parallel X[1] \parallel X[0])$. We write $\emptyset$ for the empty set and $\varepsilon$ for the empty string.
We denote by \(X[x..y]\) the range of \(X[x], \ldots, X[y]\) for non-zero integers \(x\) and \(y\). Given binary strings \(X\) and \(Y\), we denote their concatenation by \(X \parallel Y\) and their bitwise XOR by \(X \oplus Y\) when \(|X| = |Y|\). For positive integers \(x\) and \(y\) and bit strings of different lengths \(X \in \mathbb{F}_2^x\) and \(Y \in \mathbb{F}_2^y\) with \(x \geq y\), we define \(X \oplus Y \triangleq X \oplus (0^y - y \parallel Y)\).

We write \(X \leftarrow X\) to indicate that \(X\) is chosen uniformly at random and independent from other variables from a set \(X\). We consider \(\text{Func}(X, Y)\) to be the set of all mappings \(F : X \rightarrow Y\), and \(\text{Perm}(X)\) to be the set of all permutations over \(X\). Given an event \(E\), we denote the probability of \(E\) by \(\text{Pr}[E]\). We denote by \(\perp\) the invalid symbol.

For \(X \in \mathbb{F}_2^n\), we denote by \((X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_n) \triangleq X\) the splitting of \(X\) into \(n\)-bit strings \(X_1, \ldots, X_{x-1}\), and \(|X_x| \leq n\), in form of \(X_1 \parallel \ldots \parallel X_x = X\). Moreover, for \(Y \in \mathbb{F}_x\), we write \((X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_m) \xleftarrow{x_1,x_2,\ldots,x_m} Y\) to denote the splitting of \(Y\) into \(X_1 = Y[x - 1..x - x_1], X_2 = Y[x - x_1 - 1..x - x_1 - x_2], \ldots, X_m = Y[x_m - 1..0]\), where \(x = x_1 + x_2 + \ldots + x_m\). For a given set \(X\) and some non-negative integer \(x\), we write \(\lambda\) to be the union set \(\cup_{i=0}^{x} X^i\). Given a non-negative integer \(x < 2^n\), we write \(x\) for its conversion into an \(n\)-bit binary string with the most significant bit left, e.g., \((135)_{8} = (10000111)_{2}\). We omit \(n\) if it is clear from the context.

**Nonce-based Authenticated Encryption.** Let \(K\) be a set of keys, \(N\) be a set of nonces, \(\mathcal{A}\) a set of associated data, \(M\) a set of messages, \(C\) a set of ciphertexts, and \(T\) a set of authentication tags. A nonce \(N \in N\) is an input that must be unique for each authenticated encryption query.

A nonce-based authenticated encryption scheme (with associated data) \(\Pi = (E, D)\) is a tuple of deterministic encryption algorithm \(E : K \times N \times A \times M \rightarrow C \times T\) and deterministic decryption algorithm \(D : K \times N \times A \times C \times T \rightarrow M \times \{\perp\}\) with associated key space \(K\). The encryption algorithm \(E\) takes a tuple \((K, N, A, M)\) and outputs \((C, T)\), where \(C\) is a ciphertext and \(T\) an authentication tag. We assume that \(|C| = |M|\) holds for all inputs \((K, N, A, M)\) and their corresponding ciphertexts. The associated data is authenticated but not encrypted. The decryption function \(D\) takes a tuple \((K, N, A, C, T)\) and outputs either the unique plaintext \(M\) for which \(E_K(N, A, M) = (C, T)\) holds, or outputs \(\perp\) if the input is invalid. We introduce \(E_{K,N,A}^N(M)\) as short form of \(E_K(N, A, M)\) and \(D_{K,N,A}^{N,A}(C, T)\) for \(D_K(N, A, C, T)\), respectively.

We assume that authenticated-encryption schemes are (1) correct, i.e., for all \((K, N, A, M) \in K \times N \times A \times M\), it holds that \(D_{K,N,A}^{N,A}(E_{K,N,A}^N(M)) = M\) and (2) tidy, i.e., for all \((K, N, A, C, T) \in K \times N \times A \times C \times T\), it holds that \(E_{K,N,A}^N(D_{K,N,A}^{N,A}(C, T)) = (C, T)\) iff \(D_{K,N,A}^{N,A}(C, T) \neq \perp\).

### 3 Specification of Oribatida

This section defines the Oribatida authenticated-encryption scheme.

**General Definitions.** Let \(n\) denote the state size, \(k\) the key size, \(r\) the rate, \(c\) the capacity, \(s\) the mask size, \(\nu\) the nonce size, \(d\) a domain size, and \(\tau\) a tag size in bits, all of which are non-negative integers. We define:

- The key space \(K = \mathbb{F}_2^k\), with \(k \leq n\).
- The state space \(S = \mathbb{F}_2^n\).
- We denote by \(r\) the rate and by \(c\) the capacity of the Oribatida mode, where \(r + c = n\) bits. We define a block space \(B = \mathbb{F}_2^d\).
- The nonce space \(N = \mathbb{F}_2^\nu\), with \(\nu \leq r\). Oribatida requires \(\nu + k = n\).
- A finite set of domains \(\mathcal{D}\) for \(d = 4\) bits.
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the authentication of an \(a\)-block associated data \(A\) and the encryption of an \(m\)-block plaintext \(M\) with Oribatida, for \(m > 1\). \(P\) and \(P'\) are permutations, \(K\) the secret key, \(N\) the nonce, \(C\) the resulting ciphertext, and \(T\) the resulting authentication tag.

- We define positive integers \(a_{\text{max}}\) and \(m_{\text{max}}\) for the maximal length in bits of associated data message inputs, respectively.
- The associated-data space \(A = \mathbb{F}_2^{\leq a_{\text{max}}}\).
- Message and ciphertext spaces \(M = C = \mathbb{F}_2^{\leq m_{\text{max}}}\).
- Moreover, we define the space of authentication tags \(T = \mathbb{F}_2^\tau\) with \(\tau \leq r\).

We define \(s \leq c\) for the mask size in bits. We write two permutations \(P, P' \in \text{Perm}(S)\). We denote the state after the \(i\)-th call to the permutations by \(S_i = (U_i \parallel V_i)\), and the state after XORing the subsequent associated-data block \(A_i\) or message block \(M_{i-a}\) to it by \((X_i \parallel Y_i)\), where \(a\) denotes the number of associated-data blocks after padding. We say that \(A\) is integral if its length is a multiple of \(r\) bits, and say that it is partial otherwise. Similarly, we say that \(M\) (or \(C\)) is integral if its length is a multiple of \(r\) bits, and call it partial otherwise.

The Core Idea. Oribatida is a variant of the monkey-wrap design [BDPVA12], as used before, e.g., in Ascon [DEMS16] or NORX [AJN14]. Oribatida extends such previous designs by a ciphertext-block masking that boosts the security and ensures resilience against release of unverified plaintext material. We denote by \((U_i, V_i)\) the outputs of and by \((X_i, Y_i)\) the inputs to the permutation. As in the classical sponge, Oribatida considers the state \(S_i = (U_i \parallel V_i)\) as a rate part \(U_i\) of \(r\) bits, where inputs are XORed to, and a capacity part \(V_i\) of \(c = n - r\) bits. Unlike the usual sponge, an \(s\)-bit part of the capacity is used to mask the subsequent ciphertext block. The definition is given in Algorithm 1.

In the following, explanations and details are presented.

3.1 Proposed Parameter Sets

Oribatida-\(n\)-\(s\) is proposed in two versions, parametrized by the state size of the permutation \(n\), and a mask size \(s\). Table 1 lists the proposed parameter sets. We define a security parameter \(z = c + s\) which should be defined as 192 (the target for NIST security requirements). We briefly recall the parameters and the conditions satisfied by these parameters.
Table 1: Recommended schemes of Oribatida in the order of recommendation. The topmost is our primary recommendation. All integer values are given in bits. The state size is given by $r + c$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec. Name</th>
<th>Permutations</th>
<th>Key</th>
<th>Nonce</th>
<th>Tag</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Mask</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Oribatida-256-64</td>
<td>SimP-256-4 SimP-256-2</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Oribatida-192-96</td>
<td>SimP-192-4 SimP-192-2</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. We always choose a key size of $k = 128$ bits.
2. $n$ denotes the size of the permutation in bits, which is either 256 or 192.
3. The nonce length $\nu$ is chosen such that $\nu + k = n$ holds.
4. The capacity of the permutation is chosen as $c = 192 - s$ bits (by the security requirement mentioned above).
5. Thus, the mask size $s$ is at most the capacity: $s \leq c$.
6. Finally, the tag length is set to $\tau = r$ bits.

Oribatida-n-s employs two internal permutations $P, P' \in \text{Perm}(\mathbb{F}_2^n)$, where $P'$ is chosen as a round-reduced variant of $P$ to process the associated data efficiently. The following members of the Oribatida-n-s family are proposed, based on instantiations from the SimP family of permutations:

- Our primary recommendation is Oribatida-256-64. For $P$, this variant uses SimP-256-4 with $r_s = 34$ rounds per step and $\theta = 4$ steps. Moreover, for $P'$, it employs SimP-256-2 with $r_s = 34$ rounds per step and $\theta = 2$ steps.

- Our secondary recommendation is Oribatida-192-96. For $P$, this variant uses SimP-192-4 with $r_s = 26$ and $\theta = 4$ steps. For $P'$, it employs SimP-192-2 with $r_s = 26$ and $\theta = 2$ steps.

3.2 Limitations

The encryption of Oribatida produces a ciphertext of the same length as the plaintext, and a $\tau$-bit authentication tag. Its decryption will, if the given tuple of key, nonce, associated data, ciphertext, and tag is valid, produce a plaintext of the same length as the ciphertext. The nonce must be unique for each encryption query, even if the message is empty. There is no secret message number for Oribatida.

At most $2^{50} - 1$ bytes, over all the summed lengths of all nonces, associated data after padding, and messages after padding of all queries, are allowed to be processed under the same secret key before the key must be changed. At most $2^{50} - 1$ bytes, over the summed length of nonce, associated data after padding, and message after padding, are allowed in a single query. In each encryption or verification query, the associated data can be empty or present; in each encryption query, the message can be empty or present; in each decryption query, the ciphertext can be empty or present. Oribatida demands that no information about would-be plaintexts is released to the outside if a decryption query is deemed invalid.
Algorithm 1 Specification of Oribatida.

101: function $E_{A, K}^{N}(M)
102: \text{ then return } (9)\vdash
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191: \text{ then return } (9)\vdash
192: \text{ then return } (9)\vdash
193: \text{ then return } (9)\vdash

3.3 Workflow of Oribatida

Initialization. Each variant of Oribatida uses a fixed size for nonces, whose length is chosen such that $k + \nu = n$ bits. The nonce $N$ is concatenated with the key $K$ to initialize the state: $N \| K$: $(U_0, V_0) \leftarrow (N \| K) \oplus_d d_N$. The domain $d_N$ is XORed to the least significant byte of the initial state. Then, the first state value $S_0$ results from a call to the permutation: $(U_1, V_1) \leftarrow P(U_0 \| V_0)$. Note that we store the value of $V_0$ or $V_1$ (aliased by $V_1$), depending on whether the associated data is empty or not, to mask the first block of ciphertext later.
Processing Associated Data. After the initialization, the associated data $A$ is padded with a 10*-padding if $|A| \mod r \neq 0$ such that its length becomes the next highest multiple of $r$ bits. Thereupon, the padded associated data $A$ is split into $r$-bit blocks $(A_1, \cdots, A_a)$. Given the state $(U_i, V_i) \leftarrow c_{<}S_i$, $A_i$ is XORed to the rate part of the state: $X_i \leftarrow U_i \oplus A_i$, for $1 \leq i < a$. For all non-final blocks of $A$, the capacity part of the permutation output, $V_i$, is simply forwarded to the capacity part of the subsequent input to the permutation $P'$: $Y_i \leftarrow V_i$. The next state is computed by a call to the reduced permutation $P'$ afterwards, for all indices $1 < i < a$ but the final $a$-th block of $A$: $S_i \leftarrow P'(X_i \| Y_i)$. When the final block $A_a$ is processed, a domain $d_A$ that depends on the lengths of $A$ and $M$ is XORed to the least significant byte of the capacity.

Encryption. After the associated data has been processed, the message $M$ is encrypted. If the length of $M$ is not a multiple of $r$ bits, $M$ is padded with a 10*-padding such that its length after padding becomes the next highest multiple of $r$ bits. Thereupon, $M$ is split into $r$-bit blocks $(M_1, \cdots, M_m)$ after padding.

The blocks $M_i$ are processed one after the other. Given the state value $(U_{a+i}, V_{a+i}) \leftarrow c_{<}S_{a+i}$, the current block $M_i$ is XORed to the rate part $U_{a+i}$: $X_{a+i} \leftarrow M_i \oplus U_{a+i}$. The capacity part is simply forwarded: $Y_{a+i} \leftarrow V_{a+i}$. Then, $(X_{a+i} \| Y_{a+i})$ is used as input to a call to $P$ to derive the next state value $S_{a+i+1} \leftarrow P(X_{a+i} \| Y_{a+i})$.

The ciphertext blocks $C_i$ are computed from a sum of the current rate, the current plaintext block, and a (partial) earlier value from the capacity. The first ciphertext block is computed from

$$C_1 \leftarrow X_{a+i} \oplus \text{LSB}_a(V_f).$$

If it is the final block, then, $C_1$ is computed from

$$C_1 \leftarrow \text{MSB}_{\ell_E}(X_{a+i} \oplus \text{LSB}_a(V_f)),$$

where $\ell_E$ denotes the length of $M$ before padding.

The further non-final ciphertext blocks $C_i$, $1 < i < m$ are computed from $C_i \leftarrow X_{a+i} \oplus_s \text{LSB}_a(V_{a+i-1})$, for $1 < i < m$. If $m > 1$, the final ciphertext block $C_m$ is computed from

$$C_m \leftarrow \text{MSB}_{\ell_E \mod r}(X_{a+m} \oplus \text{LSB}_a(V_{a+m-1})).$$

For the final message block, a domain $d_E$ is XORed to the least significant byte of the capacity: $Y_{a+m} \leftarrow V_{a+m} \oplus d_E$. Thereupon, $P$ is called another time to derive $S_{a+m+1} \leftarrow P(X_{a+m} \| Y_{a+m})$. Its rate part – truncated to $\tau$ bits if necessary – is released as the authentication tag: $T \leftarrow \text{MSB}_{\tau}(S_{a+m+1})$.

Decryption. The decryption algorithm takes a tuple $(K, N, A, C, T)$. Again, the initialization with $K$ and $N$ as well as the processing of the associated data $A$ is performed in the same manner as for encryption. If $|C| \mod r \neq 0$, the decryption pads $C$ with a 10*-padding to the next multiple of $r$ bits. In all cases, it splits $C$ into $r$-bit blocks $(C_1, \cdots, C_{m-1})$ plus a final block $C_m$. If $m > 1$, the plaintext block is computed as

$$X_{a+i} \leftarrow C_i \oplus \text{LSB}_a(V)$$

$$M_i \leftarrow (U_{a+i} \oplus X_{a+i}),$$

where $V = V_f$ for $i = 1$ and $V = V_{a+i-1}$ otherwise. The capacity is again simply forwarded to the next call of the permutation: $Y_{a+i} \leftarrow V_{a+i}$. The subsequent state is then computed by $(U_{a+i+1} \| V_{a+i+1}) \leftarrow S_{a+i+1} \leftarrow P(X_{a+i} \| Y_{a+i})$. 

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For the final block $m$, the final plaintext block is computed from the padded ciphertext block $C_m$ as

$$X_{a+m} \leftarrow C_m \oplus \text{LSB}_s(V)$$
$$M_m \leftarrow \text{LSB}_s(U_{a+m} \oplus X_{a+m}),$$

where $x \leftarrow t_E \mod r$. For the final block, the domain $d_E$ is XORed to the least significant byte of the capacity: $Y_{a+m} \leftarrow V_{a+m} \oplus d_E$. The would-be tag $T'$ is derived by computing $(T' \parallel Z) \leftarrow P(X_{a+m} \parallel Y_{a+m})$, and using only its most significant $\tau$ bits:

$$T' \leftarrow \text{MSB}_r(T' \parallel Z)$$

as for the encryption. If $T = T'$, the ciphertext is considered valid, and $M = (M_1 \parallel \cdots \parallel M_m)$ is released as plaintext. Otherwise, the ciphertext is considered invalid, and ⊥ is given as output.

**Domain Separation.** For the purpose of domain separation, Oribatida defines a set of domain constants $d_N$, $d_A$, and $d_E$. Note that $d = 4$ bits suffice in practice; we encode them as $n$-bit constants in Algorithm 1 for simplicity of description. The domains are XORed to the least significant byte of the state at three stages. Domains are encoded as bit strings, e.g., $(12)_4 = (1100)_2$. The value depends on the presence of $A$ and $M$ and whether their final blocks are absent, partial, or integral. This ensures that there exist no trivial collisions of inputs to $P$ among blocks of $A$ and $M$.

The constants are determined by the four control bits $(t_3, t_2, t_1, t_0)$ that reflect inputs in the hardware API. The rationale behind them is the following:

- **EOI:** $t_3$ is the end-of-input control bit. This bit is set to 1 if the current data block is the final block of the input. For all other cases, $t_3$ is set to 0.

- **EOT:** $t_2$ is the end-of-type control bit. This bit is set to 1 if the current data block is the final block of the same type, i.e., it is the last block of the message/associated data. Note that, if the associated data is empty, the nonce is treated as the final block of the associated data. So, $t_2$ is set to 1. For all other cases, $t_2$ is set to 0.

- **Partial:** $t_1$ is the partial-control bit. It is set to 1 if the current data block is partial, i.e. if its size is less than the required block size. For all other data blocks, $t_1$ is 0.

- **Type:** $t_0$ is called the type-control bit. It identifies the type of the current data block. For the nonce and the processing of the final message block, $t_0$ is set to 1. For all other cases, $t_0$ is set to 0.

While processing a data block, the domain values are set as the integer representation of $t_3 \parallel t_2 \parallel t_1 \parallel t_0$. For example, if we are processing the nonce (which is always a complete $r$-bit block), where the associated data is empty, and the message is not empty, it holds that $d_N = (t_3 t_2 t_1 t_0) = (0101)_2 = 5$.

### 4 Specification of The SimP Family of Permutations

This section contains the specification of the permutation SimP. From a high-level point of view, SimP is a variant of the domain extender $\Psi'_r$ by Coron et al. [CDMS10] that iterates a block cipher in $r$ steps. We define SimP to use a round-reduced variant of the Simon [BSS13] block cipher and its key schedule through four such steps. First, we briefly recall $\Psi'_r$ before we describe the details of Simon. We will provide an overview of existing cryptanalysis and close with a discussion of the implications on SimP.
Figure 2: Top: The construction $\Psi_4'$ [CDMS10]. The blocks $\pi_i$ denote block ciphers over $F^n_2$ with key space $F^n_2$. Bottom: High-level view of the construction $\Phi_4$ as a variant of $\Psi_4'$. The blocks $\phi_i$ represent the key schedules that produce the subkeys and which are externalized from the block ciphers $\pi_i$ in $\Phi_4$. $\phi_i$ feeds the subkeys to $\pi_i$ and outputs the final subkey $K^{r_s}$ to become the next value $R^{r_s}$.

4.1 The $\Psi_4'$ Domain Extender

Coron et al. [CDMS10] proposed the $\Psi_4'$ family of two-branch Feistel-like networks, consisting of $r$ calls to (pairwise independent) block ciphers. An illustration of $\Psi_4'$ is given at the top of Figure 2. Coron et al. provide statements on the indifferentiability of their constructions, which is a stronger model than the usual indistinguishability. We briefly recall the model.

Definition 1 (Indifferentiability [MRH04]). Let $C$ be a Turing machine with oracle access to either $(\Pi, \{\pi_1^\pm, \ldots, \pi_m^\pm\})$, where $C$ is a construction and the $\pi_i$'s are ideal primitives. $C$ can employ any of the primitives internally. $C$ is said to be $(t_D, t_S, q, \epsilon)$-indifferentiable from a tuple $(\mathcal{P}, \{\pi_1^\pm, \ldots, \pi_m^\pm\})$, where $\mathcal{P}$ is an ideal primitive, if there exists a simulator $S$ with oracle access to $\mathcal{P}$ that runs in time at most $t_S$ and makes at most $q$ queries, such that for any distinguisher $A$ that runs in time at most $t_D$ and makes at most $q$ queries, it holds that

$$|\Pr[A^{C,\pi_1^\pm,\ldots,\pi_m^\pm} = 1] - \Pr[A^{\mathcal{P},\pi_1^\pm,\ldots,\pi_m^\pm} = 1]| < \epsilon.$$ 

$C$ is said to be indifferentiable from $\mathcal{P}$ if $\epsilon$ is a negligible function of the security parameters for polynomially bounded $q, t_D$ and $t_S$.

Coron et al. showed in [CDMS10] that the following theorem holds.

Theorem 1 ([CDMS10]). Let $\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_3 \leftarrow \text{Perm}(F^n_2)$ be pairwise independent permutations over $F^n_2$. The three-step construction $\Psi_3$ with an ideal block cipher is $(t_D, t_S, q, \epsilon)$-indifferentiable from an ideal cipher with $t_S = O(qn)$ and $\epsilon = 5q^2/2^n$.

It follows naturally that a four-step construction with a fourth independent permutation $\pi_4 \leftarrow \text{Perm}(F^n_2)$ inherits at least the security of the three-step construction. While the analysis by Coron et al. yielded reasonable bounds for practical constructions, there is good reason that the three- and four-step constructions can provide higher security. Omitting the proof details, we provide the following claim.

Claim. The three-step construction $\Phi_3$ is $(t_D, t_S, q, \epsilon)$-indifferentiable from a random permutation with $t_S = O(qn)$ and $\epsilon = O(n^2q^2/2^{2n})$.

The analysis of the given claim implies that almost full security is achieved already with three steps. Again, a four-step construction with a fourth independent permutation $\pi_4 \leftarrow \text{Perm}(F^n_2)$ would inherit at least the security of the three-step construction.
4.2 \( \Phi_r \): A Variant of \( \Psi'_r \) That Includes The Key Schedule

The \( \Psi'_r \) construction has to store the state that is transformed through the block cipher \( \pi_i \)'s state transformation, plus the key of the current step. Internally, however, the block ciphers \( \pi_i \) have to expand the secret key to subkeys that add to the total memory requirement. As an improvement, we propose a variant that avoids the need to store the current secret key input. For this purpose, we define the key-schedule permutation \( \phi_i : \mathbb{F}_2^w \to \mathbb{F}_2^w \) that takes an initial key \( K \) as input and outputs the subkeys \( K^0, \ldots, K^r \) for fixed number of rounds \( r \) of \( \pi_i \), for \( 1 \leq i \leq r \). An illustration is given on the bottom of Figure 2. Hereafter, we call the construction \( \Phi_r \) when it consists of \( r \) steps in total. Note that \( \Phi_r \) omits the final swap of the halves for simplicity and since it does not affect the security. Compared to \( \Psi'_r \), the adversary on the SPRP security of \( \Phi_r \) has access also to public oracles for \( \phi_r \). So, those are public as well. The rest of the setting is identical to the usual indistinguishability setting [CDMS10]. Clearly, \( \Phi_4 \) instantiated with \( \pi_1, \ldots, \pi_4 \) can only be as secure as \( \Psi'_4 \) with \( \pi_1, \ldots, \pi_4 \): any efficient successful distinguisher \( A' \) on \( \Psi'_4 \) can be used by a distinguisher \( A \) on \( \Phi_4 \) that performs the same steps as \( A' \), plus queries the \( \phi_i \) functions with the key input additionally. The reverse direction – i.e., that the security of \( \Phi_4 \) is at least that of \( \Psi'_4 \) – can be expected to hold.

4.3 Simon

The Simon family of block ciphers [BSS+13] belongs to the lightest block ciphers in terms of hardware area and energy efficiency. Internally, it consists of only XORs, bit-wise rotations, and bit-wise AND, which renders it particularly lightweight and flexible. Moreover, Simon has been analyzed intensively since its proposal\(^1\) and recently been standardized as part of the ISO/IEC 29167-21:2018 [ISO18]. To keep as close to the standard as possible, SimP is an instantiation of \( \Phi_4 \) that employs either Simon-96-96 with its key schedule for \( \phi \) as a 192-bit permutation, or Simon-128-128 with its key schedule for \( \phi \) as a 256-bit permutation. One iteration of the round function of Simon-2w-2w and its key-update function are illustrated in Figure 3. Simon-96-96 uses a word size \( w \) of 48 bits and employs 52 rounds, whereas Simon-128-128 uses \( w = 64 \) bits and 68 rounds.

4.4 Definition of The SimP-\( n-\theta \) Family of Permutations

SimP-\( n-\theta \) is an instantiation of \( P_3 \) that employs the round function and the key-update function of Simon-2w-2w in parallel as an \( n \)-bit permutation. Internally, the state of SimP-\( n-\theta \) consists of four \( w \)-bit words \( (X_0^i, X_1^i, X_2^i, X_3^i) \), where the superscript index \( i \) indicates the state after Round \( i \). We denote by \( r_s \) the number of rounds per step, and index the steps from 1 to \( \theta \), and the rounds from 1 to \( \theta \cdot r_s \). The plaintext is denoted as \( (X_0^0, X_1^0, X_2^0, X_3^0) \); the ciphertext is given as \( (X_0^{\theta r_s}, X_1^{\theta r_s}, X_2^{\theta r_s}, X_3^{\theta r_s}) \).

After Round \( r_s \), the state halves \( (X_0^r, X_1^r) \) and \( (X_2^r, X_3^r) \) are swapped; similarly, they are swapped also after Round \( 2 r_s, \ldots, \theta r_s \). One round of the permutation is illustrated in Figure 3. Thus, SimP-192-\( \theta \) uses Simon-96-96 and consists of four 48-bit words. SimP-256-\( \theta \) employs the round function and the key-update function of Simon-128-128 as a 256-bit permutation. For SimP-256-\( \theta \), the state consists of four 64-bit words.

**Round Function.** Let \( w \) be a positive integer that determines the word size, for SimP-192, it holds that \( w = 48 \) bits; for SimP-256, it holds that \( w = 64 \) bits. Let \( f : \mathbb{F}_2^w \to \mathbb{F}_2^w \)

---

\(^1\)As examples of peer-reviewed publications on Simon-96-96 and Simon-128-128, consider, e.g., [ALLW14, CW16, LLW17a, Rad15, XZBL16]. Considerably more analysis targetted the smaller-state variants.
We define the state-update function as $\ell = (j-1) \cdot r_s$. Given an input $(X^i_0, X^i_1)$, it derives $r_s$ keys $(X^{i+1}_0, X^{i+1}_1)$, for $1 \leq i \leq r_s$, as

$$X^{i+1}_0 \leftarrow X^{i+1}_1 + g(X^{i+1}_1) \oplus c \oplus z_{i+1},$$

$$X^{i+1}_1 \leftarrow X^{i+1}_0,$$

for $1 \leq i \leq r_s$.

**State-update Function.** We define the state-update function as $\pi : (F_2^w)^{r_s} \times (F_2^w)^2 \rightarrow (F_2^w)^2$, where the first input considers the expanded subkeys. Let $\ell = (j-1) \cdot r_s$. It takes $r_s$ round keys $(X^i_0, \ldots, X_{r_s-i})$ as key input, as well as $(X^i_2, X^i_3)$ as state input, and computes $(X^{i+r_s}_2, X^{i+r_s}_3)$ recursively as:

$$X^{i+r_s}_2 \leftarrow f(X^{i+1}_2) \oplus X^{i+1}_3 \oplus X^{i+1}_1,$$

$$X^{i+r_s}_3 \leftarrow X^{i+1}_2,$$

for $1 \leq i \leq r_s$.

**Step Function.** Let $\rho_j : F_2^4 \rightarrow F_2^4$ denote the step function, for $1 \leq j \leq \theta$. Define $L^i = (X^i_0, X^i_1)$ and $R^i = (X^i_2, X^i_3)$. The step transforms $(L^i, R^i) = (X^i_0, X^i_1, X^i_2, X^i_3)$ into $(X^{i+r_s}_0, X^{i+r_s}_1, X^{i+r_s}_2, X^{i+r_s}_3)$ as:

$$(L^{r_s}, R^{r_s}) = (X^{i+r_s}_0, X^{i+r_s}_1, X^{i+r_s}_2, X^{i+r_s}_3),$$

$$\rho_j(X^i_0, X^i_1, X^i_2, X^i_3) \overset{\text{def}}{=} (\pi_j(X^i_1, X^i_2), \varphi_j(X^i_0, X^i_1)),$$

for $1 \leq j \leq \theta$. One exception is the final step $\rho_\theta$, which omits the final swap of the halves:

$$\rho_\theta(X^i_0, X^i_1, X^i_2, X^i_3) \overset{\text{def}}{=} (\varphi_\theta(X^i_0, X^i_1), \pi_\theta(X^i_2, X^i_3)).$$

SimP-$n$-$\theta$ takes a plaintext $(X^0_0, X^0_1, X^0_2, X^0_3)$ and outputs $(L^{r_s}, R^{r_s}) = (X^r_0, X^r_1, X^r_2, X^r_3)$, with $r = \theta r_s$ as ciphertext.
Round Constants. The round constants are those of SIMON-96-96 and SIMON-128-128 \cite{BSS+13}, respectively. It holds that $c = 	ext{0x}ff\ldots\text{ffc}$, i.e., all $w$ bits except for the least significant two bits are 1. More precisely, for $w = 48$, it holds that

$$c = (1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1100)_2.$$  

For $w = 64$, it holds that

$$c = (1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1 111 1111 1100)_2.$$  

For both SimP-192 and SimP-256, the constants are defined as

$$z = z_0 z_1 \ldots z_{61} = (10 1011 1101 1100 0000 1101 0010 0110 0010 1000 0100 0111 111 0 0101 1011 0011)_2.$$  

The sequence has a period of 62, so $z_i = z_i \mod 62$, for non-negative integers $i$. Note that the order of the bits $z_i$ is reversed.

Number of Steps $\theta$. We only consider two choices of $\theta$, namely 2 and 4. The case $\theta = 2$ is used only to process the intermediate associate data block. In all other cases, Oribatida uses $\theta = 4$. Figure 4 shows the step-reduced variant SimP-$n$-2.

Number of Rounds. SimP-192-4 consists of $r_s = 26$ rounds for each step, and therefore performs $r = 4 \cdot r_s = 104$ rounds in total. SimP-256-4 consists of $r_s = 34$ rounds for each block, and therefore performs $r = 4 \cdot r_s = 136$ rounds in total. Similarly, SimP-192-2 consists of $r_s = 26$ rounds for each step, and therefore performs $r = 2 \cdot r_s = 52$ rounds in total. SimP-256-2 consists of $r_s = 34$ rounds for each block, and therefore performs $r = 2 \cdot r_s = 68$ rounds in total. For notational simplicity, we also denote SimP-$n$-4 as SimP-$n$ and SimP-$n$-2 as SimP’-$n$. The algorithm for SimP-$n$-$\theta$ is given in Algorithm 2.

4.5 Byte Order in Oribatida

For the sake of clarity, Figure 5 visualizes the byte and word order of the inputs. Let $SB$ denote the state in bytes; for more clarity, we further write this ordering in type-writer font. The rate consists of the first $r/8$ bytes of the state: $SB[0], \ldots, SB[r/8 - 1]$. The capacity represents the last $c/8$ bytes $SB[r/8], \ldots, SB[n/8 - 1]$. Similarly, the rate part of the state consists of the first words of the permutation input.

If the state is interpreted as an $n$-bit value, however, note that the initial Byte 0 contains the most significant eight bits: $SB[0] = (S[n - 1], S[n - 2], \ldots, S[n - 8])$. On the other side, the least significant eight bits are stored in Byte $SB[n/8 - 1]: SB[n/8 - 1] = (S[7], S[6], \ldots, S[0])$.

So, the rate part is used first as input to the key-update function, the capacity is used as input to the state-update function.
Algorithm 2 Specification of the encryption and decryption algorithms of SimP-n-θ.

101: function SimP-n-θ(M)
102: (X₀, X₁, X₂, X₃) ← M
103: for i ← 1..θ do
104:   for j ← 1..r do
105:     ℓ ← (i − 1)·rₘ + j
106:     X₀ℓ ← X₀ℓ−1 ⊕ g(X₀ℓ−1) ⊕ c ⊕ zℓ−1
107:     X₁ℓ ← X₁ℓ−1
108:     X₂ℓ ← X₂ℓ−1 ⊕ f(X₂ℓ−1) ⊕ X₁ℓ−1
109:     X₃ℓ ← X₃ℓ−1
110: if i ≠ θ then
111:   (X₀, X₁, X₂, X₃) ← swap(X₀, X₁, X₂, X₃)
112: C ← X₀rₘ || X₁rₘ || X₂rₘ || X₃rₘ
113: return C

function f(X)
122: return (X ≪ 1) ∧ (X ≪ 8) ⊕ (X ≪ 2)

function g(X)
132: return (X ≫ 3) ⊕ (X ≫ 4)

function swap(X₀, X₁, X₂, X₃)
142: return (X₀, X₃, X₁, X₂)

Figure 5: Byte and word orientation of inputs and outputs into SimP when used in Oribatida.

5 Security Arguments for Oribatida

This section provides arguments on the provable security of our mode. First, we briefly recall the necessary notions for nonce-based authenticated encryption. Thereupon, we provide an outline of its security, but omit proof details.

Assume, we consider an information-theoretic nonce-respecting distinguisher A that has access to a construction oracle that is either Oribatida or random bits. Moreover, A has access to independent random permutations \( P, P' \in \text{Perm}(\mathbb{F}_2^n) \) in both worlds.

- As usual, we bound the number of primitive queries that A asks to the construction oracle by \( q_p \);
- We further denote the number of encryption and verification queries by \( q_e \) and \( q_v \), respectively.
- We use \( \sigma \) for the total number of \( r \)-bit blocks in associated data, plaintexts, and ciphertexts over all encryption and verification queries, respectively.

The advantage of the AE-security of the duplex sponge is dominated by

\[
O\left(\frac{q_p^2 \sigma}{2^8} + \frac{q_p \sigma}{2^n} + \frac{q_p q_v}{2^e} + \frac{q_p}{2^e}\right),
\]

which addresses the probabilities of multi-collisions, the probability of collisions between internal states and primitive queries, as well as the probability to find a valid verification query or the secret key.

For Oribatida-n with an \( s \)-bit mask, we expect the rightmost term of Equation (1) to be replaceable by

\[
\frac{q_p q_v}{2^{4+r+s}}.
\]
Table 2: Security claims in bits for our recommended schemes. RUP = release of unverified plaintext material.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Goal</th>
<th>Orbatida-256-64</th>
<th>Orbatida-192-96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nAE Security</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity under RUP</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

instead of $q_p q_v / 2^c$ since each output depends on $c + s$ output bits. Moreover, for integrity under release of unverified plaintexts, we expect that the rightmost term is replaced by

$$\frac{g_p (q_v + \sigma)}{2^{c+s}}.$$  

for the same reason.

Choice of Rate and Capacity Inputs To The Permutation. The omission of the final swap does not affect the security properties in the context of the permutation, but is an optimization. Note that the reduced permutation SimP-2 – that employs only two steps for processing the associated data in Orbatida – is no longer a random permutation. It is easy to see that if the key input would be held constant and the state input would change, the state would remain a permutation, where the zero difference cannot occur. Since we choose the rate part as the key input, this distinguisher is not directly exploitable. In contrast, for the step-reduced permutation that is used for processing the associated data, we follow the established Hash-then-PRP approach. Thus, we need only the differential probability of $P'$.

Security Level. The security level is expressed in bits. A security level of $z$ bits means that in the single-key setting, the advantage of any adversary to distinguish it from the ideal primitive or to recover the key is negligible as long as its number of queries $q$ and its total number of queried $r$-bit blocks $\sigma$ over all messages satisfy $q, \sigma \ll O(2^z)$. Assume that $P$ and $P'$ are independent permutations. Given the assumptions on $A$ as above, we obtain for Orbatida-192-96 that

$$\begin{align*}
\text{Adv}^{\text{nAE}}_{\text{Orbatida-192-96}}[P,P'](A) &\in O\left(\frac{96q_p}{2^{128}} + \frac{q_p \cdot \sigma}{2^{192}} + \frac{q_p \cdot (q_v + \sigma)}{2^{192}} + \frac{q_p}{2^{128}}\right) \\
\text{Adv}^{\text{INT-RUP}}_{\text{Orbatida-192-96}}[P,P'](A) &\in O\left(\frac{96q_p}{2^{128}} + \frac{q_p \cdot \sigma}{2^{192}} + \frac{q_p \cdot (q_v + \sigma)}{2^{192}} + \frac{q_p}{2^{128}}\right).
\end{align*}$$

For Orbatida-256-64, we obtain

$$\begin{align*}
\text{Adv}^{\text{nAE}}_{\text{Orbatida-256-64}}[P,P'](A) &\in O\left(\frac{128q_p}{2^{128}} + \frac{q_p \cdot \sigma}{2^{256}} + \frac{q_p \cdot (q_v + \sigma)}{2^{256}} + \frac{q_p}{2^{128}}\right) \\
\text{Adv}^{\text{INT-RUP}}_{\text{Orbatida-256-64}}[P,P'](A) &\in O\left(\frac{128q_p}{2^{128}} + \frac{q_p \cdot \sigma}{2^{256}} + \frac{q_p \cdot (q_v + \sigma)}{2^{256}} + \frac{q_p}{2^{128}}\right).
\end{align*}$$

Table 2 summarizes our security claims for our recommended variants of Orbatida. Figure 6 illustrates the relations of the required time (as the number of permutation queries, $q_p$) and required data (in terms of the number of queried blocks in construction queries, $\sigma$) to obtain an advantage of $1$ for the individual variants of Orbatida.
Figure 6: Bounds of time \( (q_p) \) conditioned on available data \( \sigma \) so that the advantage of the dominating terms for nonce-respecting AE and INT-RUP adversaries for the variants of Oribatida becomes one.

6 Security of SimP

The number of steps and rounds of SimP was chosen to resist known cryptanalysis techniques and tools. This section provides a rationale of our choices from the existing works.

6.1 Existing Cryptanalysis on Simon

Various works considered analyzed the Simon family of block ciphers since its proposal.

Differential Cryptanalysis. Cryptanalysis that appeared early after the proposal of Simon followed heuristics for differential cryptanalysis: Abed et al. [ALLW14] followed a heuristic branch-and-bound approach that yielded differentials for up to 30 round Simon-96. Biryukov et al. [BRV14] studied more efficient heuristics, but considered the small variants with state sizes up to 64 bits. Dinur et al. [DDGS15] showed that distinguishers on Simon with \( k \) key words can be extended by at least \( k \) rounds. Interestingly, boomerangs seemed to be less a threat to Simon-like ciphers than pure differentials. Kölbl et al. [KLT15] redirected the search on optimal characteristics. More recently, Liu et al. [LLW17a] employed a variant of Matsui’s algorithm [Mat94] to find optimal differential characteristics. They found that characteristics with probability higher than \( 2^{-96} \) covered at most 27 rounds. Moreover, they found at best 31-round differentials with accumulated probability higher than \( 2^{-96} \), i.e., of probability \( 2^{-95.34} \). For Simon-128, they showed that optimal differential characteristics covered at most 37 rounds; furthermore, they found 41-round differentials with cumulative probability of \( 2^{-123.74} \).

Linear Cryptanalysis. Linear trails are similarly a threat as differential trails. Alizadeh et al. [ABG^+13, AAA^+14] studied linear trails. They reported multi-linear distinguishers on all variants of Simon. For Simon-96-96, they proposed a multi-linear distinguisher on up to 31 rounds that could be extended by two rounds in a key-recovery attacks. Similarly, they reported a 37-round distinguisher for Simon-128-128 that could be extendable by two rounds. Chen and Wang [CW16] published improved key-recovery attacks that employed
Table 3: Existing results of best distinguishers and best key-recovery attacks on Simon-96 in the single-key setting. Dist. = distinguisher; Prob. = probability; Pot. = linear potential.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>#Rds.</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Data Prob./Pot.</th>
<th>Ref</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Simon-96-96 Distinguishers</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algebraic</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20 CPs</td>
<td></td>
<td>[Rad15]</td>
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<td>$2^{95}$ CP</td>
<td></td>
<td>[XZBL16]</td>
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<td>$2^{-92.2}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>[ALLW14]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Differential</td>
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<td>$2^{-95.34}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>[LLW17a]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Linear</td>
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<td>$2^{-93.8}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>[LLW17b]</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Multiple Linear</td>
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<td>$2^{94.42}$ $2^{94.42}$ KP</td>
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<td>[AAA+14]</td>
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<tr>
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<td>$2^{88.0}$ $2^{95.2}$ KP</td>
<td>$2^{-95.2}$</td>
<td>[CW16]</td>
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<td>[LLW17b]</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>$2^{127.6}$ $2^{127.6}$ CP</td>
<td>$2^{-126.6}$</td>
<td>[CW16]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

dynamic key-guessing, i.e., adaptive guessing of key bits to reduce the complexity. Their attacks are the most effective ones for our considered variants to the best of our knowledge, covering up to 37 rounds of Simon-96-96 and up to 49 rounds of Simon-128-128 in theory. Similar as for differentials, Liu et al. studied also optimal linear approximations [LLW17b] with an algorithm adapted from Matsui. Liu et al. found that optimal linear approximations can reach at most 28 rounds for Simon-96, and at most 37 rounds for Simon-128. They further found linear hulls with potential of $2^{-93.8}$ for 31 rounds of Simon-96, and $2^{-123.15}$ for 41 rounds of Simon-128.

**Integral, Impossible-differential, and Zero-correlation Distinguishers.** Integral attacks cover at most 22 rounds for Simon-96-96 and 26 rounds of Simon-128-128. Zhang et al. [ZWW15] found integrals on up to 21 and 25 rounds for Simon-96 and Simon-128. Their results were extended by one round each by Xiang et al. [XZBL16], and later by Todo and Morii [TM16]. The latter could show the absence of integrals for 25-round Simon-96. Their observation was confirmed by Kondo et al. [KST18].

Shen et al. [SLS+17] studied impossible-differential and zero-correlation distinguishers. The maximal number of rounds that such distinguishers can cover is given by at most twice the length of the maximal diffusion. Since this is given by 11 rounds for Simon-96 and 13 rounds for Simon-128-128 [KL15], such distinguishers can cover at most 22 and 26 rounds in the single-key setting.

For related keys, Kondo et al. [KST18] searched for iterative key differences in Simon. This allowed them to extend previous results by four to 15 rounds. For Simon-96-96, the authors found iterative key differentials for up to 20 rounds. Though, it remains unclear if this yields an impossible differential; in the best case, such a 20-round distinguisher can be extended by $2 + 2 + 2$ wrapping rounds: two more blank rounds where one of the key words is not used, plus two rounds where the key difference can be canceled by the state differences, plus two outermost rounds since the result of the non-linear function is independent of the key and therefore predictable in Simon. So, an impossible-differential
distinguisher could cover up to 26 rounds. Note that this upper bound that has not been formulated to an attack on the here-considered versions by Kondo et al. and is therefore not part of the attack overview in Table 3.

**Algebraic Cryptanalysis** is unlikely to be a threat on SIMON-like constructions for sufficiently many rounds. However, Raddum [Rad15] showed that the large number of rounds is necessary, by demonstrating that equation systems of up to 14 rounds of SIMON-96-96 and up to 16 rounds of SIMON-128 are efficiently solvable on an off-the-shelf laptop. Though, extensions are unknown at the moment.

**Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks** are successful primarily on primitives that do not use parts of the key space in sequences of several rounds. The SIMON-2w-2w versions use every key bit in each sequence of two subsequent rounds, which limits the chances of meet-in-the-middle attacks drastically. Considering 3-subset meet-in-the-middle attacks, together with an initial structure and partial matching, the length of an attack is limited to that of twice the full diffusion plus four rounds plus the maximal length of an initial structure plus two rounds for a splice-and-cut part, which yields 30 rounds as upper bound. Though, it is unlikely that such attacks cover 30 or more rounds on SIMON-2w-2w.

**Correlated Sequences.** A recent interesting direction may be correlated sequences [RG18]. Rohit and Gong’s technique requires only very few texts and could break 27 rounds of SIMON-32 and SIMECK-32 and thus, outperformed all previous attacks by at least 3 rounds. Though, that approach needs further investigation and has seen application only to SIMON-32-64 until now.

### 6.2 Implications to SimP

Clearly, the key schedule of SIMON is completely linear. Therefore, the two state words that are transformed by the key schedule allow complete prediction of differences, linear and algebraic properties through a full step. Though, SimP transforms each input word through at least 2rx rounds of SIMON.

**Related-key Differential Cryptanalysis.** SimP needs an analysis of related-key differential and linear characteristics. Though, with existing methods such as the exhaustive search in [LLW17a] or SAT solvers [KLT15], such a study is difficult due to the large state size since the known tools cannot scale appropriately. There exist peer-reviewed related-key results on SIMON, e.g., by Wang et al. [WWHL18]. Though, their search restricted to related-key trails for the small variants of the SIMON family, i.e., SIMON-32, SIMON-48, and SIMON-64.

We conducted experiments using the SAT-based approach from [KLT15] as well as using the approach from [LLW17a] to search optimal differential characteristics on SimP. Though, the related-key analysis of SIMON-like constructions is computationally difficult because of the large state size. We obtained improved trails for only up to seven rounds of SIMON-96; starting from eight rounds, the best found characteristics possessed a zero key difference for up to 10 rounds, which suggests that differences in the few key words do not improve the best single-key characteristics. So, it seems that the probabilities of the existing optimal differential characteristics and linear trails for SIMON-96-96 and SIMON-128-128 also hold for SimP-192-1 and SimP-256-1 from there. Table 4 compares the probabilities of optimal single- and related-key differential characteristics.

**Number of Steps and Rounds of SimP.** SimP benefits from the intensive cryptanalysis of SIMON. The usage of the key-update function of SIMON seems to not promote consid-
Table 4: Probabilities of optimal related-key differential characteristics for round-reduced variants of SIMON-96-96 and SIMON-128-128. $p$ denotes the probability; SK = single-key model, RK = related-key model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#Rounds</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$-\log_2(p)$ (SK)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$-\log_2(p)$ (RK)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

erably more effective differential or linear attacks compared to the single-key results on SIMON. The usage of the $2w$-word key appears not exploitable neither by differentials and linear characteristics, nor by techniques that try to exploit more available state such as meet-in-the-middle attacks. The reason is in the diffusion and the relatively large number of rounds.

The number of steps and the number of rounds in our employed instantiations of SimP have been chosen very conservatively, using the number of rounds per step $r_s$ as half the number of rounds in SIMON. This choice guarantees that each bit passes at least once through the full-round cipher, and therefore is expected to possess the algebraic degree of the full-round cipher. Moreover, the diffusion properties of SIMON render impossible-differential, zero-correlation, or integral attacks implausible.

The design of SimP is as close to the original design of SIMON as possible. Therefore, any considerable novel result in the cryptanalysis on SimP would most likely also be a higher threat on SIMON-2w-2w at the same time. Thus, such results are possible, but appear unrealistic in the mid-term future. Moreover, the higher number of rounds in SimP provide an additional security margin.

7 Features

Oribatida . . .

- . . . is optimized for messages as short as 8 bytes and
- . . . is optimized for message lengths in full bytes.

As given by [NIS18]

Flexibility. All versions of the Oribatida family support . . .

- . . . nonce lengths of at least 64 bits,
- . . . tag lengths of at least 96 bits,
- . . . plaintext lengths of up to $2^{50} - 1$ bytes,
- . . . associated-data lengths of up to $2^{50} - 1$ bytes, and
• ...processing $2^{50} - 1$ bytes under a single key.

In particular, our primary recommendation Oribatida-256-128 supports...

• ...a nonce length of 128 bits,
• ...a tag length of 128 bits, and
• ...a key length of up to 256 bits.

**Efficiency.** As a keyed sponge mode that initializes the state from key and nonce, the key preprocessing is efficient and requires only a single call to the permutation.

**Simplicity.** The sponge mode is well-understood and has been analyzed intensely. It is easily adaptable to a hash function or a MAC. The implementation overhead for the decryption is low since the encryption can also be performed with the sole forward direction of the permutation. Moreover, a round-reduced permutation is used in between the associated-data blocks to further boost the performance.

# 8 Hardware Implementation

This section considers the character of SimP and Oribatida for hardware implementations.

## 8.1 SimP

Below, we list hardware-implementation characteristics of SimP.

**SimP Is Lightweight** since its transformations are exactly the round function and the key-update function of Simon-96-96 or Simon-128-128, respectively. Both transformations are based on simple operations such as rotations, XORs, and ANDs that consume only routing resources and bit-wise logical operations. The area in GEs is approximately that of Simon-96 plus some overhead, which is caused from the need of an additional input to both transformations due to the swapping after $r_s$ rounds.

**Side-channel Resistance.** Unprotected implementations of Simon are vulnerable against differential power analysis attacks using the leakage generated by the transitions in the state register; the Hamming-distance model captures such leakage. Masking – in particular, Boolean masking (XORing a random value to the output of the round function) – is one countermeasure that can be easily applied to Simon. The simple structure of Simon components allow to explore other countermeasures such as unrolling rounds to achieve higher-order side-channel resistance.

**Latency.** SimP can be implemented in different levels of serialization, from fully serial that updates one bit per cycle, to a round-based implementation that updates the full state in one clock cycle. Depending on the choice, there is a broad implementation spectrum with a trade-off between throughput and area.

## 8.2 Oribatida

Below, we consider aspects of Oribatida when implementing it in hardware.
Table 5: Implementation results for SimP-256 and Oribatida-256-64 encryption/decryption and only encryption on Virtex 7 FPGA. LUTs = lookup tables; AD = associated data; Enc. = encryption; Dec. = decryption.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encryption Type</th>
<th>LUTs FF</th>
<th>#Slices</th>
<th>Frequency (MHz)</th>
<th>Clock cycles</th>
<th>Throughput (Mbps)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SimP-256</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>580.51</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1 076.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SimP-192</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>581.98</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1 054.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oribatida-256-64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enc. and Dec.</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>554.16</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1 043.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enc. only</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>560.71</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1 055.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Oribatida Is Simple. It can be implemented efficiently with little extra cost compared to the duplex sponge. Additional costs result from the use of a module to generate the constants for the domain separation, which can be held in ROM. In modern FPGAs, this module takes only four LUTs. For domain separation, only a four-bit XOR is necessary at the input for capacity of the permutation. An additional 64-bit register to store a mask, and a 64-bit XOR to add the mask to the ciphertext is required.

Oribatida Allows A Wide Spectrum of Implementations. The use of SimP as its main building block allows to directly transfer the same strategy of using different data-path sizes to Oribatida. Thus, the implementer can choose among various trade-offs between throughput, latency, area, and power consumption.

Side-channel Resistance. In terms of side-channel resistance, the same aspects that hold for SimP also hold for the mode Oribatida. Thus, Oribatida does not introduce additional weaknesses of side channels.

Table 5 lists the implementations results obtained from Xilinx Vivado 2018 optimizing for area. All results represent measurements after the place-and-route process.

In Table 5, we list two columns for the number of clock cycles and throughput, the first one is for associated data processing (reduced rounds SimP) and the second for message processing (normal SimP). Our results represent the first implementation attempts of Oribatida that leaves still room for improvements as explained above.

9 Software Implementation

SimP Is Very Lightweight and Flexible. For SimP, only the round function and the key-update function of Simon have to be implemented, which can be realized using only rotations, logical ANDs and XORs. Since those operations treat individual bits separately without dependencies among the bits of the same words, the employed internal state size can be arbitrary. Therefore, SimP is well-suited for a variety of platforms independent of word-size limitations. There are no S-boxes or complex constants that must be stored; the RAM and ROM sizes are expected low. The round constants $z_i$ can be implemented compactly using a five-bit Linear Feedback-shift Register [BSS+13].

SimP Alleviates Side-channel Countermeasures. The lack for S-boxes renders constant-time implementations straight-forward. Moreover, the low degree of the internal function alleviates protections with maskings or sharing-based countermeasures such as threshold implementations or consolidated masking schemes.
The Memory Footprint of Oribatida Is Also Low. The full implementation state is given by the $n$-bit state, the subsequent block, plus the overhead from the mask size, plus the result of initializing the key. Note that the key needs one single preprocessing call to the permutation $P$ at initialization. Moreover, there is no overhead for the decryption operation of the primitive in Oribatida.

To minimize the memory requirements, e.g., Oribatida-192-96 needs 96-bits register for the block, 96 bits for the mask, plus 192 bits for the current state, and 128 bits for the key. Note that the state size of Oribatida is analogous to that of lightweight block ciphers with 128-bit security and small 64-bit state such as GIFT or LED. Though, such primitives either lead to birthday-bound security of at most $2^{32}$ blocks encrypted under the same key, or must be used in modes with security beyond the birthday bound that are usually slower. Therefore, they require further memory to store the previous state. To provide high security, block-cipher-based modes often have to occupy more memory.

10 Intellectual Property

The submitters are not aware of any patent involved in Oribatida. Furthermore, Oribatida will not be patented. If any of this information changes, the submitters will promptly (and within at most one month) announce these changes on the mailing list of the NIST lightweight competition.

According to [BSS+18], “SIMON and SPECK are free from any intellectual property restrictions. [The work on SIMON and SPECK] was prepared by a United States Government employee and, therefore, is excluded from copyright by Section 105 of the Copyright Act of 1976. The algorithms [of SIMON and SPECK] are free for anyone to use. There are no patent or licensing restrictions. Copyright and related rights are expressly waived through the CC0 1.0 Universal License.”
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