Dear all,

There seems to be a mistake in the dme_implementation document. The irreducible polynomial $S^3 + c S^2 + d S + e$ defined at page 3 is in fact not irreducible.

The constants $c$ and $d$ in the document do not agree with the value in the reference implementation (which are likely the correct values because they do define an irreducible polynomial).

Kind regards,

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Dear all,

I believe that the DME system does not reach the claimed level of security.

The public key is a polynomial map with 6 components in 6 variables over a finite field GF(2^48) of the form \( P = L_3 \circ G_2 \circ L_2 \circ G_1 \circ L_1 \), where the \( L_i \) are invertible linear maps.

If we represent the map over GF(2), we get a map \( P' \) of 6*48 components in 6*48 variables, and the maps \( G_i \) become quadratic maps \( G'_i \).

We can decompose the degree 4 map \( P' \) into the composition of two quadratic maps with the algorithm of Faugère and Perret [1]. The Complexity of this algorithm is \( O(n^9) \), where \( n \) is the number of variables, so we can estimate the bit cost of this step to be roughly \( (6*48)^9 \), which is approximately \( 2^{74} \), much less than the claimed security level of 256 bits.

Now we have \( P' = Q_2 \circ Q_1 \), where we know that the \( Q_1 \) is isomorphic to \( G'_2 \), and \( Q_1 \) isomorphic to \( G'_1 \). Generic algorithms that solve the Isomorphism of Polynomials e.g.[2] can recover this isomorphism with a cost that is \( O(2^{n/2}) \), so approximately \( 2^{144} \). Once these isomorphisms are recovered, they can be used to invert the public key and thus break the cryptosystem.

Note that both steps (finding the decomposition, and finding the isomorphisms) are done with generic algorithms. It is conceivable that the structure of the public map can be exploited to do the steps more efficiently. (And this seems very likely for the isomorphism finding step)

Kind regards,

Ward


Dear Ward,

thanks again for your remarks. I was not aware of the paper [1]. I will check the paper and i will check also your estimates, but I believe that they are OK. That means that we need to change the parameters of DME to double the security bits, we will explore and implement different options:

DME(4,2,64) this scheme will give 64 monomials in each polynomial, double the message and public key size and I estimate that it will multiply by 4 the computation time.

DME(6,2,44) this scheme will produce 144 monomials, double the message size and multiply by 4 (roughly). We do not implemented yet this scheme and we do not have estimate for the time.

A better option will be change the matrix of the first exponential by putting 3 non zero entries instead of to 2. Let's denote by DME3 this scheme then DME3(4,2,36) will give the same message size (288 bits) but it will produce 256 monomials and multiply by 4 the public key size. In this case when when we represent the map over F_2 we get degree 6 polynomial map that is a composition of a degree 3 and a degree 2 polynomial map. We will try to compute the complexity of the IP problem for the cubic polynomials to estimate the complexity of your attack for this scheme.

Once you have the decomposition and the 2 quadratic maps G_1 and G_2 how do you invert them and what is the complexity?

Best regards,
Ignacio

El viernes, 29 de diciembre de 2017, 0:14:28 (UTC+1), Ward Beullens escribió:

Dear all,

I believe that the DME system does not reach the claimed level of security.

The public key is a polynomial map with 6 components in 6 variables over a finite field GF(2^48) of the form P = L_3 ° G_2 ° L_2 ° G_1 ° L_1 , where the L_i are invertible linear maps.

If we represent the map over GF(2), we get a map P' of 6*48 components in 6*48 variables, and the maps G_i become quadratic maps G'_i.

We can decompose the degree 4 map P' into the composition of two quadratic maps with the algorithm of Faugère and Perret [1]. The Complexity of this algorithm is O(n^9), where n is the number of variables, so we can estimate the bit cost of this step to be roughly
Dear Ignacio, Dear all,

TL;DR: I the new parameters of the DME scheme are not secure. The following describes an attack that reduces the security in the exponent by more than half.

Recall that the attack on DME that I proposed earlier consisted of 2 steps.

1) Represent the public key map over \( F_2 \), which will make it a polynomial map of degree 4. Decompose this polynomial map into the composition of two quadratic polynomial maps.

2) We know each of the quadratic components is isomorphic to a known quadratic map (the representation of \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \) over \( F_2 \)) which we know how to invert. The second step is to recover this isomorphism with an IP solver.

The complexity of the first step with the algorithm of [1] is \( O(n^9) \), where \( n \) is the number of variables of the decomposed map, or equivalently the number of bits of a ciphertext.

The complexity of the second with the algorithm of [2] is \( O(2^{(n/2)}). \)

The adaptations proposed by Ignacio increase \( n \) enough to make the second step infeasible. But the complexity of the first step remains much lower than the targeted security level.

I did some experiments and it turns out that the degree of regularity of the quadratic components is very low. In fact, in all experiments the highest degree reached during a GB computation was 3. This means that once a decomposition is found, the public map can be efficiently inverted by doing a GB computations on each component. This means that the complexity of the attack is dominated by the complexity of the first step.

Ignacio also proposed to use \( 3 \) (instead of \( 2 \)) nonzero entries in the rows of matrix of the first exponentiation. With this adaptation, if we represent the public key over \( F_2 \) it becomes a degree 6 polynomial map which is the composition of a degree 2 with a degree 3 map. I believe (correct me if I am wrong) that the complexity of decomposing this map with the algorithm of [1] is \( O(n^{15}) \).

According to my experiments the degree of regularity of the cubic component map is 4, so preimages for this map can still be found efficiently with a GB computation, and again we can say that the complexity of the attack is dominated by the complexity of decomposing the public key.

For the different parametrizations of Ignacio I estimate the complexity of the attack as:

- \( \text{DME}(4, 2, 64) \rightarrow (4 \times 2 \times 64)^{9} \sim 2^{81} \)
- \( \text{DME}(6, 2, 44) \rightarrow (6 \times 2 \times 44)^{9} \sim 2^{81} \)
- \( \text{DME3}(4, 2, 36) \rightarrow (4 \times 2 \times 36)^{15} \sim 2^{122} \)
So none of the proposed parameter sets seem to reach the claimed security level of 256 bits.

I'll finish with a note on the experiments I did. I did not implement the algorithm for decomposing the public key. I generated the two components $L_3 \circ G_2 \circ L_2$ and $G_1 \circ L_1$, represented them over $F_2$, composed these quadratic maps with random invertible linear maps over $F_2$. This is what the output of the decomposition algorithm [1] would output. Then I used the PolyBoRi library [3] to find an inverse for a random point in $GF(2)^{6*e}$. The highest degree encountered during the GB computation was 3, except in the DME3 case, where the degree was 4. As expected I always found a unique solution.

Finding an inverse for one of the components of DME(3,2,24) (which was originally proposed to have 128 bits of security) took only 565 seconds.

Kind regards,
Ward


Sage code for the experiments on the first component of DME(3,2,24), the code for the second component and the experiments for DME3 is very similar. (This was my first time working with sage, so I apologize if my code is not very clean.)

```python
from time import time
e = 24;
KS= GF(2);
K = GF(2^e);
R = PolynomialRing(K,'X');
R.inject_variables();

#Find irreducible polynomial
while True:
    a = K.random_element();
    b = K.random_element();
    IP = X^2 + a*X + b;
    if IP.is_irreducible():
        break;

#multiplication over a degree 2 extension field of K
def mulK2(A,B):
    t0 = A[0]*B[0];
    t1 = A[1]*B[0] + A[0]*B[1];
```
\[ t2 = A[1] \times B[1]; \]
return \( t0 + b \times t2, t1 + a \times t2 \)

# squaring an element of a degree 2 extension of \( K \) a total of \( n \) times

```python
def squareK2(A, n):
    if n == 0:
        return A;
    B = mulK2(A, A);
    return squareK2(B, n - 1);
```

# find values of \( E_{ij} \) such that the exponentiation map is bijective (for vectors with nonzero entries)

```python
while True:
    E11 = ZZ.random_element(0, 2*e);
    E12 = ZZ.random_element(0, 2*e);
    E21 = ZZ.random_element(0, 2*e);
    E23 = ZZ.random_element(0, 2*e);
    E32 = ZZ.random_element(0, 2*e);
    E33 = ZZ.random_element(0, 2*e);
    det = \(-2^{(E11+E23+E32)}-2^{(E12+E21+E33)};\)
    if gcd(det, \(2^e-1\)) == 1:
        break;
```

# Find \( L_1 \)

```python
while True:
    L1 = matrix([[K.random_element(), K.random_element(), 0, 0, 0, 0],
                  [K.random_element(), K.random_element(), 0, 0, 0, 0],
                  [0, 0, K.random_element(), K.random_element(), 0, 0],
                  [0, 0, K.random_element(), K.random_element(), 0, 0],
                  [0, 0, 0, 0, K.random_element(), K.random_element()],
                  [0, 0, 0, 0, K.random_element(), K.random_element()]])
    if L1.is_invertible():
        break;
```

# matrix \( M \) for conversion between GF\(2^e\) and GF\(2^e\)

```python
t = K.gen()
M = matrix([[ (t^j)^{2^i} for j in range(0, e)] for i in range(0, e)]);
Minv = M^-1
```

```python
MM = matrix(K, 6, 6*e);
Mrow0 = M.matrix_from_rows([0]);
```

```python
for i in range(0, 6):
    MM.set_block(i, e*i, Mrow0);
```

```python
def G1L1(x):
    x = L1 * x;
    y = matrix(K, 6, 1);
    y[0], y[1] = mulK2(squareK2((x[0], x[1]), E11), squareK2((x[2], x[3]), E12));
    y[2], y[3] = mulK2(squareK2((x[0], x[1]), E21), squareK2((x[4], x[5]), E23));
    y[4], y[5] = mulK2(squareK2((x[2], x[3]), E32), squareK2((x[4], x[5]), E33));
    return y;
```
def G1L1Decomposed(x):
    return G1L1(MM*x);

R = BooleanPolynomialRing(e*6,'x')
X = R.gens()
polynomials = [0] * 6*e

#calculating the coefficients of representation of G_1 o L_1 over F_2
for i in range(0,6*e):
    for j in range(i,6*e):
        vec = matrix(K,6*e,1)
        vec[i] = 1;
        vec[j] = 1;
        Q = G1L1Decomposed(vec);
        for k in range(0,6):
            Powers = matrix((Q[k][0])^(2^n) for n in range(0,e));
            outVec = Minv * Powers;
            for l in range(0,e):
                if outVec[l,0] != 0:
                    polynomials[e*k+l] += X[i]*X[j];

#Pick a random element to forge a signature for
for i in range(0,6*e):
    if (ZZ.random_element(2) == 0):
        #print(i)
        polynomials[i] = polynomials[i] + 1

I = R.ideal(polynomials)

start = time()

GB = I.groebner_basis(prot = True);

print("GB computation took",time()-start,"seconds")

for x in GB:
    print(x)
Dear Ward, dear all

you are right on your comment about the posible decomposition of the map in two exponentials. If it is easy to do the decomposition then there is not great advantage in to use two exponentials.

Thanks for the practical proof that if one decompose the cuartic map over \( F_2 \) in two cuadratic maps the resulting quadratic map are not difficult to invert for the proposed parameters, in fact the make reason to take to exponential round was to make it safe against this attack over \( F_2 \) while keeping the message and key size small.

Below I will explain how can we make the decomposition very hard with a small modification of DME3, namely the total map will be

\[
F: F_{q^6} \rightarrow F_{q^8} \text{ instead of } F: F_{q^6} \rightarrow F_{q^6}. \]

First let me confess that I’m not totally convinced that the main algorithm of [1] can be applied over \( F_2 \) as is. It seems to me that you need to use a big field, in the case of \( F_2 \) you can work over an extension \( F_{(2^e)} \) but in this case resulting the polynomials will be of higher degree. Even if we use the complexity in [1] the following instance of DME3 will be safe:

We can change the initial linear map by adding a first map \( L_0 : F_{q^6} \rightarrow F_{q^8} \) as follows

\[
L_0(x_1, \ldots, x_6) = (x_1, \ldots, x_6, x_2 \times x_4 \times x_6, 0)
\]

and changing the first exponential map

\[
G_1: (F_{q^2})^4 \rightarrow (F_{q^2})^4 \quad \text{that now is defined by a 4x4 matrix with with 3 non zero entries} \ A_1 := (aij) \quad \text{and the entries of the last column arey} \ ai4 = 2^u + 2^v. \quad \text{We use also that} \ x_2 \times x_4 \times x_6 \text{ is non zero.}
\]

Lets keep calling by DME3 the scheme. The parameter for the DME3(3,2,48) are

\[
q = 2^{48}, \quad \text{the total map is} \quad F: F_{q^6} \rightarrow F_{q^8},
\]

each component has 64 monomials and the size of the pk is 3072 bytes this gives for kem ct=48 pk=3072 sk=288 bytes=33 instead of the original ct=36 pk=2304 sk=288 bytes=33

If we represent the composition of the two exponentials over \( F_2 \) the first one has degree \( 2 \times 2 + 3 = 8 \) because of the exponents of \( x_2 \times x_4 \times x_6 \). Then the complexity given by [1] is

\[
O(n^45)=(48)^3(3*15)=O(2^{367}).
\]

Notice that by changing the exponents ai4 one can increase easily the degree of the first exponential over \( F_2 \), for instance taking ai4=\( 2^u + 2^v + 2^w \) the degree of \( G_1 \) is \( 2 + 2 \times 4 = 10 \) that gives a complexity for [1] of \( O(n^{57})=(48)^3(3*19)=O(2^{465}) \). That means that the scheme is practically immune against any algorithm of decomposition whose complexity depends strongly on the total degree of the maps over \( F_2 \).

We will use the web page http://www.mat.ucm.es/~iluengo/DME/ an updated version of the documentation with the typos corrected and an appendix given more details of the setting of DME3. In a few weeks will put an optimized implementation of DME3(3,2,48) and DME3(5,2,28), because we will revise first the complexity of the different algorithms of decomposition over \( F_2 \).

Best regards,
Ignacio
Dear Ward, dear all,

I have found that in the interesting paper [2] the authors prove with a different method the main results of [1] and they state in Theorem 1 that their result are valid for a sufficiently large finite field. Regarding the validity over $\mathbb{F}_2$ in Problem 3 (p. 346) they ask "does there exist a polynomial-time algorithm for Boolean polynomials?"

Please note that for any other field different than $\mathbb{F}_2$ the complexity given by [1] for DME(3,2,48) is bigger than 256 bits. For instance for $\mathbb{F}_4$ the two polynomials $g_1$ and $g_2$ have degree $d_1=d_2=4$ and $n=144$ the complexity of [1] is $O(n^3(d_1d_2-1))=O(2^{322})$. For $\mathbb{F}_8$, the degrees are $d_1=d_2=8$, $n=72$ and the complexity is $O(n^3(d_1d_2-1))=O(2^{1166})$.

Best regards,
Ignacio


[2] Shangwei Zhao, Ruyong Feng, Xiao-Shan Gao
Dear all,

there is a missed parenthesis in the complexity formulas. They should be $O(n^3(d1*d2-1)))=O(2^{322})$ and
$O(n^3(d1*d2-1)))=O(2^{1166})$.
I apologize for the typos.
Best regards,
Ignacio

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El jueves, 11 de enero de 2018, 22:05:39 (UTC+1), IGNACIO LUENGO VELASCO escribió:

I have found that in the interesting paper [2] the authors prove with a different method the main results of [1] and they state in Theorem 1 that their result are valid for a sufficiently large finite field.
Regarding the validity over $F_{2}$ in Problem 3 (p. 346) they ask "does there exist a polynomial-time algorithm for Boolean polynomials?"
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Best regards,
Ignacio


[2] Shangwei Zhao, Ruyong Feng,Xiao-Shan Gao

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Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/group/pqc-forum/.
I would like to remind/clarify to Ward and everyone else that NIST will be evaluating the security of all submissions (including but not limited to DME) with respect to the original algorithm and parameters contained in the submission; for the 1st round, as per the call for proposals, we are not allowing changes to submitted algorithm or parameters to avoid moving targets.

On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 4:12 PM, IGNACIO LUENGO VELASCO <iluengo@ucm.es> wrote:

Dear all,

there is a missed parenthesis in the complexity formulas. They should be $O(n^3*(d1*d2-1))=O(2^{322})$ and $O(n^3*(d1*d2-1))=O(2^{1166})$. I apologize for the typos.
Best regards,
Ignacio

El jueves, 11 de enero de 2018, 22:05:39 (UTC+1), IGNACIO LUENGO VELASCO escribió:

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Best regards,
Ignacio


[2] Shangwei Zhao, Ruyong Feng,Xiao-Shan Gao

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Dear Ignacio,

Are you suggesting that the decomposition algorithm of [1] will not work on the PK of DME over F_2?

I am really not an expert on this functional decomposition stuff, but quoting the results of [2] as saying that the algorithm does not work over F_2 seems far-fetched. They prove that, given a random decomposable system of polynomials, the algorithm succeeds with probability close to one when the finite field is large enough. This is really not the same as saying that the algorithm does not work over F_2. Even if the algorithm of [1] only works for a small fraction of the public keys, this would still be a huge problem for DME.

Of course, the best way to find out is to run the algorithm and see if it works. I'll try to do this when I get the time.

Kind regards,
Ward.

Op 11/01/2018 om 22:05 schreef IGNACIO LUENGO VELASCO:

Dear Ward, dear all,

I have found that in the interesting paper [2] the authors prove with a different method the main results of [1] and they state in Theorem 1 that their result are valid for a sufficiently large finite field. Regarding the validity over F_2 in Problem 3 (p. 346) they ask "does there exist a polynomial-time algorithm for Boolean polynomials?" Please note that for any other field different than F_2 the complexity given by [1] for DME(3,2,48) is bigger than 256 bits. For instance for F_4 the two polynomials g1 and g2 have degree 1= d2=4 and n=144 the complexity of [1] is O(n^3*(d1*d2-1))=O(2^322). For F_8, the degrees are d1=d2=8, n=72 and the complexity is O(n^3*(d1*d2-1))=O(2^1166).

Best regards,
Ignacio


[2] Shangwei Zhao, Ruyong Feng, Xiao-Shan Gao

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Dear Ward,

I am no expert in all this field either, so maybe I am missing something, but from a very quick look at paper [2], I see that in the proof of Theorem 5 they use the fact that matrix A is regular, and prove it by relating its determinant to Vandermonde determinants and a constant. This constant turns out to be a power of 2, so this argument fails in characteristic 2.

It could happen, however, that even if the argument given in the paper does not apply to characteristic 2, the method or some variant of it could still find a decomposition of the map. As you said, the best way to know would be to actually implement and test it.

Best,

Miguel

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Dear Ward,

we thank you for your nice work that breaks the implementation we submitted to the NIST. We thank your final acknowledge that the attack can be basically prevented by using a stronger padding scheme.

The attack is based on the property that the DME map is quasi-homogeneous for certain choices of weights in the variables, that is if \( CT=(y_1,\ldots,y_6)=F(x_1,\ldots,x_6) \), then for any \( c \) in \( F_q \{-0\} \) i we put \((a_1,a_2,a_3)=G_1^{-1}(c,c,c)\) and \((b_1,b_2)=G_2(c,c)\), where \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \) are the matrices of the exponential then \( F(a_1^bx_1,a_2^bx_2,a_3^bx_3,a_2^bx_4,a_3^bx_5,a_3^bx_6)=(b_1y_1,b_1y_2,b_1y_3,b_2y_4,b_2y_5,b_2y_6) \). That is an essential property of the scheme, but a proper padding with some hash can be used to hide the quasi-homogeneity from the attacker.

Let me mention that, in the submission, we only used a very dummy padding scheme (just setting 3 bytes to the fixed value 0x01) because we were very short of time and we focused on the kernel of the DME, considering that the padding could be added later by using some standard method. For that same reason, we didn't include any secure treatment for the cases were the decapsulation finds an improperly padded message. The reason why Ward’s attack succeeds is precisely because we use this dummy padding scheme.

as we mention in the paper, in order to be able to resist against an IND-CCA2 attack were the attacker can perform \( 2^{64} \) queries to the decapsulation oracle, we would need at least a padding that involves more than 64 bits of randomness.

We are considering alternatives for a secure padding and we are open for suggestions. If someone has an idea about a secure way to pad the message, please get in contact with us.

We will shortly implement DME as described in the paper (with a proper padding that adds 128 bits to a 256 bit message) and put the reference implementation in our webpage and in github.

With this changes in the implementation we keep our claim that DME achieves security level 5.

Let me also mention that in the submission paper we describe the use of DME for signature but we where unable to finish the implementation on time for the NIST deadline and that is the reason that we do not submit a candidate for signature.

Finally, we would like to announce that we have found a new algorithm for the key generation for the DME that reduces the time for key
generation time by a factor of 28 so an increase in size the field q will not represent a big penalty in the key generation time. Let me explain a little the details of the new algorithm that we will use in the new implementation.

The public key is formed by 6 polynomials \( \{F_i\} \) each of them has 64 monomials in 6 variables. The key generation algorithm in the reference implementation uses interpolation with 64 pairs of (plain_text, cypher_text) computed with private key.

The new key generation algorithm computes directly a 64x6 matrix with the coefficients of the polynomials \( \{F_i\} \) from the matrices of the (secret) linear components using operations on matrices that includes tensor (Kronecker) product of matrices.

Here I put the timing statistics for 1000 tests in a core i5 computer. We give timings and number of field additions and field multiplications:

SKEY→PKEY (via interpolation): mean = 55340.570[us], std_dev = 261.851[us],
\[ F_q(\text{add}) = 279859, F_q(\text{mul}) = 279940 \]

SKEY→PKEY (via tensor product): mean = 1942.790[us], std_dev = 8.880[us],
\[ F_q(\text{add}) = 3901, F_q(\text{mul}) = 10142 \]

As you can see the new algorithm is 28 faster. You can compare it with the time for encryption and decryption and it is faster than decryption:

ENCRYPT: mean = 261.460[us], std_dev = 4.291[us],
\[ F_q(\text{add}) = 384, F_q(\text{mul}) = 1368 \]

DECRYPT: mean = 4117.590[us], std_dev = 8.913[us],
\[ F_q(\text{add}) = 25188, F_q(\text{mul}) = 25188 \]

Best regards,
Ignacio

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