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**From:** AE Louisy <louisy.ae@gmail.com>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 21, 2018 12:02 PM  
**To:** pqc-comments  
**Cc:** pqc-forum@list.nist.gov  
**Subject:** OFFICIAL COMMENT: DualModeMS

Dear DualModeMS team,

I have two questions concerning your scheme:

In order to obtain EUF-CMA security, a modification is made to the Inner Layer. This modification is based on adding an  $l$ -long bit string to the original digest to compute a new one. I was wondering what value of  $l$  is chosen for the three parameter sets given.

I also wanted to know how exactly the choice to make  $2^\Delta$  trees instead of one changes the size of the public key. I understand that having several trees means that each root needs a tag to identify it, but that results in public key sizes still slightly smaller than the ones given in the supporting documentation.

Sincerely,

A-E. Louisy,

Student in cryptography at Versailles University

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**From:** Jocelyn Ryckeghem <Jocelyn.Ryckeghem@lip6.fr>  
**Sent:** Monday, September 10, 2018 9:49 AM  
**To:** pqc-comments; AE Louisy  
**Cc:** pqc-forum@list.nist.gov; Jean-Charles Faugere; Ludovic Perret  
**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] OFFICIAL COMMENT: DualModeMS

Dear Louisy,

In DualModeMS,  $2^{\delta}$  is the number of Merkle trees. Each root is stored in the public key, so the size of the public key is  $2^{\delta}$  SHA3 hash. Moreover, we add in the public key a seed of  $K$  bits ( $K$  is the level of security in bits). It is used to generate  $Z$ , a set of tau elements of  $GF(2^k)$ .

So, the size of the public key is:

for  $K=128$ ,  $2^4 * 256$  bits + 128 bits = 528 bytes.

for  $K=192$ ,  $2^5 * 384$  bits + 192 bits = 1560 bytes.

for  $K=256$ ,  $2^5 * 512$  bits + 256 bits = 2080 bytes.

In the specification, the size of the public for  $K=256$  is noted as 2112 bytes. This is a typo, the true size is 2080 bytes.

About the EUF-CMA security of the Inner layer, our implementation does not propose this functionality. However, as also mentioned in the GeMSS specification, there is a standard technique that allows to obtain EUF-CMA security for the Inner layer. The length  $l$  of a random salt should be 128 bits (for the three parameter sets) since the number of signature requests is assumed limited to  $2^{64}$ .

Best regards,  
the DualModeMS team.

AE Louisy <louisy.ae@gmail.com> wrote:

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