Dear authors, dear all,

we have studied the vulnerability of LEDApkc against a reaction attack and would like to point to a new reaction attack which we think is relevant for this cryptosystem. The description of our attack is available at:


Best regards,

Tomas Fabsic, Viliam Hromada, Pavol Zajac
Dear Tomas, Viliam and Pavol,

thank you for pointing out this improved version of your previous statistical attack based on reactions.

We observe that the effectiveness of this attack has been verified under the following two assumptions:

i) \( n_0 = 2 \),

ii) artificially increased DFR through modified system parameters.

In this respect, we have the following comments.

1) According to our preliminary evaluations, the number of candidates for \( G \) increases approximately as \( 2^{n_0^2} p^{n_0^2} \), thus the efficiency of this attack against the LEDApkc instances with \( n_0 > 2 \) cannot be claimed (and we believe is questionable).

2) Assumption ii) ignores the fact that the number of decryptions to reconstruct the matrix \( Q \) depends also on the rate of change of the DFR as a function of the number of errors \( t \) near the working point of the code on the said curve. Therefore, the conclusions drawn by artificially changing the working point of the code cannot be easily generalized to the parameter sets in the LEDApkc proposal.

Based on the above considerations, we believe that the arguments provided in your paper are not sufficient to prove that this attack affects the LEDApkc instances with \( n_0 = 2 \) at their DFR working point.

Concerning LEDApkc instances with higher \( n_0 \), there is no evidence of the efficiency of this attack even under the assumption of an artificially increased DFR.

In any case, please take into account that \( \text{DFR}^{-1} \) can be considered as a lower bound on the number of safe encryptions/decryptions for any LEDApkc keypair, independently of reaction attacks and their future evolution.

Best regards,
-- The LEDApkc team
Dear all,

we prepared a document as an official comment on LEDA kem and LEDA pkc (attached to this message and available at the url reported below) in which:

** We provide our quantification of the quantum and classic computational effort levels we considered as the computational requirements to break AES. We relied on classical circuit design estimates for the classical computing complexity, and on the work by Grassl et al. at PQCrypto 2016 for the quantum computing complexity.

** We delineate an automatic procedure to find an optimal set of parameters for LEDA kem/LEDA pkc matching the aforementioned security margin. We pair this procedure with the release of the sources of a parameter computation tool for LEDA kem/LEDA pkc. The sources are hereby placed in the public domain, and we welcome contributions and suggestions.

** Our approach to the estimation of the computational effort required to perform Information Set Decoding attacks was to evaluate their complexity in the finite regime (as opposed to employing asymptotic bounds), and to perform an exhaustive search in the parameter space of the algorithms.

We report that, concerning the parameter sizes of the LEDA cryptosystems, the advantages offered by more recent ISD algorithms over the proposal by Stern in 1988 are lower than a factor of 2^4.

** We report new running time and key size figures for the optimal parameter sets, showing a x3.5--x6.8 speedup on the reference implementation and a ~x2 key size reduction w.r.t. the submission parameters.

** We propose a novel technique allowing us to design a set of QC-LDPC code parameters for use in LEDA kem/LEDA pkc deriving an upper bound to the code DFR in closed-form. This allows to include a bound on the DFR as a parameter design criterion.

** We report sample sets of parameters targeting an upper bound for the DFR of 2^-64 for long term keys in LEDA pkc.

The full document is both attached to this message, and hosted at https://www.ledacrypt.org/archives/official_comment.pdf

The public domain software implementation of the automated procedure for the design of tight and optimal sets of parameters for the LEDA cryptosystems is available at https://github.com/LEDAcrypt/LEDAtools

At the same address, we also provide a software tool to compute the complexity of the considered ISD attacks, given a set of code parameters.

The header files containing the revised parameter sets which tightly match the security requirements are both hosted at
https://www.ledacrypt.org/archives/new_parameter_headerfiles.zip, and available on our github repositories, tagged as version 1.1.0 of the codebase.

The revised codebase also includes the appropriate modifications to cope with an artificially higher number of errors being inserted in the message (i.e. a check for the number of errors has been added) and the modifications suggested in the previous official comments.

Best regards,
--LEDA team
Dear NIST and pqc-forum subscribers,

with this message we want to announce the merger of the LEDAkem and LEDApkc proposals.

* Concerning the similarity of the submissions, we note that the LEDAkem and LEDApkc primitives are based on equivalent mathematical trapdoors, i.e., the syndrome and codeword decoding problems for quasi-cyclic codes. LEDAkem’s key encapsulation exploits a Niederreiter formulation that allows fast operations when randomly generated messages (like keys) are conveyed. LEDApkc’s public key encryption scheme is directly derived from LEDAkem, but exploiting a McEliece formulation for the purpose of natively allowing more information to be encrypted in one go and employing the IND-CCA2 (assuming no decryption failures) gamma-construction proposed by Kobara and Imai.

* Concerning the parameter sets proposed, we note that LEDAkem and LEDApkc can be employed with the same parameter sets (as per the original submission) if a lifetime for the private key of 1/(DFR) decryptions satisfies the practical LEDApkc application scenario.  
If this is not the case, our analysis (reported in our official comment 2018-10-01) on the upper bounds of the DFR provided by the QC-LDPC codes employed in the LEDA cryptosystems allows to scale the parameters to the desired DFR. While the original submission of LEDAkem and LEDApkc pointed to a common set of parameters, if admitted to the second round we will provide differentiated parameter sets allowing to achieve lower DFRs for LEDApkc, where the DFR figure has some security impacts (for instance, when considering reaction attacks).
No changes, besides the ones due to the tighter parametrization proposed in our official comment are expected to the LEDAkem parameters.

* We acknowledge the fact that we are merging a KEM and a PKE scheme: this is explicitly allowed by the NIST merger guidelines. The schemes will retain, in the merged proposal, their corresponding security guarantees, as there will be no difference in their algorithmic description.

* We will provide, by the requested deadline, new signed IP statements for the merged submission as per NIST’s request. We will carry on in our current line of proposing a patent-free cryptosystem and public domain licensed code base to avoid any issue to whomever may be willing to research on, implement or adopt the LEDA cryptosystems.

* We confirm that we will provide a merged submission package and the corresponding documentation if admitted to the second round, as per NIST’s request. We foresee a simpler description of the merged submission in a single specification document and a simplification of the code base, which currently shares a non negligible amount of components, reducing the code footprint.

The LEDAkem and LEDApkc team

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