Two notes:

1. I see a potential implementation pitfall that should have been at least noted in the specification. Due to the fact $216091 \equiv 27 \mod 256$, $756839 \equiv 103 \mod 256$, the most significant byte of serialize(S) is going to have less entropy (under whatever/most optimistic assumption) than would be necessary to hide encode(seed). While the concrete implementations don’t ever end up using those most significant bytes, there is no clear indication that they are unsafe to use and there ought to be.

2. The specification of the decapsulation algorithm is woefully and inherently non-constant time (the way you determine if one of the decodings is “good” and then break from a loop if you’ve found a good one). Having run some cycle-counting it seems very feasible to learn from the time Decaps takes with high probability how many “bad” encodings there were. As at least 1 bad encoding occurs with pretty high frequency this could probably yield useful information that could allow mounting a CCA attack (although I haven’t worked out the details yet).

Like any timing issue, it should obviously be fixable without too much trouble at the cost of worse performance on average.

—Jacob Alperin-Sheriff
Hi Jacob, hi all,

1. Unless I misunderstand, you mean to mod out by 8 and not by 256. So there are only 216091%8=3 and 756839%8=7 bits left in the most significant byte. Also, serialize(S) is cut into chunks of 255 bytes which are then used to mask codewords of the same length. So there are only 216091%(8*255)=1891 and 756839%(8*255)=2039 bits of masking material left in the last chunk, which obviously is not enough to mask a 255*8=2040 bit codeword. So the most significant byte and the most significant chunk should not be used (and they aren't). I agree that this is worth a cautionary note.

2. Completing the loop regardless of early success will make a timing attack more difficult, but not impossible. The current implementation relies on non-constant-time Reed-Solomon error correction as well as non-constant-time big number arithmetic. It is possible to make everything constant-time, but maybe only with a little more than "not too much" trouble ;)

Alan

On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Alperin-Sheriff, Jacob (Fed) <jacob.alperin-sheriff@nist.gov> wrote:
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> 
> 
> I see a potential implementation pitfall that should have been at
> least noted in the specification. Due to the fact 216091%256 = 27,
> 756839%256=103, the most significant byte of serialize(S) is going to
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> > trouble at the cost of worse performance on average.
> 
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> 
>
Dear Jacob, Dear Alan, Dear All,

Previous month we posted an attack on LWE based schemes that rely on Error Correcting Codes (ECC). We showed that if the decoding step of the ECC leaks side-channel information about the presence of errors, we could use this information to attack the scheme and obtain the secret key. This vulnerability is not only present in LWE-based schemes, but also in other post-quantum schemes with ECC’s. We demonstrate this for Ramstake, a Mersenne prime scheme, where we mount a timing attack that recovers the full secret key in a matter of minutes.

Just as in the timing attack on LAC, we use timing variations in the execution of the error correcting codes to detect errors and break the IND-CCA security. These timing variations were already observed by Jacob Alperin-Sheriff and as remarked allow an attack where an adversary can input any chosen ciphertext, observe whether an error occurred and so derive information about the secret. We will give a simplified overview of the attack strategy in this mail, the implementation of the attack can be found on github.

Our CCA attack exploits side channel timing information that is leaked from the error correcting step in the decapsulation algorithm. Using this information we can distinguish between codewords that lead to a decryption failure and those that are decoded successfully.

We construct a ciphertext, such that a potential decoding error reveals information about the presence of one’s in a certain range of the binary expansion of the secret (which has low Hamming weight). Querying multiple of these ciphertexts we can apply a binary search to find the exact positions of each individual one in the secret. We can reconstruct the full secret and thus break the implementation of the scheme in less than 2 minutes.

In the attachment you can find a more detailed description which, for the sake of readability and typesetting, we did not want to put into an email directly. The full details of the attack will be presented in an upcoming paper, but the curious ones can find an implementation of the attack at https://github.com/danversjp/RamstakeTimingAttack.

Best regards,

Jan-Pieter D’Anvers and Marcel Tiepelt

On 18/02/18 17:47, alan szepieniec wrote:
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> >
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