
From: Mustafa Khairallah <khairallah@ieee.org>
Sent: Thursday, August 1, 2019 7:16 PM
To: lwc-forum; lightweight-crypto
Subject: OFFICIAL COMMENT: COMET
Attachments: iacrdoc.pdf

Dear all,

I have found attacks based on weak key analysis that allow forgery with probability 2^{-64} (the adversarial advantage is $D/2^{64}$, where D is the number of online queries), i.e. it needs 2^{64} online queries and negligible offline cost. These attacks allow privacy attacks/key recovery attacks with 2^{64} Online Queries and 2^{64} Offline Queries.

I have informed the designers about these attacks four days ago and they have confirmed that my analysis is correct. My understanding is that they are working on a security proof that includes these bad events. We disagree on whether these attacks contradict the claims made in the submission document. However, I assert again as I assert in the document that I make no conclusions on whether these attacks affect the security in practice and I leave this judgment to the designers and the readers.

My analysis is attached.

Regards,
Mustafa

From: Mridul Nandi <mridul.nandi@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, August 5, 2019 5:46 AM
Cc: lwc-forum; lightweight-crypto; Shay Gueron; Ashwin Jha
Subject: Re: [lwc-forum] OFFICIAL COMMENT: COMET

Dear all,

We would like to clarify that Mustaf's observations on COMET does not violate our security claims, as specified in the specification document. We will soon publish a formal security proof on ePrint.

The COMET team

Thanks and regards,
Mridul Nandi
Associate Professor
Indian Statistical Institute
Kolkata

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Mridul Nandi
Associate Professor
Indian Statistical Institute
Kolkata

On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 4:46 AM Mustafa Khairallah <khairallah@ieee.org> wrote:

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> Mustafa

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