PIR with Nearly Optimal Online Time and Bandwidth

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Joint work with Aqeel, Chandrasekaran, and Maggs

To appear in CRYPTO'21

Oblivious DNS Deployed by Cloudflare and Apple



Nick Feamster Follow Dec 8, 2020 · 5 min read ★




Enable Private DNS with 1.1.1.1 on Android 9 Pie


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





Problem Definition




Problem Definition





Classical PIR

(no preprocessing)



Classical PIR

(no preprocessing)

Linear-time $\widetilde{O}(1)$ -BW

Preprocessing PIR


(one-time preprocessing, unbounded queries)

Classical PIR

(no preprocessing)

Preprocessing PIR

(one-time preprocessing, unbounded queries)



 $O(\sqrt{n})$ -time

 $O(\sqrt{n})$ -BW

[CK, Eurocrypt'19 best student paper] Assume: $O(\sqrt{n})$ client storage, OWF

The best of both worlds?

Linear-time
$$\widetilde{O}(1)$$
 -BW

$$O(\sqrt{n})$$
-time

$$O(\sqrt{n}) - BW$$

[CK, Eurocrypt'19 best student paper] Assume: $O(\sqrt{n})$ client storage, OWF

Our result: 2-server preprocessing PIR

$$O(\sqrt{n})$$
-time

$$\widetilde{O}(1)$$
 -BW

Assume: hardness of LWE $O(\sqrt{n})$ client storage

Open question:

A truly practical PIR scheme ?



Our scheme

Privately Puncturable Pseudorandom Sets

Inefficient strawman

Inspired by [CK19]









Samples a set: include each index w.p. $\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}$







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
S1: 1, 3, 5, 16, 18





















S1:1, 3, 5, 16, 181S2:3, 6, 13, 19, 330

. . .

















S1:1, 3, 5, 16, 181S2:3, 6, 13, 19, 330


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
$S_{\sqrt{n}\log^2 n}$: 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10

This requires $\widetilde{O}(n)$ client space!





































 $S_{2'} = S_{2} \setminus 6$

Parity(S2')



S2: 3,6, 13, 19, 33 O

This leaks information





S2' = S2 | resample 6

S2: 3,6, 13, 19, 33 0





S2: 3,6, 13, 19, 33 0














k-fold repetition amplifies correctness

parity(S2) S2: 3,6, 13, 19, 33 0 parity(S2')






Online: refresh















client space $\widetilde{O}(n)$ online BW $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$ online time $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$









client space $\widetilde{O}(n)$ $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$ online BW $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$ \longrightarrow $\widetilde{O}(1)$ online time $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$ $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$



Our scheme

Privately Puncturable Pseudorandom Sets


Inefficient strawman





Compressed to K1







































Puncturable Pseudorandom Set

- Sample a key K
- Set(K) enumerates the set
- Puncture(K, x) gives a key that resamples whether x is in the set

Punctured key hide punctured point

sees punctured key

Punctured key hide punctured point

Fast membership test : $\tilde{O}(1)$ $\hat{\Box}$ Find i s.t. $\mathbf{6} \in \operatorname{Set}(\mathrm{K}_i)$

Punctured key hide punctured point



Fast set enumeration : $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$



Punctured key hide punctured point

Fast membership test : $\widetilde{O}(1)$




Strawman using **Privately Puncturable PRF**

Ordinary PRF

$\begin{array}{rcl} K & \leftarrow & \operatorname{Gen}(1^{\lambda}) \\ y & \leftarrow & \operatorname{Eval}(K, x) \end{array}$

Privately Puncturable PRF



Privately Puncturable PRF

• Punctured key
$$K_x$$
 hides punctured point x
• $\operatorname{PEval}(K_x, x) \Longrightarrow$ pseudo-random

[BKM17,CC17,BTVW17]

Privately Puncturable PRF: known from LWE

• Punctured key K_x hides punctured point x• $\operatorname{PEval}(K_x, x) \Longrightarrow$ pseudo-random

[BKM17,CC17,BTVW17]

Strawman Puncturable Pseudorandom Set

6 is included iff PRF.Eval(K, 6) has $\frac{1}{2} \log n$ trailing Os

Strawman Puncturable Pseudorandom Set

6 is included iff PRF.Eval(K, 6) has $\frac{1}{2}\log n$ trailing Os



Would this work?

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PRF.Puncture(K, **6**) punctures **6**

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6 is included iff PRF.Eval(K, 6) has $\frac{1}{2}\log n$ trailing Os

PRF.Puncture(K, **6**) punctures **6**

Set enumeration takes O(n) time!

Other strawman attempts

 $\begin{array}{ll} \operatorname{PRF.Eval}(K, 1) & x_1 \\ \operatorname{PRF.Eval}(K, 2) & \longrightarrow & x_2 \\ \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{ll} x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_2 \\ \end{array}$ $\operatorname{PRF.Eval}(K, \sqrt{n}) & & x_{\sqrt{n}} \end{array}$

Set

Slow membership test!


Our scheme

Privately Puncturable Pseudorandom Sets

Inefficient strawman

Key Insight

 ∞



- Fast membership test
- Fast set enumeration
- **Breaks**" puncturing "just a little"









X = 001010




















To puncture a point x = 00001010: Puncture all relevant suffixes from the PRF key






010 H(010) = 1


110 H(110) = 1







Each level has $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$ size in this tree Set enumeration time: $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$



X = 0000 1010 Y = 0011 1010

\mathbf{x} included $\implies \mathbf{y}$ more likely included

X = 00001010Y = 00111010

\mathbf{x} included $\implies \mathbf{y}$ more likely included

Puncturing **x** removes **y** with small prob!

Summary: Our PIR scheme

- Key idea: a new puncturable PR Set
- Conceptually very simple construction
- Proofs are non-trivial
- Towards practicality: need a concretely efficient Privately puncturable PRF

See our paper for:

Detailed proofs

Correctness proof is actually tricky!

Trade off client space and online time

https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1592

Open question:

A truly practical PIR scheme ?

Thank you ! runting@cs.cmu.edu

