#	Organization Name	Submitted By	Type*	Page #^	Starting Line #^	Ending Line #	Section #	Comment (Include rationale for comment)^	Suggested Change^
							3.1.1e Employ dual authorization to execute critical or sensitive system	Can this be clarified to state if this is intended for each action, or for a user to gain initial access.  E.g., will users be required to get approval to	
							and organizational	obtain privileges, through authorization of two	
							operations.	individuals? Is this not 2FA and MFA OR is this two person control? Does this mean two people	
		Jonathan Jowers / Craig						are required when executing certain commands, operations, or functions? Serial or in parallel.	
1	Leidos	Meyer	G	12	471	482	3.1.2e Restrict access to	I don't see small contractors as being able to	It is not also and the town him.
							systems and system	Does BYOD end with this control? Is that the intention? Does this mean cloud services can't	It is not clear what applying this control would should
		Jonathan					components to only those information resources that are	be used. 800-53 has options to restrict or prohibit external systems. I think this allows us to use	mean in many circumstances; remove the
		Jowers / Bill Lewandowski					owned, provisioned, or issued	Cloud as we would be "provisioning" and	control unless the meaning
2	Leidos	/ Craig Meyer	G	12	483	490	by the organization.	"Issuing" but would like to hear a better explanation/definition.	of it can be clarified.
							3.1.3e Employ secure information transfer solutions	Is the intent of this control to know where all data is, even in a cloud environment? Also, what are	The meaning is not clear for this control, suggest removal
							to control information flows	the details in the SC-46 Cross Domain Policy	unless the meaning of the
		Jonathan					between security domains on connected systems.	Enforcement? Do we have a definition of "Security Domain"? What are the minimum	controlc an be verified.
		Jowers / Bill Lewandowski						requirements? It appears that this control is derived from 800-53	
3	Leidos	/ Craig Meyer	G	12-13	491	518		AC-4. However, it doesn't map to any specific	
							3.4.1e Establish and maintain an authoritative	What are the differences in this control compared to NIST SP 800-171r1 3.4.1 and 3.4.3 controls?	
		Jonathan					source and repository to provide a trusted source and		
		Jowers / Bill Lewandowski					accountability for approved		
4	Leidos		G	16	557	569	and implemented system components.		
							3.4.3e Employ automated discovery and management	Is the intent to use advanced tools to know everything (definition of what? Managed and	
							tools to maintain an up-to-	unmanaged devices) connected to IS network?	
		Jonathan Jowers / Bill					date, complete, accurate, and readily available		
5	Leidos	Lewandowski / Craig Meyer	G	16-17	589	603	inventory of system components.		
3	Loidos	7 Graig Weyer		10-17	309		3.5.1e Identify and	Does this control include operating systems other	
							authenticate systems and system components before	than Windows? What are the ramifications (Clarification) of "Before establishing a network	
		Jonathan					establishing a network	connection"?	
		Jowers / Bill					connection using bidirectional authentication that is		
6	Leidos	Lewandowski / Craig Meyer	G	18	607	620	cryptographically-based and replay resistant.		

#	Organization Name	Submitted By	Type*	Page #^	Starting Line #^	Ending Line #	Section #	Comment (Include rationale for comment)^	Suggested Change^
							3.5.2e Employ password	Clarify the requirement, rather than a solution?	
							managers for the generation,	Reads like the solution.	
							rotation, and management of		
							passwords for systems and		
							system components that do		
							not support multifactor		
_			_	4.0	004		authentication or complex		
/	Leidos		G	18	621	640	account management.		
							3.9.1e Conduct enhanced	What are the enhancements from current	
							personnel screening (vetting)	screening, criminal background checks and	
		Jonathan					for individual trustworthiness	termination processes already required?	
		Jowers / Craig					and reassess individual		
a	Leidos	Meyer	G	23	707	722	trustworthiness on an		
-	Leidos	Meyer	0	20	707	122	ongoing basis. 3.9.2e Ensure that	Define adverse information? What is the	
							organizational systems are	enhancement from existing data protection &	
							protected whenever adverse	monitoring controls?	
		Jonathan					information develops	Information of Controls:	
		Jowers / Bill					regarding the trustworthiness		
		Lewandowski					of individuals with access to		
9	Leidos	/ Craig Meyer	G	23-24	723	729	CUI.		
							3.11.1e Employ threat	Clarify difference to control 3.14.3?	
							intelligence to inform the		
							development of the system		
							and security architectures,		
		Jonathan					selection of security controls,		
		Jowers / Bill					monitoring, threat hunting,		
		Lewandowski	_				and response and recovery		
10	Leidos	/ Craig Meyer	G	25	737		activities.		
							3.11.3e Employ advanced	Is this an enhancement to Security Operations	
							automation and analytics	Center functions?	
		Jonathan Jowers / Bill					capabilities to predict and		
		Lewandowski					identify risks to organizations,		
11	Leidos		G	25-26	772	706	systems, or system		
11	reinn2	/ Craig Meyer	J	20-20	112	700	components.	le the intent of this control to provide -	Cuganat shanging the "-t
							3.11.5e Assess the	Is the intent of this control to provide a	Suggest changing the "at
							effectiveness of security solutions at least annually to	prescriptive Organization Define Value (ODV) for control reviews?	least annually" statement to "organizationally defined
							address anticipated risk to	CONTROL LEAGENS :	frequency.
							the system and the		inequency.
		Jonathan					organization based on		
		Jowers / Craig					current and accumulated		
12	Leidos	Meyer	G	26-27	805	815	threat intelligence.		

#	Organization Name	Submitted By	Type*	Page #^	Starting Line #^	Ending Line #	Section #	Comment (Include rationale for comment)^	Suggested Change <sup>^</sup>
	Name			TT .	Lille #		3.12.1e Conduct penetration		Suggest changing the "at
							testing at least annually,	prescriptive Organization Define Value (ODV) for	least annually" statement to
							leveraging automated	control reviews?	"organizationally defined
		Jonathan					scanning tools and ad hoc		frequency.
		Jowers / Craig					tests using human experts.		
13	Leidos	Meyer	G	28	849	872			
							3.13.1e Employ diverse	Will a document like NIST SP 800-171A be	Suggest removing this
							system components to	created to provide guidance on all controls? This	control because it works
							reduce the extent of	control is very broad and has many requirements.	agaist our ability to create
							malicious code propagation.	What are "diverse system components"? The	robust secured platforms.
		Jonathan						irony here is that we try to standardize on	This would be especially true
		Jowers / Craig						platforms in order to scale compliance to all of	for smaller companies.
14	Leidos	Meyer	G	29	906			hte existing controls. If we purposly make our	
							3.13.2e Disrupt the attack	Is this control intended to "edge" towards	Suggest removing this
							surface of organizational	national security level protections? Are	control because it works
							systems and system	contractors required to implement deception	agaist our ability to create
							components through	techinques? How will they be measured for	robust secured platforms.
		Jonathan					unpredictability, moving target	effectiveness?	This would be especially true
		Jowers / Craig	_				defense, or non-persistence.	Like the previous control this control would make	for smaller companies.
15	Leidos	Meyer	G	29-30	910	952		it harder for us to maintain a properly secured	
							3.13.3e Employ technical	Will a document like NIST SP 800-171A be	
							and procedural means	created to provide guidance on all controls? This	
		Jonathan					through a combination of	control is very broad and has many requirements.	
		Jonathan Jowers / Craig					misdirection, tainting, or		
16	Leidos	Meyer Meyer	G	30-31	956	074	disinformation to confuse and		
10	Leidos	ivieyei	G	30-31	930		mislead adversaries.	What would be an example of an audit plan to	
							3.14.1e Employ roots of trust, formal verification, or	address this control?	
								address this control?	
		Jonathan					cryptographic signatures to verify the integrity and		
		Jowers / Craig					correctness of security critical		
17	Leidos	Meyer	G	33	1020		or essential software.		
			_				3.14.3e Ensure that Internet	Is this control requiring combinations (joining) of	
							of Things (IoT), Operational	24/7 Security Operations Center monitoring, anti-	
							Technology (OT), and	virus, and data loss prevention? Which	
							Industrial Internet of Things	requirements STIG.etc.? What are the	
							(IIoT) systems, components,	configurations control standards?	
							and devices are compliant	<u></u>	
							with the security requirements		
							imposed on organizational		
		Jonathan					systems or are isolated in		
		Jowers / Craig					purpose- specific networks.		
18	Leidos	Meyer	G	34	1068	1102			

#	Organization	Submitted By	Type*	Page #^	Starting	Ending	Section #	Comment	Suggested Change^
	Name			#^	Line #^	Line #	O 44 4 - Defeat	(Include rationale for comment)^	I de alle a server de la casa de la
							3.14.4e Refresh	Will a document like NIST SP 800-171A be	Ideally; remove this control
							organizational systems and	created to provide guidance on all controls? This	because it introduces risk
							system components from a	, , ,	and unecessary work that
							known, trusted state at least	Of all the controls 3.14.4e is the most concerning	
							twice annually.	,,,,,	better secure the
								to account 'all' devices to include Windows, Mac,	envrionment. At a minimum,
									change "twice annually" to
								firewalls, etc. This could be a full time staff and all	organizationally defined
								the risk it introduces in to operations. What a	interval"
								management and risk nightmare.	
								Unless I am misunderstanding this control, this	
		Jonathan						control does not scale. It sounds like this control	
		Jowers / Craig						is suggesting we wipe away software installations	
19	Leidos	Meyer	G	34-35	1104	1136		and configurations and start over twice a year.	
							3.14.5e Conduct periodic	Is this only Policy and procedure only? What is	
							reviews of persistent	the intended enhancement? Is there a definition	
							organizational storage	of 'persistent organizational storage'? Destruction	
							locations and purge CUI that	or other? (I.e., Key, hardware, sanitation) Is there	
		Jonathan					is no longer needed	a definition of 'persistent organizational storage'?	
		Jowers / Bill					consistent with federal		
		Lewandowski/					records retention policies and		
20	Leidos	Craig Meyer	G	35-36	1137	1151	disposition schedules.		
							3.14.6e Use threat indicator	Clarify difference to control 3.14.1e?	
							information relevant to the	Recommendations of which services to use?	
							information and systems	E.g., US-CERT, NDISAC, DSIE, McAfee?	
							being protected and effective		
							mitigations obtained from		
		Jonathan					external organizations to		
		Jowers / Bill					inform intrusion detection and		
21	Leidos	Lewandowski	G	36	1152	1167	threat hunting.		