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SP 800-114 Rev. 1

DRAFT User's Guide to Telework and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Security

NIST requests public comments on two draft Special Publications (SPs) on telework and BYOD security: Draft SP 800-114 Revision 1, *User's Guide to Telework and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Security*, and Draft SP 800-46 Revision 2, *Guide to Enterprise Telework, Remote Access, and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Security*. Organizations are increasingly threatened, attacked, and breached through compromised telework devices used by their employees, contractors, business partners, and vendors. These publications make recommendations for organizations (in SP 800-46 Revision 2) and users (in SP 800-114 Revision 1) to improve their telework and BYOD security practices.

The public comment period for both publications closes on **April 15, 2016**.

Send comments on Draft SP 800-114 Revision 1 to 800-114comments<at>nist.gov with "Comments SP 800-114" in the subject line.

Send comments on Draft SP 800-46 Revision 2 to 800-46comments<at>nist.gov with "Comments SP 800-46" in the subject line.

1 **Draft NIST Special Publication 800-114**
2 **Revision 1**
3

4 **User's Guide to Telework and**
5 **Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)**
6 **Security**
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17 **C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y**
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**Draft NIST Special Publication 800-114
Revision 1**

**User's Guide to Telework and
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)
Security**

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March 2016



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107 collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations.

108

109

Abstract

110 Many people telework, and they use a variety of devices, such as desktop and laptop computers,
111 smartphones, and tablets, to read and send email, access websites, review and edit documents, and
112 perform many other tasks. Each telework device is controlled by the organization, a third party (such as
113 the organization's contractors, business partners, and vendors), or the teleworker; the latter is known as
114 bring your own device (BYOD). This publication provides recommendations for securing BYOD devices
115 used for telework and remote access, as well as those directly attached to the enterprise's own networks.

116

117

Keywords

118 bring your own device (BYOD); host security; information security; network security; remote access;
119 telework

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176
177

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	vii
1. Introduction	1
1.1 Purpose and Scope.....	1
1.2 Audience.....	1
1.3 Document Structure.....	1
2. Overview of Telework Technologies	3
2.1 Remote Access Methods.....	3
2.2 Telework Devices.....	4
2.3 Telework Device Security Overview.....	5
3. Securing Information	7
4. Securing Home Networks and Using Other Networks	9
4.1 Wired Home Networks.....	9
4.2 Wireless Home Networks.....	10
4.3 External Networks.....	12
4.4 Organization Networks.....	12
5. Securing BYOD Telework PCs	13
5.1 Software Updates.....	13
5.2 User Accounts and Sessions.....	13
5.2.1 Use Accounts with Limited Privileges.....	14
5.2.2 Protect Accounts with Passwords.....	14
5.2.3 Protect User Sessions from Unauthorized Physical Access.....	15
5.3 Networking Configuration.....	15
5.3.1 Disable Unneeded Networking Features.....	15
5.3.2 Limit the Use of Remote Access Utilities.....	16
5.3.3 Configure Wireless Networking.....	16
5.4 Attack Prevention.....	16
5.4.1 Install and Configure Antivirus Software.....	17
5.4.2 Use Personal Firewalls.....	17
5.4.3 Enable and Configure Content Filtering Software.....	18
5.5 Primary Application Configuration.....	19
5.5.1 Web Browsers.....	20
5.5.2 Email Clients.....	21
5.5.3 Instant Messaging Clients.....	22
5.5.4 Office Productivity Suites.....	22
5.6 Remote Access Software Configuration.....	22
5.7 Security Maintenance and Monitoring.....	23
6. Securing BYOD Telework Mobile Devices	25
7. Considering the Security of Third-Party Devices	27

List of Appendices

Appendix A— Additional Security Considerations for Telework	28
--	-----------

178	A.1	Phone Services	28
179	A.2	WPAN Technologies	28
180	A.3	Wireless Broadband Data Network Technologies	29
181	A.4	Information Destruction	29
182	Appendix B— Glossary		31
183	Appendix C— Acronyms and Abbreviations		33
184	Appendix D— Resources		34
185			
186			

187 **Executive Summary**

188 Many people *telework* (also known as *telecommuting*), which is the ability for an organization's
189 employees, contractors, business partners, vendors, and/or other users to perform work from locations
190 other than the organization's facilities. Teleworkers use various devices, such as desktop and laptop
191 computers, smartphones, and tablets, to read and send email, access websites, review and edit documents,
192 and perform many other tasks. Most teleworkers use *remote access*, which is the ability of an
193 organization's users to access its non-public computing resources from locations other than the
194 organization's facilities. Organizations have many options for providing remote access, including virtual
195 private networks, remote system control, and individual application access (e.g., webmail).

196 Telework devices can be divided into two categories: personal computers (desktops, laptops) and mobile
197 devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets). Each telework device is controlled by the organization, the
198 teleworker, or a third party the teleworker is affiliated with (a contractor, business partner, or vendor for
199 the organization). Telework devices controlled by the user are also known as *bring your own device*
200 (*BYOD*). This publication provides recommendations for securing BYOD devices used for telework and
201 remote access, as well as those directly attached to the enterprise's own networks. Many organizations
202 limit the types of BYOD devices that can be used and which resources they can use, such as permitting
203 BYOD laptops to access a limited set of resources and permitting all other BYOD devices to access
204 webmail only. This allows organizations to limit the risk they incur from BYOD devices. When a
205 telework device uses remote access, it is essentially a logical extension of the organization's own
206 network. Therefore, if the telework device is not secured properly, it poses additional risk to not only the
207 information that the teleworker accesses but also the organization's other systems and networks. For
208 example, a telework device infected with a worm could spread the worm through remote access to the
209 organization's internal computers. Therefore, telework devices should be secured properly and have their
210 security maintained regularly.

211 **Before implementing any of the recommendations or suggestions in the guide, users should back up**
212 **all data and verify the validity of the backups. Readers with little or no experience configuring**
213 **personal computers, mobile devices, or home networks should seek assistance in applying the**
214 **recommendations. Every telework device's existing configuration and environment is unique, so**
215 **changing its configuration could have unforeseen consequences, including loss of data and loss of**
216 **device or application functionality.**

217 Implementing the following recommendations should help teleworkers improve the security of their
218 telework devices. Some of the recommendations may be challenging for many users to implement, so
219 users who are unsure of how to implement these recommendations should seek expert assistance.

220 **Before teleworking, users should understand not only their organization's policies and**
221 **requirements, but also appropriate ways of protecting the organization's information that they may**
222 **access.**

223 Sensitive information that is stored on or sent to or from telework devices needs to be protected so that
224 malicious parties can neither access nor alter information. An unauthorized release of sensitive
225 information could damage the public's trust in an organization, jeopardize the mission of an organization,
226 or harm individuals if their personal information has been released. Understanding how to protect such
227 information accessed during teleworking can be confusing because there are many ways in which
228 information can be protected. Examples include protecting the physical security of telework devices,
229 encrypting files stored on devices, and ensuring that information stored on devices is backed up.

230

231 **Teleworkers should ensure that all the devices on their wired and wireless home networks are**
232 **properly secured, as well as the home networks themselves.**

233 An important part of telework and remote access security is applying security measures to the personal
234 computers (PCs) and mobile devices using the same wired and wireless home networks to which the
235 telework device normally connects. If any of these other devices become infected with malware or are
236 otherwise compromised, they could attack the telework device or eavesdrop on its communications.
237 Teleworkers should also be cautious about allowing others to place devices on the teleworkers' home
238 networks, in case one of these devices is compromised.

239 Teleworkers should apply security measures to the home networks to which their telework devices
240 normally connect. One example of a security measure is using a broadband router or firewall appliance to
241 prevent computers outside the home network from initiating communications with telework devices on
242 the home network. Another example is ensuring that sensitive information transmitted over a wireless
243 home network is adequately protected through strong encryption.

244 **Teleworkers who use a BYOD desktop or laptop (PC) for telework should secure its operating**
245 **system and primary applications.**

246 Securing a BYOD PC includes the following actions:

- 247 ■ Using a combination of security software, such as antivirus software, personal firewalls, spam and
248 web content filtering, and popup blocking, to stop most attacks, particularly malware;
- 249 ■ Restricting who can use the PC by having a separate standard user account for each person, assigning
250 a password to each user account, using the standard user accounts for daily use, and protecting user
251 sessions from unauthorized physical access;
- 252 ■ Ensuring that updates are regularly applied to the operating system and primary applications, such as
253 web browsers, email clients, instant messaging clients, and security software;
- 254 ■ Disabling unneeded networking features on the PC and configuring wireless networking securely;
- 255 ■ Configuring primary applications to filter content and stop other activity that is likely to be malicious;
- 256 ■ Installing and using only known and trusted software;
- 257 ■ Configuring remote access software based on the organization's requirements and recommendations;
258 and
- 259 ■ Maintaining the PC's security on an ongoing basis, such as changing passwords regularly and
260 checking the status of security software periodically.

261 **Teleworkers who use a BYOD mobile device for telework should secure it based on the security**
262 **recommendations from the device's manufacturer.**

263 A wide variety of mobile devices exists, and security features available for these devices also vary widely.
264 Some devices offer only a few basic features, whereas others offer sophisticated features similar to those
265 offered by PCs. This does not necessarily imply that more security features are better; in fact, many
266 devices offer more security features because the capabilities they provide (e.g., wireless networking,
267 instant messaging) make them more susceptible to attack than devices without these capabilities. General
268 recommendations for securing BYOD mobile devices are as follows:

- 269 ■ Limit access to the device, such as setting a unique personal identification number (PIN) or password
270 not used elsewhere, and automatically locking a device after an idle period;
- 271 ■ Disable networking capabilities, such as Bluetooth and Near Field Communication (NFC), except
272 when they are needed;
- 273 ■ Ensure that security updates, if available, are acquired and installed at least weekly, preferably daily;
- 274 ■ Configure applications to support security (e.g., blocking activity that is likely to be malicious);
- 275 ■ Download and run apps only from authorized apps stores;
- 276 ■ Do not jailbreak or root the device;
- 277 ■ Do not connect the device to an unknown charging station; and
- 278 ■ Use an isolated, protected, and encrypted environment that is supported and managed by the
279 organization to access the organization's data and services.

280 **Teleworkers should avoid using any client device for telework that is not controlled by the**
281 **organization, the teleworker, or the teleworker's affiliated organization (contractor, business**
282 **partner, vendor, etc.)**

283 Teleworkers often want to perform remote access from unknown devices, such as checking email from a
284 kiosk computer at a hotel or from a friend's mobile phone. However, teleworkers typically do not know if
285 such devices have been secured properly or if they have been compromised. Consequently, a teleworker
286 could use a device infected with malware that steals their information (e.g., passwords, email messages,
287 and other sensitive data). Many organizations either prohibit unknown devices from being used for
288 remote access or permit use only by having the teleworker first restart the PC with special removable
289 media inserted so that the PC will reboot into a secure environment for telework purposes.

290

291 **1. Introduction**

292 **1.1 Purpose and Scope**

293 This publication helps teleworkers secure the networks and bring your own device (BYOD) devices they
294 use for telework, such as personally owned desktop and laptop computers and mobile devices (e.g.,
295 smartphones, tablets). The document focuses specifically on security for telework involving remote
296 access to organizations' non-public computing resources. It provides practical, real-world
297 recommendations for securing telework computers' operating systems (OS) and applications, as well as
298 home networks that the computers use. It presents basic recommendations for securing mobile devices
299 used for telework. The document also presents advice on protecting the information stored on telework
300 computers and removable media.

301 **1.2 Audience**

302 This document has been created primarily for teleworkers who are responsible for securing the networks
303 and BYOD devices that they use for telework. The document also should be helpful to information
304 security personnel and others who may need to assist teleworkers with their devices and remote access
305 use.

306 **1.3 Document Structure**

307 This document is intended to be used by readers with various levels of experience and security
308 knowledge, who are faced with different situations in securing their BYOD devices. For example, one
309 reader might be securing a home network and a laptop, while another reader wants to secure a
310 smartphone. Not all sections of this guide will apply to every situation.

311 The remainder of this document is organized into five major sections:

- 312 ■ Section 2 provides an overview of telework and remote access and an introduction to security
313 concerns regarding telework devices.
- 314 ■ Section 3 provides guidelines on securing information stored on or sent to or from telework devices.
- 315 ■ Section 4 presents recommendations for securing wired and wireless home networks used for
316 telework.
- 317 ■ Section 5 discusses securing BYOD personal computers (PC) through methods such as applying
318 software updates and installing and configuring antivirus software and personal firewalls.
- 319 ■ Section 6 gives an overview of securing BYOD mobile devices.

320 The document also contains several appendices with supporting material:

- 321 ■ Appendix A presents additional security-related considerations for telework, such as using phone
322 services (e.g., cellular phones, Voice over Internet Protocol [VoIP] services), using wireless personal
323 area network (WPAN) technologies such as Bluetooth, using wireless broadband data cards, and
324 ensuring the secure destruction of removable media and printed materials that might contain sensitive
325 information.
- 326 ■ Appendix B contains a glossary.
- 327 ■ Appendix C contains a list of acronyms and abbreviations.

328 ■ Appendix D lists print resources and online tools and resources that may be helpful references for
329 securing BYOD devices.

330

331

332 2. Overview of Telework Technologies

333 Many people *telework* (also known as *telecommuting*), which is the ability for an organization's
334 employees, contractors, business partners, vendors, and/or other users to perform work from locations
335 other than the organization's facilities. Teleworkers use various devices, such as desktop and laptop
336 computers, smartphones, and tablets, to read and send email, access websites, review and edit documents,
337 and perform many other tasks. Most teleworkers use *remote access*, which is the ability for an
338 organization's users to access its non-public computing resources from locations other than the
339 organization's facilities.

340 This section of the publication provides an overview of telework technologies. It discusses commonly
341 used remote access methods and talks about the need to secure telework devices, such as laptops and
342 smartphones.

343 2.1 Remote Access Methods

344 Organizations have many options for providing remote access to their computing resources. The options
345 most commonly used for teleworkers are as follows:

346 ■ **Virtual private network (VPN).** A VPN is a secure "tunnel" that connects the teleworker's device to
347 the organization's network. Once the tunnel has been established, the teleworker can access many of
348 the organization's computing resources through the tunnel. The types of VPNs most commonly used
349 for teleworking are as follows:

350 – **Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) VPN.** An IPsec VPN can give teleworkers access to many
351 different types of resources, such as applications, file servers, and printers. Using an IPsec VPN
352 requires IPsec client software to be installed and configured on each telework device. Various
353 applications, such as a word processor for viewing and editing documents, also may need to be
354 installed. Because of the software installation and configuration needs, IPsec VPNs are most
355 often accessed from computers issued and controlled by the organization. Some organizations
356 permit teleworkers to install IPsec VPN clients on their own PCs and mobile devices. The client
357 software is often preconfigured by the organization and provided to the teleworkers; otherwise,
358 teleworkers can configure IPsec VPN clients built into their devices or acquire, install, and
359 configure third-party clients.

360 – **Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) VPN.** Some SSL VPNs primarily provide access to web
361 applications through standard web browsers. Other SSL VPNs are very similar to IPsec VPNs
362 and can provide access to many types of applications; these types of VPNs typically require users
363 to install additional software.

364 ■ **Remote system control.** Remote system control allows a teleworker to remotely use a PC at the
365 organization from a telework device. The remote PC has the software installed that the teleworker
366 needs to run, such as office productivity software (e.g., word processors, spreadsheet programs) and
367 organization-specific applications. The remote system control method most commonly used for
368 telework is terminal server access, which gives each teleworker access to a separate standard virtual
369 desktop.¹ Terminal server access requires the teleworker to either install a special client application

¹ A less commonly used method is remote desktop access, which gives a teleworker access to a particular actual desktop at the organization, most often the user's own computer at the organization's office. Solutions involving remote desktop access can be more difficult to secure and maintain than solutions based on terminal server access (for example, exposing internal desktops to malware from external devices), so many organizations do not permit remote desktop access from telework devices not controlled by the organization.

370 on the telework device or use a web interface, often with a browser plug-in or other additional
371 software that the organization provides. A similar method is known as virtual desktop infrastructure
372 (VDI), and it delivers virtual images of operating systems to users. Yet another method that is
373 essentially VDI for smartphones and tablets is known as virtual mobile infrastructure (VMI).

374 ■ **Individual application access.** A teleworker can access an individual application remotely, usually a
375 web application such as email access. This type of access typically requires only a web browser on
376 the telework device, so in most cases there is no need to reconfigure the device or install software on
377 it before accessing the applications.

378 There are many ways in which teleworkers gain access to the Internet, including broadband networks
379 (e.g., cable modem, wireless broadband), cellular networks, wireless hotspots, and other organizations'
380 networks. For this publication, the access method used is typically irrelevant; any special considerations
381 related to a particular method are highlighted.

382 Most of the computing resources used through remote access are available only to an organization's users.
383 Before accessing such resources, the users need to demonstrate their identities, such as with usernames
384 and passwords. Many remote access solutions require teleworkers to authenticate multiple times; for
385 example, a teleworker might need to authenticate to use a VPN, and then authenticate to individual
386 applications accessed through the VPN. Many organizations have separate authentication systems for
387 remote access, and it is common for teleworkers to be issued a hardware token and to have to enter a code
388 from the token into the computer to be authenticated. Many organizations also require teleworkers to
389 reauthenticate periodically during long remote access sessions, such as after each eight hours of a session
390 or after 30 minutes of idle time. These authentication options help organizations confirm that the person
391 using remote access is authorized to do so.

392 Most remote access technologies and many individual applications are able to encrypt their
393 communications automatically. This ability prevents attackers on the Internet and other networks from
394 eavesdropping on the communications or tampering with them. It is outside the scope of this publication
395 to provide a detailed explanation of communications protection. Teleworkers should check with their
396 organizations as to what protection is applied to their communications, so that they do not inadvertently
397 transfer sensitive information over networks without adequate protection.

398 2.2 Telework Devices

399 Telework devices can be divided into two general categories:

400 ■ **Personal computers (PC)**, which are desktop and laptop computers. PCs run desktop/laptop
401 operating systems such as Windows, Mac OS X, and Linux. PCs can be used for any of the remote
402 access methods described in Section 2.1.

403 ■ **Mobile devices**, which are small mobile computers such as smartphones and tablets. Mobile devices
404 are most often used for remote access methods that use web browsers, primarily SSL VPNs and
405 individual web application access.

406 The difference between PCs and mobile devices is decreasing. Mobile devices are offering more
407 functionality previously provided only by PCs. Still, the security controls available for PCs and mobile
408 devices are significantly different as of this writing, so this publication provides separate
409 recommendations for PCs and mobile devices, where applicable.

410 Another set of categories used in the recommendations is the party that is responsible for the security of
411 the telework device. These categories are as follows:

- 412 ■ **Organization.** Telework devices in this category are usually acquired, configured, and managed by
413 the organization. These devices can be used for any of the organization's remote access methods.
- 414 ■ **Third-Party-Controlled.** These telework devices are controlled by a third party, typically one that
415 employs the teleworker on behalf of the organization (such as one of the organization's contractors,
416 business partners, or vendors). This third party is ultimately responsible for securing the telework
417 devices and maintaining their security. These devices can usually be used for many or all of the
418 organization's remote access methods.
- 419 ■ **Bring Your Own Device (BYOD).** All non-organization-controlled devices managed by the
420 teleworkers themselves are also known as *bring your own device (BYOD)*.² These devices can usually
421 be used for many or all of the organization's remote access methods.
- 422 ■ **Unknown.** Labeled as "unknown" because there are no assurances regarding their security, these
423 telework devices are owned and controlled by other parties, such as kiosk computers at hotels, and
424 PCs or mobile devices owned by friends and family. Remote access options for these devices are
425 typically quite limited because users cannot or should not install the organization's software onto
426 them, such as VPN software, terminal server software, and web browser plug-ins. Their use is
427 extremely risky because of the unknown nature of their security posture. Therefore, many
428 organizations either prohibit the use of unknown devices for telework or permit use only by having
429 the user first restart the PC with special removable media inserted so that the PC will reboot into a
430 secure environment for telework purposes.

431 For various reasons, including security policies and technology limitations, organizations often limit
432 which types of devices can be used for remote access. For example, an organization might permit only its
433 own PCs and mobile devices to be used. Some organizations have tiered access levels, such as allowing
434 organization PCs to access many resources, BYOD PCs to access a more limited set of resources, and
435 BYOD mobile devices to access only one or two resources, such as webmail. This allows an organization
436 to limit the risk it incurs by permitting the most-controlled devices to have the most access and the least-
437 controlled devices to have minimal access or no access at all.

438 **Before using a BYOD device, each teleworker should check with his or her organization to confirm**
439 **that the organization permits the teleworker's BYOD devices to be used.** Teleworkers should also be
440 aware that many organizations periodically reassess their policies for telework devices and may change
441 which types of devices are permitted, so teleworkers should ensure they review current information on
442 remote access devices.

443 2.3 Telework Device Security Overview

444 In today's computing environment, there are many threats to telework devices. These threats are posed by
445 people with many different motivations, including causing mischief and disruption, and committing
446 identity theft and other forms of fraud. Teleworkers can increase their devices' security to provide better
447 protection against these threats. The primary threat against most telework devices is malware. *Malware*,
448 also known as *malicious code*, refers to a computer program that is covertly placed onto a computing
449 device with the intent of compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the device's data,
450 applications, or OS. Common types of malware threats include viruses, worms, malicious mobile code,
451 Trojan horses, rootkits, spyware, and bots.³ Malware threats can infect devices through many means,

² Strictly speaking, BYOD devices could be used only within the enterprise, and not for telework or remote access. However, the vast majority of BYOD devices are used externally, so for the purposes of this publication, all BYOD devices are considered telework devices. The security concerns associated with enterprise-only BYOD devices are nearly identical to those for telework BYOD devices.

³ More information on malware is available in Section 5.4.1.

452 including email, websites, file downloads and file sharing, peer-to-peer software, instant messaging, and
453 social media. Another common threat against telework devices is loss or theft of the device. Someone
454 with physical access to a device has many options for attempting to view or copy the information stored
455 on it.

456 *Security protections*, also known as *security controls*, are measures against threats that are intended to
457 compensate for the device's security weaknesses, also known as *vulnerabilities*. Threats attempt to take
458 advantage of these vulnerabilities. Some vulnerabilities can be eliminated through security protections,
459 such as a feature in an application that automatically downloads and installs new versions of the
460 application that have corrected previous errors. For vulnerabilities that cannot be eliminated, security
461 protections can prevent attacks from taking advantage of them, such as antivirus software stopping an
462 infected email from being opened by a user, or hard drive encryption making files unreadable by others.
463 Regardless of how many security protections are used, it is simply impossible to provide 100 percent
464 protection against attacks because of the complexity of computing. A more realistic goal is to use security
465 protections to give attackers as few opportunities as feasible to gain access to a device or to damage the
466 device's software or information.

467 For an organization, permitting teleworkers to remotely access its computing resources gives attackers
468 additional opportunities to breach the organization's security. When a telework device uses remote
469 access, it is essentially an extension of the organization's own network. The same is true when a BYOD
470 device is directly connected to the organization's local network. Therefore, if the telework device is not
471 secured properly, it poses additional risk not only to the information that the teleworker accesses, but also
472 to the organization's other systems and networks. For example, a telework device infected with a worm
473 could spread it through remote access to the organization's internal computers. Therefore, telework
474 devices should be secured properly and have their security maintained regularly.

475 Many organizations automatically check the security health of each telework device that attempts to use
476 remote access to ensure that it complies with the organization's policies. Examples of the checks are
477 verifying that a PC's OS is fully patched, antivirus software is installed and up-to-date, and a personal
478 firewall is enabled, or seeing if a smartphone has been rooted or jailbroken. Some remote access solutions
479 can also determine if the device has been secured by the organization and what type of device it is (e.g.,
480 desktop/laptop, smartphone, tablet). Based on the results of these checks, the organization can determine
481 whether the device should be permitted to use remote access.

482 The remainder of this publication provides recommendations for securing telework devices. The
483 recommendations address securing PCs and mobile devices, securing the networks that telework devices
484 use, and protecting information stored on and sent to and from telework devices. This publication also
485 provides guidance on evaluating the security of unknown devices, so that teleworkers can decide whether
486 the devices should be used for remote access.

487

488 3. Securing Information

489 Sensitive information, such as personally identifiable information (PII) (e.g., personnel records, medical
490 records, financial records),⁴ that is stored on or sent to or from telework devices needs to be protected so
491 that malicious parties cannot access or alter it. An unauthorized release of sensitive information could
492 damage the public's trust in an organization, jeopardize the organization's mission, or harm individuals if
493 their personal information has been released.

494 Before teleworking, users should understand their organization's policies and requirements and the
495 appropriate ways of protecting the organization's information. This can be confusing because there are
496 many ways in which information can be protected. Examples of methods that organizations may expect or
497 require teleworkers to use are as follows:

498 ■ **Using physical security controls** for telework devices and removable media. For example, an
499 organization might require that laptops not be left unattended when taken to hotels, conferences, and
500 other locations where third parties could easily gain physical access to the devices. Organizations may
501 also have physical security requirements for papers and other non-computer media that contain
502 sensitive information and are taken outside the organization's facilities.

503 ■ **Encrypting files stored on telework devices and removable media** such as CDs and flash drives.
504 This prevents attackers from readily gaining access to information in the files. Many options exist for
505 protecting files, including encrypting individual files or folders, volumes, and hard drives. Generally,
506 using an encryption method to protect files also requires the use of an authentication mechanism (e.g.,
507 password) to decrypt the files when needed.

508 ■ **Ensuring that information stored on telework devices is backed up.** If something adverse happens
509 to a device, such as a hardware, software, or power failure or a natural disaster, the information on the
510 device will be lost unless it has been backed up to another device or removable media. Some
511 organizations permit teleworkers to back up their local files to a centralized system (e.g., through
512 VPN remote access), whereas other organizations recommend that their teleworkers perform local
513 backups (e.g., burning CDs, copying files onto removable media). Teleworkers should perform
514 backups, following their organizations' guidelines, and verify that the backups are valid and
515 complete.⁵ It is important that backups on removable media be secured at least as well as the device
516 that they backed up. For example, if a computer is stored in a locked room, then the media also
517 should be in a secured location; if a computer stores its data encrypted, then the backups of that data
518 should also be encrypted.

519 ■ **Ensuring that information is destroyed when it is no longer needed.** For example, the
520 organization's files should be removed from a computer that is about to be retired. Some remote

⁴ OMB Memorandum 06-19, *Reporting Incidents Involving Personally Identifiable Information and Incorporating the Cost for Security in Agency Information Technology Investments*, defines PII as "any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, biometric records, etc., including any other personal information which is linked or linkable to an individual." The full text of the memorandum is available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2006/m-06-19.pdf>.

⁵ If the backups are not valid or complete, information may be lost, so validation of backups is very important. Some backup utilities offer features that can check each backup to ensure it is valid. For a simple backup, such as copying files to removable media, a teleworker may be able to check the backup by opening a sampling of files from the media. Teleworkers can also test the backup restoration process, such as restoring a backup onto another computer or restoring backed-up files into a separate test folder. Teleworkers should be cautious when testing a restore so that they do not inadvertently overwrite the current information on the device. Teleworkers should consult the documentation for the backup process to determine how the backups should be validated.

521 access methods perform basic information cleanup, such as clearing web browser caches that might
522 inadvertently hold sensitive information, but more extensive cleanup typically requires using a special
523 utility, such as a disk scrubbing program specifically designed to remove all traces of information
524 from a device. Many organizations offer their teleworkers assistance in removing information from
525 BYOD devices. Another example of information destruction is shredding telework papers containing
526 sensitive information once the papers are no longer needed.

527 ■ **Erasing information from missing devices.** If a smartphone or tablet is lost or stolen, its contents
528 might be remotely erasable by the organization or its service provider, particularly if the device has
529 cellular networking enabled. Erasing the contents prevents an attacker from obtaining any information
530 from the device. The availability of this service depends on the capabilities of the product and the
531 company providing network services for the product.

532 Each situation may require a different combination of protection options: for example, an organization
533 might require one combination for SSL VPN access from BYOD PCs and another combination for access
534 to an individual application from BYOD mobile devices. Teleworkers should follow their organizations'
535 requirements and recommendations for protecting sensitive information accessed with telework devices.
536 Some organizations use the same requirements and recommendations for all types of information because
537 of the difficulties in differentiating sensitive and nonsensitive information.

538 Teleworkers also need to ensure that they adequately protect their remote access-specific authenticators,
539 such as passwords, personal identification numbers (PIN), and hardware tokens. Such authenticators
540 should not be stored with the telework device, nor should multiple authenticators be stored with each
541 other (e.g., a password or PIN should not be written on the back of a hardware token).

542 Teleworkers should also be aware of how to handle threats involving *social engineering*, which is a
543 general term for attackers trying to trick people into revealing sensitive information or performing certain
544 actions, such as downloading and executing files that appear to be benign but are actually malicious. For
545 example, an attacker might approach a teleworker in a coffee shop and ask to use the computer for a
546 minute or offer to help the teleworker with using the computer. Teleworkers should be wary of any
547 requests they receive that could lead to a security breach or the theft of a telework device.

548 If a teleworker suspects that a security breach (including loss or theft of materials) has occurred involving
549 a telework device, remote access communications, removable media, or other telework components, the
550 teleworker should immediately follow the organization's policy and procedures for reporting the possible
551 breach. This is particularly important if any of the affected telework components contain sensitive
552 information such as PII, so that the potential impact of a security breach is minimized.

553

554 **4. Securing Home Networks and Using Other Networks**

555 An important part of telework and remote access security is applying security measures to the home
556 networks to which the telework device normally connects.⁶ A major component of home network security
557 is securing other PCs and mobile devices on the home network. If any of these devices become infected
558 with malware or are otherwise compromised, they could be used to attack the telework device or
559 eavesdrop on its communications. Consequently, teleworkers should ensure that all devices on their home
560 networks are secured properly. Teleworkers should also be cautious about allowing others to place
561 devices on the teleworkers' wired and wireless home networks, in case one of these devices has been or
562 will be compromised. Teleworkers also need to be aware of the risks of using external networks and of
563 the procedures for connecting their telework devices, including BYOD devices, to the organization's own
564 networks.

565 Sections 4.1 and 4.2 present recommendations for securing wired and wireless home networks,
566 respectively. Section 4.3 briefly discusses the security implications of performing telework from external
567 networks. (Many of the recommendations made in Sections 4.1 through 4.3 may be challenging for many
568 users to implement. Users who are unsure of how to implement these recommendations should seek
569 expert assistance.) Finally, Section 4.4 discusses issues regarding connecting BYOD devices to an
570 organization's own networks.

571 **4.1 Wired Home Networks**

572 Teleworkers should secure their wired home networks to help protect their telework devices. The most
573 important part of securing most wired home networks is separating the home network from the network's
574 Internet Service Provider (ISP) as much as possible. If a telework device connects directly to the
575 teleworker's ISP, such as plugging the device directly into a cable modem, then the device becomes
576 directly accessible from the Internet and is at very high risk of being attacked. To prevent this from
577 occurring, the home network should have a security device between the ISP and the telework device. This
578 is most commonly accomplished by using a broadband router (e.g., cable modem router) or a firewall
579 appliance.⁷

580 This security device should be configured to prevent computers outside the home network from initiating
581 communications with any of the devices on the home network, including the telework device.⁸ Even if
582 each device uses a personal firewall, a firewall appliance, broadband router, or other similar protection
583 should also be used to provide an additional layer of security. For example, if a personal firewall on a
584 computer malfunctioned, the appliance or router would still protect the computer from unsolicited
585 network communications from external computers. In some cases, the appliance or router also can protect
586 devices on the home network from each other—if the devices are logically separated by the appliance or

⁶ Some telework devices, such as smartphones and laptops with wireless broadband network cards, may not use home networks.

⁷ A firewall appliance should not be confused with a personal firewall, which is software based; a firewall appliance is a separate physical device. A firewall appliance for a home network cannot perform the rigorous firewalling (e.g., stateful inspection) that enterprise-class firewalls can provide. Firewall appliances are intended to provide an additional layer of security by reducing the number of attacks that reach the PCs on the home network.

⁸ Some firewalls provide this protection through a feature known as network address translation (NAT). NAT translates the home network's external, public Internet Protocol (IP) address assigned by the ISP into multiple internal private IP addresses. This not only helps to prevent external computers from initiating connections to the home network computers, but it also allows the home network to use a single public IP address, even though multiple devices may exist on the home network. This may offer a cost savings for consumers (many ISPs charge fees for multiple IP addresses). However, NAT may also interfere with the use of an organization's remote access solutions, particularly VPNs, as well as the use of the IPv6 protocol, so teleworkers should check with their organizations if they experience problems with the organizations' VPN or IPv6 services while using NAT.

587 router. For example, a router that has both wired and wireless interfaces might be able to prevent the
588 spread of certain types of malware from a device on the wireless network to a device on the wired
589 network, depending on the router's capabilities and configuration. However, such home network
590 configurations are relatively complex to set up and maintain, so only users who are proficient in
591 networking and security should consider implementing these configurations.

592 When installing and configuring firewall appliances, broadband routers, and similar devices, teleworkers
593 should perform the security precautions described in the manufacturer's documentation. The following
594 are some examples of possible precautions:⁹

- 595 ■ Changing default passwords on the device so that attackers cannot use them to gain access to the
596 device (lists of default passwords are widely available on the Internet);
- 597 ■ Configuring the device so that it cannot be administered from outside the home network, preventing
598 external attackers from taking control of the device;
- 599 ■ Configuring the device to silently ignore unsolicited requests sent to it, which essentially hides the
600 device from malicious parties. Teleworkers should check with their ISP before configuring a device
601 this way, because it could inadvertently interfere with necessary communications with the ISP's
602 infrastructure;
- 603 ■ Checking for updates and applying them periodically, as explained in the manufacturer's
604 documentation—either automatically (typically daily or weekly) or manually (to be performed by the
605 teleworker at least monthly); and
- 606 ■ For broadband routers, turning off or disabling built-in wireless access points (APs) that are not used.

607 The proper precautionary measures for a firewall appliance, broadband router, etc. vary greatly from
608 device to device, so some or all of these options may not be applicable to many devices.

609 4.2 Wireless Home Networks

610 Wireless networking transfers information through the air between a telework device and a wireless AP.¹⁰
611 If improperly configured, a wireless home network will transmit sensitive information without adequate
612 protection, exposing it to other wireless devices in close proximity. Accordingly, teleworkers should
613 secure their wireless home networks so that their remote access communications are protected.
614 Teleworkers should follow the security recommendations from the documentation for the home network's
615 wireless AP. Assuming that the network is using Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
616 802.11 protocols, the following are examples of common security recommendations:

- 617 ■ **Use strong encryption to protect communications.** An industry group called the Wi-Fi Alliance has
618 created a series of product security certifications called Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), which
619 include the WPA and WPA2 certifications. These certifications define sets of security requirements
620 for wireless networking devices. Devices with wireless network cards that support either WPA or
621 WPA2 can use their security features, such as encrypting network communications with the

⁹ If the manufacturer's documentation does not explicitly recommend any security precautions, teleworkers should consider implementing the examples, assuming that the appliance or router supports the configuration options listed in the examples.

¹⁰ A device can also wirelessly network directly with another device through what is known as an ad hoc wireless network. However, known security risks exist with ad hoc networks; therefore, this guide does not recommend their use.

622 Advanced Encryption Security (AES) algorithm.¹¹ Recommended choices, in order with the most
623 preferred option first, are as follows:

- 624 1. WPA2 with AES
- 625 2. WPA with AES
- 626 3. WPA with Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)

627 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is an earlier form of protection for wireless communications that
628 has serious flaws. Attackers can easily circumvent WEP and gain access to the information being sent
629 over the wireless network. If WEP is the only protection option available for a home network, users
630 should configure it to use 128-bit encryption (which will somewhat slow attacks), use the
631 organization's secure remote access solution (e.g., VPN) to protect their remote access
632 communications, and avoid sending any sensitive information unprotected.

633 ■ **Use a WPA2, WPA, or WEP key** (depending on the option selected above). This key is a series of
634 characters (either a password composed of letters, digits, and punctuation, or a hexadecimal number)
635 that is used to limit access to a wireless network. A wireless AP can be configured to require each
636 device to provide the same key as the one stored in the AP. Devices that do not know the key cannot
637 use the wireless network. The key should be long and complex, making it difficult for others to guess.
638 This should help to prevent people near the AP from gaining unauthorized access to the network.

639 ■ **Permit access for only particular wireless network cards.** Some APs can be configured to allow
640 only specific devices to use the wireless network. This is accomplished by identifying the media
641 access control (MAC) address of each device's wireless network card and entering the MAC address
642 into a list on the AP. Because a MAC address should be unique to a particular network interface,
643 specifying its MAC address in the AP can be helpful in preventing some unauthorized parties from
644 gaining wireless network access.¹² (Consult a device's documentation to learn how to determine its
645 MAC address.)

646 ■ **Change the default service set identifier (SSID).** An SSID is a name assigned to a wireless AP. The
647 SSID allows people and devices to distinguish one wireless network from another. Most APs have a
648 default SSID—often the manufacturer or product's name. If this default SSID is not changed, and
649 another nearby wireless network has the same default SSID, then the teleworker's device might
650 accidentally attempt to join the wrong wireless network.¹³ Changing the SSID to something
651 unusual—not the default value or an obvious value, such as “SSID” or “wireless”—makes it much
652 less likely that a device will choose the wrong network.

653 ■ **Disable SSID broadcasts from the wireless AP.** Many wireless APs broadcast the SSID, which
654 essentially advertises the existence of the AP to any computers in the vicinity. Configuring an AP so
655 that it does not broadcast its SSID makes it less likely that people will inadvertently attempt to join
656 the wireless network, but does not stop an attacker from doing so.

¹¹ AES is a Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) approved encryption algorithm, which means that it has been reviewed and approved by the Federal Government as being sufficiently strong to protect information on federal systems.

¹² A knowledgeable attacker can circumvent MAC address lists by configuring his or her computer to pretend to use an authorized MAC address. MAC address lists are mainly helpful at preventing use of the wireless network by people who have no malicious intent, such as someone accidentally connecting to the network or someone looking for a way to get Internet access. Using MAC address lists provides an additional layer of security that can deter attackers (e.g., cause them to look for easier targets) but not stop them.

¹³ If the teleworker's access point and telework device are configured to use encryption, the telework device will fail to join the other wireless network because the two networks are using different encryption keys. This is another benefit of using encryption for wireless communications.

657 ■ **Disable AP administration through wireless communications.** Flaws are frequently identified in
658 the administration utilities for wireless APs. If an AP has such a flaw, attackers in the vicinity could
659 reconfigure it to disable its security features or use it to acquire access to the teleworker's home
660 network or the Internet. To prevent such incidents, teleworkers should configure APs so that they can
661 only be administered locally, if feasible—such as running a cable between a computer and the AP—
662 and not administered wirelessly or otherwise remotely.

663 4.3 External Networks

664 Teleworkers should be aware that networks other than their home networks are unlikely to provide much
665 protection for their telework devices and communications, such as a laptop using a wireless hotspot at a
666 coffee shop. For example, external networks may not encrypt network communications, making them
667 susceptible to eavesdropping, particularly for wireless networks. Telework devices on external networks
668 are also often directly accessible from the Internet. Some networks provide partial protection, such as
669 blocking specific types of communications usually associated with malicious activity and checking
670 communications for the most common known threats, such as widespread worms or spam messages.

671 Because there is usually no easy way for teleworkers to determine what protection an external network
672 might be providing for their devices, teleworkers should assume that third-party networks are not
673 providing any protection. Telework devices on third-party networks are generally at higher risk of being
674 compromised than those on home networks, and their communications are also at higher risk of being
675 monitored. Before using a third-party network, teleworkers should ensure that their devices are fully
676 updated (see Section 5.1 and Section 6). The updates should be retrieved over a trusted network, such as
677 the user's home network. When teleworkers use a third-party network to access their organization's
678 computing resources, they should use a VPN or other secure remote access solution provided by the
679 organization, and they should activate the secure remote access solution (e.g., establishing a VPN session)
680 immediately after connecting to the third-party network, if applicable.

681 4.4 Organization Networks

682 Organizations may choose to permit BYOD devices to directly connect to networks within their facilities,
683 such as using a wireless network within a user's office building. Teleworkers who are interested in
684 bringing BYOD devices into the office to use enterprise networks should first determine if the
685 organization permits such network access, and if they do, then find out which network(s) the BYOD
686 devices are allowed to use. Many organizations set up a dedicated BYOD network, usually wireless, and
687 this network is the only one that BYOD devices can directly connect to. Teleworkers should not connect
688 any BYOD devices to an organization's internal networks without explicit permission to do so.

689

690 **5. Securing BYOD Telework PCs**

691 Teleworkers who use BYOD desktop or laptop PCs for telework should implement the recommendations
692 presented in this section. These recommendations should be helpful in securing a PC's OS and primary
693 applications. Teleworkers who do not need to secure BYOD PCs may skip this section.

694 Some of the recommendations made in this section may be challenging for many users to implement.
695 Users who are unsure of how to implement these recommendations should seek expert assistance.

696 **5.1 Software Updates**

697 Many threats take advantages of vulnerabilities in software on PCs. Software manufacturers release
698 updates for their software to eliminate these vulnerabilities. Accordingly, teleworkers should ensure that
699 updates are applied regularly to the major software on their BYOD PCs. In addition to the OS, updating
700 should include the following types of software:

- 701 ■ Web browsers;
- 702 ■ Email clients;
- 703 ■ Instant messaging clients;
- 704 ■ Office productivity software (document viewers, word processors, spreadsheet tools, etc.);
- 705 ■ Antivirus software; and
- 706 ■ Personal firewalls.

707 Teleworkers should review manufacturer documentation for each software program their PC contains in
708 these categories to determine each program's update capabilities. Most major software programs provide
709 built-in mechanisms to update themselves automatically. Teleworkers should enable these features so that
710 the programs check for updates at least weekly, preferably daily (especially for antivirus software and
711 other security software). For any programs that do not offer automatic updating, the teleworker should
712 determine from the documentation other available options, such as running an update feature from the
713 application's menus every week or visiting the manufacturer's website weekly for updates and
714 downloading and installing any available updates.

715 For a PC with metered connectivity, such as a cellular modem, teleworkers should be cautious when
716 configuring automatic software update features. Because many updates are very large, downloading them
717 over metered networks could be quite costly. Large updates should be downloaded over non-metered
718 networks whenever feasible.

719 Some software manufacturers offer updates at no charge, whereas others require an annual fee or other
720 payment to receive updates, such as paying a subscription fee to get the latest antivirus signatures. Most
721 software manufacturers that charge a fee allow users to pay it through the manufacturer's website and
722 receive updates within minutes of making payment.

723 **5.2 User Accounts and Sessions**

724 A PC can be configured with user accounts and passwords to restrict who can use the PC. This section
725 explains how teleworkers can configure their BYOD PCs to prevent unauthorized access to their
726 applications and data.

727 5.2.1 Use Accounts with Limited Privileges

728 On most OSs, user accounts can have full privileges or limited privileges. Accounts with full privileges,
729 also known as *administrative accounts*, should be used only when performing PC management tasks,
730 such as installing updates and application software, managing user accounts, and modifying OS and
731 application settings. If a PC is attacked while an administrative account is in use, the attack will be able to
732 inflict more damage to the PC. Therefore, user accounts should be set up to have limited privileges; such
733 accounts are known as *daily use, limited, or standard user accounts*. Teleworkers should not use
734 administrative accounts for general tasks, such as reading email, web browsing, and social networking,
735 because such tasks are common ways of infecting PCs with malware.

736 The primary disadvantages of having separate administrative and standard user accounts are that standard
737 users might not be able to run some applications, especially ones designed for older OSs, or to install
738 applications and OS or application updates. This could cause a significant delay in downloading and
739 installing updates, as well as making other tasks less convenient for users. Some OSs have a feature that
740 allows a person logged in as a standard user to perform individual administrative tasks by selecting a
741 particular option.

742 Each person who uses the telework PC should have a separate standard user account. On most OSs, this
743 keeps each person's data and settings (e.g., files, stored emails, web browser bookmarks and security
744 settings) private from other people using the PC. It also helps limit how much damage certain attacks can
745 cause, such as damaging only one user's files, not all users' files.

746 5.2.2 Protect Accounts with Passwords

747 Each PC user account should have a password to prevent unauthorized people from using the PC—not
748 only people with physical access to the PC, but also attackers attempting to contact the PC from other
749 computers. Users should select strong passwords that cannot be guessed by attackers. The following are
750 recommended practices for password selection:¹⁴

- 751 ■ **Select a sufficiently long password.** Longer passwords are more difficult to guess than shorter
752 passwords of similar complexity (see below). The downside is that longer passwords are often more
753 difficult for users to remember. Users should select passwords that are at least eight characters long.
754 Passphrases, which are long passwords composed of multiple words, may be easier to remember than
755 conventional passwords.
- 756 ■ **Create a complex password.** A variety of characters should be part of the password. For example, a
757 password made of all lower case letters is a relatively simple password, but another password of the
758 same length made of upper and lower case letters, digits, and symbols (such as punctuation marks) is
759 relatively complex. The more complex the password is, the more difficult it will be for others to
760 guess. Users should select passwords containing digits and/or symbols in addition to letters. Users
761 should not create new passwords that are very similar to old passwords. For example, if the old
762 password was “dahlia*1”, the new password should not be “dahlia*2”.
- 763 ■ **Do not use password hints.** Password hints can be very helpful to people in guessing others'
764 passwords and using them to gain unauthorized access to a PC. Users should not use password hints
765 unless their PCs do not need protection from people with physical access to them.

¹⁴ Organizations may have additional requirements for the selection and management of passwords on BYOD PCs used for telework. Teleworkers should ensure that they meet any such requirements, in addition to the recommendations listed here.

766 ■ **Do not use the same password for other accounts.** Teleworkers should not use the same password
767 for multiple accounts, such as organization and personal email accounts, instant messaging accounts,
768 and e-commerce website accounts. If the password used for the telework PC is also used for other
769 user accounts and an attacker learned one of the passwords, the attacker could then access the other
770 accounts.

771 Teleworkers should change their passwords regularly, based on the interval specified in their
772 organizations' password policies. This is necessary because if a password is unknowingly revealed to an
773 unauthorized person or uncovered by malware or other automated attacks, the password could be used
774 without authorization until the teleworker changes the password.

775 If an OS password is forgotten, especially for an administrative account, it may be difficult to regain
776 access to the PC. Therefore, users should consider writing down their OS passwords and storing them in a
777 physically secure location, such as a locked fire safe. Users should also safeguard their other passwords,
778 such as application and website passwords. For example, some organizations provide cryptographic
779 tokens to teleworkers that can be used to hold passwords. When the teleworker needs to retrieve a
780 password, he or she authenticates to the token (such as entering a PIN into the token), and the token
781 provides the password. The token helps prevent users from losing their passwords while also protecting
782 the passwords from attackers. Another option for protecting application and website passwords is a
783 password management utility, which is a program that can be used to generate, store, and access
784 passwords securely. A teleworker typically enters a single password to gain access to all the passwords
785 stored by the utility.

786 **5.2.3 Protect User Sessions from Unauthorized Physical Access**

787 It is important that user sessions be protected against unauthorized physical access. For example, if a PC
788 is sitting unattended in an area that other people can access, anyone could walk up to the PC and
789 masquerade as the user, such as sending email from the user's account, accessing the organization's
790 remote access resources, making purchases from websites, or accessing sensitive information stored on
791 the PC. To prevent such events, most OSs allow the user to lock the current session through menu options
792 or a combination of keystrokes. Also, many OSs offer screensavers that activate automatically after the
793 PC has been idle for a certain number of minutes, and can also be activated manually by the user on
794 demand. Some of these screensavers can be configured to lock the PC and require the user to enter his or
795 her password to unlock it. If a PC will be left unattended in an accessible area at any time, users should
796 use a password-protected screensaver or manually lock their user sessions. However, users should be
797 aware that these security features provide only short-term protection; someone who has access to the PC
798 for an extended period of time can bypass these features and gain access to the user's session and data.

799 **5.3 Networking Configuration**

800 Most PCs can be configured to limit network access, which reduces the number of ways in which
801 attackers can try to gain access to the PC. This section makes recommendations for configuring
802 networking features to better protect the PC.

803 **5.3.1 Disable Unneeded Networking Features**

804 By default, most PCs provide several networking features that can provide communications and data
805 sharing between PCs. Most teleworkers need to use only a few of these features. Because many attacks
806 are network based, PCs should use only the necessary networking features. For example, file and printer
807 sharing services, which allow other computers to access a telework PC's files and printers, should be
808 disabled unless the PC shares its files or printers with other computers, or if a particular application on the

809 PC requires the service to be enabled.¹⁵ Other examples of services that might not be needed are IPv6
810 protocols and wireless networking protocols (e.g., Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11, NFC). Consult the PC's
811 hardware and OS documentation for guidance on which network features should be disabled; if still
812 unsure, seek expert assistance.

813 **5.3.2 Limit the Use of Remote Access Utilities**

814 Some OSs offer features that allow a teleworker to get remote technical support assistance from a
815 coworker, friend, product manufacturer, or others when running into problems with a PC. Many
816 applications are also available that permit remote access to the PC from other computers. Although these
817 features are convenient, they also increase the risk that the PC will be accessed by attackers. Therefore,
818 such utilities should be kept disabled at all times except specifically when needed. The utilities should
819 also be configured to require the remote person to be authenticated, usually with a username and
820 password, before gaining access to the PC. (See the recommendations in Section 5.2.2 for choosing strong
821 passwords.) Provide the username and password to the remote person in person, by phone, or by other
822 means that cannot be monitored by attackers; do not send passwords through email messages, instant
823 messaging, or other methods that may not provide protection for communications.

824 **5.3.3 Configure Wireless Networking**

825 An improperly configured wireless network could transmit sensitive information without protecting it
826 properly, allowing people nearby to eavesdrop. Section 4.2 explains how to secure a wireless home
827 network. In addition, PCs should be configured so that they do not automatically attempt to join wireless
828 networks they detect. For example, a PC could join a neighbor's wireless home network instead of the
829 teleworker's network; if that neighbor's network is improperly secured, then the teleworker's
830 communications and computer could be at higher risk. Therefore, teleworkers should configure their PCs
831 so they do not join detected wireless networks automatically, with the exception of the organization's own
832 wireless networks, if such access is authorized. Teleworkers should also configure their PCs so that they
833 cannot use ad hoc networking, which is a relatively easy way to attack a PC.

834 **5.4 Attack Prevention**

835 As explained in Section 2, no 100 percent solution exists for computer security; it is simply not possible
836 to thwart every single attack. PCs should use a combination of software and software features that will
837 stop most attacks, particularly malware. The types of software described in this section are antivirus
838 software, personal firewalls, spam and web content filtering, and popup blocking. Changing a few settings
839 on common applications, such as email clients and web browsers, can also stop some attacks.

840 Although security tools can stop many attacks, teleworkers also need to practice safe computing habits.
841 One of the most common ways that PCs are attacked is by users opening and executing files from
842 unknown and untrusted sources. Teleworkers may download these files from websites, file sharing
843 services, or other means, or they may be sent to teleworkers through email, instant messaging, social
844 media, and other communications services. These files often contain malware, and teleworkers
845 unknowingly infect their PCs by trying to use these files. Teleworkers should avoid using any files that
846 are coming from unknown and untrusted sources. Other people using a BYOD PC should also be made
847 aware of safe computing habits.

¹⁵ It is particularly important to disable such services if the PC will be used on unsecured wireless networks, such as most wireless hotspots.

848 5.4.1 Install and Configure Antivirus Software

849 Antivirus software is specifically designed to detect many forms of malware and prevent them from
850 infecting PCs, as well as cleaning PCs that have already been infected. Because malware is the most
851 common threat against PCs, NIST recommends that PCs use antivirus software at all times.¹⁶ The
852 antivirus software should be kept up-to-date, as described in Section 5.1.

853 Many brands of antivirus software are available, most of which offer similar functionality. **NIST**
854 **recommends configuring antivirus software to use the following types of functions:**

- 855 ■ Automatically checking for and acquiring updates of signature or data definition files at least daily;
- 856 ■ Scanning critical OS components, such as startup files, system basic input/output system (BIOS), and
857 boot records;
- 858 ■ Monitoring the behavior of common applications, such as email clients, web browsers, file transfer
859 and file sharing programs, and instant messaging software;
- 860 ■ Performing real-time scans of each file as it is downloaded, opened, or executed;
- 861 ■ Scanning all hard drives regularly to identify any file system infections, and optionally scanning
862 removable media as well;
- 863 ■ Handling files that are infected by attempting to *disinfect* them, which refers to removing malware
864 from within a file, and *quarantining* them, which means that files containing malware are stored in
865 isolation for future disinfection or examination; and
- 866 ■ Logging all significant events, such as the results of scans, the startup and shutdown of antivirus
867 software, the installation of updates, and the discovery and handling of any instances of malware.

868 5.4.2 Use Personal Firewalls

869 A *personal firewall* is a software program that monitors communications between a PC and other
870 computers and that blocks communications that are unwanted. When properly configured, a personal
871 firewall limits the ability of other computers to initiate communications with the telework PC. This can
872 significantly reduce the exposure of the PC to network-based attacks, such as worms and botnets. A
873 personal firewall can also be used to protect shared resources on a PC, such as file and print shares.
874 Accordingly, a personal firewall should be enabled on every telework PC. Personal firewalls should be
875 configured to log significant events, such as blocked and allowed activity, the startup and shutdown of the
876 firewall software, and firewall configuration changes, to assist in troubleshooting problems. All personal
877 firewalls can monitor incoming communications, and some can also monitor outbound communications;
878 the latter offers better security, but it can also inadvertently cause problems in using certain applications.

879 Although personal firewalls are important security controls for PCs, some can be relatively difficult to
880 configure correctly. If a personal firewall is configured to be too restrictive, it could prevent some
881 applications or OS functions from working correctly. For example, a personal firewall might prevent the
882 use of file and print services. On the other hand, if a personal firewall is configured to be too permissive,
883 it could permit attacks to compromise the PC. Teleworkers should read their personal firewall

¹⁶ For some OSs, such as most Unix-based OSs, alternate types of antimalware software, such as rootkit detectors, may be more effective than antivirus software at protecting the PCs from malware and should be used instead of antivirus software. Readers with such OSs should adjust the recommendations presented in this publication so that they apply to the types of antimalware software most useful for their particular OSs.

884 documentation carefully to gain a solid understanding of how it should be configured. If it is not clear,
885 teleworkers should seek expert guidance on configuring their personal firewalls.¹⁷

886 Ideally, personal firewalls should deny all types of communications that teleworkers have not specifically
887 approved as being permitted. This is known as a *deny by default* configuration because all
888 communications that are not on the exception list are denied (blocked) automatically. Most firewalls can
889 be configured to allow communications based on lists of authorized applications, such as web browsers
890 contacting web servers and email clients sending and receiving email messages. Communications
891 involving any other application are either denied automatically, or permitted or denied based on the
892 teleworker responding to a prompt asking for a decision regarding the activity. For example, if a
893 teleworker installs a new application and runs it for the first time, the firewall might ask the teleworker if
894 that application should be allowed to access the Internet.

895 Unfortunately, this feature can be problematic. Personal firewalls often do not provide clear information
896 on which application is attempting to use the network, so teleworkers struggle to determine if the activity
897 is benign or malicious. If the nature of the activity is unclear, cautious teleworkers often choose to block
898 the activity, but this may inadvertently disrupt legitimate activity. To avoid this problem, many
899 teleworkers choose to permit access whenever asked, but this could support malicious activity. When
900 unsure what to do, teleworkers should search for additional information about the service or software in
901 question or ask someone with more security expertise for assistance.

902 Each PC should only have a single personal firewall enabled.¹⁸ If multiple firewalls are enabled, they may
903 interfere with each other. For example, one firewall might allow activity that the other one has been
904 configured to block. This could slow the performance of the PC, cause applications to stop functioning
905 properly, and weaken the computer's security. When enabling a firewall, teleworkers should verify that
906 the firewall's functionality is enabled for every network interface on the PC, including VPNs and wired,
907 wireless, and virtual network cards.

908 Many personal firewalls offer additional security features. For example, some firewalls offer the ability to
909 require teleworkers to enter a password before accessing the firewall's configuration settings. This
910 protects the configuration from being inadvertently or purposely altered by a user.

911 Teleworkers should be aware that most firewalls are frequently stopping unwanted activity. For example,
912 worms and other malware are constantly trying to infect more PCs. Teleworkers should not be alarmed by
913 notices from their firewall that indicate that incoming connections were blocked or that a specific attack
914 was attempted. If a firewall indicates that the PC was just scanned for a particular worm, this does not in
915 any way indicate that the PC has actually been infected with a worm.

916 **5.4.3 Enable and Configure Content Filtering Software**

917 *Content filtering* is the process of monitoring communications such as email and web pages, analyzing
918 them for suspicious content, and preventing the delivery of suspicious content to users. Two common
919 types of content filtering are spam filtering software and web content filtering software.

¹⁷ Configuring a personal firewall can be a complex task. Some firewalls have rules for specific protocols, services, or port numbers (e.g., File Transfer Protocol [FTP], Hypertext Transfer Protocol [HTTP], Simple Mail Transfer Protocol [SMTP]). For these firewalls, proper configuration may require networking and security experience.

¹⁸ Having multiple personal firewalls installed on a single PC is fine as long as only one is enabled at a time. For example, some OSs have built-in personal firewalls, but a user might install a third-party firewall onto the computer because the third-party firewall is part of a security software suite that includes antivirus software and other security applications.

920 *Spam* is often used to deliver spyware and other forms of malware to users. Spam is also frequently used
921 for performing phishing attacks, which are deceptive computer-based means to trick individuals into
922 disclosing sensitive personal information. Spam filtering software analyzes emails to search for spam
923 characteristics, and typically places messages that appear to be spam in a separate email folder. Most
924 organizations perform spam filtering for their users; however, because spam filtering is subjective, some
925 spam will still reach users, and some desired email messages will accidentally be classified as spam. Still,
926 spam filtering software can significantly reduce the amount of spam that reaches users. Many email
927 clients also offer spam filtering capabilities.

928 Users can refine spam filtering capabilities through the following customization options:

929 ■ **Blacklists.** A *blacklist* is a list of email senders who have previously sent spam to a user. When a user
930 receives a spam message, he or she can request that the sender's email address be added to a blacklist.
931 This will cause future emails from the same sender to be classified as spam automatically.

932 ■ **Whitelists.** A *whitelist* is a list of email senders that are known to be benign, such as coworkers,
933 friends, and family. A user can add their email addresses to a whitelist, which will cause their future
934 emails to not be classified as spam. Spam filtering accidentally classifies some emails as spam that
935 are not, but a whitelist overrides that classification and ensures that emails from trusted senders are
936 received by the user.

937 ■ **Bayesian Spam Filters.** A *Bayesian spam filter* determines the likelihood that a particular email
938 message is spam, based on a comparison of the email's characteristics with those of previously
939 received spam messages. When a user receives email, the user corrects any errors that the spam
940 filtering software has made. The Bayesian filter then analyzes the benign messages and the spam to
941 record their characteristics. For example, a Bayesian filter might record that a user has received
942 35 spam messages containing the phrase "FREE FREE FREE" but no benign messages with that
943 phrase. When a user receives a new email, the filter looks for that phrase, as well as any other
944 characteristics associated with benign or spam messages, and assigns a spam probability to the
945 message. The effectiveness of Bayesian filters depends on users reviewing all their emails and
946 ensuring each is marked correctly as being spam or not.

947 Web content filtering software typically works by comparing a website address that a user attempts to
948 access with a list of known bad websites. Although the primary purpose of web content filtering software
949 is to prevent access to inappropriate materials, many also contain lists of websites that are known as
950 hostile, such as those attempting to distribute malware to visitors or hosting phishing websites. Web
951 content filtering software might inadvertently classify benign content as inappropriate or vice versa.

952 From a telework PC security perspective, spam content filtering technologies and web content filtering
953 technologies are strongly recommended. All content filtering products that are used should be kept up-to-
954 date to ensure that their detection is as accurate as possible.

955 **5.5 Primary Application Configuration**

956 Many attacks, particularly malware, take advantage of features provided by common applications such as
957 email clients, web browsers, instant messaging clients, and office productivity suites. By default,
958 applications often are configured to favor functionality over security. Accordingly, teleworkers should
959 consider disabling unneeded features and capabilities from applications, particularly those that are
960 commonly exploited by malware. Teleworkers should also consider configuring applications to filter
961 content and stop other activity that is likely to be malicious. Examples of application settings to consider
962 are listed below. Teleworkers should be aware that a single PC might have multiple web browsers, email

963 clients, instant messaging clients, and office productivity suites installed, each of which may have
964 different features and configuration settings.¹⁹

965 Teleworkers should also consider their organization's policies regarding application use. For example,
966 many organizations forbid the use of peer-to-peer software and file sharing programs on organization
967 computers because of the increased security risks associated with the software. Teleworkers should
968 remove software that is forbidden by policy from their telework computers to better protect the
969 organization's information. In general, teleworkers should install and use only known and trusted
970 software on their BYOD PCs.

971 **5.5.1 Web Browsers**

972 Teleworkers should consider adopting the following recommendations for the web browsers on their
973 BYOD PCs:

974 ■ **Use a different brand of web browser for telework.** Multiple brands of web browsers (e.g.,
975 Microsoft Internet Explorer or Edge, Mozilla Firefox, Apple Safari, Google Chrome, Opera) can be
976 installed on a single PC. Accessing websites containing malicious content is one of the most common
977 ways for PCs to be attacked, such as spyware plug-ins being installed in a browser. To reduce the
978 likelihood that such attacks could impact telework, teleworkers can use one brand of browser for
979 telework only and another brand of browser for all other website access. This separates the telework-
980 related data within one browser from the data within the other browser, providing better protection for
981 the telework data (although this alone cannot adequately secure browser data). Having a separate
982 brand of browser for telework also allows the teleworker to secure it more tightly.

983 ■ **Block popup windows.** Web browsers support the use of *popup windows*, which are standalone web
984 browser panes that open automatically when a web page is loaded or a user performs an action
985 designed to trigger a popup window. Many popup windows contain advertising, but some are used to
986 attack computers. Some popup windows are crafted to resemble legitimate system message boxes or
987 websites and can trick users into going to phony websites, including sites used for phishing, or
988 authorizing changes to their computers, among other malicious actions. For example, a popup
989 window may tell a user that the computer is infected with spyware and to click on OK to disinfect it.
990 By clicking on OK, the user unwittingly permits spyware or other types of malware to be installed on
991 the computer.

992 To control popup windows, teleworkers should either configure their web browsers to block them or
993 use third-party popup blocking utilities that can block them. Both options prevent popup windows
994 from opening and indicate to the teleworker that a popup window was blocked. If the teleworker did
995 not want the window to be blocked, he or she could then choose to permit that particular popup
996 window or all popup windows from a trusted website, such as the organization's remote access
997 website.

998 ■ **Enable phishing filter capabilities.** Most browsers can detect possible phishing attempts and warn
999 the user before allowing the user to visit a suspected phishing site. Teleworkers should check their
1000 browser's documentation to see if it offers a phishing filter, and if so, enable it.

1001 ■ **Remove unneeded browser plug-ins.** A *plug-in* is a utility that works in conjunction with a web
1002 browser to enhance the browser's capabilities. Most plug-ins are beneficial, but some plug-ins are
1003 malicious. Teleworkers should periodically review the plug-ins installed in their browsers and

¹⁹ Many manufacturers document their security recommendations in their product documentation or on their websites. Some manufacturers also make security checklists available for securing their operating systems, applications, and devices. Many of these checklists are posted on the NIST Security Checklists for IT Products site, located at <http://checklists.nist.gov/>.

1004 uninstall all plug-ins that are unneeded or unknown to the teleworkers. If a necessary plug-in is
1005 accidentally uninstalled, the teleworker is usually prompted to download and install it the next time
1006 the teleworker accesses content that requires the plug-in.

1007 ■ **Protect sensitive information stored by the browser.** Browsers may store sensitive information on
1008 behalf of users, such as cached website passwords, digital certificates, and encryption keys. Some
1009 browsers have options for strongly protecting this information. Typically, the browser requires a user
1010 to enter a master password, which is used solely to protect the sensitive information. Teleworkers
1011 should check their browser's documentation to determine if it offers a protection option, and if so,
1012 enable it and set a master password.

1013 ■ **Prevent website passwords from being recalled automatically.** Most browsers can save passwords
1014 that have been entered into websites. However, many browsers also offer auto-fill or auto-complete
1015 options that recall stored passwords and enter them into password text boxes automatically. This
1016 could allow someone else who accesses a telework device to gain access to various websites posing
1017 as the teleworker. To prevent this, teleworkers should configure their web browsers so that they do
1018 not use auto-fill or auto-complete functions for usernames and passwords.

1019 ■ **Run web browsers with the least privileges possible.** Some web browsers can run in a mode that
1020 offers low privileges, which means that actions performed within the web browser can affect the
1021 computer in very limited ways. This helps prevent some attacks sent through web browsers from
1022 succeeding and limits the damage caused by attacks that do succeed. Teleworkers should run their
1023 web browsers with the least privileges possible.

1024 ■ **Use third-party security and privacy enhancing plug-ins.** Such plug-ins can improve the security
1025 and privacy of telework in many ways, some of which are specific to a particular type of browser.
1026 Examples include preventing active content from running automatically within the web browser,
1027 stopping the use of tracking techniques across websites, and blocking advertising content from
1028 downloading to the browser.

1029 5.5.2 Email Clients

1030 Teleworkers should consider adopting the following recommendations for each email client on their
1031 BYOD PCs:

1032 ■ **Limit mobile code execution.** Mobile code is a way for a remote computer, such as a website, to run
1033 programs on a teleworker's device. Email messages can carry malicious mobile code that attempts to
1034 infect the device from which the messages are read. To prevent infections, most email clients can be
1035 configured to permit only the required forms of mobile code (e.g., JavaScript, ActiveX, Java).
1036 Teleworkers should consider disabling mobile code support in their email clients, with the
1037 understanding that the full content of certain benign email messages might not be available.

1038 ■ **Set default message reading format and sending format to plain text.** Many email clients allow
1039 users to specify the default format for reading and sending emails. The most commonly used formats
1040 are plain text and Hypertext Markup Language (HTML). Because malware, phishing, and other types
1041 of attacks often take advantage of features offered by HTML, it is preferable that the default message
1042 format be set to plain text. This will result in emails being displayed as text only, which means that
1043 pictures, hyperlinks, and other content provided through HTML would be omitted or displayed only
1044 through alternative text. Also, sending emails as plain text is helpful to other security-conscious users
1045 who prefer to read email messages in plain text.

1046 ■ **Disable automatic previewing and opening of email messages.** Some email-based malware may be
1047 activated and infect a computer when the malicious email is previewed or opened. Many email clients

1048 can be configured to preview or open email messages automatically. This can provide an easy way for
1049 malware to infect a computer. Accordingly, email clients should be configured not to preview or open
1050 email messages automatically. This gives teleworkers an opportunity to identify and delete an email
1051 that appears to be suspicious, based on the sender, recipient, subject, and other identifying
1052 information that can be reviewed without viewing the entire email.

1053 ■ **Enable spam filtering.** Section 5.4.3 has additional information concerning this issue.

1054 5.5.3 Instant Messaging Clients

1055 Teleworkers should consider adopting the following recommendations for each instant messaging client
1056 on their BYOD PCs:

1057 ■ **Suppress the display of email addresses.** If the teleworker's displayed name or supporting
1058 information includes an email address, this may be harvested by malware or malicious users, then
1059 used in future attacks.

1060 ■ **Restrict file transfers.** If the software can transfer files with other instant messaging users, it should
1061 be configured to prompt the teleworker before permitting a file transfer to begin. File transfers are a
1062 common way to transfer malware to other computers and infect them.

1063 5.5.4 Office Productivity Suites

1064 Teleworkers should consider adopting the following recommendations for each office productivity suite
1065 on their BYOD PCs:

1066 ■ **Restrict macro use.** Applications such as word processors and spreadsheets often contain macro
1067 languages that certain types of malware use. Most common applications with macro capabilities offer
1068 security features that permit macros only from trusted locations or prompt the user to approve or
1069 reject each attempt to run a macro. The prompting feature can be effective at stopping macro-based
1070 malware threats.

1071 ■ **Limit personal information.** Many office productivity tools allow personal information, such as
1072 name, initials, mailing address, and phone number, to be stored with each document created.
1073 Although the most basic information (typically, name and initials) are often needed for collaboration
1074 features and edit tracking, information such as mailing addresses and phone numbers is not. Personal
1075 information becomes embedded within document files and may inadvertently be distributed with files
1076 to others. Teleworkers should not enter any more personal information than necessary into the user
1077 settings of office productivity tools. For some word processors, teleworkers can use sanitization
1078 utilities that remove personal information from documents, as well as comments, tracked changes,
1079 and other information that might be embedded in documents but should not be part of the final
1080 document.

1081 ■ **Use secured folders for application files.** Most office productivity applications allow users to define
1082 default locations for saving documents and holding temporary files, including auto-save and backup
1083 copies of documents. This can be very helpful at protecting application files from unauthorized access
1084 by others. Teleworkers should also store their custom dictionary entries in a user-specific file stored
1085 in one of their protected folders.

1086 5.6 Remote Access Software Configuration

1087 As described in Section 2, teleworkers may have to install remote access software onto their BYOD PCs
1088 or configure software built into the PC's OS. This software should be configured based on the

1089 organization's requirements and recommendations. In many cases, the remote access software will be
1090 preconfigured by the organization so that teleworkers do not have to be concerned about configuring it. In
1091 general, remote access software should be configured so that only the necessary functions are enabled.
1092 Teleworkers should also ensure that whenever updates to the remote access software are available, that
1093 they are acquired and installed. If the organization provides the updates, teleworkers should make sure
1094 that they will be notified when updates are available.

1095 **5.7 Security Maintenance and Monitoring**

1096 Teleworkers should maintain their BYOD PCs' security on an ongoing basis. Common responsibilities
1097 are as follows:

- 1098 ■ Confirming periodically that the OS and primary applications are up-to-date. Many software
1099 programs have a menu option or other mechanism that displays the update status, such as the number
1100 of updates that have not yet been applied or the most recent date the software was updated.
- 1101 ■ Checking the status of security software periodically to ensure that it is still enabled, configured
1102 properly, and up-to-date. Some operating systems offer security dashboards that show the current
1103 status of the security software. Checking the software's status should also include verifying that the
1104 regular scans performed by antivirus software have not found any infections on the PC. If an infection
1105 is still present, the teleworker should follow the antivirus software's instructions for disinfecting the
1106 PC.
- 1107 ■ Creating a new user account whenever another person needs to start using the PC, as well as disabling
1108 or deleting a user account whenever the associated person no longer needs to use the PC. All the user
1109 accounts should be reviewed periodically to ensure that only the necessary accounts are enabled.
- 1110 ■ Changing the teleworker's PC password regularly in accordance with the organization's password
1111 policy.
- 1112 ■ Periodically identifying security issues on the PC. Some OSs offer utilities that can be run to check
1113 the PC for potential problems. These utilities can identify missing software updates and incorrect
1114 security settings and can provide recommendations for fixing problems. However, understanding the
1115 reports that these utilities produce and properly implementing recommended solutions can require
1116 someone with considerable security expertise. Teleworkers without sufficient expertise should seek
1117 expert assistance before implementing any unclear recommendations.

1118 Teleworkers also need to investigate any cases in which the PC begins to display unusual behavior.
1119 Generally, the best first step is to ensure that the computer's software (especially antivirus software) is
1120 fully up-to-date; then, the entire computer should be scanned using the antivirus software. If any malware
1121 is detected, it should be removed using the antivirus software; if no malware is detected, then the next
1122 step should be to reboot the computer, which clears many errors. If that is ineffective, then additional
1123 troubleshooting steps need to be performed. Examples are as follows:

- 1124 ■ Checking antivirus manufacturer websites for instances of malware that cause the unusual behavior
1125 being seen,
- 1126 ■ Uninstalling and reinstalling an application that is not functioning properly,
- 1127 ■ Searching the OS manufacturer's website for information on similar problems, and
- 1128 ■ Using troubleshooting utilities that can provide insights into what is happening on the PC.

1129 If the problem still cannot be resolved, or the teleworker does not have sufficient knowledge to perform
1130 these troubleshooting steps, the teleworker should seek expert assistance, such as contacting the
1131 organization's help desk if the organization provides support for BYOD PCs. Teleworkers can assist with
1132 troubleshooting by collecting and documenting information regarding the problems. Some OSs provide
1133 features that automate this process, and some PC manufacturers install utilities on their PCs designed
1134 specifically for this purpose. Teleworkers should consult the PC's hardware and OS manuals for
1135 information regarding such features. Teleworkers also should preserve error messages by performing a
1136 screen capture, copying and pasting the error message into a file or email, or writing down the error
1137 message verbatim on paper. (The appropriate technique should be selected based on the complexity of the
1138 error message and the PC's support for performing screen captures, if any.)

1139

1140 6. Securing BYOD Telework Mobile Devices

1141 Teleworkers who use BYOD mobile devices for telework, particularly smartphones and tablets, should
1142 implement the recommendations presented in this section. Teleworkers who do not need to secure BYOD
1143 mobile devices can skip this section.

1144 A wide variety of mobile devices exist, and the security features available for these devices also vary
1145 widely. Some devices offer only a few basic features, whereas others offer sophisticated features similar
1146 to those offered by PCs. This does not necessarily imply that more security features are better; in fact,
1147 many devices offer more security features because the capabilities they provide make them more
1148 susceptible to attack than devices without these capabilities. In general, mobile devices currently face
1149 fewer threats than PCs, but threats against mobile devices are increasing. The variety in security features
1150 makes it infeasible to create specific recommendations that apply to all mobile devices; therefore,
1151 teleworkers should consult the documentation provided by their device manufacturers and service
1152 providers (e.g., cellular service) and follow their security recommendations. General recommendations
1153 are as follows:

1154 ■ **Limit access to the device.** Most mobile devices allow the owner to restrict access by setting a PIN
1155 or password; some also support more sophisticated authentication mechanisms, such as biometrics
1156 (e.g., the owner's thumbprint). Using some sort of authenticator prevents or deters access to the
1157 teleworker's information and service by a person who gains unauthorized physical access to the
1158 device. Some devices can also be configured to lock themselves automatically after an idle period; a
1159 person attempting to use the device when it is locked must authenticate again to unlock it.²⁰ PINs and
1160 passwords should be changed periodically and whenever teleworkers suspect that someone else may
1161 know them. Each PIN or password should be unique and not used elsewhere, either currently or
1162 previously, to prevent a PIN or password from being compromised by someone and then used to gain
1163 access to additional devices, applications, websites, etc.

1164 ■ **Disable necessary networking capabilities except when they are needed.** Many mobile devices
1165 offer multiple types of networking capabilities, such as IEEE 802.11, Bluetooth, and NFC.²¹
1166 Attackers can try to use these capabilities to access information on the device or use the device's
1167 services. This can be prevented by disabling each networking capability that is not used, and by
1168 enabling necessary capabilities only when they are going to be used. For example, if a person only
1169 uses a Bluetooth earpiece occasionally with a smartphone, then the teleworker could enable the
1170 smartphone's Bluetooth capability only when the teleworker wants to use the earpiece and disable it
1171 when the teleworker is done with the earpiece. Each enabled networking capability increases the risk
1172 of successful attacks, so teleworkers should consider the relative risk of each form of networking
1173 before enabling it (for example, enabling Bluetooth in a crowded public area is generally riskier than
1174 enabling it in a private home).

1175 ■ **Keep devices updated.** Most mobile devices can be updated or patched to eliminate known security
1176 flaws. Devices that support updating may do so directly (e.g., the teleworker selects an option on the
1177 device to get an update) or indirectly (e.g., the teleworker downloads a patch onto a PC, and then
1178 installs the patch onto the mobile device through a data cable connecting the two). If a device does
1179 support updating, teleworkers should follow the provided instructions to ensure that security updates

²⁰ Some devices can be configured to wipe themselves after a certain number of failed authentication attempts. If this feature is enabled, teleworkers should maintain current backups of the information on the device so that it can be restored if excessive authentication attempts cause the device to be wiped.

²¹ In addition, some devices can accept third-party networking cards to provide additional networking capabilities. Consult the cards' documentation as well and remove or disable the cards if they are not needed.

- 1180 are identified, acquired, and installed regularly, at least weekly. See Section 5.1 for information on
1181 acquiring updates through metered networks.
- 1182 ■ **Configure applications to support security.** Many applications on mobile devices, such as web
1183 browsers, are often configured by default to favor functionality over security. Accordingly,
1184 teleworkers should consider disabling unneeded application features and configuring applications to
1185 stop or block activity that is likely to be malicious. Section 5.5 provides configuration
1186 recommendations for web browsers, email clients, and instant messaging clients on personal
1187 computers; these recommendations should also be applied to mobile devices to the extent possible.
- 1188 ■ **Download and run apps only from authorized app stores.** Teleworkers should be cautious about
1189 downloading and installing software that is not being provided by either the organization or the
1190 device's manufacturer. An example is downloading games from an unfamiliar website. Such software
1191 could reduce the security of the device if the software is not configured properly, or the software itself
1192 could contain malware that would infect the device. The software could also inadvertently disrupt
1193 other applications, including security software.
- 1194 ■ **Do not jailbreak or root the device.** Doing so disables the manufacturer's built-in security
1195 capabilities for the device. This makes the device's use so risky that many organizations
1196 automatically check mobile devices attempting to access their networks and services for signs of
1197 jailbreaking or rooting, and they deny any access to such devices.
- 1198 ■ **Do not connect the device to an unknown charging station.** Many charging stations enable people
1199 to recharge their mobile devices through direct wired connections between a device's USB interface
1200 and the charging station. Unfortunately, someone may have altered a charging station, such as one in
1201 a public area, so that it attempts to automatically gain unauthorized access to the data, applications,
1202 services, and other resources on mobile devices that attach to it.
- 1203 ■ **Use an isolated, protected, and encrypted environment that is supported and managed by the**
1204 **organization to access the organization's data and services.** If such an environment is available, it
1205 is generally automatically generated and maintained on mobile devices so that teleworkers don't need
1206 to act. The environment isolates the organization's stored data, applications, and other files on the
1207 mobile device so that the organization can maintain control over them without having any access to
1208 the teleworker's personal information, files, etc. on the same mobile device.
- 1209 Teleworkers should be cautious about connecting mobile devices to other computers, such as
1210 synchronizing data between a smartphone and a PC. Malware could be transmitted from one device to
1211 another during a synchronization. Also, a synchronization could inadvertently cause sensitive information
1212 to be transferred from one device to another, and the second device might not be configured to provide
1213 adequate protection to that information, putting it at higher risk of exposure. Before connecting a mobile
1214 device to another computer, teleworkers should ensure that the mobile device and the computer to which
1215 it will be attached have both been properly secured.

1216

1217 **7. Considering the Security of Third-Party Devices**

1218 Teleworkers sometimes want to perform remote access from devices owned by third parties, such as
1219 checking email from a kiosk computer at a conference. However, when a third party is responsible for
1220 securing a device, teleworkers typically do not know if it has been secured properly. Consequently, a
1221 teleworker could perform remote access from a compromised device—for example, one infected with
1222 malware intended to steal information from users, such as their passwords or email messages.

1223 Many organizations either prohibit third-party devices from being used for remote access or permit only
1224 limited use, such as for webmail. If an organization permits the use of third-party devices for telework,
1225 teleworkers should think about the environment of a third-party device before deciding whether or not to
1226 use it. There is generally more risk in using third-party BYOD devices than in using teleworker-owned
1227 BYOD devices because of uncertainty as to how the third-party devices have been secured; however,
1228 some third-party devices are reasonably secured. Teleworkers should consider who is responsible for
1229 securing a third-party device and who can access the device. For example, a kiosk provided at a
1230 conference for attendees only is more likely to be reasonably secure than a kiosk in a hotel lobby
1231 available to the general public. Whenever possible, teleworkers should not use publicly accessible devices
1232 for telework, including remote access to email and other applications.

1233 Teleworkers should avoid using any third-party devices for performing sensitive functions or accessing
1234 sensitive information. If a teleworker is not reasonably confident of the security of a third-party device,
1235 the teleworker should be cautious and avoid using it. Many teleworkers choose not to use any third party-
1236 secured devices for remote access because of security concerns.

1237

1238 Appendix A—Additional Security Considerations for Telework

1239 In addition to securing telework devices and home networks, there are additional security-related
1240 considerations for telework. For example, teleworkers should consider the relative security of phone
1241 services, such as cordless phones, cellular phones, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services.
1242 Other possible security concerns include the use of wireless personal area network (WPAN) technologies,
1243 such as Bluetooth; use of wireless broadband network technologies; and secure destruction of removable
1244 media, printed materials, and other forms of media that may contain sensitive information. This appendix
1245 provides recommendations for each topic.

1246 A.1 Phone Services

1247 Depending on the sensitivity of telework communications, telephone security may be a consideration. The
1248 various choices for telephones and telephone services span a wide spectrum of privacy capabilities. At the
1249 low end are older cordless phones, whose calls may be picked up by walkie-talkies, baby monitors, and
1250 radio scanners; at the high end are corded phones. The most commonly used options are summarized
1251 below.

- 1252 ■ **Corded phones using traditional wired telephone networks.** Physical connections are required to
1253 intercept communications involving traditional corded telephones that use wired telephone networks,
1254 so they are sufficiently secure for typical telework. Security for corded phones used with VoIP
1255 networks is described below.
- 1256 ■ **Cordless phones using traditional wired telephone networks.** Cordless phone communications can
1257 be intercepted by eavesdroppers within physical proximity of the phone, often a few hundred yards at
1258 most. Cordless phones used for telework should employ spread spectrum technology, which uses a
1259 rapidly changing set of frequencies to scramble transmissions, thus reducing the risk of
1260 eavesdropping. Security for cordless phones used with VoIP networks is described below.
- 1261 ■ **Cellular phones.** Cellular network transmissions are scrambled to deter eavesdropping, so their use
1262 should be acceptable for typical telework.
- 1263 ■ **Voice over IP.** There are many services that offer phone service over the Internet. Known as VoIP,
1264 the services convert speech to Internet messages and transmit them to a facility that interfaces with
1265 the telephone network. The party on the other end can be using any type of phone service, not just
1266 VoIP. From a security standpoint, this type of connection may be susceptible to eavesdropping
1267 because it may be carried over the local network and the Internet. Because of the potential for
1268 vulnerabilities in one or more of these networks, communications carried over VoIP should not be
1269 considered secure unless encryption is used. Many VoIP services provide strong encryption, so
1270 teleworkers interested in using VoIP for telework discussions involving sensitive or proprietary
1271 information should first check with the VoIP provider to see if communications are encrypted and if
1272 this encryption meets federal agency requirements.

1273 A.2 WPAN Technologies

1274 WPANs are small-scale wireless networks that require no infrastructure to operate. A WPAN is typically
1275 used by a few devices in a single room to communicate without the need to physically connect devices
1276 with cables. Examples include using a wireless keyboard or mouse with a computer, printing wirelessly,
1277 synchronizing a smartphone with a laptop, and allowing a wireless headset or earpiece to be used with a
1278 cell phone. The most commonly used type of technologies for WPANs is Bluetooth. Bluetooth does not
1279 require an unobstructed line of sight between the two devices using it. Bluetooth devices can be up to 100
1280 meters (approximately 328 feet) apart, depending on output power.

1281 As Sections 5 and 6 mention, teleworkers should disable Bluetooth when it is not in use. In addition,
1282 Bluetooth users should use a PIN that is at least eight characters long, preferably one that includes letters
1283 and digits. This makes it more difficult for an attacker to guess the PIN and gain access to the Bluetooth
1284 devices. For Bluetooth devices that do not support the use of long PINs (some permit only four-digit
1285 PINs), teleworkers should choose hard-to-guess PINs. Teleworkers should also configure their Bluetooth
1286 devices to encrypt their communications, if the devices support it; the devices' documentation should
1287 provide the necessary information on configuring encryption capabilities.

1288 **A.3 Wireless Broadband Data Network Technologies**

1289 Wireless broadband data networks are a form of mobile networking for PCs. This technology allows a PC
1290 to have wireless access to the Internet from nearly any location. Because of the nature of cellular
1291 communications, it is much more difficult for an attacker to eavesdrop on wireless broadband networks
1292 than WLANs, but it is still possible. Therefore, teleworkers should assume that wireless broadband
1293 communications are not sufficiently secure for transmitting sensitive information. Teleworkers should
1294 consult with their organization to determine what protection the organization's remote access solution
1295 provides before using wireless broadband to send or receive sensitive information.

1296 **A.4 Information Destruction**

1297 When a teleworker-owned computer is no longer going to be used, it should be prepared for retirement.
1298 The computer's built-in storage devices, such as hard drives, often contain information that teleworkers
1299 might not want others to see, including their organizations' files and their personal information, such as
1300 files from tax return software. Even if the teleworker deletes all of the files from the computer, curious
1301 people who get access to the computer might be able to recover the files using free or inexpensive
1302 software utilities specifically designed to recover deleted files. Accordingly, teleworkers should ensure
1303 that all data on their computers' built-in storage devices is wiped out before donating, selling, or
1304 discarding a computer. Methods of performing these actions are as follows:

1305 ■ **Use a third-party disk scrubbing utility.** Several commercial and open source software products are
1306 available that are specially designed to remove traces of data from computers. Follow the
1307 manufacturer directions for removing data from the hard drive.

1308 ■ **Retain the hard drive.** Following the instructions in the computer manufacturer's documentation, a
1309 teleworker can remove the hard drive from the computer. If other people want to use the computer in
1310 the future, they can purchase a new hard drive and install an OS onto the computer. This is the best
1311 option if the computer is no longer functioning properly, preventing the use of disk scrubbing
1312 utilities.

1313 ■ **Destroy the hard drive.** Hard drives can be degaussed, which involves applying a magnetic field to
1314 the drive that makes it unusable. Hard drives can also be shredded or otherwise physically destroyed
1315 through specialized equipment and services.

1316 Teleworkers also need to ensure that removable media, printed materials, and other forms of media that
1317 may contain sensitive information are also destroyed. Many organizations provide information destruction
1318 services for their teleworkers, such as scrubbing or destroying hard drives and shredding removable
1319 media and printed materials.

1320 Data scrubbing for BYOD devices can be problematic because the devices are used for both personal and
1321 work purposes, and it may be necessary to scrub the telework data without affecting the personal data.
1322 Selective data scrubbing can be performed through enterprise mobile device management software (for

1323 mobile devices) and specialized utilities. Teleworkers should consult with their organization about the
1324 organization's options for scrubbing BYOD device data.

1325 Appendix B—Glossary

1326 Selected terms used in the publication are defined below.

1327 **Administrative Account:** A user account with full privileges on a computer. Such an account is intended
1328 to be used only when performing personal computer (PC) management tasks, such as installing updates
1329 and application software, managing user accounts, and modifying operating system (OS) and application
1330 settings.

1331 **Blacklist:** A list of email senders who have previously sent spam to a user.

1332 **Content Filtering:** The process of monitoring communications such as email and web pages, analyzing
1333 them for suspicious content, and preventing the delivery of suspicious content to users.

1334 **Daily Use Account:** See “Standard user account.”

1335 **Disinfect:** To remove malware from within a file.

1336 **Malicious Code:** See “Malware.”

1337 **Malware:** A computer program that is covertly placed onto a computer with the intent of compromising
1338 the privacy, accuracy, or reliability of the computer’s data, applications, or OS.

1339 **Mobile Device:** A small mobile computer such as a smartphone or tablet.

1340 **Personal Computer (PC):** A desktop or laptop computer.

1341 **Personal Firewall:** A software program that monitors communications between a computer and other
1342 computers and blocks communications that are unwanted.

1343 **Phishing:** Deceptive computer-based means to trick individuals into disclosing sensitive personal
1344 information.

1345 **Popup Window:** A standalone web browser pane that opens automatically when a web page is loaded or
1346 a user performs an action designed to trigger a popup window.

1347 **Quarantine:** To store files containing malware in isolation for future disinfection or examination.

1348 **Remote Access:** The ability for an organization’s users to access its non-public computing resources from
1349 external locations other than the organization’s facilities.

1350 **Remote System Control:** Remotely using a computer at an organization from a telework computer.

1351 **Security Controls:** See “Security Protections.”

1352 **Security Protections:** Measures against threats that are intended to compensate for a computer’s security
1353 weaknesses.

1354 **Service Set Identifier (SSID):** A name assigned to a wireless AP.

- 1355 **Social Engineering:** A general term for attackers trying to trick people into revealing sensitive
1356 information or performing certain actions, such as downloading and executing files that appear to be
1357 benign but are actually malicious.
- 1358 **Standard User Account:** A user account with limited privileges that will be used for general tasks such
1359 as reading email and surfing the web.
- 1360 **Telecommuting:** See “Telework.”
- 1361 **Telework:** The ability for an organization’s employees, contractors, business partners, vendors, and other
1362 users to perform work from locations other than the organization’s facilities.
- 1363 **Telework Device:** A PC or mobile device used by a teleworker for performing telework.
- 1364 **Virtual Private Network (VPN):** A tunnel that connects the teleworker’s computer to the organization’s
1365 network.
- 1366 **Vulnerability:** A security weakness in a computer.
- 1367 **Whitelist:** A list of email senders known to be benign, such as a user’s coworkers, friends, and family.
1368

1369 **Appendix C—Acronyms and Abbreviations**

1370 Acronyms and abbreviations used in this guide are defined below.

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AP	Access Point
BIOS	Basic Input/Output System
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
FISMA	Federal Information Security Management Act
FTP	File Transfer Protocol
HTML	Hypertext Markup Language
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
IP	Internet Protocol
IPsec	Internet Protocol Security
ISP	Internet Service Provider
IT	Information Technology
ITL	Information Technology Laboratory
MAC	Media Access Control
NAT	Network Address Translation
NFC	Near Field Communication
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OS	Operating System
PC	Personal Computer
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PIN	Personal Identification Number
SMTP	Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SSID	Service Set Identifier
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
TKIP	Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
VDI	Virtual Desktop Infrastructure
VMI	Virtual Mobile Infrastructure
VoIP	Voice over Internet Protocol
VPN	Virtual Private Network
WEP	Wired Equivalent Privacy
WPA	Wi-Fi Protected Access
WPAN	Wireless Personal Area Network

1371

1372 **Appendix D—Resources**

1373 The lists below provide examples of resources that might be helpful in securing devices used for
1374 telework.

1375

1376 **Resource Sites**

Site Name	URL
National Checklist Program Repository	http://checklists.nist.gov/
Safety & Security Center	http://www.microsoft.com/security/default.aspx
StaySafeOnline.org	http://www.staysafeonline.org/
telework.gov	http://www.telework.gov/

1377

1378

1379 **Documents**

Document Title	URL
<i>Best Practices for Keeping Your Home Network Secure</i>	https://www.nsa.gov/ia/files/factsheets/l43v/Slick_Sheets/Slicksheet_BestPracticesForKeepingYourHomeNetworkSecure.pdf
NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-46 Revision 2 (Draft), <i>Guide to Enterprise Telework, Remote Access, and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Security</i>	http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html#800-46r2
NIST SP 800-111, <i>Guide to Storage Encryption Technologies for End User Devices</i>	http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-111
NIST SP 800-121 Revision 1, <i>Guide to Bluetooth Security</i>	http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-121r1
NIST SP 800-124 Revision 1, <i>Guidelines for Managing the Security of Mobile Devices in the Enterprise</i>	http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-124r1
NIST SP 800-153, <i>Guidelines for Securing Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs)</i>	http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-153

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