The attached DRAFT document (provided here for historical purposes) has been superseded by the following publication:

Publication Number: NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-78-4 (2nd Draft)

Title: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal

Identity Verification

Publication Date: May 2014

• Final Publication: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-78-4 (which links to http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-78-4.pdf).

 Information on other NIST Computer Security Division publications and programs can be found at: http://csrc.nist.gov/ The following information was posted with the attached DRAFT document:

May 13, 2013

SP 800-78-4

DRAFT Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification

NIST announces the release of public comment for *Draft Special Publication SP 800-78-4*, *Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification (PIV)*. The document has been modified 1) to align with the Candidate Final FIPS 201-2 and Draft SP 800-73-4 and 2) to add requirements for Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) validation testing. In particular, the following changes are introduced in Draft SP 800-78-4:

- Algorithm and key size requirements for the optional PIV Secure Messaging key have been added.
- RSA public keys may only have a public exponent of 65,537. (Client applications are still encouraged to be able to process RSA public keys that have any public exponent that is an odd positive integer greater than or equal to 65,537 and less than 2²⁵⁶.)
 - A new Section was added to provide requirements for CAVP validation testing.

Except for minor editorial changes, all changes can be reviewed with the track-change version of Draft SP 800-78-4 (see 2nd link below to view file with track changes).

NIST requests comments on Draft SP 800-78-4 by 5:00pm EDT on *June 14, 2013*. Please submit your comments, using the comment template form (see 3rd link below) to piv_comments @ nist.gov with "Comments on Public Draft SP 800-78-4" in the subject line.

1	Draft NIST Special Publication 800-78-4
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5	Cryptographic Algorithms and Key
6	Sizes for Personal Identity
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Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification W. Timothy Polk Donna F. Dodson William E. Burr Hidegard Ferraiolo David Cooper Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.XXX May 2013 May 2013 National Institute of Standards and Technology and Director National Institute of Standards and Technology and Director	32	Draft NIST Special Publication 800-78-4
Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification W. Timothy Polk Donna F. Dodson William E. Burr Hildegard Ferraiolo David Cooper Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.XXX http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.XXX May 2013 May 2013 U.S. Department of Commerce Rebecca Blank, Acting Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology National Institute of Standards and Technology	33	
Sizes for Personal Identity Verification W. Timothy Polk Donna F. Dodson William E. Burr Hildegard Ferraiolo David Cooper Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory Http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.XXX http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.XXX May 2013 May 2013 U.S. Department of Commerce Rebecca Blank, Acting Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology	34	
Verification W. Timothy Polk Donna F. Dodson William E. Burr Hildegard Ferraiolo David Cooper Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory Information Technology Laboratory Http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.XXX May 2013 May 2013 U.S. Department of Commerce Rebecca Blank, Acting Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology National Institute of Standards and Technology	35 C 1	ryptographic Algorithms and Key
38 39 W. Timothy Polk 40 Donna F. Dodson 41 William E. Burr 42 Hildegard Ferraiolo David Cooper 43 Computer Security Division 45 Information Technology Laboratory 46 47 48 49 50 http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.XXX 51 52 53 54 May 2013 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 U.S. Department of Commerce 69 68 CU.S. Department of Standards and Technology 70 71 National Institute of Standards and Technology	36	•
39 W. Timothy Polk 40 Donna F. Dodson 41 William E. Burr 42 Hildegard Ferraiolo 43 David Cooper 44 Computer Security Division 45 Information Technology Laboratory 46 47 48 49 50 http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.XXX 51 52 53 54 May 2013 55 66 67 68 U.S. Department of Commerce 69 69 61 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 60 60 61 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 69 60 60 60 60 60 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 69 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 69 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60	37	Verification
40 Donna F. Dodson 41 William E. Burr 42 Hildegard Ferraiolo 43 David Cooper 44 Computer Security Division 45 Information Technology Laboratory 46 47 48 49 50 http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.XXX 51 52 53 54 May 2013 55 66 67 68 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 69 60 60 61 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 69 60 60 60 61 60 60 61 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 61 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60	38	
41 William E. Burr 42 Hildegard Ferraiolo 43 David Cooper 44 Computer Security Division 45 Information Technology Laboratory 46 47 48 49 50 http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.XXX 51 52 53 54 May 2013 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 69 60 60 61 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 69 60 60 60 60 61 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60		· ·
Hildegard Ferraiolo David Cooper Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory Information Te		
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44 Computer Security Division 45 Information Technology Laboratory 46 47 48 49 50 http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.XXX 51 52 53 54 May 2013 55 66 67 68 U.S. Department of Commerce 69 69 60 61 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 69 60 60 60 60 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 69 60 60 60 60 60 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60		
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46 47 48 49 50 http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.XXX 51 52 53 54 May 2013 55 66 67 61 62 63 64 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 69 60 61 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 69 60 60 60 61 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 60 60 60 60 61 61 62 63 64 65 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
48 49 50		
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50 http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.XXX 51 52 53 54	48	
51 52 53 54	49	
52 53 54		http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.XXX
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 60 61 60 61 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 68 69 69 69 69 60 60 60 61 60 61 60 61 60 61 60 61 60 61 60 61 60 61 60 61 60 61 60 61 60 60 61 60 60 61 60 60 61 60 60 60 61 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60		
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55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 U.S. Department of Commerce Rebecca Blank, Acting Secretary 70 71 National Institute of Standards and Technology		May 2013
56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 U.S. Department of Commerce Rebecca Blank, Acting Secretary 70 71 National Institute of Standards and Technology		Way 2013
58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 U.S. Department of Commerce 69 Rebecca Blank, Acting Secretary 70 71 National Institute of Standards and Technology		
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 U.S. Department of Commerce 69 69 69 69 70 71 National Institute of Standards and Technology		
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 U.S. Department of Commerce 69 69 69 69 70 71 National Institute of Standards and Technology		ATMENT OF COMMA
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 U.S. Department of Commerce 69 69 69 69 70 71 National Institute of Standards and Technology		gr. Che
62 63 64 65 66 67 68 U.S. Department of Commerce 69 <i>Rebecca Blank, Acting Secretary</i> 70 71 National Institute of Standards and Technology		<u>★ Æ®</u> ★
65 66 67 68 U.S. Department of Commerce 69 <i>Rebecca Blank, Acting Secretary</i> 70 71 National Institute of Standards and Technology		S. S. S.
65 66 67 68 U.S. Department of Commerce 69 <i>Rebecca Blank, Acting Secretary</i> 70 71 National Institute of Standards and Technology	63	
66 67 68 U.S. Department of Commerce 69 <i>Rebecca Blank, Acting Secretary</i> 70 71 National Institute of Standards and Technology		STATES OF P
67 68 U.S. Department of Commerce 69 <i>Rebecca Blank, Acting Secretary</i> 70 71 National Institute of Standards and Technology		
68 U.S. Department of Commerce 69 Rebecca Blank, Acting Secretary 70 71 National Institute of Standards and Technology		
 Rebecca Blank, Acting Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology 		U.S. Department of Commerce
National Institute of Standards and Technology	69	
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111 112 113 **Reports on Computer Systems Technology** 114 The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology 115 (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's 116 measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of 117 concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of 118 information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, 119 technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than 120 national security-related information in Federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series 121 reports on ITL's research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its 122 collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. 123 124 Abstract 125 126 Federal Information Processing Standard 201 (FIPS 201) defines requirements for the PIV lifecycle 127 activities including identity proofing, registration, PIV Card issuance, and PIV Card usage. FIPS 201 also 128 defines the structure of an identity credential that includes cryptographic keys. This document contains 129 the technical specifications needed for the mandatory and optional cryptographic keys specified in FIPS 130 201 as well as the supporting infrastructure specified in FIPS 201 and the related Special Publication 800-131 73, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification [SP800-73], and SP 800-76, Biometric Data Specification 132 for Personal Identity Verification [SP800-76], that rely on cryptographic functions. 133 134 **Keywords** 135 136 137 cryptographic algorithm; FIPS 201; identity credential; Personal Identity Verification (PIV); smart cards 138 139 **Acknowledgments** 140 141 The authors wish to thank Sharon Keller from NIST, who contributed to the development of the 142 Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program validation requirements. 143 144 Trademark Information 145 146 All registered trademarks or trademarks belong to their respective organizations.

147	Table of Contents	
148	1 INTRODUCTION	1
149 150 151 152	1.1 PURPOSE	1 1
153	2 APPLICATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHY IN FIPS 201	3
154	3 ON CARD CRYPTOGRAPHIC REQUIREMENTS	5
155 156 157 158 159 160	3.1 PIV CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS	6 8 8
161	5 PIV CARD APPLICATION ADMINISTRATION KEYS	
162	6 IDENTIFIERS FOR PIV CARD INTERFACES	
163 164 165	 6.1 KEY REFERENCE VALUES 6.2 PIV CARD ALGORITHM IDENTIFIERS 6.3 ALGORITHM IDENTIFIERS FOR PIV KEY TYPES 	12
166	7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM VALIDATION TESTING REQUIREMENTS	
167	APPENDIX A— ACRONYMS	
168169	APPENDIX B— REFERENCES List of Tables	21
170	Table 3-1. Algorithm and Key Size Requirements for PIV Key Types	6
171	Table 3-2. Signature Algorithm and Key Size Requirements for PIV Information	
172 173	Table 3-3. FIPS 201 Signature Algorithm Object Identifiers	
173	Table 3-5. ECC Parameter Object Identifiers for Approved Curves	
175	Table 3-6. Hash Algorithm Object Identifiers	
176	Table 5-1. Algorithm and Key Size Requirements for PIV Card Application Administration Keys.	
177	Table 6-1. Key References for PIV Key Types	
178	Table 6-2. Identifiers for Supported Cryptographic Algorithms	13
179	Table 6-3. PIV Card Keys: Key References and Algorithms	
180 181	Table 7-1. Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) Validation Requirements	14

182 1 Introduction

- Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 (HSPD 12) mandated the creation of new standards
- 184 for interoperable identity credentials for physical and logical access to Federal government
- locations and systems. Federal Information Processing Standard 201 (FIPS 201), *Personal*
- 186 Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, was developed to establish
- standards for identity credentials [FIPS201]. This document, Special Publication 800-78-4,
- specifies the cryptographic algorithms and key sizes for PIV systems and is a companion
- document to FIPS 201.

1.1 Purpose

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- 191 FIPS 201 defines requirements for the PIV lifecycle activities including identity proofing,
- registration, PIV Card issuance, and PIV Card usage. FIPS 201 also defines the structure of an
- identity credential that includes cryptographic keys. This document contains the technical
- specifications needed for the mandatory and optional cryptographic keys specified in FIPS 201
- as well as the supporting infrastructure specified in FIPS 201 and the related Special Publication
- 196 800-73, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification [SP800-73], and SP 800-76, Biometric Data
- 197 Specification for Personal Identity Verification [SP800-76], that rely on cryptographic functions.

198 **1.2 Scope**

- The scope of this recommendation encompasses the PIV Card, infrastructure components that
- support issuance and management of the PIV Card, and applications that rely on the credentials
- supported by the PIV Card to provide security services. The recommendation identifies
- acceptable symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms, digital signature algorithms, key
- establishment schemes, and message digest algorithms, and specifies mechanisms to identify the
- algorithms associated with PIV keys or digital signatures.
- Algorithms and key sizes have been selected for consistency with applicable Federal standards
- and to ensure adequate cryptographic strength for PIV applications. All cryptographic
- algorithms employed in this specification provide at least 80 bits of security strength. For
- detailed guidance on the strength of cryptographic algorithms, see [SP800-57(1)],
- 209 Recommendation on Key Management Part 1: General.

1.3 Audience and Assumptions

- 211 This document is targeted at Federal agencies and implementers of PIV systems. Readers are
- assumed to have a working knowledge of cryptography and public key infrastructure (PKI)
- 213 technology.

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1.4 Document Overview

- 215 The document is organized as follows:
- 216 + Section 1, *Introduction*, provides the purpose, scope, audience, and assumptions of the
- 217 document and outlines its structure.

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- + Section 2, *Application of Cryptography in FIPS 201*, identifies the cryptographic mechanisms and objects that employ cryptography as specified in FIPS 201 and its supporting documents.
- + Section 3, *On Card Cryptographic Requirements*, describes the cryptographic requirements for cryptographic keys and authentication information stored on the PIV Card.
- + Section 4, *Certificate Status Information*, describes the cryptographic requirements for status information generated by PKI certification authorities (CA) and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responders.
- + Section 5, *PIV Card Application Administration Keys*, describes the cryptographic requirements for management of information stored on the PIV Card.
 - + Section 6, *Identifiers for PIV Card Interfaces*, specifies key reference values and algorithm identifiers for the application programming interface and card commands defined in [SP 800-73].
- + Section 7, *Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Testing Requirements*, specifies the cryptographic algorithm validation testing that must be performed on the PIV Card based on the keys and algorithms that it supports.
- 235 + Appendix A, Acronyms, contains the list of acronyms used in this document.
- 236 + Appendix B, *References*, contains the list of documents used as references by this document.

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Application of Cryptography in FIPS 201 238 239 FIPS 201 employs cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate cardholders, secure information 240 stored on the PIV Card, and secure the supporting infrastructure. 241 FIPS 201 and its supporting documents specify a suite of keys to be stored on the PIV Card for 242 personal identity verification, digital signature generation, and key management. The PIV cryptographic keys specified in FIPS 201 are: 243 244 the asymmetric PIV Authentication key; 245 an asymmetric Card Authentication key; 246 + a symmetric Card Authentication key; 247 an asymmetric digital signature key for signing documents and messages; 248 an asymmetric key management key, supporting key establishment or key transport, and 249 up to twenty retired key management keys; 250 + a symmetric PIV Card Application Administration Key; and 251 + an asymmetric PIV Secure Messaging key, supporting the establishment of session keys for use with secure messaging. 252 253 The cryptographic algorithms, key sizes, and parameters that may be used for these keys are 254 specified in Section 3.1. PIV Cards must implement private key computations for one or more of the algorithms identified in this section. 255 256 Cryptographically protected objects specified in FIPS 201, SP 800-73, and SP 800-76 include: 257 + the X.509 certificates for each asymmetric key on the PIV Card, except the PIV Secure 258 Messaging key; 259 + a card verifiable certificate (CVC) for the PIV Secure Messaging key; 260 + a digitally signed Card Holder Unique Identifier (CHUID); 261 + digitally signed biometrics using the Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework 262 (CBEFF) signature block; and 263 + the SP 800-73 Security Object, which is a digitally signed hash table. 264 The cryptographic algorithms, key sizes, and parameters that may be used to protect these 265 objects are specified in Section 3.2. Certification authorities (CA) and card management systems that protect these objects must support one or more of the cryptographic algorithms, key sizes, 266 267 and parameters specified in Section 3.2.

the identified algorithms, key sizes, and parameters specified in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.

Applications may be designed to use any or all of the cryptographic keys and objects stored on

the PIV Card. Where maximum interoperability is required, applications should support all of

- FIPS 201 requires CAs and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responders to generate
- and distribute digitally signed certificate revocation lists (CRL) and OCSP status messages.
- 273 These revocation mechanisms support validation of the PIV Card, the PIV cardholder, the
- 274 cardholder's digital signature key, and the cardholder's key management key.
- 275 The signed revocation mechanisms specified in FIPS 201 are:
- + X.509 CRLs that specify the status of a group of X.509 certificates; and
- + OCSP status response messages that specify the status of a particular X.509 certificate.
- 278 The cryptographic algorithms, key sizes, and parameters that may be used to sign these
- 279 mechanisms are specified in Section 4. Section 4 also describes rules for encoding the signatures
- 280 to ensure interoperability.
- FIPS 201 permits optional card management operations. These operations may only be
- performed after the PIV Card authenticates the card management system. Card management
- systems are authenticated through the use of PIV Card Application Administration Keys. The
- 284 cryptographic algorithms and key sizes that may be used for these keys are specified in Section
- 285 5.

3 On Card Cryptographic Requirements

- FIPS 201 identifies a suite of objects that are stored on the PIV Card for use in authentication
- 288 mechanisms or in other security protocols. These objects may be divided into three classes:
- 289 cryptographic keys, signed authentication information stored on the PIV Card, and message
- 290 digests of information stored on the PIV Card. Cryptographic requirements for PIV keys are
- detailed in Section 3.1. Cryptographic requirements for other stored objects are detailed in
- 292 Section 3.2.

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3.1 PIV Cryptographic Keys

- FIPS 201 specifies six different classes of cryptographic keys to be used as credentials by the
- 295 PIV cardholder:
- + the mandatory PIV Authentication key;
- + the mandatory asymmetric Card Authentication key;
- 298 + an optional symmetric Card Authentication key;
- 299 + a conditionally mandatory digital signature key;
- 300 + a conditionally mandatory key management key: 1 and
- + an optional asymmetric key to establish session keys for secure messaging.
- Table 3-1 establishes specific requirements for cryptographic algorithms and key sizes for each
- key type. Table 3-1 also specifies time periods with different sets of acceptable algorithms for
- each key type. Note that use of 1024-bit RSA for digital signature and key management keys
- was phased out in 2008. The use of 1024-bit RSA for authentication keys is permitted to
- leverage current products and promote efficient adoption of FIPS 201, but must be phased out by
- 307 12/31/2013. These requirements anticipate that digital signature and key management keys will
- be used to protect data for longer periods of time, while data enciphered solely for authentication
- is usually a random challenge (rather than sensitive information) and is generally not retained.
- In addition to the key sizes, keys must be generated using secure parameters. Rivest, Shamir,
- 311 Adleman (RSA) keys must be generated using a public exponent of 65,537. Elliptic curve keys
- 312 must correspond to one of the following recommended curves from [FIPS186]:
- 313 + Curve P-256; or
- 314 + Curve P-384.
- 315 To promote interoperability, this specification further limits PIV Authentication and Card
- Authentication elliptic curve keys to a single curve (P-256). PIV cryptographic keys for digital
- signatures and key management may use P-256 or P-384, based on application requirements.
- 318 There is no phase out date specified for either curve.

¹ The digital signature and key management keys are mandatory if the cardholder has a government-issued email account at the time of credential issuance.

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If the PIV Card Application supports the virtual contact interface [SP800-73] and the digital signature key, the key management key, or any of the retired key management keys are elliptic curve keys corresponding to Curve P-384, then the PIV Secure Messaging key shall use P-384, otherwise it may use P-256 or P-384.

Table 3-1. Algorithm and Key Size Requirements for PIV Key Types

PIV Key Type	Time Period for Use	Algorithms and Key Sizes
PIV Authentication key	Through 12/31/2013	RSA (1024 or 2048 bits) ECDSA (Curve P-256)
	After 12/31/2013	RSA (2048 bits) ECDSA (Curve P-256)
asymmetric Card Authentication key	Through 12/31/2013	RSA (1024 or 2048 bits) ECDSA (Curve P-256)
	After 12/31/2013	RSA (2048 bits) ECDSA (Curve P-256)
symmetric Card Authentication key	After 12/31/2010	3TDEA ² AES-128, AES-192, or AES-256
digital signature key	After 12/31/2008	RSA (2048 bits) ECDSA (Curve P-256 or P-384)
key management key	After 12/31/2008	RSA key transport (2048 bits); ECDH (Curve P-256 or P-384)
PIV Secure Messaging key		ECDH (Curve P-256 or P-384)

- While this specification requires that the RSA public exponent associated with PIV keys be
- 325 65,537, applications should be able to process RSA public keys that have any public exponent
- that is an odd positive integer greater than or equal to 65,537 and less than 2^{256} .
- 327 This specification requires that the key management key must be an RSA key transport key or an
- 328 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key. The specifications for RSA key transport are
- 329 [PKCS1] and [SP800-56B]; the specification for ECDH is [SP800-56A].

3.2 Authentication Information Stored on the PIV Card

3.2.1 Specification of Digital Signatures on Authentication Information

- FIPS 201 requires the use of digital signatures to protect the integrity and authenticity of
- information stored on the PIV Card. FIPS 201 and SP 800-73 require digital signatures on the
- following objects stored on the PIV Card:
- + X.509 public key certificates;
- + the optional card verifiable certificate (CVC);
- + the CHUID;

² 3TDEA is Triple DES using Keying Option 1 from [SP800-67], which requires that all three keys be unique (i.e., $Key_1 \neq Key_2$, $Key_2 \neq Key_3$, and $Key_3 \neq Key_1$).

- + biometric information (e.g., fingerprints); and
- + the SP 800-73 Security Object.

340 Approved digital signature algorithms are specified in [FIPS 186]. Table 3-2 provides specific

- requirements for public key algorithms and key sizes, hash algorithms, and padding schemes for
- 342 generating digital signatures for digitally signed information stored on the PIV Card. Agencies
- are cautioned that generating digital signatures with elliptic curve algorithms may initially limit
- interoperability.

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Table 3-2. Signature Algorithm and Key Size Requirements for PIV Information

Public Key Algorithms and Key Sizes	Hash Algorithms	Padding Scheme
RSA (2048 or 3072)	SHA-256	PKCS #1 v1.5
	SHA-256	PSS
ECDSA (Curve P-256)	SHA-256	N/A
ECDSA (Curve P-384)	SHA-384	N/A

- Note: As of January 1, 2011, only SHA-256 may be used to generate RSA signatures on PIV
- objects. RSA signatures may use either the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding scheme or the Probabilistic
- 348 Signature Scheme (PSS) padding as defined in [PKCS1]. The PSS padding scheme OID is
- independent of the hash algorithm; the hash algorithm is specified as a parameter (for details, see
- 350 [PKCS1]).
- 351 The CVC shall be signed using ECDSA (Curve P-256) with SHA-256 if it contains an ECDH
- 352 (Curve P-256) subject public key, and shall be signed using ECDSA (Curve P-384) with SHA-
- 353 384 otherwise.
- FIPS 201, SP 800-73, and SP 800-76 specify formats for the CHUID, the Security Object, the
- biometric information, and X.509 public key certificates, which rely on object identifiers (OID)
- 356 to specify which signature algorithm was used to generate the digital signature. The object
- identifiers specified in Table 3-3, below, must be used in FIPS 201 implementations to identify
- 358 the signature algorithm.³

Table 3-3. FIPS 201 Signature Algorithm Object Identifiers

Signature Algorithm	Object Identifier
RSA with SHA-1 and	sha1WithRSAEncryption ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
PKCS #1 v1.5 padding	pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 5}
RSA with SHA-256 and	sha256WithRSAEncryption ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
PKCS #1 v1.5 padding	pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 11}
RSA with SHA-256 and	id-RSASSA-PSS ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
PSS padding	pkcs-1(1) 10}
ECDSA with SHA-256	ecdsa-with-SHA256 ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045)
	signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2 (3) 2}

_

³ The OID for RSA with SHA-1 and PKCS #1 v1.5 padding is included in Table 3-3 since applications may encounter X.509 certificates and other data objects that were signed before January 1, 2011, using this algorithm. RSA with SHA-1 and PKCS #1 v1.5 may also be used through December 31, 2013, in some circumstances, as described in Section 4, to sign CRLs.

Signature Algorithm	Object Identifier
ECDSA with SHA-384	ecdsa-with-SHA384 ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2 (3) 3}

3.2.2 Specification of Public Keys In X.509 Certificates

FIPS 201 requires generation and storage of an X.509 certificate to correspond with each asymmetric private key contained on the PIV Card, except the PIV Secure Messaging key. X.509 certificates include object identifiers to specify the cryptographic algorithm associated with a public key. Table 3-4, below, specifies the object identifiers that may be used in

certificates to indicate the algorithm for a subject public key.

Table 3-4. Public Key Object Identifiers for PIV Key Types

PIV Key Type	Asymmetric Algorithm	Object Identifier
PIV Authentication key;	RSA	{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1}
Card Authentication key; digital signature key	ECDSA	{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) id-publicKeyType(2) 1}
	RSA	{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1}
key management key	ECDH	{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) id-publicKeyType(2) 1}

A single object identifier is specified in Table 3-4 for all elliptic curve keys. An additional object identifier must be supplied in a parameters field to indicate the elliptic curve associated with the key. Table 3-5, below, identifies the named curves and associated OIDs. (RSA exponents are encoded with the modulus in the certificate's subject public key, so the OID is not affected.)

Table 3-5. ECC Parameter Object Identifiers for Approved Curves

Asymmetric Algorithm	Object Identifier
Curve P-256	ansip256r1 ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 7 }
Curve P-384	ansip384r1 ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 }

3.2.3 Specification of Message Digests in the SP 800-73 Security Object

SP 800-73 mandates inclusion of a Security Object consistent with the Authenticity/Integrity Code defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in [MRTD]. This object contains message digests of other digital information stored on the PIV Card and is digitally signed. This specification requires that the message digests of digital information be computed using the same hash algorithm used to generate the digital signature on the Security Object. The set of acceptable algorithms is specified in Table 3-2. The Security Object format identifies the

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hash algorithm used when computing the message digests by inclusion of an object identifier; the appropriate object identifiers are identified in Table 3-6.

Table 3-6. Hash Algorithm Object Identifiers

Hash Algorithm	Algorithm OID
SHA-1	id-sha1 ::= {iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26}
SHA-256	id-sha256 ::= {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1}
SHA-384	id-sha384 ::= {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2}

 $^{^4}$ The OID for SHA-1 is included in Table 3-6 since applications may encounter Security Objects that were signed before January 1, 2011, using RSA with SHA-1 and PKCS #1 v1.5 padding.

383	4 Certificate Status Information
384 385 386	The FIPS 201 functional component <i>PIV Card Issuance and Management Subsystem</i> generates and distributes status information for PIV asymmetric keys, other than PIV Secure Messaging keys. FIPS 201 mandates two formats for certificate status information:
387	+ X.509 CRLs; and
388	+ OCSP status response messages.
389 390 391 392	The CRLs and OCSP status responses shall be digitally signed to support authentication and integrity using a key size and hash algorithm that satisfy the requirements for signing PIV information, as specified in Table 3-2 ⁵ , and that are at least as large as the key size and hash algorithm used to sign the certificate.
393 394 395	CRLs and OCSP messages rely on object identifiers to specify which signature algorithm was used to generate the digital signature. The object identifiers specified in Table 3-3 must be used in CRLs and OCSP messages to identify the signature algorithm.

⁵ CRLs and OCSP status responses that only provide status information for certificates that were signed with RSA with SHA-1 and PKCS #1 v1.5 padding may be signed using RSA with SHA-1 and PKCS #1 v1.5 padding through 12/31/2013.

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5 PIV Card Application Administration Keys

PIV Cards may support card activation by the card management system to support card personalization and post-issuance card update. PIV Cards that support card personalization and post-issuance updates perform a challenge response protocol using a symmetric cryptographic key (i.e., the PIV Card Application Administration Key) to authenticate the card management system. After successful authentication, the card management system can modify information stored in the PIV Card. Table 5-1, below, establishes specific requirements for cryptographic algorithms and key sizes for PIV Card Application Administration Keys.

Table 5-1. Algorithm and Key Size Requirements for PIV Card Application Administration Keys

Card Expiration Date	Algorithm
After 12/31/2010	3TDEA
	AES-128, AES-192, or AES-256

6 Identifiers for PIV Card Interfaces

- 407 SP 800-73 defines an application programming interface, the *PIV Client Application*
- 408 Programming Interface (Part 3), and a set of mandatory card commands, the PIV Card
- 409 Application Card Command Interface (Part 2). The command syntaxes for these interfaces
- 410 identify PIV keys using one-byte key references; their associated algorithms (or suites of
- algorithms) are specified using one-byte algorithm identifiers. The same identifiers are used in
- both interfaces.

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- Section 6.1 specifies the key reference values for each of the PIV key types. Section 6.2 defines
- algorithm identifiers for each cryptographic algorithm supported by this specification. Section
- 415 6.3 identifies valid combinations of key reference values and algorithm identifiers based on the
- 416 period of use.

6.1 Key Reference Values

- 418 A PIV Card key reference is a one-byte identifier that specifies a cryptographic key according to
- 419 its PIV Key Type. Table 6-1 defines the key reference values used on the PIV interfaces for PIV
- 420 Key Types.

Table 6-1. Key References for PIV Key Types

PIV Key Type	Key Reference Value
PIV Secure Messaging key	'03'
retired key management key	'82', '83', '84', '85', '86', '87', '88', '89', '8A', '8B', '8C', '8D', '8E', '8F', '90', '91', '92', '93', '94', '95'
PIV Authentication key	'9A'
PIV Card Application Administration Key	'9B'
digital signature key	'9C'
key management key	'9D'
Card Authentication key	'9E'

6.2 PIV Card Algorithm Identifiers

- 423 A PIV Card algorithm identifier is a one-byte identifier that specifies a cryptographic algorithm
- and key size, or a suite of algorithms and key sizes. For symmetric cryptographic operations, the
- algorithm identifier also specifies a mode of operation (i.e., ECB). Table 6-2 lists the algorithm
- 426 identifiers for the cryptographic algorithms that may be recognized on the PIV interfaces. All
- other algorithm identifier values are reserved for future use.

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Table 6-2. Identifiers for Supported Cryptographic Algorithms

Algorithm Identifier	Algorithm – Mode
'00'	3 Key Triple DES – ECB
'03'	3 Key Triple DES – ECB
'06'	RSA 1024 bit modulus, $65,537 \le exponent \le 2^{256} - 1$
'07'	RSA 2048 bit modulus, $65,537 \le exponent \le 2^{256} - 1$
'08'	AES-128 – ECB
'0A'	AES-192 – ECB
'0C'	AES-256 – ECB
'11'	ECC: Curve P-256
'14'	ECC: Curve P-384
'27'	Cipher Suite 2
'2B'	Cipher Suite 4

- Note that both the '00' and '03' algorithm identifiers correspond to 3 Key Triple DES ECB.
- 430 Algorithm identifiers '27' and '2B' represent suites of algorithms and key sizes for use with
- secure messaging and key establishment. Cipher Suite 2 (CS2) is the cipher suite used to
- establish session keys and for secure messaging when the PIV Secure Messaging key is an
- ECDH (Curve P-256) key, and Cipher Suite 4 (CS4) is the cipher suite used to establish session
- keys and for secure messaging when the PIV Secure Messaging key is an ECDH (Curve P-384)
- key. Details of secure messaging, the key establishment protocol, and the algorithms and key
- sizes for these two cipher suites are specified in SP 800-73, Part 2.

6.3 Algorithm Identifiers for PIV Key Types

Table 6-3 summarizes the set of algorithms supported for each key reference value based on the time period of use.

Table 6-3. PIV Card Keys: Key References and Algorithms

PIV Key Type	Key Reference Value	Time Period for Use	Permitted Algorithm Identifiers
PIV Secure Messaging key	'03'		'27', '2B'
retired key management key	'82', '83', '84', '85', '86', '87', '88', '89', '8A', '8B', '8C', '8D', '8E', '8F', '90', '91', '92', '93', '94', '95'		'06', '07', '11', '14'
DIV Authorization key	'9A'	Through 12/31/2013	'06', '07', '11'
PIV Authentication key	9A	After 12/31/2013	'07', '11'
PIV Card Application Administration Key	'9B'	After 12/31/2010	'00', '03', '08', '0A', '0C'
digital signature key	'9C'	After 12/31/2008	'07', '11', '14'
key management key	'9D'	After 12/31/2008	'07', '11', '14'
anymmetric Cord Authoritication land	יסרי	Through 12/31/2013	'06', '07', '11'
asymmetric Card Authentication key	'9E'	After 12/31/2013	'07', '11'
symmetric Card Authentication key	'9E'	After 12/31/2010	'00', '03', '08', '0A', '0C'

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7 Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Testing Requirements

As noted in Section 4.2.2 of [FIPS201], the PIV Card shall be validated under [FIPS140] with an 442 443 overall validation of Level 2 and with Level 3 physical security. The scope of the Cryptographic 444 Module Validation Program (CMVP) validation shall include all cryptographic operations 445 performed over both the contact and contactless interfaces. Table 7-1 describes the 446 Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) tests that are required, at the time of publication, for each supported key and algorithm. If any changes are made to the CAVP 447 validation requirements, the changes, along with the deadlines for conformance with these 448 449 requirements, will be posted on NIST'S "Personal Identity Verification Program (NPIVP)" web 450 page at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/npivp/index.html.

Table 7-1. Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) Validation Requirements

Supported Private Keys	Supported Algorithm	Required Functionality	Minimum CAVP Validation Requirements
PIV	2048-bit	Key Generation and	Key Generation:
Authentication	RSA	Signature Generation	186-2:
key		for 2048-bit RSA with	Key (gen)(MOD: 2048 PubKey Values: 65537)
		public key exponent 65,537	Prerequisite: RNG or DRBG; SHS
			186-3:
			186-3KEY(gen):
			FIPS186-3_Fixed_e, FIPS186-3_Fixed_e_Value
			PGM(Prime Generation Methods with supporting variables)
			Prerequisites: RNG or DRBG; SHS
			Signature Generation:
			186-3 RSASP1 component:
	EGDGA	W G	(PKCS #1 v1.5 (SHA-256) and RSASSA-PSS)
	ECDSA	Key Generation and Signature Generation	Key Generation: 186-2:
	(Curve P-256)	for Curve P-256	
	F-230)	Joi Curve F-230	PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-256) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG
			186-3:
			PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-256
			(ExtraRandomBits and/or TestingCandidates))
			Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG
			Signature Generation:
			186-3 ECDSA Signature Generation component: CURVE(P-256 (SHA-256))
			Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG

Supported Private Keys	Supported Algorithm	Required Functionality	Minimum CAVP Validation Requirements
asymmetric Card Authentication key	2048-bit RSA	Signature Generation for 2048-bit RSA	Key Generation (if key can be generated on card): 186-2: Key(gen)(MOD: 2048 PubKey Values: 65537) Prerequisite: RNG or DRBG; SHS
			186-3: 186-3KEY(gen): FIPS186-3_Fixed_e, FIPS186-3_Fixed_e_Value PGM(Prime Generation Methods with supporting variables) Prerequisites: RNG or DRBG; SHS
			Signature Generation: 186-3 RSASP1 component: (PKCS #1 v1.5 (SHA-256) and RSASSA-PSS)
	ECDSA (Curve P-256)	Signature Generation for Curve P-256	Key Generation (if key can be generated on card): 186-2: PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-256) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG
			186-3: PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-256 (ExtraRandomBits and/or TestingCandidates)) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG
			Signature Generation: 186-3 ECDSA Signature Generation component: CURVE(P-256 (SHA-256)) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG
symmetric Card Authentication	3TDEA	Encryption and Decryption for 3TDEA	TECB(e/d; KO 1)
key	AES-128	Encryption and Decryption for AES-128	ECB (e/d; 128)
	AES-192	Encryption and Decryption for AES-192	ECB (e/d; 192)
	AES-256	Encryption and Decryption for AES-256	ECB (e/d; 256)

Supported Private Keys	Supported Algorithm	Required Functionality	Minimum CAVP Validation Requirements
digital signature key	2048-bit RSA	Key Generation and Signature Generation for 2048-bit RSA with public key exponent 65,537	Key Generation: 186-2: Key(gen)(MOD: 2048 PubKey Values: 65537) Prerequisite: RNG or DRBG; SHS
			186-3: 186-3KEY(gen): FIPS186-3_Fixed_e, FIPS186-3_Fixed_e_Value PGM(Prime Generation Methods with supporting variables) Prerequisites: RNG or DRBG; SHS
			Signature Generation: 186-3 RSASP1 component: (PKCS #1 v1.5 (SHA-256) and RSASSA-PSS)
	ECDSA (Curve P-256)	Key Generation and Signature Generation for Curve P-256	Key Generation: 186-2: PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-256) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG
			186-3: PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-256 (ExtraRandomBits and/or TestingCandidates)) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG
			Signature Generation: 186-3 ECDSA Signature Generation component: CURVE(P-256 (SHA-256)) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG
	ECDSA (Curve P-384)	Key Generation and Signature Generation for Curve P-384	Key Generation: 186-2: PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-384) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG
			186-3: PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-384 (ExtraRandomBits and/or TestingCandidates)) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG
			Signature Generation: 186-3 ECDSA Signature Generation component: CURVE(P-384 (SHA-384)) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG

Supported Private Keys	Supported Algorithm	Required Functionality	Minimum CAVP Validation Requirements
key management key	2048-bit RSA	2048-bit RSA Key Transport	Key Generation (if key can be generated on card): 186-2: Key(gen)(MOD: 2048 PubKey Values: 65537) Prerequisite: RNG or DRBG; SHS 186-3: 186-3KEY(gen): FIPS186-3_Fixed_e, FIPS186-3_Fixed_e_Value PGM(Prime Generation Methods with supporting
	ECDH (Curve P-256)	Key Agreement for Curve P-256	SP 800-56B RSADP component ⁶ Key Generation (if key can be generated on card): 186-2: PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-256) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG 186-3: PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-256 (ExtraRandomBits and/or TestingCandidates)) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG Key Agreement:
	ECDH (Curve P-384)	Key Agreement for Curve P-384	Key Agreement: SP 800-56A Section 5.7.1.2 ECC CDH primitive component: CURVE(P-256) Key Generation (if key can be generated on card): 186-2: PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-384) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG 186-3: PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-384 (ExtraRandomBits and/or TestingCandidates)) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG Key Agreement: SP 800-56A Section 5.7.1.2 ECC CDH primitive component: CURVE(P-384)
PIV Card Application Administration	3TDEA	Encryption and Decryption for 3TDEA	TECB(e/d; KO 1)
Key	AES-128	Encryption and Decryption for AES-128	ECB (e/d; 128)
	AES-192	Encryption and Decryption for AES-192	ECB (e/d; 192)
	AES-256	Encryption and Decryption for AES-256	ECB (e/d; 256)

 $^{^{\}rm 6}$ The SP 800-56B RSADP component tests are currently under development.

Supported Private Keys	Supported Algorithm	Required Functionality	Minimum CAVP Validation Requirements
PIV Secure Messaging key	Cipher Suite 2	Key Generation for Curve P-256	Key Generation (of card's static ECDH key): 186-2: PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-256) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG
			186-3: PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-256 (ExtraRandomBits and/or TestingCandidates)) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG
		C(1, 1, ECC CDH) with Curve P-256	ECC: SCHEME[OnePassDH (KC <karole: Responder > < KCRole: Provider > < KCType: Unilateral > < KDF: Concat >) (EC: P-256 (SHA256 CMAC_AES128))]</karole:
			Prerequisite: RNG or DRBG; SHS
		CMAC with AES-128	AES CMAC (Generation/Verification) (KS: 128; Block Size(s): Full / Partial; Msg Len(s) Min: 32 Max: 12,745; Tag Length(s): 16)
		Encryption and Decryption for AES CBC 128	AES CBC (e/d; 128)
	Cipher Suite 4	Key Generation for Curve P-384	Key Generation (of card's static ECDH key): 186-2: PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-384) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG
			186-3: PKG (Public Key Generation): CURVE(P-384 (ExtraRandomBits and/or TestingCandidates)) Prerequisites: DRBG or RNG
		C(1, 1, ECC CDH) with Curve P-384	ECC: SCHEME[OnePassDH (KC <karole: Responder > < KCRole: Provider > < KCType: Unilateral > < KDF: Concat >) (ED: P-384 (SHA384 CMAC_AES256))]</karole:
			Prerequisite: RNG or DRBG; SHS
		CMAC with AES-256	AES CMAC (Generation/Verification) (KS: 256; Block Size(s): Full / Partial; Msg Len(s) Min: 32 Max: 12,745; Tag Length(s): 16)
		Encryption and Decryption for AES CBC 256	AES CBC (e/d; 256)

457	Appendix A	A—Acronyms
458	The following	ng abbreviations and acronyms are used in this standard:
459	3TDEA	Three key TDEA (TDEA with Keying Option 1 [SP800-67])
460	AES	Advanced Encryption Standard [FIPS197]
461 462 463	CA CAVP CBC	Certification Authority Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program Cipher Block Chaining
464 465 466 467	CBEFF CDH CHUID CMAC	Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework Cofactor Diffie-Hellman Card Holder Unique Identifier Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code
468 469 470	CMVP CRL CVC	Cryptographic Module Validation Program Certificate Revocation List Card Verifiable Certificate
471 472	DES DRBG	Data Encryption Standard Deterministic Random Bit Generator
473 474 475 476	ECB ECC ECDH ECDSA	Electronic Codebook Elliptic Curve Cryptography Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
477 478	FIPS FISMA	Federal Information Processing Standards Federal Information Security Management Act
479 480	ICAO ITL	International Civil Aviation Organization Information Technology Laboratory
481	NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
482 483 484	OCSP OID OMB	Online Certificate Status Protocol Object Identifier Office of Management and Budget
485 486 487 488	PIV PKCS PKI PSS	Personal Identity Verification Public-Key Cryptography Standards Public Key Infrastructure Probabilistic Signature Scheme
489 490	RNG RSA	Random Number Generator Rivest, Shamir, Adleman cryptographic algorithm
491	SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm

Draft Special Publication 800-78-4
for PIV

Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes

492	SHS	Secure Hash Standard
493	SP	Special Publication
494 495	TDEA TECB	Triple Data Encryption Algorithm; Triple DEA TDEA Electronic Codebook

496	Appendix B-	-References
497 498 499	[FIPS140]	Federal Information Processing Standard 140-2, <i>Security Requirements</i> for Cryptographic Modules, NIST, May 25, 2001. (See http://csrc.nist.gov)
500 501	[FIPS186]	Federal Information Processing Standard 186-3, <i>Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</i> , June 2009. (See http://csrc.nist.gov)
502 503	[FIPS197]	Federal Information Processing Standard 197, <i>Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)</i> , November 2001. (See http://csrc.nist.gov)
504 505 506	[FIPS201]	Federal Information Processing Standard 201-2, <i>Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors</i> . (See http://csrc.nist.gov)
507 508 509	[MRTD]	PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access Version - 1.1 Date - October 01, 2004. Published by authority of the Secretary General, International Civil Aviation Organization.
510 511	[PKCS1]	Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
512 513 514	[SP800-67]	NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 1, <i>Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher</i> , January 2012. (See http://csrc.nist.gov)
515 516 517	[SP800-56B]	NIST Special Publication 800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, August 2009. (See http://csrc.nist.gov)
518 519 520	[SP800-56A]	NIST Special Publication 800-56A, <i>Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography</i> , March 2007. (See http://csrc.nist.gov)
521 522 523	[SP800-57(1)]	NIST Special Publication 800-57, <i>Recommendation for Key Management – Part 1: General (Revision 3)</i> , July 2012. (See http://csrc.nist.gov)
524 525	[SP800-73]	Draft NIST Special Publication 800-73-4, <i>Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification</i> . (See http://csrc.nist.gov)
526 527	[SP800-76]	Draft NIST Special Publication 800-76-2, <i>Biometric Data Specification for Personal Identity Verification</i> . (See http://csrc.nist.gov)