



QUANTUMXCHANGE

SP 800-90B Non-Proprietary Public Use Document

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Entropy Source: JEnt-MemOnly

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References

Ref	Title	Date	Author
[90B]	NIST SP 800-90B, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation	10-Jan-2018	NIST CT
[140IG]	Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program	17-Mar-2023	CMVP
[ESVMM]	Entropy Source Validation, program Management Manual (under development)	TBD	ESV
[Hill 2022]	<i>JEnt (MemOnly) and JEnt Analysis Approaches</i> . CMUF Entropy Working Group.	18-Oct-2022	Joshua E. Hill
[JEnt-MemOnly]	<i>Jitterentropy library</i> with MemOnly updates. https://github.com/joshuaehill/jitterentropy-library/tree/MemOnly up to commit 217bd17b43fcd1e69fbeb0d28a8e48bca3bf9144. Tagged as v3.4.1-MemOnly-2 .	21-Nov-2022	Various
[Müller 2022]	CPU Time Jitter Based Non-Physical True Random Number Generator	01-Jul-2022	S. Müller Chronox.de

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1 Description

This Public Use Document accompanies the Quantum Xchange entropy source validation of the MemOnly branch of the open-source jitterentropy-library, hereafter referred to as “JEnt-MemOnly”. JEnt-MemOnly is a non-physical entropy source intended to generate entropy input for instantiation and reseed of an SP 800-90A compliant DRBG.

The JEnt-MemOnly design is depicted in Figure 1, with design documented in [Müller 2022, Section 3]. A summary of MemOnly branch code changes and an accompanying analysis process is provided in [Hill 2022].




Figure 1: Entropy Source (Adapted from [Müller 2022, Figure 3.1])

The JEnt-MemOnly design includes elements that map to the conceptual components contained within an SP 800-90B entropy source:

- The Memory Access (MemAccess) primary noise source (memory timing).
- An additional noise source (Overall Timing).
- Health tests (depicted as the “Stuck Test” block in Figure 1).
- A conditioning algorithm: SHA2-256 (CAVP Cert. #[A4015](#)).

In the original jitterentropy-library design, noise from both the Overall Timing source as well as the MemAccess noise source contributes to the estimation of entropy at runtime and in the assessment process. The [JEnt-MemOnly] branch of the design provides modifications to:

- Use the timing of the memory MemAccess as the sole source of entropy that is credited in the analysis. The Overall Timing is now treated as an additional noise source but is not credited in the analysis.
- Limit the primary noise source output (and thus the entropy estimation) to a selected sub-distribution.
- Provide configurable decimation (discarding) of samples credited in the analysis and health testing – see [Hill 2022] for additional detail.
- Remove unused and deprecated code.

The use of JEnt-MemOnly is accompanied by a process to determine a defensible entropy estimate along with the corresponding runtime parameters. Briefly, the process:

- Identifies an allocated memory size (per platform) required to force sufficient proportion of cache misses.
- Identifies the sub-distribution (minimum and maximum time delta) associated with memory I/O.
- Applies the *Selected Sub-distribution Empirical* analysis approach for JENT_MEMORY_DEPTH_EXP=8.

This Public Use Document is constructed to support validation of multiple platforms within a general architecture. While the performance of JEnt-MemOnly is highly variable across variations in CPU and memory configuration, the MemOnly branch implementation and the selected sub-distribution entropy analysis approach permit a consistent Entropy Analysis Report and associated validation listing. The design of JEnt-MemOnly permits compile time configuration (here required to be consistent with the Operating Conditions and Configuration settings described below) that results in the entropy source providing full-entropy conditioned output. Consequently:

- Table 2 cites evaluated platforms.
- Table 3 provides tested operating conditions for each evaluated platform.
- Table 4 specifies platform specific configuration elements for each evaluated platform.

Table 1: Evaluated Entropy Source Specification

Identifier	Details
Entropy Source Name	JEnt-MemOnly
Firmware Version	QXC Phio TX 3.2.4
Entropy Category	Non-physical (NP)
Entropy Estimation Track (per SP 800-90B §3.1.2)	Non-IID

QXC Phio TX 3.2.4 refers to cryptographic module firmware that includes a patched version of [JEnt-MemOnly]. The patch replaces the [JEnt] SHA3-256 conditioning function with a SHA2-256 hash function from a validated OpenSSL library.

Table 2: Evaluated Platforms

Evaluated Platform(s)	CPU	RAM size	RAM configuration
Phio TX Model D	Intel® Celeron® 3865U @ 1.80GHz	8GB	Crucial CT8G4SFRA266

The entropy assessment findings and the validation described by this Public Use Document are specific to the particular part/version and entropy-relevant parameters given in the tables above and do not apply more broadly. If the entropy-relevant parameters are different than those described in this report, then additional modeling and statistical testing are required. Any part/version or configuration other than that described above is not covered by this validation.

2 Security Boundary

The JEnt-MemOnly entropy source in the context of a software or firmware solution is depicted in Figure 1.

3 Operating Conditions

The testing and operation of the JEnt-MemOnly entropy source is valid across full range of operations for the operational environment, as the mechanism of entropy is not expected to vary across conditions.

4 Configuration Settings

Entropy relevant parameters are listed in Table 3 (parameters common across platforms) and Table 4 (parameters specific to a platform and an associated operating and analysis configuration).

Table 3: Entropy-Relevant Parameters (common across validated platforms)

Parameter	Meaning	Type	Value
JENT_CONF_ENABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER	Allow the internal (pthreads-based) timer.	Macro	Not Defined
JENT_HEALTH_LAG_PREDICTOR	Use the Lag-predictor-based health test.	Macro	Defined
JENT_LAG_WINDOW_SIZE	Size of the Lag-predictor-based health test window.	Macro	131072
JENT_LAG_HISTORY_SIZE	Size of the Lag-predictor-based history.	Macro	8
JENT_DISTRIBUTION_MIN	Lower bound for the selected memory sub-distribution.	Macro	DIST_MIN
JENT_DISTRIBUTION_MAX	Upper bound for the selected memory sub-distribution.	Macro	DIST_MAX
JENT_MEMORY_SIZE_EXP	Provides a default value for the initial memory size (i.e., $2^{\text{MEM_SIZE}}$ bytes will be used).	Macro	MEM_SIZE
JENT_MEMORY_DEPTH_EXP	Exponent of selected memory depth.	Macro	MEM_DEPTH
JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE	APT Window size.	Macro	512
JENT_HASHLOOP_EXP	Exponent of number of hash loops (i.e., there are $2^{\text{JENT_HASHLOOP_EXP}}$ hash loops per output).	Macro	0
JENT_MEMACCESSLOOP_EXP	Exponent of number of MemAccess loops (i.e., there are $2^{\text{JENT_MEMACCESSLOOP_EXP}}$ MemAccess loops per output).	Macro	0
JENT_DIST_WINDOW_EXP	Exponent of the size of the window for the Distribution Health Test (i.e., the window is $2^{\text{JENT_DIST_WINDOW_EXP}}$ samples).	Macro	16
JENT_DIST_FAILURE_CUTOFF	Establishes the number of consecutive Distribution Health Test warnings that yield a Distribution Health Test failure.	Macro	DIST_WARN
JENT_DIST_CUTOFF_PERCENT	Establishes the targeted lower percentage for the Distribution Health Test.	Macro	DIST_PERC
JENT_POWERUP_TESTLOOPCOUNT	A lower bound for the number of values to test on initialization ($\text{JENT_POWERUP_TESTLOOPCOUNT} + \text{CLEARCACHE}$ are performed).	Macro	1024
CLEARCACHE	An additional number of values to perform to set branch prediction and caches.	Macro	100
ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR	The number of extra bits of min entropy required to make a “full entropy” claim. Used only in FIPS mode.	Macro	64
osr	Oversample Rate. The code presumes that the lower bound for the primary noise source min entropy is $1/\text{osr}$ per output 64-bit symbol.	Variable	OSR
fips_enabled	Flag that controls error mode reporting and use of the ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR.	Variable	1
enable_notime	A flag that controls the use of the internal (pthreads-based) timer.	Variable	0

Parameter	Meaning	Type	Value
memsize_exp	Exponent of the size of the allocated memory region (i.e., the allocated memory buffer is $2^{\text{memsize_exp}}$ bytes).	Variable	MEM_SIZE
Optimizer Setting	The compiler optimizer setting has a substantial impact on the resulting distribution. ¹	Compiler Flag	-O0

Table 4: Entropy-Relevant Parameters (platform specific)

Platform	DIST_MIN	DIST_MAX	DIST_WARN	DIST_PERC	MEM_SIZE	MEM_DEPTH	OSR
Phio TX Model D	260	350	10	10	23	8	1

Platform specific parameters:

- **DIST_MIN**: JENT_DISTRIBUTION_MIN macro setting.
- **DIST_WARN**: JENT_DIST_FAILURE_CUTOFF macro setting.
- **DIST_PERC**: JENT_DIST_CUTOFF_PERCENT macro setting.
- **DIST_MAX**: JENT_DISTRIBUTION_MAX macro setting.
- **MEM_SIZE**: The size of the memory region being used for the noise source in the memsize_exp variable (i.e., $2^{\text{MEM_SIZE}}$ bytes will be used).
- **MEM_DEPTH**: JENT_MEMORY_DEPTH_EXP macro setting.
- **OSR** (osr variable): Establishes the oversample rate using the osr variable.

5 Physical Security Mechanisms

The JEnt-MemOnly entropy source operates within the physical protections of the associated processor.

The JEnt-MemOnly design may be incorporated into modules intended for CMVP validation of compliance to FIPS 140-3 and the related suite of security assurance standards and specifications. Any additional physical security protections are outside the scope of this entropy source design and implementation.

6 Conceptual Interfaces

The entropy source is depicted in Figure 1. At a high level, the entropy source is initialized by running the jent_entropy_init or jent_entropy_init_ex functions, which invoke lower-level functions that include the required power-on health tests.

After the library has been initialized, new instances can be allocated using the jent_entropy_collector_alloc function. This function allocates the memory necessary for a JEnt instance, establishes the initial value of osr for this instance, and allows the user of the entropy source (e.g., the cryptographic module designer) to pass in flags to request that entropy-relevant security parameters be set in a specific way. These flags (and their corresponding impact on the entropy-relevant security parameters) are described in Table 5.

Table 5. Supported JEnt Flags

Flag	Description
JENT_DISABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER	Disables the pthreads-based internal timer, forcing use of the hardware counter (prevents the enable_notime flag from automatically being set).
JENT_FORCE_FIPS	Forces the fips_enabled flag.

¹ The impact of the optimizer on this library is extensively discussed on the library's GitHub repository [Issue #21](#).

Flag	Description
JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER	Requests use of the pthreads-based internal timer, which disables use of the hardware counter (forces the enable_notime flag to be set).
JENT_MAX_MEMSIZE_64kB through JENT_MAX_MEMSIZE_1024MB	Establishes the largest memory region that can be allocated for the MemAccess source.
JENT_MEMSIZE_64kB through JENT_MEMSIZE_1024MB	Sets the initial allocation size for the MemAccess source.

The value for `memsize_exp` is set during allocation depending on the following logic: if a `JENT_MEMSIZE_*` flag was passed in, then this value is used as the initial setting for `memsize_exp`. If no such flag is supplied, and the `JENT_MEMORY_SIZE_EXP` macro is defined and non-zero, then this value is used. If neither of these occur, then the library tries to determine the total amount of cache available. If the available cache size is accessible, then approximately 8 times this total cache size is used; to be precise, if the cache size is `cache_memsize`, then $\text{memsize_exp} = \text{floor}(\log_2(\text{cache_memsize})) + 3$. If the total cache size cannot be estimated, then the `JENT_MEMSIZE_DEFAULT` value is used as an initial setting for `memsize_exp` (by default 1MB).

In this entropy source, only the identified per-platform value for `memsize_exp` is explicitly covered by this entropy assessment report. Because the `JENT_MEMORY_SIZE_EXP` macro is configured as identified² (it is set to the platform-specific setting `MEM_SIZE`), no `JENT_MEMSIZE_*` flag or `JENT_MAX_MEMSIZE_*` flag should be set on initialization. This will force the fixed value `memsize_exp=MEM_SIZE`.

This function allocates the memory necessary for a JEnt instance, establishes the value of `osr` for this instance, and allows the user to request various behaviors by passing in the parameters listed in Table 2 and Table 3.

The JEnt-MemOnly instance can then be used to request entropy using the `jent_read_entropy` or `jent_read_entropy_safe` functions. These functions repeatedly produce blocks of 256 bits of conditioned data using the `jent_random_data` function until at least the amount of requested data has been produced.

The `jent_read_entropy_safe` function has logic that automatically (and without explicit notice to the user) re-instantiates the entropy source in the event of a health test failure; in this case, the value of `osr` is incremented (up to a maximum value of 20), and the value of `memsize_exp` is incremented (up to the value specified by the `JENT_MAX_MEMSIZE_*` flag, or `JENT_MAX_MEMSIZE_DEFAULT` if such a flag is not specified). If the `osr` value exceeds 20, then a failure indication is returned. The `jent_read_entropy_safe` function automatically adjusts both the `memsize_exp` and `osr` entropy-relevant parameters, but it does so in a way that results in a setting that is more conservative for most hardware architectures.

The `jent_random_data` function first makes an initialization call to `jent_measure_jitter` to establish an initial value for the time, and then iteratively calls `jent_measure_jitter` in a loop until $(256 + \text{ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR}) * \text{osr}$ non-stuck delta noise source outputs have been input into the conditioner.

7 Min-Entropy Rate

There are interfaces that allow a user or cryptographic module developer to sample both the raw data and conditioned data for this entropy source.

² Our expectation is that use of a larger memory region would behave similarly (as this is the point of the qualification process that results in the `MEM_SIZE` parameter), but this should be confirmed on a per-hardware architecture basis.

When blocks of 1-million consecutive raw data samples are tested using the SP 800-90B non-IID tests, the results are expected to conform to an assessment distribution. Table 6 provides the observed assessment range for the assessed noise sources.

Table 6: Observed Raw Test Results (platform specific)

Platform	Raw Data Assessment	
	Minimum	Maximum
Phio TX Model D	2.63	2.84

In accordance with the Entropy Analysis Report, the conditioned output of this entropy source is full-entropy; that is, the analysis supports the claim of 256 bits of min entropy per 256-bit conditioned output block, provided the platform specific conditions and configuration settings described above are met.

These blocks are the output of a vetted conditioning function and can be subdivided further (as per SP 800-90B). If these blocks are subdivided, then every byte from the block can be treated as possessing at least 8 bits of min entropy, and the min entropy of any truncated sub-portion of the 256-bit output block is linearly scaled with the length of the retained sub-portion.

If this entropy source is used to seed a compliant DRBG, then the seeding requirements summarized in Table 7 must be met.

Table 7. Seeding Requirements for Security Strengths

DRBG Security Strength (bits)	Bytes Required (Nonce Provided)	256-bit Blocks Required (Nonce Provided)	Bytes Required (Random Nonce)	256-bit Blocks Required (Random Nonce)
112	14	1	21	1
128	16	1	24	1
192	24	1	36	2
256	32	1	48	2

8 Health Tests

All health tests are essentially continuous health tests, and are tested within the `jent_stuck` function. This function performs a modified version of the Repetition Count Test (RCT), an Adaptive Proportion Test (APT), a Lag Health Test, and a Distribution Health Test.

The Lag Health Test is performed by attempting to predict the current symbol using the prior 8 symbols. If the most successful lag (delay) becomes too successful in predicting the current output, or if the test is globally more successful than expected, then the Lag Health Test fails.

The Distribution Health Test operates on data prior to the selection of a sub-distribution or any decimation. If the proportion of pre-raw data that is output is persistently too low, then the Distribution Health Test fails.

When the `fips_mode` flag is set, calls to the `jent_health_failure` function return with the current `health_failure` flag state. If `fips_mode` is not set, then this function always indicates that no failure has occurred. The `health_failure` flag indicates a persistent error for the JEnt instance used, and this flag cannot be reset. For an instance in FIPS mode, it is only possible to continue using the library for entropy production if a new JEnt instance is created.

The targeted cutoff parameters for the APT, RCT and Lag Predictor Health Test are dependent on the setting of `osr`. In the FIPS mode, only data that passes all health tests can be integrated into the conditioner as credited data from the primary noise source.

All of the start-up tests (the full set of continuous health tests³) take the first 1024 consecutive samples. The samples used by the start-up health test are discarded. Some of the architectural health tests are run on the first 1124 samples.

On-demand testing is performed by allocating a new JEnt handle, which triggers the start-up tests. The samples used by the on-demand health test (effectively the start-up health test) are discarded.

There is no mechanism to clear an error state short of re-instantiating a new entropy source.

9 Maintenance

The JEnt-MemOnly entropy source does not require maintenance.

10 Required Testing

If a user of this entropy source or cryptographic module developer wanted to verify that their instance of this source is working correctly, then they can use this procedure.

A raw data sample can be generated using the `jitterentropy-hashtime` tool in the `tests/raw-entropy/recording_userspace` directory.

The `jitterentropy-hashtime` program is compiled using the command:

```
CFLAGS="-DJENT_MEMORY_DEPTH_EXP=MEM_DEPTH -DJENT_MEMORY_SIZE_EXP=MEM_SIZE -DJENT_DISTRIBUTION_MIN=DIST_MIN -DJENT_DISTRIBUTION_MAX=DIST_MAX" make -f Makefile.hashtime
```

Raw data can be extracted using the command:

```
./jitterentropy-hashtime 1000000 1 jent-sample
```

This creates the file `jent-sample-0001-sd.bin` which contains 8-bit raw samples that can be directly tested using the NIST tool using the command:

```
ea_non_iid -vv jent-sample-0001-sd.bin
```

If the resulting assessed entropy is greater than or equal to the “Minimum Assessment” and less than or equal to the “Maximum Assessment” values noted in Table 6, then this result is evidence that the entropy source is behaving in a way that is consistent with the assessed entropy source. Any assessed entropy greater than $\frac{1}{osr}$ bits of min entropy per symbol would support the entropy source’s “full entropy” claim for the output conditioned data.

³ Note that the Distribution Health Test requires a window size of at least `2JENT_DIST_WINDOW_EXP` “pre-raw” samples to fill its test window after the platform’s “delta GCD” is set. This amount of data is not available in start-up testing, so the Distribution Health Test cannot fail during start-up health testing.