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RSA BSAFE[®] Crypto-C Micro Edition Version 3.0.0.1, 3.0.0.14, 3.0.0.15, 3.0.0.19, 3.0.0.21, and 3.0.0.23 Security Policy

This is a non-proprietary security policy for RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition (Crypto-C ME) 3.0.0.1, 3.0.0.14, 3.0.0.15, 3.0.0.19, 3.0.0.21, and 3.0.0.23 security software.

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Contents:

| F | Preface | 2 |
|---|--------------------------------------|----|
| | References | 2 |
| | Terminology | 2 |
| | Document Organization | 3 |
| 1 | Crypto-C ME Cryptographic Toolkit | 4 |
| | 1.1 Cryptographic Module | 4 |
| | 1.2 Crypto-C ME Interfaces | 7 |
| | 1.3 Roles and Services | |
| | 1.4 Cryptographic Key Management | 8 |
| | 1.5 Cryptographic Algorithms | |
| | 1.6 Self Tests | |
| 2 | Secure Operation of Crypto-C ME | 14 |
| | 2.1 Crypto Officer and User Guidance | 14 |
| | 2.2 Roles | 15 |
| | 2.3 Modes of Operation | 15 |
| | 2.4 Operating Crypto-C ME | 16 |
| | 2.5 Startup Self-tests | 17 |
| | 2.6 Random Number Generator | 17 |
| 3 | Services | 19 |
| 4 | Acronyms | |

Preface

This security policy describes how Crypto-C ME meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2. The security policy also describes how to securely operate Crypto-C ME in a FIPS 140-2 compliant manner.

The Crypto-C ME software development toolkit enables developers to incorporate cryptographic technologies into applications. Crypto-C ME security software is designed to help protect sensitive data as it is stored, using strong encryption techniques that ease integration with existing data models. Using the capabilities of Crypto-C ME software in applications helps provide a persistent level of protection for data, lessening the risk of internal, as well as external, compromise.

FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the United States Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html).

References

This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the Crypto-C ME Module and Crypto-C ME's use of this module in terms of a FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module security policy.

For more information about Crypto-C ME, the Crypto-C ME Module, and the entire RSA BSAFE product line, see:

- Information on the full line of RSA products and services is available at <u>www.emc.com/domains/rsa/</u>.
- RSA BSAFE product overviews are available at <u>www.emc.com/security/rsa-bsafe.htm</u>.
- Answers to technical or sales related questions are available at <u>www.emc.com/support/rsa/</u>.

Terminology

In this document, the term Cryptographic Module denotes the Crypto-C ME FIPS 140-2 validated Cryptographic Module.

The Crypto-C ME Module is also referred to as:

- The Cryptographic Module
- The module.

Document Organization

This Security Policy explains the Cryptographic Module's FIPS 140-2 relevant features and functionality. This document comprises the following sections:

- This section, "Preface" on page 2 provides an overview and introduction to the Security Policy.
- "Crypto-C ME Cryptographic Toolkit" on page 4 describes Crypto-C ME and how it meets FIPS 140-2 requirements.
- "Secure Operation of Crypto-C ME" on page 14 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS 140-2 mode of operation.
- "Services" on page 19 lists the functions of Crypto-C ME.
- "Acronyms" on page 22 lists the acronyms and definitions used in this document.

1 Crypto-C ME Cryptographic Toolkit

The Crypto-C ME software development toolkit enables developers to incorporate cryptographic technologies into applications. Crypto-C ME security software is designed to help protect sensitive data as it is stored, using strong encryption techniques that ease integration with existing data models. Using the capabilities of Crypto-C ME software in applications helps provide a persistent level of protection for data, lessening the risk of internal, as well as external, compromise.

The features of Crypto-C ME include the ability to optimize code for different processors, and specific speed or size requirements. Assembly-level optimizations on key processors mean that Crypto-C ME algorithms can be used at increased speeds on many platforms.

Crypto-C ME offers a full set of cryptographic algorithms including asymmetric key algorithms, symmetric key block and stream algorithms, message digests, message authentication, and Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) support. Developers can implement the full suite of algorithms through a single Application Programming Interface (API) or select a specific set of algorithms to reduce code size or meet performance requirements.

Note: When operating in a FIPS 140-2-approved manner, the set of algorithm implementations is not customizable.

1.1 Cryptographic Module

Crypto-C ME is classified as a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module for the purposes of FIPS 140-2. As such, Crypto-C ME must be tested on a specific operating system and computer platform. The cryptographic boundary includes Crypto-C ME running on selected platforms running selected operating systems while configured in "single user" mode. Crypto-C ME was validated as meeting all FIPS 140-2 Level 1 security requirements, including cryptographic key management and operating system requirements.

Crypto-C ME is packaged as a set of dynamically loaded modules or shared library files that contain the module's entire executable code. The Crypto-C ME toolkit relies on the physical security provided by the host PC in which it runs.

For FIPS 140-2 validation, Crypto-C ME is tested on the following platforms:

- NetBSD[®] (tested with Crypto-C ME 3.0.0.15):
 - NetBSD v2.0.3 x86 (32-bit)
 - NetBSD v2.0.3 MIPS RM7035c (32-bit).
- Timesys[™] (tested with Crypto-C ME 3.0.0.14 and 3.0.0.19):
 - Linux 2.6.26.8-rt16 PowerPC[®] (32-bit).
- Timesys (tested with Crypto-C ME 3.0.0.21):
 - Linux 2.6.33.9-rt ARM[®] v7 (MV78230) (32-bit)
 - Linux 3.0.0-rt ARM v7 (PJ4B-MOP) (32-bit)

RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition 3.0.0.1, 3.0.0.14, 3.0.0.15, 3.0.0.19, 3.0.0.21, and 3.0.0.23 Security Policy

- Linaro (tested with Crypto-C ME 3.0.0.23):
 - Linux (kernel 3.10.33) ARM Cortex A7 Dual Core (MB86S73) (32-bit)
- Red Hat[®] (tested with Crypto-C ME 3.0.0.1):
 - Enterprise Linux[®] AS 4.0 x86 (32-bit) with LSB 3.0.3.
- Windows[®] (tested with Crypto-C ME 3.0.0.1):
 - VistaTM Ultimate x86 (32-bit) Visual Studio 2005 SP1 (MD option)
 - XP Professional SP2 x86 (32-bit) Visual Studio 2005 SP1 (MT option).

Note: Compliance is maintained on all of the above platforms for which the binary executable remains unchanged.

For resolution of the "Multi User" modes issue, see the NIST document, Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, located at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-2/

FIPS1402IG.pdf

The following table lists the certification levels sought for Crypto-C ME for each section of the FIPS 140-2 specification.

Table 1Certification Levels

| Section of the FIPS 140-2 Specification | Level |
|---|-------|
| Cryptographic Module Specification | 3 |
| Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces | 1 |
| Roles, Services, and Authentication | 1 |
| Finite State Model | 1 |
| Physical Security | N/A |
| Operational Environment | 1 |
| Cryptographic Key Managment | 1 |
| EMI/EMC | 1 |
| Self-Tests | 1 |
| Design Assurance | 1 |
| Mitigation of Other Attacks | 1 |
| Overall | 1 |

1.1.1 Configuring Single User Mode

This section describes how to configure single user mode for the different operating system platforms supported by Crypto-C ME.

NetBSD, Timesys Linux, Linaro Linux, and Red Hat Linux

To configure single user mode for systems running a NetBSD operating system:

- 1. Log in as the root user.
- Edit /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to remove all the users except root and the pseudo-users (daemon users). Make sure the password fields in /etc/shadow for the pseudo-users are either a star (*) or double exclamation mark (!!). This prevents login as the pseudo-users.
- 3. Edit /etc/nsswitch.conf so that files is the only option for passwd, group, and shadow. This disables the Network Information Service (NIS) and other name services for users and groups.
- 4. In the /etc/xinetd.d directory, edit rexec, rlogin, rsh, rsync, telnet, and wu-ftpd as required, setting the value of disable to yes.
- 5. Reboot the system for the changes to take effect.

Microsoft Windows

To configure single user mode for systems running a Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP2 or Windows Vista Ultimate operating system, guest accounts, server services, terminal services, remote registry services, remote desktop services, and remote assistance must be disabled. For detailed instructions on how to perform these tasks, see the Microsoft support site.

1.2 Crypto-C ME Interfaces

Crypto-C ME is validated as a multi-chip, standalone module. The physical cryptographic boundary of the module is the case of the general-purpose computer or mobile device, which encloses the hardware running the module. The physical interfaces for Crypto-C ME consist of the keyboard, mouse, monitor, CD-ROM drive, floppy drive, serial ports, USB ports, COM ports, and network adapter(s).

The logical boundary of the cryptographic module is the set of library files (libcryptocme2.so, libccme_base.so, libccme_ecc.so, libccme_ecc.so) and the signature file that comprise the module. The underlying logical interface to Crypto-C ME is the API, documented in the *RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition API Reference Guide*. Crypto-C ME provides for Control Input through the API calls. Data Input and Output are provided in the variables passed with the API calls, and Status Output is provided through the returns and error codes that are documented for each call. This is illustrated in the following diagram.




Figure 1 Crypto-C ME Logical Interfaces

1.3 Roles and Services

Crypto-C ME meets all FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements for roles and services, implementing both a User (User) role and Officer (CO) role. As allowed by FIPS 140-2, Crypto-C ME does not support user identification or authentication for these roles. Only one role can be active at a time and Crypto-C ME does not allow concurrent operators.

The following table describes the services accessible by the two roles.

| Table 2 | Crypto-C ME Roles and Services |
|---------|---|
| Role | Services |
| Officer | The Officer has access to a super-set of the services that are available to the User. The Officer role can also invoke the full set of self-tests inside the module. |
| User | The User can perform general security functions, as described in the <i>RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition API Reference Guide</i> . The User can also call specific FIPS 140-2 module functions as defined in the <i>API Reference Guide</i> . |

1.3.1 Officer Role

An operator assuming the Officer role can call any Crypto-C ME function. The complete list of the functionality available to the Officer is outlined in "Services" on page 19.

1.3.2 User Role

An operator assuming the User role can use the entire Crypto-C ME API except for R FIPS140 self test full(), which is reserved for the Officer. The complete list of Crypto-C ME functions is outlined in "Services" on page 19.

1.4 Cryptographic Key Management

Cryptographic key management is concerned with generating and storing keys, managing access to keys, protecting keys during use, and zeroizing keys when they are not longer required.

1.4.1 Key Generation

Crypto-C ME supports generation of DSA, RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public and private keys. Also, Crypto-C ME uses a FIPS 186-2 compliant random number generator as well as a Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator (Dual ECDRBG) and HMAC-DRBG in the generation of asymmetric and symmetric keys used in algorithms such as AES, Triple-DES, RSA, DSA, DH, ECC, and HMAC.

1.4.2 Key Storage

Crypto-C ME does not provide long-term cryptographic key storage. If a user chooses to store keys, the user is responsible for storing keys exported from the module.

The following table lists all keys and CSPs in the module and where they are stored.

| , , | |
|--|---|
| Key or CSP | Storage |
| Hardcoded DSA public key | Persistent storage embedded in the module binary (encrypted). |
| Hardcoded AES key | Persistent storage embedded in the module binary (plaintext). |
| AES keys | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| Triple-DES keys | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| HMAC with SHA-1 and SHA-2 keys (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| DH public/private keys | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| ECC public/private keys | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| RSA public/private keys | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| DSA public/private keys | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| FIPS 186-2 seed | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| FIPS 186-2 key | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| EC DRBG entropy | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| EC DRBG S value | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| EC DRBG init_seed | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| HMAC DRBG entropy | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| HMAC DRBG V value | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| HMAC DRBG key | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |
| HMAC DRBG init_seed | Volatile memory only (plaintext). |

Table 3 Key Storage

1.4.3 Key Access

An authorized operator of the module has access to all key data created during Crypto-C ME operation.

Note: The User and Officer roles have equal and complete access to all keys.

1.4.4 Key Protection/Zeroization

All key data resides in internally allocated data structures and can be output only using the Crypto-C ME API. The operating system protects memory and process space from unauthorized access. The operator should follow the steps outlined in the *RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition API Reference Guide* to ensure sensitive data is protected by zeroizing the data from memory when it is no longer needed. All volatile keys and CSPs listed in Table 3 are zeroized by unloading the module from memory.

1.5 Cryptographic Algorithms

Crypto-C ME supports a wide variety of cryptographic algorithms. To achieve compliance with the FIPS 140-2 standard, only FIPS 140-2-approved or allowed algorithms can be used in an approved mode of operation.

The following table lists the FIPS 140-2-approved algorithms supported by Crypto-C ME with validation certificate numbers for Crypto-C ME 3.0.0.1, 3.0.0.14, 3.0.0.15, 3.0.0.19, and 3.0.0.21.

| | Validation Certificates | | | | |
|--|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| Algorithm | 3.0.0.1 | 3.0.0.14 and 3.0.0.19 | 3.0.0.15 | 3.0.0.21 | 3.0.0.23 |
| AES ECB, CBC, CFB (128-bit), OFB (128-bit), CTR (128, 192, and 256-bit), and CCM | 860 | 1771 | 1951 | 2808 | 3120 |
| AES GCM (128, 192, 256-bit) and GMAC (128, 192, and 256-bit) | Vendor affirmed | Vendor affirmed | Vendor affirmed | Vendor affirmed | Vendor affirmed |
| Triple-DES ECB, CBC, CFB (64bit), and OFB (64-bit). | 707 | 1147 | 1268 | 1686 | 1791 |
| Diffie-Hellman, EC-Diffie-Hellman, and EC-Diffie-Hellman with Components | Non-approved ¹ | Non-approved ¹ | Non-approved ¹ | Non-approved ¹ | Non-approved ¹ |
| DSA | 311 | 554 | 623 | 850 | 904 |
| ECDSA | 98 and 100 | 239 and 240 | 281 and 283 | 491 and 492 503 and 504 | 565 and 569 |

Table 4 Crypto-C ME FIPS 140-2-approved Algorithms

| | Validation Certificates | | | | |
|--|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Algorithm | 3.0.0.1 | 3.0.0.14 and 3.0.0.19 | 3.0.0.15 | 3.0.0.21 | 3.0.0.23 |
| FIPS 186-2 Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) - Change Notice 1, with and without the mod q step | 492 | 943 | 1027 | 1274 | 1330 |
| Dual ECDRBG and HMAC-DRBG | 4 | 122 | 172 | 480 | 632 |
| RSA X9.31, PKCS #1 V.1.5, and PKCS #1 V.2.1, (SHA256 - PSS) | 412 | 887 | 1012 | 1470 1489 | 1591 |
| RSA encrypt and decrypt | Non-approved ¹ |
| SHA-1 | 855 | 1555 | 1713 | 2356 | 2578 |
| SHA-224, 256, 384, and 512 | 855 | 1555 | 1713 | 2356 | 2578 |
| HMAC-SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512 | 477 | 1040 | 1177 | 1759 | 1959 |

 Table 4
 Crypto-C ME FIPS 140-2-approved Algorithms (continued)

¹Allowed in FIPS 140-2 mode for key transport

The following Crypto-C ME algorithms are not FIPS 140-2-approved:

- DES
- MD2
- MD5
- HMAC MD5
- DES40
- RC2
- RC4
- RC5
- ECAES
- ECIES
- PBKDF1 SHA-1
- PBKDF2 HMAC SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
- RSA PKCS #1 V.2.0 (OAEP)
- Entropy RNG
- OTP RNG.

For more information about using Crypto-C ME in a FIPS 140-2 compliant manner, see "Secure Operation of Crypto-C ME" on page 14.

RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition 3.0.0.1, 3.0.0.14, 3.0.0.15, 3.0.0.19, 3.0.0.21, and 3.0.0.23 Security Policy

1.6 Self Tests

Crypto-C ME performs a number of power-up and conditional self-tests to ensure proper operation.

If the power-up self-test fails, the toolkit is disabled and the operation fails. If the ECC provider self-test fails, the provider libraries (libccme_base.so, libccme_ecc.so, and libccme_eccaccel.so) are disabled and the operation fails. The toolkit can only leave the disabled state by reloading the FIPS 140-2 module. If the conditional self-test fails, the operation fails but the toolkit is not disabled.

For self-test failures (power-up or conditional) the library notifies the user through the returns and error codes for the API.

1.6.1 Power-up Self-test

Crypto-C ME implements the following power-up self-tests:

- AES, AES CCM, AES GCM, and AES GMAC Known Answer Tests (KATs)
- DES and Triple-DES KATs
- SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 KATs
- HMAC SHA-1, HMAC SHA-224, HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, and HMAC SHA-512 KATs
- RSA sign/verify test
- DSA sign/verify test
- DH, EC-DH, and EC-DH with Components conditional test
- ECDSA sign/verify test
- PRNG (FIPS 186-2, Dual ECDRBG, and HMAC-DRBG) KATs
- Software integrity test.

Power-up self-tests are executed automatically when Crypto-C ME is loaded into memory.

1.6.2 Conditional Self-tests

Crypto-C ME performs two conditional self-tests:

- A pair-wise consistency test each time Crypto-C ME generates a DSA, RSA, or EC public/private key pair.
- A Continuous Random Number Generation (CRNG) test each time the toolkit produces random data, as per the FIPS 186-2 standard. The CRNG test is performed on all approved and non-approved RNGs.

1.6.3 Critical Functions Tests

Depending on operating mode, Crypto-C ME performs the following known answer tests:

- In R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL mode, Crypto-C ME performs a known answer test for MD5 and HMAC-MD5.
- In R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_ECC mode, Crypto-C ME performs a known answer test for ECAES and ECIES.
- In R_FIPS140_MODE_SSL_ECC mode, a known answer test is performed for MD5, HMAC-MD5, ECAES, and ECIES.

1.6.4 Mitigation of Other Attacks

RSA key operations implement blinding, a reversible way of modifying the input data, so as to make the RSA operation immune to timing attacks. Blinding has no effect on the algorithm other than to mitigate attacks on the algorithm. Blinding is implemented through blinding modes, and the following options are available:

- Blinding mode off.
- Blinding mode with no update, where the blinding value is constant for each operation.
- Blinding mode with full update, where a new blinding value is used for each operation.

2 Secure Operation of Crypto-C ME

This section provides an overview of how to securely operate Crypto-C ME in compliance with the FIPS 140-2 standards.

2.1 Crypto Officer and User Guidance

The Crypto Officer and User must only use algorithms approved for use in a FIPS 140 mode of operation, as listed in Table 4 on page 10. The requirements for using the approved algorithms in a FIPS 140 mode of operation are as follows:

- The bit length for a DSA key pair must be 1024 bits.
- Bit lengths for an RSA key pair must be between 1024 and 4096 bits in multiples of 512.
- Bit lengths for an HMAC key must be between 80 and 4096 bits.
- EC key pairs must have named curve domain parameters from the set of NIST-recommended named curves (P192, P224, P256, P384, P521, B163, B233, B283, B409, B571, K163, K233, K283, K409, K571). The module limits possible curves for Dual EC DRBG to P256, P384, and P521 in accordance with SP 800-90.
- When using RSA for key wrapping, the strength of the methodology is between 80 and 150 bits of security.
- The Diffie-Hellman shared secret provides between 80 and 150 bits of encryption strength.
- EC Diffie-Hellman primitives must use curve domain parameters from the set of NIST-recommended named curves. Using NIST-recommended curves, the computed Diffie-Hellman shared secret provides between 80 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
- When using an approved RNG to generate keys, the requested security strength for the RNG must be at least as great as the security strength of the key being generated.

2.2 Roles

If a user of Crypto-C ME needs to operate the toolkit in different roles, then the user must ensure that all instantiated cryptographic objects are destroyed before changing from the Crypto User role to the Crypto Officer role, or unexpected results could occur.

The following table lists the roles a user can operate in.

Table 5 Crypto-C ME Roles

| Role | Description |
|------------------------|--|
| R_FIPS140_ROLE_OFFICER | An operator assuming the Crypto Officer role can call any Crypto-C ME function. The complete list of the functionality available to the Crypto Officer is outlined in "Services" on page 19. |
| R_FIPS140_ROLE_USER | An operator assuming the Crypto User role can use the entire Crypto-C ME API except for R_FIPS140_self_test_full(), which is reserved for the Crypto Officer. The complete list of Crypto-C ME functions is outlined in "Services" on page 19. |

2.3 Modes of Operation

The following table lists and describes the available modes of operation.

| Mode | Description |
|--|---|
| R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140 FIPS 140-2-approved. | Provides the cryptographic algorithms listed in Table 4 on page 10. The default random number generator is the FIPS 186-2 PRNG. |
| | This is the Crypto-C ME default mode on start up. |
| R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL FIPS 140-2-approved if used with TLS | Provides the same algorithms as R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140, plus the MD5 message digest. |
| protocol implementations. | This mode can be used in the context of the key establishment phase in the TLSv1 and TLSv1.1 protocol. For more information, see section 7.1 Acceptable Key Establishment Protocols in Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/ fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf). |
| | The implementation guidance disallows the use of the SSLv2 and SSLv3 versions. Cipher suites that include non-FIPS 140-2-approved algorithms are unavailable. |
| | This mode allows implementations of the TLS protocol to operate Crypto-C ME in a FIPS 140-2 compliant manner with the FIPS 186-2 PRNG as the default. |

| | Table 6 | Crypto-C ME Modes of Operation |
|--|---------|--------------------------------|
|--|---------|--------------------------------|

RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition 3.0.0.1, 3.0.0.14, 3.0.0.15, 3.0.0.19, 3.0.0.21, and 3.0.0.23 Security Policy

| Mode | Description |
|--|--|
| R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_ECC Not FIPS 140-2-approved. | Provides the same algorithms as R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140, plus ECAES and ECIAS. The random number generator in this mode is the Dual ECDRBG. |
| R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL_ECC Not FIPS 140-2-approved. | Provides the same algorithms as R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL, plus ECAES and ECIAS. The random number generator in this mode is the Dual ECDRBG. The same restrictions with respect to protocol versions and cipher suites as in R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL apply. |
| R_FIPS140_MODE_NON_FIPS140 Not FIPS 140-2-approved. | Allows users to operate Crypto-C ME without any cryptographic algorithm restrictions. |
| R_FIPS140_MODE_DISABLED Not FIPS 140-2-approved. | Indicates that the FIPS140 library is disabled, usually due to an internal or caller's usage error. No future transition into other modes is permitted. |

Table 6 Crypto-C ME Modes of Operation (continued)

In each mode of operation, the complete set of services, which are listed in this Security Policy, are available to both the Crypto Officer and User roles (with the exception of R FIPS140 self test full(), which is always reserved for the Crypto Officer).

Note: Cryptographic keys must not be shared between modes. For example, a key generated in R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140 mode must not be shared with an application running in R_FIPS140_MODE_NON_FIPS140 mode.

2.4 Operating Crypto-C ME

Crypto-C ME operates in R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140 by default if the Crypto-C ME library is initialized with the PRODUCT_DEFAULT_RESOURCE_LIST(). Call R_FIPS140_get_mode() to determine the current mode of Crypto-C ME.

When changing the mode of operation to a FIPS-approved mode, the module must be re-initialized with the appropriate product resource list,

(PRODUCT DEFAULT RESOURCE LIST() or

PRODUCT_FIPS140_SWITCH_RESOURCE_LIST() for R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140, or PRODUCT FIPS140 SSL SWITCH RESOURCE LIST() for

R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL). This ensures that the module is reloaded and all power-up self-tests are properly executed. To change the module to a non-FIPS-approved mode, call R_FIPS140_set_mode() with one of the information identifiers listed in Table 6 on page 15.

Note: R_FIPS140_set_mode() can only be used when changing to a non-FIPS-approved mode.

RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition 3.0.0.1, 3.0.0.14, 3.0.0.15, 3.0.0.19, 3.0.0.21, and 3.0.0.23 Security Policy

After setting Crypto-C ME into a FIPS 140-2-approved mode, Crypto-C ME enforces that only the algorithms listed in Table 4 on page 10 are available to operators. To disable FIPS 140-2 mode, call R_FIPS140_set_mode() with the R_FIPS140_MODE_NON_FIPS140 information identifier.

R_FIPS140_self_tests_full() is restricted to operation by the Crypto Officer.

The user of Crypto-C ME links with the static library for their platform, which loads the Crypto-C ME shared or dynamic link master and provider libraries at runtime. For more information, see "FIPS 140-2 Library and Modes of Operation" in the *RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition API Reference Guide*.

The current Crypto-C ME role can be determined calling R_FIPS140_get_role(). The role can be changed by calling R_FIPS140_set_role() with one of the information identifiers listed in Table 5 on page 15.

2.5 Startup Self-tests

Crypto-C ME provides the ability to configure when power-up self-tests are executed. To operate Crypto-C ME in a FIPS 140-2 compliant manner, the default shipped configuration, which executes the self-tests when the module is first loaded, must be used.

For more information about this configuration setting, see the RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition Installation Guide.

2.6 Random Number Generator

In FIPS 140-2 modes, Crypto-C ME provides a default RNG. For R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140 and R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL, Crypto-C ME provides a FIPS 186-2 PRNG for all operations that require the generation of random numbers. For R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_ECC and R_FIPS140_MODE_FIPS140_SSL_ECC, Crypto-C ME implements a Dual ECDRBG internally.

In all modes, users can choose to use an approved RNG other than the default RNG, including the FIPS 186-2 PRNG (with or without mod q), Dual ECDRBG, or HMAC DRBG when creating a RNG object and setting this object against the operation requiring random number generation (for example, key generation). However, when DSA is used, the RNG used internally is always the FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1 Option 1 with mod q PRNG.

This module also includes a non-approved Entropy RNG that is used to generate seed material for the approved PRNGs.

2.6.1 PRNG Seeding

In the FIPS 140-2 validated library, Crypto-C ME implements deterministic random number generators that can be called to generate random data. The quality of the random data output from these RNGs depends on the quality of the supplied seeding (entropy). Crypto-C ME provides internal entropy collection (for example, from high precision timers) where possible, but it is strongly recommended to collect entropy from external sources.

This is particularly critical if developing on embedded platforms where there are only limited internal entropy sources available. For more information on seeding PRNGs, see "Randomness Recommendations for Security" in <u>RFC 1750</u>.

The R_CR_INFO_ID_RAND_ENTROPY_FUNC identifier specifies that additional entropy be available. R_CR_INFO_ID_RAND_ENTROPY_FUNC is set against the R_CR object, which encapsulates the random number generator, and takes a callback function that the random number generator then uses to gather additional entropy if needed. For more information about R_CR_INFO_ID_RAND_ENTROPY_FUNC, see the *RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition API Reference Guide*.

3 Services

The following is the list of services provided by Crypto-C ME. For more information about these functions, see the *RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition API Reference Guide*.

BIO_append_filename() BIO_clear_flags() BIO_clear_retry_flags() BIO_copy_next_retry() BIO_debug_cb() BIO_dump() BIO_dump_format() BIO_dup_chain() BIO_f_buffer() BIO_f_null() BIO_find_type() BIO_flags_to_string() BIO flush() BIO_free() BIO_free_all() BIO_get_cb() BIO_get_cb_arg() BIO_get_close() BIO_get_flags() BIO_get_fp() BIO_get_retry_BIO() BIO_get_retry_flags() BIO_get_retry_reason() BIO_get_ssl() BIO_get_state_cb() BIO_get_state_cb_arg() BIO gets() BIO method name() BIO method type() BIO new() BIO new file() BIO_new_fp() BIO_new_mem() BIO_open_file() BIO_pop() BIO_print_hex() BIO_printf() BIO_push() BIO_puts() BIO read() BIO read filename() BIO reference inc() BIO_reset() BIO_retry_type() BIO_rw_filename() BIO_s_file BIO_s_mem() BIO_s_null() BIO_seek() BIO_set_bio_cb() BIO_set_cb()

BIO_set_cb_arg() BIO_set_close() BIO_set_flags() BIO_set_fp() BIO_should_io_special() BIO_should_read() BIO_should_retry() BIO_should_write() BIO_state_to_string() BIO_tell() BIO_write() BIO_write_filename() PRODUCT_DEFAULT_RESOURCE_LIST() PRODUCT_FIPS140_ECC_SWITCH_RESOURCE_LIST() PRODUCT_FIPS140_SSL_ECC_SWITCH_RESOURCE_ LIST() PRODUCT_FIPS140_SSL_SWITCH_RESOURCE_LIST() PRODUCT FIPS140 SWITCH RESOURCE LIST() PRODUCT_LIBRARY_FREE() PRODUCT_LIBRARY_INFO() PRODUCT_LIBRARY_INFO_TYPE_FROM_STRING() PRODUCT_LIBRARY_INFO_TYPE_TO_STRING() PRODUCT_LIBRARY_NEW() PRODUCT_LIBRARY_VERSION() PRODUCT NON FIPS140 SWITCH RESOURCE LIST() R CR asym decrypt() R CR asym decrypt init() R CR asym encrypt() R CR asym encrypt init() R CR CTX alg supported() R CR CTX free() R_CR_CTX_get_info() R_CR_CTX_ids_from_sig_id() R_CR_CTX_ids_to_sig_id() R_CR_CTX_new() R_CR_CTX_set_info() R_CR_decrypt() R_CR_decrypt_final() R_CR_decrypt_init() R_CR_decrypt_update() R CR DEFINE CUSTOM CIPHER LIST() R CR_DEFINE_CUSTOM_METHOD_TABLE() R_CR_derive_key() R_CR_derive_key_data() R_CR_digest() R_CR_digest_final() R_CR_digest_init() R_CR_digest_update() R_CR_dup() R_CR_encrypt() R_CR_encrypt_final()

RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition 3.0.0.1, 3.0.0.14, 3.0.0.15, 3.0.0.19, 3.0.0.21, and 3.0.0.23 Security Policy

R CR encrypt init() R CR encrypt update() R CR free() R CR generate key() R CR generate key init() R CR generate parameter() R CR generate parameter init() R CR get crypto provider name() R CR get default imp method() R_CR_get_default_method() R_CR_get_default_signature_map() R_CR_get_detail() R_CR_get_detail_string() R_CR_get_detail_string_table() R_CR_get_device_handle() R_CR_get_error() R_CR_get_error_string() R_CR_get_file() R_CR_get_function() R_CR_get_function_string() R_CR_get_function_string_table() R_CR_get_info() R_CR_get_line() R_CR_get_reason() R_CR_get_reason_string() R_CR_get_reason_string_table() R_CR_ID_from_string() R_CR_ID_sign_to_string() R_CR_ID_to_string() R_CR_key_exchange_init() R_CR_key_exchange_phase_1() R CR key exchange phase 2() R_CR_mac() R_CR_mac_final() R_CR_mac_init() R_CR_mac_update() R_CR_new() R CR random bytes() R CR random seed() R CR RES CRYPTO CUSTOM METHOD() R CR set info() R CR sign() R CR sign final() R CR sign init() R CR sign update() R CR SUB from string() R CR SUB to string() R CR TYPE from string() R CR TYPE to string() R CR verify() R CR verify final() R CR verify init() R_CR_verify_mac() R_CR_verify_mac_final() R_CR_verify_mac_init() R_CR_verify_mac_update() R_CR_verify_update() R ERROR EXIT CODE() R_FIPS140_free() R_FIPS140_get_default() R_FIPS140_get_failure_reason()

R FIPS140 get failure reason string() R FIPS140 get info() R FIPS140 get interface version() R FIPS140 get mode() R FIPS140 get role() R FIPS140 get supported interfaces() R FIPS140 KAT STATE to string() R FIPS140 library free() R FIPS140 library init() R_FIPS140_load_module() R_FIPS140_MODE_from_string() R_FIPS140_MODE_to_string() R FIPS140 new() R_FIPS140_RESULT_from_string() R FIPS140_RESULT_to_string() R FIPS140 ROLE from string() R FIPS140_ROLE_to_string() R_FIPS140_self_tests_full() R FIPS140 self tests short() R FIPS140 set info() R_FIPS140_set_interface_version() R_FIPS140_set_mode() R_FIPS140_set_role() R FIPS140_STATE_from_string() R_FIPS140_STATE_to_string() R_FIPS140_unload_module() R_FORMAT_from_string() R_FORMAT_to_string() R free() R get mem functions() R HW CTX build device handle list() R_HW_CTX_free() R_HW_CTX_get device handle list() R_HW_CTX_get_device_handle_list_count() R_HW_CTX_get_device_handle_list_handle() R HW CTX get info() R_HW_CTX_iterate_devices() R HW CTX new() R HW CTX probe devices() R HW CTX set info() R HW DEV get device driver id() R HW DEV get device name() R HW DEV get device number() R_HW_DEV_get_info() R_HW_DEV_is_equal() R HW DEV set info() R HW DRIVER free() R HW DRIVER get info() R HW DRIVER load devices() R HW DRIVER new() R HW DRIVER probe devices() R HW DRIVER set info() R HW_OBJ_dup() R_HW_OBJ_free() R_HW_OBJ_get_info() R HW OBJ init() R HW OBJ new() R_HW_OBJ_set_info() R HW SEARCH eof() R HW SEARCH free() R_HW_SEARCH_get_locate_count()

R HW SEARCH locate() R HW SEARCH new() R HW SEARCH next() R HW SEARCH set browse() R LIB CTX free() R LIB CTX get detail string() R LIB CTX get error string() R LIB CTX get function string() R LIB CTX get info() R_LIB_CTX_get_reason_string() R_LIB_CTX_new() R_LIB_CTX_set_info() R_lock_ctrl() R_lock_get_cb() R_lock_get_name() R_lock_num() R_lock_r() R_lock_w() R_lock_set_cb() R locked add() R_locked_add_get_cb() R_locked_add_set_cb() R_lockid_new() R_lockids_free() R_malloc() R_PKEY_cmp() R_PKEY_CTX_free() R_PKEY_CTX_get_info() R_PKEY_CTX_get_LIB_CTX() R_PKEY_CTX_new() R_PKEY_CTX_set_info() R_PKEY_decode_pkcs8() R_PKEY_delete_device() R_PKEY_encode_pkcs8() R_PKEY_FORMAT_from_string() R_PKEY_FORMAT_to_string() R_PKEY_free() R_PKEY_from_binary() R_PKEY_from_bio() R_PKEY_from_file() R PKEY from public key binary() R PKEY get handle() R_PKEY_get_info() R_PKEY_get_num_bits() R_PKEY_get_num_primes() R_PKEY_get_PKEY_CTX() R_PKEY_get_private_handle() R_PKEY_get_public_handle() R_PKEY_get_purpose() R_PKEY_get_type() R PKEY iterate fields() R PKEY METHOD free() R PKEY METHOD get flag() R_PKEY_METHOD_get_name() R_PKEY_METHOD_get_type() R_PKEY_new() R PKEY PASSWORD_TYPE_from_string() R PKEY PASSWORD_TYPE_to_string() R_PKEY_pk_method() R PKEY print() R_PKEY_public_cmp()

R PKEY public from bio() R PKEY public from file() R PKEY public to bio() R PKEY public to file() R PKEY read device() R PKEY reference inc() R PKEY rsa blinding lib start() R PKEY rsa no blinding lib start() R PKEY set handle() R_PKEY_set_info() R_PKEY_set_private_handle() R_PKEY_set_public_handle() R_PKEY_set_purpose() R_PKEY_to_binary() R_PKEY_to_bio() R PKEY to file() R PKEY to public key binary() R PKEY TYPE from string() R PKEY TYPE to string() R PKEY write device() R_realloc() R_remalloc() R_RES_LIST_get_item() R_RES_LIST_get_resource() R_RES_LIST_set_item() R_RES_LIST_set_resource() R_set_mem_functions() R SKEY_delete_device() R_SKEY_free() R_SKEY_get_handle() R_SKEY_get_info() R_SKEY_new() R_SKEY_read_device() R_SKEY_set_handle() R_SKEY_set_info() R SKEY write device() R thread id() R_thread_id_get_cb() R_thread_id_set_cb() R TIME cmp() R time cmp() R TIME CTX free() R TIME CTX new() R_TIME_dup() R_TIME_export() R TIME free() R TIME get time mi method() R_TIME_get_utc_time_method() R TIME import() R TIME new() R TIME offset() R TIME time() R unlock r() R_unlock_w()

4 Acronyms

The following table lists and describes the acronyms and definitions used throughout this document.

Table 7 Acronyms and Definitions

| Term | Definition |
|----------------|--|
| AES | Advanced Encryption Standard. A fast block cipher with a 128-bit block, and keys of lengths 128, 192, and 256 bits. Replaces DES as the US symmetric encryption standard. |
| API | Application Programming Interface. |
| Attack | Either a successful or unsuccessful attempt at breaking part or all of a cryptosystem. Various attack types include an algebraic attack, birthday attack, brute force attack, chosen ciphertext attack, chosen plaintext attack, differential cryptanalysis, known plaintext attack, linear cryptanalysis, and middle person attack. |
| CBC | Cipher Block Chaining. A mode of encryption in which each ciphertext depends upon all previous ciphertexts. Changing the Initialization Vector (IV) alters the ciphertext produced by successive encryptions of an identical plaintext. |
| CFB | Cipher Feedback. A mode of encryption that produces a stream of ciphertext bits rather than a succession of blocks. In other respects, it has similar properties to the CBC mode of operation. |
| CRNG | Continuous Random Number Generation. |
| CTR | Counter mode of encryption that turns a block cipher into a stream cipher. It generates the next keystream block by encrypting successive values of a counter. |
| DES | Data Encryption Standard. A symmetric encryption algorithm with a 56-bit key. See also Triple-DES. |
| Diffie-Hellman | The Diffie-Hellman asymmetric key exchange algorithm. There are many variants, but typically two entities exchange some public information (for example, public keys or random values) and combines them with their own private keys to generate a shared session key. As private keys are not transmitted, eavesdroppers are not privy to all of the information that composes the session key. |
| DSA | Digital Signature Algorithm. An asymmetric algorithm for creating digital signatures. |
| DRBG | Deterministic Random Bit Generator. |
| Dual ECDRBG | Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator. |
| EC | Elliptic Curve. |
| ECAES | Elliptic Curve Asymmetric Encryption Scheme. |
| ECB | Electronic Codebook. A mode of encryption that divides a message into blocks and encrypts each block separately. |
| ECC | Elliptic Curve Cryptography. |

| Term | Definition |
|------------|---|
| ECDH | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman. |
| ECDHC | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Components. Described NIST SP 800-56A, March 2007, Section 5.7.1.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography Cofactor Diffie-Hellman (ECC CDH) Primitive. |
| ECDSA | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. |
| ECIES | Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme. |
| Encryption | The transformation of plaintext into an apparently less readable form (called ciphertext) through a mathematical process. The ciphertext can be read by anyone who has the key that decrypts (undoes the encryption) the ciphertext. |
| FIPS | Federal Information Processing Standards. |
| GCM | Galois/Counter Mode. A mode of encryption that combines the Counter mode of encryption with Galois field multiplication for authentication. |
| GMAC | Galois Message Authentication Code. An authentication only variant of GCM. |
| НМАС | Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication Code. |
| HMAC DRBG | HMAC Deterministic Random Bit Generator. |
| IV | Initialization Vector. Used as a seed value for an encryption operation. |
| KAT | Known Answer Test. |
| Key | A string of bits used in cryptography, allowing people to encrypt and decrypt data. Can be used to perform other mathematical operations as well. Given a cipher, a key determines the mapping of the plaintext to the ciphertext. The types of keys include distributed key, private key, public key, secret key, session key, shared key, subkey, symmetric key, and weak key. |
| MD5 | A secure hash algorithm created by Ron Rivest. MD5 hashes an arbitrary-length input into a 16-byte digest. |
| NIST | National Institute of Standards and Technology. A division of the US Department of Commerce (formerly known as the NBS) which produces security and cryptography-related standards. |
| OFB | Output Feedback. A mode of encryption in which the cipher is decoupled from its ciphertext. |
| OS | Operating System. |
| PC | Personal Computer. |
| PDA | Personal Digital Assistant. |
| PPC | PowerPC. |
| privacy | The state or quality of being secluded from the view or presence of others. |

| Table 7 Acronyms and | Definitions |
|----------------------|-------------|
|----------------------|-------------|

RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition 3.0.0.1, 3.0.0.14, 3.0.0.15, 3.0.0.19, 3.0.0.21, and 3.0.0.23 Security Policy

Term Definition The secret key in public key cryptography. Primarily used for decryption but also used for private key encryption with digital signatures. PRNG Pseudo-random Number Generator. RC2 Block cipher developed by Ron Rivest as an alternative to the DES. It has a block size of 64 bits and a variable key size. It is a legacy cipher and RC5 should be used in preference. RC4 Symmetric algorithm designed by Ron Rivest using variable length keys (usually 40-bit or 128-bit). RC5 Block cipher designed by Ron Rivest. It is parameterizable in its word size, key length, and number of rounds. Typical use involves a block size of 64 bits, a key size of 128 bits, and either 16 or 20 iterations of its round function. RNG Random Number Generator. RSA Public key (asymmetric) algorithm providing the ability to encrypt data and create and verify digital signatures. RSA stands for Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, the developers of the RSA public key cryptosystem. SHA Secure Hash Algorithm. An algorithm that creates a unique hash value for each possible input. SHA takes an arbitrary input that is hashed into a 160-bit digest. SHA-1 A revision to SHA to correct a weakness. It produces 160-bit digests. SHA-1 takes an arbitrary input that is hashed into a 20-byte digest. The NIST-mandated successor to SHA-1, to complement the Advanced Encryption SHA-2 Standard. It is a family of hash algorithms (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512) that produce digests of 224, 256, 384 and 512 bits respectively. Triple-DES A variant of DES that uses three 56-bit keys.

Table 7 Acronyms and Definitions