



NitroView Enterprise Security Manager / Receiver Version 8.0.0.20080605 and 8.2.0 Security Policy

FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Validation



Model Number
NS-ESMRCV-2250-R

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1	Introduction	3
1.1	Acronyms and Abbreviations	4
2	NitroSecurity NitroView Enterprise Security Manager and Receiver	6
2.1	Functional Overview	6
2.2	Module Description	8
2.3	Module Ports and Interfaces	8
3	Security Functions	10
4	FIPS Approved Mode of Operation	11
4.1	Set-Up and Initialization Procedures.....	11
5	Identification and Authentication	12
6	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs	13
7	Roles and Services	16
8	Access Control	18
9	Physical Security	20
10	Self Tests	22
11	Mitigation of Attacks	23
12	References	23

1 Introduction

This document is the Security Policy for NitroSecurity NitroView Enterprise Security Manager (ESM) / Receiver (RCV) combination cryptographic module. This Security Policy specifies the security rules under which this cryptographic module shall operate to meet the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2. It describes how the module functions to meet the FIPS requirements, and the actions that operators must take to maintain the security of the module.

This Security Policy describes the features and design of the NitroView ESMRCV cryptographic module using the terminology contained in the FIPS 140-2 specification. *FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules* specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive but unclassified information. The NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) validates cryptographic modules to the FIPS 140-2 standard. The Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) validates algorithms used by a FIPS validated module. Validated products are accepted by the Federal agencies of both the USA and Canada for the protection of sensitive or designated information.

The FIPS 140-2 standard, and information on the CMVP can be found at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp>. Information on the CAVP can be found at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp>. More information describing the NitroView ESMRCV can be found at <http://www.NitroSecurity.com>.

In this document, the NitroSecurity NitroView Enterprise Security Manager and Receiver module is also referred to as “the NitroView ESMRCV”, “the ESMRCV”, or “the module”. For clarity, references to ESM denote ESM functionality and references to Receiver denote embedded Receiver functionality.

This Security Policy contains only non-proprietary information. All other documentation submitted for FIPS 140-2 conformance testing and validation is “NitroSecurity - Proprietary” and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements.

The NitroSecurity NitroView ESMRCV cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security for FIPS 140-2 as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Cryptographic Module Security Requirements.

<i>Security Requirements Section</i>	<i>Level</i>
Cryptographic Module Specification	2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
Roles and Services and Authentication	2
Finite State Machine Model	2
Physical Security	2
Operational Environment	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	2
EMI/EMC	2
Self-Tests	2
Design Assurance	2
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A
Cryptographic Module Security Policy	2

Document Version History

Version	Date	Comments	Name
1.00	4/3/08	Initial Draft	Ward Rosenberry
1.02	7/16/08	Initial submission draft	Ward Rosenberry
1.03	7/31/08	Responded to evaluator comments	Ward Rosenberry
1.04	8/20/08	Responded to 2 nd round of evaluator comments	Ward Rosenberry
1.05, 1.06	10/14/08 10/16/08	Final iterations	Ward Rosenberry
1.07	12/23/08	Final iterations from NIST feedback (FIPS vs non-FIPS mode. PRNG crypto seed key and zeroize operations.	Bill Virtue
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2.0	9/1/09	Updated to reflect version 8.2	Salo Fajer
2.01	10/12/09	Updated version number	Salo Fajer

1.1 Acronyms and Abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CFB	Cipher Feedback
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DRNG	Deterministic Random Number Generator
DH	Diffie-Hellman Algorithm
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
ECB	Electronic Code Book
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
EDC	Error Detection Code
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
KAT	Known Answer Test
LAN	Local Area Network
LED	Light Emitting Diode
NDRNG	Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
NIC	Network Interface Card
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
PRNG	Pseudo Random Number Generator
PUB	Publication
RAM	Random Access Memory
ROM	Read Only Memory
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest Shamir Adleman public key cryptosystem

SHA-1	Secure Hash Algorithm
SHA-384	Secure Hash Algorithm
T-DES	Triple-DES (Data Encryption Standard)

2 NitroSecurity NitroView Enterprise Security Manager and Receiver

2.1 Functional Overview

NitroSecurity provides highly scalable enterprise security solutions that provide intrusion prevention, network behavior analysis and security event management enabling enterprises to secure their networks with real-time threat mitigation.


This cryptographic module combines NitroSecurity's NitroView ESM functionality and NitroView Receiver functionality within a single space-saving 1U rack mountable hardware system. While the ESM and Receiver subsystems comprise a single ESMRCV system, for clarity this document discusses some ESM and Receiver capabilities as though they are separate systems. Some discussions reference ESM functionality while Receiver oriented discussions reference embedded Receiver functionality.

The NitroView ESMRCV provides a unique patented, ultra-high-performance aggregation and correlation engine integrated into each NitroView ESMRCV. These sophisticated data acquisition and management capabilities give the NitroView ESMRCV the power to manage thousands of events per second. The NitroView ESMRCV provides advanced correlation and analysis of relevant security information collected from IDS, IPS, firewalls, servers, hosts, and many other devices. By unifying relevant security information, NitroView is able to provide Unified Security Management (USM), combining and enhancing security event management (SEM), security information management (SIM), network behavior analysis (NBA), and anomaly detection functions. The NitroView ESMRCV uses an advanced, highly responsive web-based Graphical User Interface (GUI) to provide near real-time analysis and reporting of both live data (events as they're acquired) and deep forensics (events collected over months or years).

NitroView ESMRCV embedded Receiver capabilities enable the collection of security events and network flow data from multi-vendor sources including firewalls, IPS/IDS, NetFlow and others. The NitroView ESMRCV embedded Receiver is an integral component of a comprehensive security management solution with the ability to gather and analyze data from 3rd party network and security solutions.

Figure 1 shows a high level functional view of the NitroView ESMRCV. The NitroView ESMRCV uses data acquired by NitroGuard IPS devices and the NitroView ESMRCV embedded Receiver to provide data for its correlation and analysis capabilities. Users access all NitroView ESM and embedded Receiver functions, and NitroGuard IPS devices, via an encrypted HTTPS communication channel between their browser and the NitroView ESMRCV's embedded web server. All communication between the NitroView ESMRCV's ESM functions, and the embedded NitroView Receiver and external NitroGuard IPS devices (i.e. Commands and data) use encrypted SSH tunnels. Data collection, correlation and analysis features are available for security events and network flows provided by external NitroGuard IPS devices and the embedded NitroView Receiver device.

Figure 1. Functional View of the Cryptographic Module.



2.2 Module Description

The NitroSecurity NitroView ESMRCV is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module consisting of production-grade components contained within an opaque hard production-grade enclosure (the outside case is steel). The removable cover is protected by tamper evident security seals in accordance with FIPS 140-2 Level 2. The cryptographic boundary is the metal enclosure of the device. The module has a single processor complex, composed of one or more CPUs each with one or more general purpose CPU cores, and all of the module services implemented by module software are executed by this processor complex, using the memory devices that contain the executable code and data. Note that all of the CPU cores in the processor complex are general purpose, and none of them have any FIPS security relevant functionality implemented in hardware.

The module has a limited operational environment and does not have a FIPS bypass mode or a FIPS maintenance mode.

The NitroView ESMRCV meets applicable Federal Communication Commission (FCC) Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements as defined in Subpart B of FCC Part 15, for Class B devices.

The module uses algorithms from OpenSSL that is built, installed, protected and initialized as specified in the *OpenSSL FIPS 140-2 Security Policy* Version 1.1.2, dated January 29, 2008. Appendix B of the OpenSSL Security Policy specifies the complete set of source files of this module. There are no additions, deletions or alterations of this set as used during module build. All source files, including the specified OpenSSL distribution tar file, are verified as specified in Appendix B of the OpenSSL Security Policy. Installation, protection, and initialization must be completed as specified in Appendix C of the OpenSSL Security Policy. That information is available to consumers of the ESMRCV cryptographic module. Any deviation from specified verification, protection, installation and initialization procedures will result in a non FIPS 140-2 compliant module.

Once the software is installed there are no modifications allowed to the OpenSSL or OpenSSH software components. NitroSecurity Linux kernel version 2.6.18.5 is unlikely to be modified.

2.3 Module Ports and Interfaces

The cryptographic module has numerous physical ports and four logical FIPS 140-2 interfaces. The physical ports and logical interfaces are described in Table 2.

Where distinct logical interfaces share the same physical port, communication protocols (such as TCP/IP, and 802.3) and the ESMRCV application rules of operation logically separate and isolate these interfaces from one another.

Table 2. Physical Ports and Logical FIPS 140-2 Interfaces.

<i>Physical Port</i>	<i>Description</i>
Front Panel	
Power On Switch	Power input
Power Off Switch	Power input
Arrow Keys	Control input for the LCD Display
LCD Display	Status output on the LCD Display
Rear Panel	
Management Port 1	Network interface connector for control input, status output, data input and data output. The network interface is an RJ45 copper interface (10/100/1000 megabit). This port may connect to a management browser, external IPS devices, SDEE/RDEP and NPP data sources, and accepts monitored data feeds directed to the embedded Receiver.

Physical Port	Description
Management Port 2	Network interface connector with the functionality similar to Management Port 1. The ESMRCV may use this as an alternate management port. This port may connect to a management browser and external IPS devices. This port does not accept SDEE/RDEP and NPP data or monitored data feeds directed to the embedded Receiver.
VGA Monitor Port	15-pin D-connector for status output.
Serial Port	Not used.
Mouse Port	PS2 Control input from mouse.
Keyboard Port	PS2 Control input from keyboard.
USB 0	Not used.
USB 1	Not used.
Power Input 1	This is not a FIPS 140-2 logical interface. Power (110 / 220 VAC) enters the module via the power input connectors.
Power Input 1 LED	Green indicates power is available to the module via this power connector. Yellow indicates power is not available at this power connector. Unlit indicates no power is connected to this power connector.
Power Input 2	This is not a FIPS 140-2 logical interface. Power (110 / 220 VAC) enters the module via the power input connectors.
Power Input 2 LED	Green indicates power is available to the module via this power connector. Yellow indicates power is not available at this power connector. Unlit indicates no power is connected to this power connector.
UID Switch	Pressing this switch enables the front LED to identify the unit in a rack of devices. This non-security relevant switch is not available on all ESMRCV models.

The FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces correspond to physical ports as described in Table 3.

Table 3. FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces.

Logical Interface	Description
Data input	<p>Data input consists of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> encrypted metadata entering the cryptographic module via Management Port 1 over an SSH connection from NitroGuard IPS devices for the purpose of being analyzed and/or archived. plaintext 3rd party security data including events, flows (NetFlow and sFlow), alerts (firewalls, IPSs, VPNs, etc), host and server log data entering the cryptographic module via Management Port 1 from 3rd party devices on the network for the purpose of analysis and or archiving. plaintext or TLS-encrypted data sent from SDEE / RDEP data sources or Nitro Plugin Protocol data sources via Management Port 1. The Receiver may be configured to accept and decrypt TLS data for the purpose of analysis and or archiving.

<i>Logical Interface</i>	<i>Description</i>
Data output	<p>Data output consists of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • encrypted event analysis (instrumentation) data exiting the cryptographic module via Management Port 1 or Management Port 2 to a browser over an HTTPS connection. • encrypted commands exiting the cryptographic module via Management Port 1 or Management Port 2 over an SSH connection for the purpose of controlling an IPS device. • plaintext analysis data exiting the cryptographic module via Management Port 1 or Management Port 2 over a TCP/IP socket connection for the purpose of being stored in an external storage system. • connection requests sent over Management Port 1 to an SDEE or RDEP data source to set up a TLS connection for handling encrypted data requests or simple unencrypted data requests if the data source is not using encryption.
Control input	<p>Control input consists of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • commands from crypto officers and users entering the module from a browser in encrypted format via Management Port 1 or Management Port 2 over an HTTPS connection. • commands from a master crypto officer entering the module via the keyboard and mouse ports and the arrow keys on the front of the system
Status output	<p>The status output consists of</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FIPS operational status returned from status requests by crypto officers. FIPS operational status is output in encrypted format on the HTTPS (browser) connection. The ESMRCV system properties dialog displays the result of the most recent FIPS self-test. • FIPS error status output automatically in plaintext format to the LCD and on HTTP port 4242 (management ports 1 and 2). <p>The power input LEDs also indicate status of power supplied to the module.</p>

3 Security Functions

The NitroView ESMRCV cryptographic module implements the security functions described in Table 4.

Table 4. Module Security Functions.

<i>Security Function</i>	<i>Purpose or Use</i>	<i>Certificate</i>
Approved Security Functions		
AES (FIPS PUB 197) CBC(e/d; 128)	TLS and SSH encryption and decryption.	668
Triple-DES (FIPS PUB 46.3) (CBC)	Support for ANSI X9.31 PRNG	613

Security Function	Purpose or Use	Certificate
SHA-1 (FIPS PUB 180-2) (BYTE-only)	TLS and SSH signature verification, data integrity	701
HMAC-SHA1	Data integrity and data authentication within SSH	352 (HMAC), 701 (SHS)
RNG (ANSI X9.31 PRNG, Appendix A.2.4)	Key generation	387
RSA (FIPS PUB 186-2) ALG[RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5]; SIG(gen); SIG(ver); 2048, SHS: SHA-1	TLS and SSH key transport, signature verification	310
Allowed Security Functions		
Diffie Hellman (2048 bit key agreement and key establishment methodology). While not approved, it may be used in FIPS mode.	Key agreement within SSH	Vendor Affirmed

4 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation

The Master Crypto Officer must select FIPS mode during initial configuration. Once in FIPS mode the module performs only FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms and security functions. When the module is registered with an ESM that is in FIPS mode, the [IPS] module permanently enters FIPS mode. The module can not register with a NitroView ESM (server) that is not in FIPS mode. The IPS will only communicate with a FIPS approved mode ESM.

In the FIPS approved mode, crypto officers may configure the module for operation within the IT environment and they may make administrative changes. Users may access the module's data encryption and decryption services by using the IPS services via an ESM. The FIPS-validated NitroGuard IPS allows loading software updates in the field, but this operation must not be used as this operation invalidates the module's FIPS evaluated configuration.

The module supports a non-FIPS mode of operation. If during initial configuration the Master Crypto Officer does not enable FIPS mode, the module will not be in FIPS mode and can only communicate with a non-FIPS mode ESM. Non-FIPS mode communication between the IPS and ESM exists and is proprietary.

Approved Methods: HTTPS (TLS 1.0), OpenSSH (using FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms and security functions).

Non-Approved Methods: SNMP V3, OPSEC (Operations Security), plaintext.

4.1 Set-Up and Initialization Procedures

The NitroSecurity Operator Guidance provides the following steps to set up and initialize the module into FIPS mode:

1. Check the packaging and the module, including the two tamper evident seals for signs of tampering. If tampering is detected, contact NitroSecurity Support for instructions. Place the third tamper-evident seal so it covers the USB ports. Place the fourth tamper-evident seal so it covers the serial interface. These seals can be found in the package of accessories included in the shipping container.
2. Power up the module.
3. After the module boots up, configure the ESMRCV network interface by following the instructions in the *NitroSecurity Installation and Setup Guide* section "Configuring the Network Interface on the ESM".
4. Use a browser to log into the ESMRCV following the instructions in the *NitroSecurity Installation and Setup Guide* section "Logging Into NitroView". Change the default password as instructed.

5. When the module prompts to choose FIPS approved mode or non-approved mode, choose FIPS approved mode. The module configures itself for permanent operation in FIPS approved mode.
6. To verify FIPS mode use the NitroView ESM GUI. The bottom 'status' bar indicates that the module is in FIPS mode (shows version / date and "FIPS Enabled"). Using the GUI, select a single device go to device properties, click the FIPS button – runs the FIPS self test and outputs the FIPS status
 - a. Additionally, the master crypto officer is able to see the FIPS status when they authenticate to cryptographic module's console. The FIPS status can be observed when the crypto officer selects the command line option number 3 to determine whether the cryptographic module is in a FIPS approved mode of operation.

At this point the ESMRCV is fully configured. The embedded Receiver is already registered with the ESMRCV for management purposes. You may proceed to establish communications with managed IPS devices by using the ESMRCV management interface to key those devices.

If at any point the system unexpectedly stops operating, check for an error condition through the HTTP interface by viewing the NitroView ESMRCV FIPS Status web page at <http://ipaddress:4242>. If the error condition "0", a single ASCII zero, is displayed, reboot the system to try and correct the problem. If the Test Failed condition persists, contact NitroSecurity Support for further instructions. If the FIPS Status web page returns a single "1", a single ASCII one, then the module is in proper FIPS operating condition.

If you are instructed to return the system to the factory, be sure to zeroize the encryption keys by giving the "Prepare box for RMA" command on the console. After zeroization is complete you can return the system to NitroSecurity.

5 Identification and Authentication

The module supports two crypto officer roles, user roles and a network user role. See section [\[7 Roles and Services\]](#) for more information about these roles.

Multiple concurrent role-based sessions (crypto officer and user roles) are allowed. The module's "System Administrator", which always has the master crypto officer role, is the only user that can give or revoke a user's crypto officer role, and can do so at any time, even during a user's session after the user has authenticated. Separation of roles is achieved by first requiring authentication before granting access to services offered to a particular role. The software then programmatically separates roles and services during module use by providing role-specific services to the specific authenticated role. The software programmatically separates concurrent sessions within a role through the use of atomic operations for all operations that change configuration data. The event logging system records all access to the system and associates all configuration changes with the identity of the session making the change. Roles cannot be changed while authenticated to the module.

Network users consist of network devices sending logs, events and other data feeds to the Receiver subsystem.

The module does not display any authentication data entered into the module. Access to the authorized roles is restricted as explained in Table 5:

Table 5. Roles and Required Identification and Authentication.

<i>Role</i>	<i>Type of Authentication</i>	<i>Authentication Data</i>
Master Crypto Officer	Identity-based	Master Crypto Officer Role-based A master crypto officer authenticates by entering a username and a password at the console. Start-up and other operations using the LCD and front panel arrow controls are unauthenticated.
Crypto Officer	Identity-based	A crypto officer authenticates by entering a user name and a password.

<i>Role</i>	<i>Type of Authentication</i>	<i>Authentication Data</i>
User	Identity-based	A user authenticates by entering a user name and a password.
Network User	None	Network users are unauthenticated.

The strength of the operator authentication, per the above roles, is as follows in Table 6:

Table 6. Strength of Authentication.

<i>Authentication Mechanism</i>	<i>Strength of Mechanism</i>
Password	<p>"The master crypto officer, crypto officers, and users authenticate using a minimum 8 ASCII-character (Decimal values between 33 and 126, inclusive) password that must include all of the following: one upper case character (A-Z), one digit (0-9), and one special character (printable characters excluding space and alphanumerics, 32 choices). This yields a minimum of 61.1E+12, over 61 trillion, possible combinations; thus, the possibility of correctly guessing a password is less than 1 in 1,000,000..</p> <p>The possibility of randomly guessing a password in 60 seconds is less than 1 in 100,000. The system allows no more than 6,000 login attempts per minute. Combine this fact with a one in 61 trillion possibility of guessing a password to compute only a 1 in 10.2E+9, over 10 billion, possibility of guessing a password in one minute."</p>

When the cryptographic module is powered off and subsequently powered on, the results of previous authentications (the authentication states of sessions) are cleared from memory. When the module is powered up again, operators must re-authenticate, entering the correct user name and password.

6 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs

The following table identifies the Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) used within the module. Cryptographic keys and CSPs are never output from the module in plaintext. An Approved key generation method is used to generate keys that are generated on the module. Cryptographic keys in the section of the table labeled Other Cryptographic Keys are not considered CSPs as they are public keys.

Table 7. Cryptographic Keys and CSPs.

<i>Data Item</i>	<i>Description</i>
HTTPS Private Key	RSA 2048-bit private key used for the symmetric key wrapping in the Web administration interface (TLS). The key is generated by the FIPS validated RNG (certificate # 387) at intervals defined by the organization's security policy, or the master crypto officer can import a validated key (pair). The key is stored in unencrypted format on an unencrypted disk partition. The key is zeroized according to DoD 5220.22-M ¹ on a rekey or when returning the module to the manufacturer for repair or replacement.

¹ <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/522022m.htm>

Data Item	Description
Default ESM SSH Private Key	RSA 2048-bit private key used for the transfer of key material in the SSH protocol. The key is generated off the module and is stored in unencrypted form in the file system on an unencrypted disk partition. After module initialization, this key is maintained on the module for initial authentication with new devices added to the system.
Active ESM SSH Private Key	RSA 2048-bit private key used for the transfer of key material in the SSH protocol. This key is generated by the FIPS validated RNG (certificate #387) during manufacturing. The key is stored in unencrypted format on an unencrypted disk partition. This key is zeroized according to DoD 5220.22-M when returning the module to the manufacturer for repair or replacement.
Receiver SSH Private Key	RSA 2048-bit private key used for the transfer of key material in the SSH protocol. This key is generated by the FIPS validated RNG (certificate #387) during manufacturing. This key is stored in unencrypted format on an unencrypted disk partition. This key is zeroized according to DoD 5220.22-M when returning the module to the manufacturer for repair or replacement.
NPP TLS Private Key(s)	RSA 2048-bit private key(s) used for symmetric key wrapping if TLS 1.0 communication is configured for use with any NPP data sources. Plaintext (a socket connection) may be configured instead in which case this key does not exist. This key is generated by the FIPS validated RNG (certificate # 387) on starting an encrypted listener the first time. This key is stored in unencrypted format on an unencrypted disk partition. This key is zeroized according to DoD 5220.22-M[1] when returning the module to the manufacturer for repair or replacement.
TLS AES Encryption Keys	AES 128-bit ephemeral symmetric key used for encrypting and decrypting TLS sessions for the Web administration interface. This key is generated using a FIPS approved RNG (certificate # 387). The key is deleted from memory after use.
SSH AES Encryption Keys	AES 128-bit ephemeral symmetric key used for encrypting and decrypting SSH sessions with IPS and Receiver devices. This key is produced using DH key agreement. The key is deleted from memory after use.
Diffie-Hellman Keys	Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public and private parameters used for key agreement to provide SSH AES Encryption Keys. These key parameters are deleted from memory after use.
HMAC Key	The ephemeral HMAC key is used within the SSH protocol for data authentication purposes. It is generated as specified in the SSH protocol specification ² (using OpenSSH). This key is deleted from memory after use.
Default Crypto Officer Password	An 11-character password used by crypto officers to authenticate to the Web Administration interface for module initialization purposes only. As soon as the master crypto officer logs in using this password, the module forces the master crypto officer to set another password. An obfuscated, non-human readable but not encrypted, version of the password is stored in the file system on an unencrypted disk partition.

² <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4252.txt>

Data Item	Description
Master Crypto Officer Password	A minimum 8-character password used by the master crypto officer to authenticate to the Web Administration interface. The master crypto officer sets his or her own password that is associated with the user name NGCP. An obfuscated, non-human readable but not encrypted, version of the password is stored in the file system. The limited operating environment does not provide access to operating system services to access the obfuscated password data. This password is zeroized according to DoD 5220.22-M when returning the module to the manufacturer for repair or replacement.
Crypto Officer Passwords	A minimum 8-character password used by crypto officers to authenticate to the Web Administration interface. Each crypto officer has his or her own password that is associated with a user name. An obfuscated, non-human readable but not encrypted, version of the password is stored in the file system. The limited operating environment does not provide access to operating system services to access the obfuscated password data. These passwords are zeroized according to DoD 5220.22-M when returning the module to the manufacturer for repair or replacement.
User Passwords	A minimum 8-character password used by operators to authenticate to the Web Administration interface. Each operator has his or her own password that is associated with a user name. An obfuscated, non-human readable but not encrypted, version of the password is stored in the file system. The limited operating environment does not provide access to operating system services to access the obfuscated password data. These passwords are zeroized according to DoD 5220.22-M when returning the module to the manufacturer for repair or replacement.
Seed Key	Triple Des 168 bit seed key used to initialize the ANSI X9.31 Pseudo RNG which is used to generate other cryptographic keys.
RNG Seed	OpenSSL uses /dev/random as a source of random numbers. The Linux kernel initializes this pseudo device at system startup. /dev/random guarantees a high degree of entropy and blocks until it has the proper level of entropy. The FIPS-validated version of OpenSSL performs continual tests on the random numbers it uses.
Other Cryptographic Keys	
HTTPS Public Key	<p>This RSA 2048-bit public key corresponds to the HTTPS Private Key described above.</p> <p>This public key is output from the module in plaintext form as it is used for the transfer of key material in the SSH protocol. This key is generated by the FIPS validated RNG (certificate #387) at intervals defined by the organization's security policy, or the master crypto officer can import a validated key (pair). The key is stored in unencrypted format on an unencrypted disk partition. The public key is maintained in a self signed certificate by default, but may be signed by a certificate authority if a key pair is imported. This key is zeroized according to DoD 5220.22-M when returning the module to the manufacturer for repair or replacement.</p>

Data Item	Description
Default ESM SSH Public Key	<p>This RSA 2048-bit public key corresponds to the Default SSH Private Key described above.</p> <p>RSA 2048-bit public key used for the transfer of key material in the SSH protocol. This key is generated off the module and is stored in unencrypted form in the file system on an unencrypted disk partition. After module initialization, this key are maintained on the module for initial authentication with new devices added to the system.</p>
Active ESM SSH Public Key	<p>This RSA 2048-bit public key corresponds to the Active SSH Private Key described above.</p> <p>RSA 2048-bit public key used for the transfer of key material in the SSH protocol. This key is generated by the FIPS validated RNG (certificate #387) during manufacturing. The key is stored in unencrypted format on an unencrypted disk partition. This key is zeroized according to DoD 5220.22-M when returning the module to the manufacturer for repair or replacement.</p>
Receiver SSH Public Key	<p>This RSA 2048-bit public key corresponds to the Receiver SSH Private Key described above.</p> <p>RSA 2048-bit public key used for the transfer of key material in the SSH protocol. This key is generated by the FIPS validated RNG (certificate #387) during manufacturing. The key is stored in unencrypted format on an unencrypted disk partition. This key is zeroized according to DoD 5220.22-M when returning the module to the manufacturer for repair or replacement.</p>
NPP TLS Public Key(s)	<p>This RSA 2048-bit public key corresponds to the NPP TLS Private Key described above.</p> <p>RSA 2048-bit public key(s) used for symmetric key wrapping if TLS 1.0 communication is configured for use with any NPP data sources. Plaintext (a socket connection) may be configured instead in which case this key does not exist. This key is generated by the FIPS validated RNG (certificate # 387) on starting an encrypted listener the first time. This key is stored in unencrypted format on an unencrypted disk partition. The public key is maintained in a self-signed certificate. This key is zeroized according to DoD 5220.22-M[1] when returning the module to the manufacturer for repair or replacement.</p>
Software Integrity Public Key	<p>RSA 2048-bit public key used to verify the digital signature of stored hash values used for the software/firmware integrity test. The public key is generated off the module and is maintained in a self signed certificate stored in unencrypted form in the filesystem. This key is zeroized according to DoD 5220.22-M when returning the module to the manufacturer for repair or replacement.</p>

7 Roles and Services

The module supports a master crypto officer role, a crypto officer role and user roles including a network user role that is unauthenticated. The module has a single System Administrator role that is designated as the master crypto officer role and that role has the username NGCP. The System Administrator role has all permissions for the ESMRCV and those permissions cannot be changed. Only the System Administrator can create and modify users and groups. The System Administrator can only give a user the crypto officer role by assigning the user to a group with crypto officer role. Only the System Administrator installs and configures the ESMRCV for operation in the environment and sets the device to operate in FIPS mode. Only the System Administrator maintains the device in FIPS mode by performing rekey operations when needed. Only the System Administrator is allowed to zeroize the module in the event it is returned to the manufacturer for repair

or replacement. It is possible for a crypto officer to perform user operations however the documentation recommends that user accounts be used for non-crypto officer operations.

Users access the device instrumentation over the HTTPS channel and cause the ESMRCV to send commands to IPS devices and the embedded Receiver device, and to receive data from IPS devices and the embedded Receiver device using the encrypted SSH channel.

Some operations cause the ESMRCV to send commands to IPS devices and the embedded Receiver device and receive data from IPS devices and the embedded Receiver device using encrypted SSH channels (i.e. use key material), and these operations do not require a user to have crypto officer role. Any operation that generates, destroys, exports or imports key material requires crypto officer role.

The embedded Receiver subsystem is within the same cryptographic boundary as the ESM subsystem so commands from this ESM to the embedded Receiver over the internal SSH tunnel need not be authenticated. Nevertheless, the embedded Receiver does use certificate based authentication. Crypto officers access the device over the SSH channel, give commands to use the ESMRCV device features, and perform key management operations, all of which are referred to as the “ESMRCV Instrumentation” in table 8 below. The embedded Receiver subsystem considers all commands received over the SSH tunnel to be authenticated crypto officer commands.

The module supports services that are available to users in the various roles. All of the services are described in detail in the module’s user documentation. Table 8 shows the services available to the various roles.

Table 8. Roles and Services

<i>Service</i>	<i>Master Crypto Officer</i>	<i>Crypto Officer</i>	<i>User</i>	<i>Network User</i>
Change password, Console Interface, Initialize ESMRCV, Key ESMRCV, Start system, Zeroize system	●			
Import / export ESMRCV Key, ESMRCV Instrumentation, Reboot system, Rekey ESMRCV, Shutdown system	●	●		
Register devices with the module	●	●		
Create and modify users and groups	●			
SSH rekey after each hour of operation	●	●		
Open / Close / accept SSH connection to / from an IPS or embedded Receiver / ESMRCV.	●			
Add and remove ESMRCV devices	●	●		
Run the FIPS self test	●	●		
Start, stop and control event and flow collection services	●	●	●	
Send user data (including alerts, events, logs, and NetFlows and similar data feeds) to the ESMRCV.				●

<i>Service</i>	<i>Master Crypto Officer</i>	<i>Crypto Officer</i>	<i>User</i>	<i>Network User</i>
Configure network data feeds including logs, events, flows, and NPP and SDEE / RDEP data sources.	●	●		
Accept connection from NPP data source	●			
Connect to TLS SDEE or RDEP data source	●			
First start of each encrypted listener	●			
Access web interface, Logout of web interface		●	●	
Authenticate to Web or Console Interface	●	●		
Any RNG function	●			

Importing Device keys is available as part of the (device) registration process. Each / any IPS or Receiver must register with an ESM before communications can begin between the devices. This registration is performed by exchanging 'key' information. A unique key is assigned to a device for the purpose of identifying a 'valid' device to be registered. Once an IPS is added, it is very important to key the device. Keying the device enables the ESM to communicate with the IPS and ensures added security by ignoring all outside sources of communication.

Note: A key exported from a non-FIPS device cannot be imported to a device operating in FIPS mode, nor can a key exported from a FIPS device be imported to a non-FIPS device. If you attempt to perform this action when you are adding a device to the system, the "The file is invalid" error will appear.

This term 'Key' in this manner is not related to encryption keys and refers to device registration keys.

NitroSecurity uses the Linux 'shred' command as the actual 'process' to securely erase disk data following the guidelines under the authority of DoD Directive 5220.22-M for the protection of classified information. NitroSecurity also recommends its customers become familiar with the NIST Special Publication 800-88 (Guidelines for Media Sanitation) to devise an appropriate erasure policy specific to their environment.

The Linux 'shred' command is designed primarily to securely delete files on the system. Using 'shred' overwrites all addressable hard drive locations with a character, its complement, and then a random character, followed by verification. The procedure is completed a number of times and prevents data from being recovered by commercially available processes.

8 Access Control

Table 9 shows services that use or affect cryptographic keys or CSPs. For each service, the key or CSP is indicated along with the type of access.

- R** - The item is read or referenced by the service.
- W** - The item is written or updated by the service.
- E** - The item is executed by the service. (The item is used as part of a cryptographic service.)
- D** - The item is deleted by the service.
- Z** - The item is zeroized (DoD erasure according to DoD 5220.22-M) by the service.

Table 9. Access Control

Key or CSP	Service	Access Control
HTTPS Key Pair	Initialize the system	W, E
	Rekey ESMRCV	D, W, E
	Access Web Interface ³	R, E
	Zeroize the system	Z
TLS AES Encryption Key	Access Web Interface	W, E
	Logout of web interface	D
	Shutdown or Reboot	D
Default ESM SSH key Pair	Register devices with the module	R, E
Active ESM SSH Key Pair	Rekey ESMRCV	W, E
	Open SSH connection to an IPS or embedded Receiver	R, E
	Import Key	W
	Export Key	R
	Zeroize the system	Z
SSH AES Encryption Key	Open SSH connection to an ESMRCV	W, E
	SSH rekey after each hour of operation	D, W, E
	Close SSH connection	D
	Shutdown or Reboot	D
Integrity Public Key	Start the system or do a FIPS self-test	E
	Zeroize the system	Z
Active Receiver SSH Key Pair	Rekey ESMRCV	W, E
	Accept SSH connection from an ESM	R, E
	Zeroize the system	Z
NPP TLS Key Pair(s)	First start of each encrypted listener	W
	Accept connection from NPP data source	R, E
	Zeroize the system	Z
SDEE and RDEP AES Encryption Keys	Connect to TLS SDEE or RDEP data source	W, E
	Logout of web interface	D
	Shutdown or Reboot	D
HMAC Key	Open SSH connection	W, E
	SSH rekey after each hour of operation	D, W, E
	Close SSH connection	D
	Shutdown or Reboot	D
Crypto Officer Password	Change password	W, D
	Authenticate to Web or Console Interface	R, E
	Zeroize	Z

³ User and crypto officer operations access the web interface.

<i>Key or CSP</i>	<i>Service</i>	<i>Access Control</i>
User Password	Change password	W, D
	Authenticate to Web Interface	R, E
	Zeroize	Z
RNG Seed Key	Any RNG function	W,R,E,D


9 Physical Security

The physical security of the cryptographic module meets FIPS 140-2 level 2 requirements. The cryptographic module consists of production-grade components that include standard passivation techniques (a sealing coat applied over the module's circuitry to protect against environmental or other physical damage). The module meets commercial-grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, shock and vibration.

The module has three tamper-evident seals that are serialized so they can be tracked by the crypto officer. One is placed over the seam where the top removable lid slides forward under the chassis top cover. The second seal is placed over the rear seam between the top cover and the rear panel. The third seal is covering the USB ports on the back of the module. The top cover is removed by sliding it back and then lifting it off. This action breaks both seals, leaving evidence of tampering. The crypto officer guidance directs the crypto officer to periodically inspect the module for signs of tampering such as dents or scratches on the module enclosure or damage to the tamper evident seals. If tampering is detected, the crypto officer is instructed to perform a zeroize command and then to contact NitroSecurity Support for further assistance.

Figure 7 shows how the tamper evident seals are placed over the front and rear seams between the module's removable lid and the module chassis. As shown on Figure 7, tamper evident seals are also placed over the USB connectors to prevent their use. A crypto officer applies a tamper evident seal (provided with the module) over the USB connectors to prevent their use without leaving evidence of tampering. These seals must be inspected in accordance with the organization security policy.

Figure 7. Tamper Evident Seals.



10 Self Tests

The module performs both power-on self test (POST) and conditional self tests to verify the integrity and correct operational functioning of the cryptographic module. If the system fails a self test, it reports status indicating that a failure has occurred and transitions to an error state, blocking all data input, data output and control input via their respective interfaces.

While the module is performing any power on self test or conditional test, software rules within the executable image prevent the module from entering a state where data output via the data output interface is possible.

Anyone with physical access to the module can run the POST on demand by power cycling the module or entering a Reboot command using the keypad. Anyone with logical access to the module, using the GUI, can run the POST on demand by rebooting the device, or just initiating a POST.

Table 10 summarizes the system self tests and conditional tests.

Table 10. Self Tests.

<i>Self Test</i>	<i>Description</i>
<i>Mandatory power-up tests performed at power-up and on demand:</i>	
Cryptographic Algorithm Known Answer Tests	Each cryptographic algorithm (AES, Triple-DES, SHA-1, and RNG) performed by the module, is tested using a "known answer" test to verify the correct operation of the algorithm.
Firmware Integrity Test	The module verifies the RSA 2048 bit digital signatures on SHA-1 hashes of the NitroSecurity Software (Version 8.0.0.20080605 and 8.2.0) to confirm their integrity.
<i>Critical Functions tests performed at power-up:</i>	
None	No security-relevant critical functions tests are performed.
<i>Conditional tests performed, as needed, during operation:</i>	
Pairwise Consistency Tests	The module performs pair wise consistency tests whenever RSA asymmetric keys are generated.
Continuous RNG	16 bits continuous testing is performed during each use of the approved RNG. This test is a "stuck at" test to check the RNG output data for failure to a constant value.

Any self test success or failure messages are output to error log files.

Known answer tests for encryption/decryption or hashing, function by encrypting or hashing a string for which the calculated output is known and stored within the cryptographic module. An encryption or hashing test passes when the freshly calculated output matches the expected (stored) value. A test fails when the calculated output does not match the expected value. For decryption, the test then decrypts the ciphertext encrypted string. A decryption test passes when the freshly calculated output matches the plaintext value. A decryption test fails when the calculated output does not match the plaintext value.

Known answer tests for Random Number Generators function by seeding the RNG with known values and checking that the output matches the pre-calculated value stored within the cryptographic module. The test passes when the freshly generated output matches the pre-calculated value. A test fails when the generated output does not match the pre-calculated value.

Pair wise consistency tests for RSA keys (these keys are used for key transport) use the public key to encrypt a plaintext value. The resulting ciphertext value is compared to the original plaintext value. If the two values are

equal, then the test fails. If the two values differ, the private key is used to decrypt the ciphertext and the resulting value is compared to the original plaintext value. If the two values are not equal, the test fails.

11 Mitigation of Attacks

The cryptographic module is not designed to mitigate specific attacks such as differential power analysis or timing attacks.

12 References

National Institute of Standards and Technology, *FIPS PUB 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*, available at URL: <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp>.

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National Institute of Standards and Technology, *Data Encryption Standard (DES)*, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 46-3, available at URL: <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp>.

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National Institute of Standards and Technology, *Secure Hash Standard (SHS)*, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-1, available at URL: <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp>.