Microsoft Windows

FIPS 140 Validation

Microsoft Windows 10 (Creators Update)
Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile (Creators Update)

Non-Proprietary

Security Policy Document

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<td>March 15, 2018</td>
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<td>Draft sent to NIST CMVP</td>
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<td>February 12, 2018</td>
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1 Introduction

Microsoft Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is a kernel-mode cryptographic module that provides cryptographic services through the Microsoft CNG (Cryptography, Next Generation) API to Windows 10 kernel components.

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library also provides cryptographic provider registration and configuration services to both user and kernel mode components. See Non-Security Relevant Configuration Interfaces for more information.

The relationship between Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library and other components is shown in the following diagram:

1.1 List of Cryptographic Module Binary Executables

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library consists of the following binaries:
The Windows build covered by this validation is:

Version 10.0.15063

1.2 Validated Platforms

The Windows editions covered by this validation are:

- Windows 10 Home Edition (32-bit version)
- Windows 10 Pro Edition (64-bit version)
- Windows 10 Enterprise Edition (64-bit version)
- Windows 10 Education Edition (64-bit version)
- Windows 10 S Edition (64-bit version)
- Windows 10 Mobile
- Microsoft Surface Hub

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library component listed in Section 1.1 was validated using the combination of computers and Windows operating system editions specified in the following table:

<table>
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<th>Computer</th>
<th>Windows 10 Home</th>
<th>Windows 10 Pro</th>
<th>Windows 10 Enterprise</th>
<th>Windows 10 Education</th>
<th>Windows 10 S</th>
<th>Windows 10 Mobile</th>
<th>Surface Hub</th>
<th>Windows 10</th>
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<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Microsoft Surface Pro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Microsoft Surface Book</td>
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<tr>
<td>Microsoft Surface Pro 4</td>
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<td>Microsoft Lumia 950</td>
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¹ Host OS: Windows Server 2016, hardware platform: Surface Pro 4
1.3 Configure Windows to use FIPS-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

Use the FIPS Local/Group Security Policy setting or a Mobile Device Management (MDM) to enable FIPS-Approved mode for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library.

The Windows operating system provides a group (or local) security policy setting, “System cryptography: Use FIPS compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing”.

Consult the MDM documentation for information on how to enable FIPS-Approved mode. The Policy CSP - Cryptography includes the setting AllowFipsAlgorithmPolicy.

Changes to the Approved mode security policy setting do not take effect until the computer has been rebooted.

2 Cryptographic Module Specification

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is a multi-chip standalone module that operates in FIPS-Approved mode during normal operation of the computer and Windows operating system and when Windows is configured to use FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms as described in Configure Windows to use FIPS-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms.

In addition to configuring Windows to use FIPS-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms, third-party applications and drivers installed on the Windows platform must not use any of the non-approved algorithms implemented by this module. Windows will not operate in an Approved mode when the operators chooses to use a non-Approved algorithm or service.

The following configurations and modes of operation will cause Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library to operate in a non-approved mode of operation:

- Boot Windows in Debug mode
- Boot Windows with Driver Signing disabled

2.1 Cryptographic Boundary

The software cryptographic boundary for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is defined as the binary CNG.SYS.
2.2 FIPS 140-2 Approved Algorithms

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library implements the following FIPS-140-2 Approved algorithms:

- FIPS 180-4 SHS SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 (Cert. # 3790)
- FIPS 198-1 SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 HMAC (Cert. # 3061)
- NIST SP 800-67r1 Triple-DES (2 key legacy-use decryption\(^3\) and 3 key encryption/decryption) in ECB, CBC, CFB8 and CFB64 modes (Cert. # 2459)
- FIPS 197 AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in ECB, CBC, CFB8, CFB128, and CTR modes (Cert. # 4624)
- NIST SP 800-38B and SP 800-38C AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in CCM and CMAC modes (Cert. # 4624)
- NIST SP 800-38D AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 GCM decryption and GMAC (Cert. # 4624)
- NIST SP 800-38E XTS-AES XTS-128 and XTS-256 (Cert. # 4624)\(^4\)
- FIPS 186-4 RSA (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS) digital signature generation and verification with 2048 and 3072 moduli; supporting SHA-1\(^5\), SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 (Certs. # 2521)
- FIPS 186-4 RSA key-pair generation with 2048 and 3072 moduli (Cert. # 2521)
- FIPS 186-4 ECDSA key pair generation and verification, signature generation and verification with the following NIST curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 (Cert. # 1133)
- FIPS 186-4 DSA PQG generation and verification, signature generation and verification (Cert. # 1223)\(^6\).
- KAS – SP 800-56A Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement; Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) with parameter FB (p=2048, q=224) and FC (p=2048, q=256); key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength (Cert. # 127)
- KAS – SP 800-56A EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement; Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) with parameter EC (P-256 w/ SHA-256), ED (P-384 w/ SHA-384), and EE (P-521 w/ SHA-512); key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256-bits of encryption strength (Cert. # 127)
- NIST SP 800-56B RSADP mod 2048 (Cert. # 1281)
- NIST SP 800-90A AES-256 counter mode DRBG (Cert. # 1555)
- NIST SP 800-108 Key Derivation Function (KDF) CMAC-AES (128, 192, 256), HMAC (SHA1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) (Cert. # 140)
- NIST SP 800-132 KDF (also known as PBKDF) with HMAC (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) as the pseudo-random function (vendor affirmed)
- NIST SP 800-38F AES Key Wrapping (128, 192, and 256) (Cert. # 4626)

---

\(^2\) This module may not use some of the capabilities described in each CAVP certificate.

\(^3\) Two-key Triple-DES Decryption is only allowed for Legacy-usage (as per SP 800-131A). The use of two-key Triple-DES Encryption is disallowed. The caller is responsible for using the key for up to \(2^{32}\) encryptions for IETF protocols and \(2^{26}\) encryptions for any other use.

\(^4\) AES XTS must be used only to protect data at rest and the caller needs to ensure that the length of data encrypted does not exceed \(2^{20}\) AES blocks.

\(^5\) SHA-1 is only acceptable for legacy signature verification.

\(^6\) The DSA functions of signature generation/verification are not supported by this module. DSA functions are not provided as a service, but parts of the DSA algorithm are required as a prerequisite to the KAS FFC implementation contained in this module, which is why DSA is listed here.
• NIST SP 800-135 IKEv1 and IKEv2 KDF primitives (Cert. # 1278)\(^7\)
• NIST SP 800-135 TLS primitive (Cert. # 1278)\(^8\)

2.3 Non-Approved Algorithms

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library implements the following non-approved algorithms:

- A non-deterministic random number generator (NDRNG) that is not a FIPS Approved algorithm but is allowed by FIPS 140. The NDRNG provides entropy input to the DRBG.
- SHA-1 hash, which is disallowed for use in digital signature generation. It can be used for legacy digital signature verification. Its use is Acceptable for non-digital signature generation applications.
- RSA 1024-bits for digital signature generation, which is disallowed.
- NIST SP 800-56A Key Agreement using Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) with parameter FA (p=1024, q=160). The key establishment methodology provides 80 bits of encryption strength instead of the Approved 112 bits of encryption strength listed above.
- If HMAC-SHA1 is used, key sizes less than 112 bits (14 bytes) are not allowed for usage in HMAC generation, as per SP 800-131A.
- MD5 and HMAC-MD5 - allowed for TLS and EAP-TLS
- RC2, RC4, MD2, MD4 (disallowed in FIPS mode)
- 2-Key Triple-DES Encryption, which is disallowed for usage altogether as of the end of 2015.
- DES in ECB, CBC, CFB8 and CFB64 modes (disallowed in FIPS mode)
- Legacy CAPI KDF (proprietary; disallowed in FIPS mode)
- RSA encrypt/decrypt (disallowed in FIPS mode)
- IEEE 1619-2007 XTS-AES, XTS-128 and XTS-256
- NIST SP 800-38D AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 GCM encryption
- ECDH with the following curves that are allowed in FIPS mode as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.2

<table>
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<th>Security Strength (bits)</th>
<th>Allowed in FIPS mode</th>
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\(^7\) This cryptographic module supports the IKEv1 and IKEv2 protocols with SP 800-135 rev 1 KDF primitives, however, the protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the NIST CAVP and CMVP.

\(^8\) This cryptographic module supports the TLS protocol with SP 800-135 rev 1 KDF primitive, however, the protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the NIST CAVP and CMVP.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Curve</th>
<th>Security Strength (bits)</th>
<th>Allowed in FIPS mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nistP192</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>nistP224</td>
<td>112</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>numsP256t1</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>numsP384t1</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>numsP512t1</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secP160k1</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secP160r1</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secP160r2</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secP192k1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>secP192r1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>secP224k1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>112</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secP256k1</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secP256r1</td>
<td>128</td>
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<td>secP384r1</td>
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<td>wtls12</td>
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<td>120</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x962P256v1</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.4 FIPS 140-2 Approved Algorithms from Bounded Modules

A bounded module is a FIPS 140 module which provides cryptographic functionality that is relied on by a downstream module. As described in the Integrity Chain of Trust section, Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library depends on the following modules and algorithms:

**Implemented in the Windows OS Loader (module certificate #3090):**

- CAVP certificate #2523 for FIPS 186-4 RSA PKCS#1 (v1.5) digital signature verification with 2048 moduli; supporting SHA-256
- CAVP certificate #3790 for FIPS 180-4 SHS SHA-256

**Implemented in Windows Resume (module certificate #3091):**

- CAVP certificate #4624 for FIPS 197 AES CBC 128 and 256, SP 800-38E AES XTS 128 and 256
2.5 **Cryptographic Bypass**

Cryptographic bypass is not supported by Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library.

2.6 **Hardware Components of the Cryptographic Module**

The physical boundary of the module is the physical boundary of the computer that contains the module. The following diagram illustrates the hardware components of the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library module:

![Diagram of hardware components](image)

3 **Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces**

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library module implements a set of algorithm providers for the Cryptography Next Generation (CNG) framework in Windows. Each provider in this module represents a single cryptographic algorithm or a set of closely related cryptographic algorithms. These algorithm providers are invoked through the CNG algorithm primitive functions, which are sometimes collectively referred to as the CNG API. For a full list of these algorithm providers, see [https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa375534.aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa375534.aspx)

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library module is accessed through one of the following logical interfaces:

2. Entropy sources supply random bits to the random number generator through the entropy interfaces.
3.1 CNG Primitive Functions

The following security-relevant functions are exported by Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library:

- BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider
- BCryptCreateHash
- BCryptCreateMultiHash
- BCryptDecrypt
- BCryptDeriveKey
- BCryptDeriveKeyPBKDF2
- BCryptDestroyHash
- BCryptDestroyKey
- BCryptDestroySecret
- BCryptDuplicateHash
- BCryptDuplicateKey
- BCryptEncrypt
- BCryptExportKey
- BCryptFinalizeKeyPair
- BCryptFinishHash
- BCryptFreeBuffer
- BCryptGenerateKeyPair
- BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey
- BCryptGenRandom
- BCryptGetProperty
- BCryptHash
- BCryptHashData
- BCryptImportKey
- BCryptImportKeyPair
- BCryptKeyDerivation
- BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider
- BCryptProcessMultiOperations
- BCryptSecretAgreement
- BCryptSetProperty
- BCryptSignHash
- BCryptVerifySignature
- SystemPrng
- EntropyPoolTriggerReseedForIum
- EntropyProvideData
- EntropyRegisterSource
- EntropyUnregisterSource

All of these functions are used in the approved mode. Furthermore, these are the only approved functions that this module can perform.

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library has additional export functions described in Non-Security Relevant Configuration Interfaces.
3.1.1 Algorithm Providers and Properties

3.1.1.1 BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE   *phAlgorithm,
    LPCWSTR pszAlgId,
    LPCWSTR pszImplementation,
    ULONG   dwFlags);

The BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider() function has four parameters: algorithm handle output to the opened algorithm provider, desired algorithm ID input, an optional specific provider name input, and optional flags. This function loads and initializes a CNG provider for a given algorithm, and returns a handle to the opened algorithm provider on success.

Unless the calling function specifies the name of the provider, the default provider is used.

The calling function must pass the BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE_HMAC_FLAG flag in order to use an HMAC function with a hash algorithm.

3.1.1.2 BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE   hAlgorithm,
    ULONG   dwFlags);

This function closes an algorithm provider handle opened by a call to BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider() function.

3.1.1.3 BCryptSetProperty

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptSetProperty(
    BCRYPT_HANDLE   hObject,
    LPCWSTR pszProperty,
    PUCHAR   pbInput,
    ULONG   cbInput,
    ULONG   dwFlags);

The BCryptSetProperty() function sets the value of a named property for a CNG object. The CNG object is a handle, the property name is a NULL terminated string, and the value of the property is a length-specified byte string.

3.1.1.4 BCryptGetProperty

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptGetProperty(
    BCRYPT_HANDLE   hObject,
    LPCWSTR pszProperty,
    PUCHAR   pbOutput,
    ULONG   cbOutput,
    ULONG   dwFlags);
The BCryptGetProperty() function retrieves the value of a named property for a CNG object. The CNG object is a handle, the property name is a NULL terminated string, and the value of the property is a length-specified byte string.

3.1.1.5 BCryptFreeBuffer
VOID WINAPI BCryptFreeBuffer(
    PVOID pvBuffer);
Some of the CNG functions allocate memory on caller's behalf. The BCryptFreeBuffer() function frees memory that was allocated by such a CNG function.

3.1.2 Random Number Generation

3.1.2.1 BCryptGenRandom
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptGenRandom(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
    PUCHAR pbBuffer,
    ULONG cbBuffer,
    ULONG dwFlags);
The BCryptGenRandom() function fills a buffer with random bytes. The random number generation algorithm is:

- BCRYPT_RNG_ALGORITHM. This is the AES-256 counter mode based random generator as defined in SP 800-90A.

This function is a wrapper for SystemPrng.

3.1.2.2 SystemPrng
BOOL SystemPrng(
    unsigned char *pbRandomData,
    size_t cbRandomData);
The SystemPrng() function fills a buffer with random bytes generated from output of NIST SP 800-90A AES-256 counter mode based DRBG seeded from the Windows entropy pool. The Windows entropy pool is populated from the following sources:

- An initial entropy value provided by the Windows OS Loader at boot time.
- The values of the high-resolution CPU cycle counter at times when hardware interrupts are received.
- Random values gathered from the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), if one is available on the system.
- Random values gathered by calling the RDRAND CPU instruction, if supported by the CPU.

The Windows DRBG infrastructure located in cng.sys continues to gather entropy from these sources during normal operation, and the DRBG cascade is periodically reseeded with new entropy.
3.1.2.3 EntropyRegisterSource

NTSTATUS EntropyRegisterSource(
    ENTROPY_SOURCE_HANDLE * phEntropySource,
    ENTROPY_SOURCE_TYPE     entropySourceType,
    PCWSTR                 entropySourceName );

This function is used to obtain a handle that can be used to contribute randomness to the Windows entropy pool. The handle is returned in the phEntropySource parameter. For this function, entropySource must be set to ENTROPY_SOURCE_TYPE_HIGH_PUSH, and entropySourceName must be a Unicode string describing the entropy source.

3.1.2.4 EntropyUnregisterSource

NTSTATUS EntropyUnregisterSource(
    ENTROPY_SOURCE_HANDLE hEntropySource);

This function is used to destroy a handle created with EntropyRegisterSource().

3.1.2.5 EntropyProvideData

NTSTATUS EntropyProvideData(
    ENTROPY_SOURCE_HANDLE   hEntropySource,
    PCBYTE                pbData,
    SIZE_T                 cbData,
    ULONG                  entropyEstimateInMilliBits );

This function is used to contribute entropy to the Windows entropy pool. hEntropySource must be a handle returned by an earlier call to EntropyRegisterSource. The caller provides cbData bytes in the buffer pointed to by pbData, as well as an estimate (in the entropyEstimateInMilliBits parameter) of how many millibits of entropy are contained in these bytes.

3.1.2.6 EntropyPoolTriggerReseedForIum

VOID EntropyPoolTriggerReseedForIum(BOOLEAN fPerformCallbacks);

This function will trigger a kernel DRBG reseed for the cng.sys inside the IUM (Isolated User Mode) environment. If called inside the IUM environment, it triggers a reseed from one or more of the entropy pools of the system. If called inside the normal world (non-IUM) environment, this function does nothing.

3.1.3 Key and Key-Pair Generation

3.1.3.1 BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE   hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   *phKey,
    P UCHAR              pbKeyObject,
    ULONG                cbKeyObject,
    P UCHAR              pbSecret,
    ULONG                cbSecret,
The BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey() function generates a symmetric key object directly from a DRBG for use with a symmetric encryption algorithm or key derivation algorithm from a supplied key value. The calling application must specify a handle to the algorithm provider created with the BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider() function. The algorithm specified when the provider was created must support symmetric key encryption or key derivation.

3.1.3.2  BCryptGenerateKeyPair

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptGenerateKeyPair(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE   hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   *phKey,
    ULONG   dwLength,
    ULONG   dwFlags);

The BCryptGenerateKeyPair() function creates an empty public/private key pair. After creating a key using this function, call the BCryptSetProperty() function to set its properties. The key pair can be used only after BCryptFinalizeKeyPair() function is called.

3.1.3.3  BCryptFinalizeKeyPair

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptFinalizeKeyPair(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hKey,
    ULONG   dwFlags);

The BCryptFinalizeKeyPair() function completes a public/private key pair import or generation directly from the output of a DRBG. The key pair cannot be used until this function has been called. After this function has been called, the BCryptSetProperty() function can no longer be used for this key.

3.1.3.4  BCryptDuplicateKey

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDuplicateKey(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hKey,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   *phNewKey,
    UCHAR   pbKeyObject,
    ULONG   cbKeyObject,
    ULONG   dwFlags);

The BCryptDuplicateKey() function creates a duplicate of a symmetric key.

3.1.3.5  BCryptDestroyKey

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDestroyKey(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hKey);

The BCryptDestroyKey() function destroys the specified key.

3.1.4  Key Entry and Output

3.1.4.1  BCryptImportKey

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptImportKey(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
The BCryptImportKey() function imports a symmetric key from a key blob.

### 3.1.4.2 BCryptImportKeyPair

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptImportKeyPair(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hImportKey,
    LPCWSTR pszBlobType,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE *phKey,
    PUCHAR   pbInput,
    ULONG   cbInput,
    ULONG   dwFlags);
```

The BCryptImportKeyPair() function is used to import a public/private key pair from a key blob.

### 3.1.4.3 BCryptExportKey

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptExportKey(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hExportKey,
    LPCWSTR pszBlobType,
    PUCHAR   pbOutput,
    ULONG   cbOutput,
    ULONG   *pcbResult,
    ULONG   dwFlags);
```

The BCryptExportKey() function exports a key to a memory blob that can be persisted for later use.

### 3.1.5 Encryption and Decryption

#### 3.1.5.1 BCryptEncrypt

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptEncrypt(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey,
    PUCHAR   pbInput,
    ULONG   cbInput,
    VOID    *pPaddingInfo,
    PUCHAR   pbIV,
```
The BCryptEncrypt() function encrypts a block of data of given length.

3.1.5.2 BCryptDecrypt

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDecrypt(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hKey,
    PUCHAR   pbInput,
    ULONG   cbInput,
    VOID    *pPaddingInfo,
    PUCHAR   pbIV,
    ULONG   cbIV,
    PUCHAR   pbOutput,
    ULONG   cbOutput,
    ULONG   *pcbResult,
    ULONG   dwFlags);

The BCryptDecrypt() function decrypts a block of data of given length.

3.1.6 Hashing and Message Authentication

3.1.6.1 BCryptCreateHash

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptCreateHash(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE   hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE  *phHash,
    PUCHAR   pbHashObject,
    ULONG   cbHashObject,
    PUCHAR   pbSecret,
    ULONG   cbSecret,
    ULONG   dwFlags);

The BCryptCreateHash() function creates a hash object with an optional key. The optional key is used for HMAC, AES GMAC and AES CMAC.

3.1.6.2 BCryptHashData

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptHashData(
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE   hHash,
    PUCHAR   pbInput,
    ULONG   cbInput,
    ULONG   dwFlags);
The BCryptHashData() function performs a one way hash on a data buffer. Call the BCryptFinishHash() function to finalize the hashing operation to get the hash result.

3.1.6.3 **BCryptDuplicateHash**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDuplicateHash(
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE  hHash,
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE  *phNewHash,
   PUCHAR   pbHashObject,
    ULONG   cbHashObject,
    ULONG   dwFlags);
```

The BCryptDuplicateHash() function duplicates an existing hash object. The duplicate hash object contains all state and data that was hashed to the point of duplication.

3.1.6.4 **BCryptFinishHash**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptFinishHash(
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE hHash,
    PUCHAR   pbOutput,
    ULONG   cbOutput,
    ULONG   dwFlags);
```

The BCryptFinishHash() function retrieves the hash value for the data accumulated from prior calls to BCryptHashData() function.

3.1.6.5 **BCryptDestroyHash**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDestroyHash(
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE  hHash);
```

The BCryptDestroyHash() function destroys a hash object.

3.1.6.6 **BCryptHash**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptHash(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
    PUCHAR pbSecret,
    ULONG cbSecret,
    PUCHAR pbInput,
    ULONG cbInput,
    PUCHAR pbOutput,
    ULONG cbOutput);
```

The function BCryptHash() performs a single hash computation. This is a convenience function that wraps calls to the BCryptCreateHash(), BCryptHashData(), BCryptFinishHash(), and BCryptDestroyHash() functions.

3.1.6.7 **BCryptCreateMultiHash**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptCreateMultiHash(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE *phHash,
```
BCryptCreateMultiHash() is a function that creates a new MultiHash object that is used in parallel hashing to improve performance. The MultiHash object is equivalent to an array of normal (reusable) hash objects.

### 3.1.6.8 BCryptProcessMultiOperations

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptProcessMultiOperations(
    BCRYPT_HANDLE hObject,
    BCRYPT_MULTI_OPERATION_TYPE operationType,
    PVOID pOperations,
    ULONG cbOperations,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The BCryptProcessMultiOperations() function is used to perform multiple operations on a single multi-object handle such as a MultiHash object handle. If any of the operations fail, then the function will return an error.

Each element of the operations array specifies an operation to be performed on/with the hObject.

For hash operations, there are two operation types:

- Hash data
- Finalize hash

These correspond directly to BCryptHashData() and BCryptFinishHash(). Each operation specifies an index of the hash object inside the hObject MultiHash object that this operation applies to. Operations are executed in any order or even in parallel, with the sole restriction that the set of operations that specify the same index are all executed in-order.

### 3.1.7 Signing and Verification

#### 3.1.7.1 BCryptSignHash

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptSignHash(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hKey,
    VOID    *pPaddingInfo,
    PUCHAR   pbInput,
    ULONG   cbInput,
    PUCHAR   pbOutput,
    ULONG   cbOutput,
    ULONG   *pcbResult,
    ULONG   *pcbPublicKey
```

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3.1.7.2 BCRYPTSignHash

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCRYPTSignHash(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hKey,
    VOID    *pPaddingInfo,
    PCHAR   pbHash,
    ULONG   cbHash,
    PCHAR   pbSignature,
    ULONG   cbSignature,
    ULONG   dwFlags);

The BCRYPTSignHash() function creates a signature of a hash value. 
Note: this function accepts SHA-1 hashes, which according to NIST SP 800-131A is disallowed for digital signature generation. SHA-1 is currently legacy-use for digital signature verification.

3.1.7.2 BCRYPTVerifySignature

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCRYPTVerifySignature(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hKey,
    VOID    *pPaddingInfo,
    PCHAR   pbHash,
    ULONG   cbHash,
    PCHAR   pbSignature,
    ULONG   cbSignature,
    ULONG   dwFlags);

The BCRYPTVerifySignature() function verifies that the specified signature matches the specified hash. 
Note: this function accepts SHA-1 hashes, which according to NIST SP 800-131A is disallowed for digital signature generation. SHA-1 is currently legacy-use for digital signature verification.

3.1.8 Secret Agreement and Key Derivation

3.1.8.1 BCRYPTSecretAgreement

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCRYPTSecretAgreement(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE       hPrivKey,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE       hPubKey,
    BCRYPT_SECRET_HANDLE   *phAgreedSecret,
    ULONG                   dwFlags);

The BCRYPTSecretAgreement() function creates a secret agreement value from a private and a public key. This function is used with Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithms.

3.1.8.2 BCRYPTDeriveKey

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCRYPTDeriveKey(
    BCRYPT_SECRET_HANDLE hSharedSecret,
    LPCWSTR              pwszKDF,
    BCRYPTBufferDesc     *pParameterList,
    PCHAR pbDerivedKey,
    ULONG                cbDerivedKey,
    ULONG                *pcbResult,
    ULONG                dwFlags);

The BCRYPTDeriveKey() function derives a key from a secret agreement value. 
Note: When supporting a key agreement scheme that requires a nonce, BCRYPTDeriveKey uses whichever nonce is supplied by the caller in the BCRYPTBufferDesc. Examples of the nonce types are found in Section 5.4 of http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar2.pdf
When using a nonce, a random nonce should be used. And then if the random nonce is used, the entropy (amount of randomness) of the nonce and the security strength of the DRBG has to be at least one half of the minimum required bit length of the subgroup order.

For example:

- for KAS FFC, entropy of nonce must be 112 bits for FB, 128 bits for FC.
- for KAS ECC, entropy of the nonce must be 128 bits for EC, 182 for ED, 256 for EF.

### 3.1.8.3 BCryptDestroySecret

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDestroySecret(
    BCRYPT_SECRET_HANDLE   hSecret);
```

The BCryptDestroySecret() function destroys a secret agreement handle that was created by using the BCryptSecretAgreement() function.

### 3.1.8.4 BCryptKeyDerivation

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptKeyDerivation(
    _In_        BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey,
    _In_opt_    BCryptBufferDesc     *pParameterList,
    _Out_writes_bytes_to_(cb DerivedKey, *pcbResult) PUCHAR pb DerivedKey,
    _In_        ULONG                cbDerivedKey,
    _Out_       ULONG                *pcbResult,
    _In_        ULONG                dwFlags);
```

The BCryptKeyDerivation() function executes a Key Derivation Function (KDF) on a key generated with BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey() function. It differs from the BCryptDeriveKey() function in that it does not require a secret agreement step to create a shared secret.

### 3.1.8.5 BCryptDeriveKeyPBKDF2

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDeriveKeyPBKDF2(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hPrf,
    PUCHAR pbPassword,
    ULONG cbPassword,
    PUCHAR pbSalt,
    ULONG cbSalt,
    ULONGLONG cIterations,
    PUCHAR pbDerivedKey,
    ULONG cbDerivedKey,
    ULONG *pcbResult,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The BCryptDeriveKeyPBKDF2() function derives a key from a hash value by using the password based key derivation function as defined by SP 800-132 PBKDF and IETF RFC 2898 (specified as PBKDF2).
3.1.9 Cryptographic Transitions

3.1.9.1 DH and ECDH
Through the year 2010, implementations of DH and ECDH were allowed to have an acceptable bit strength of at least 80 bits of security (for DH at least 1024 bits and for ECDH at least 160 bits). From 2011 through 2013, 80 bits of security strength was considered deprecated, and was disallowed starting January 1, 2014. As of that date, only security strength of at least 112 bits is acceptable. ECDH uses curve sizes of at least 256 bits (that means it has at least 128 bits of security strength), so that is acceptable. However, DH has a range of 1024 to 4096 and that changed to 2048 to 4096 after 2013.

3.1.9.2 SHA-1
From 2011 through 2013, SHA-1 could be used in a deprecated mode for use in digital signature generation. As of Jan. 1, 2014, SHA-1 is no longer allowed for digital signature generation, and it is allowed for legacy use only for digital signature verification.

3.2 Control Input Interface
The Control Input Interface are the functions in Algorithm Providers and Properties. Options for control operations are passed as input parameters to these functions.

3.3 Status Output Interface
The Status Output Interface for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is the return value from each export function in the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library.

3.4 Data Output Interface
The Data Output Interface for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library consists of the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library export functions except for the Control Input Interfaces. Data is returned to the function’s caller via output parameters.

3.5 Data Input Interface
The Data Input Interface for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library consists of the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library export functions except for the Control Input Interfaces. Data and options are passed to the interface as input parameters to the export functions. Data Input is kept separate from Control Input by passing Data Input in separate parameters from Control Input.

3.6 Non-Security Relevant Configuration Interfaces
The following interfaces are not cryptographic functions and are used to configure cryptographic providers on the system. Please see https://msdn.microsoft.com for details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCryptEnumAlgorithms</td>
<td>Enumerates the algorithms for a given set of operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptEnumProviders</td>
<td>Returns a list of CNG providers for a given algorithm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptRegisterConfigChangeNotify</td>
<td>This is deprecated beginning with Windows 10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptResolveProviders</td>
<td>Resolves queries against the set of providers currently registered on the local system and the configuration information specified in the machine and domain configuration tables, returning an ordered list of references to one or more providers matching the specified criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptAddContextFunctionProvider</td>
<td>Adds a cryptographic function provider to the list of providers that are supported by an existing CNG context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptRegisterProvider</td>
<td>Registers a CNG provider.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptUnregisterProvider</td>
<td>Unregisters a CNG provider.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptUnregisterConfigChangeNotify</td>
<td>Removes a CNG configuration change event handler. This API differs slightly between User-Mode and Kernel-Mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptGetFipsAlgorithmMode</td>
<td>Determines whether Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is operating in FIPS mode. Some applications use the value returned by this API to alter their own behavior, such as blocking the use of some SSL versions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CngGetFipsAlgorithmMode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EntropyRegisterCallback</td>
<td>Registers the callback function that will be called in a worker thread after every reseed that the system performs. The callback is merely informational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptQueryProviderRegistration</td>
<td>Retrieves information about a CNG provider.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptEnumRegisteredProviders</td>
<td>Retrieves information about the registered providers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptCreateContext</td>
<td>Creates a new CNG configuration context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptDeleteContext</td>
<td>Deletes an existing CNG configuration context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptEnumContexts</td>
<td>Obtains the identifiers of the contexts in the specified configuration table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptConfigureContext</td>
<td>Sets the configuration information for an existing CNG context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptQueryContextConfiguration</td>
<td>Retrieves the current configuration for the specified CNG context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptAddContextFunction</td>
<td>Adds a cryptographic function to the list of functions that are supported by an existing CNG context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptRemoveContextFunction</td>
<td>Removes a cryptographic function from the list of functions that are supported by an existing CNG context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptEnumContextFunctions</td>
<td>Obtains the cryptographic functions for a context in the specified configuration table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptConfigureContextFunction</td>
<td>Sets the configuration information for the cryptographic function of an existing CNG context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptQueryContextFunctionConfiguration</td>
<td>Obtains the cryptographic function configuration information for an existing CNG context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptEnumContextFunctionProviders</td>
<td>Obtains the providers for the cryptographic functions for a context in the specified configuration table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptSetContextFunctionProperty</td>
<td>Sets the value of a named property or a cryptographic method.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4 Roles, Services and Authentication

4.1 Roles
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is a kernel-mode driver that does not interact with the user through any service therefore the module’s functions are fully automatic and not configurable. FIPS 140 validations define formal “User” and “Cryptographic Officer” roles. Both roles can use any of this module’s services.

4.2 Services
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library services are:

1. Algorithm Providers and Properties – This module provides interfaces to register algorithm providers
2. Random Number Generation
3. Key and Key-Pair Generation
4. Key Entry and Output
5. Encryption and Decryption
6. Hashing and Message Authentication
7. Signing and Verification
8. Secret Agreement and Key Derivation
9. Show Status
10. Self-Tests - The module provides a power-up self-tests service that is automatically executed when the module is loaded into memory. See Self-Tests.
11. Zeroizing Cryptographic Material - See Cryptographic Key Management

4.2.1 Mapping of Services, Algorithms, and Critical Security Parameters
The following table maps the services to their corresponding algorithms and critical security parameters (CSPs).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Algorithms</th>
<th>CSPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algorithm Providers and Properties</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Number Generation</td>
<td>AES-256 CTR DRBG NDRNG (allowed, used to provide entropy to DRBG)</td>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Entropy Input AES-CTR DRBG Seed AES-CTR DRBG V AES-CTR DRBG Key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key and Key-Pair Generation</td>
<td>RSA, DH, ECDH, ECDSA, RC2, RC4,</td>
<td>Symmetric Keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Entry and Output</td>
<td>SP 800-38F AES Key Wrapping (128, 192, and 256)</td>
<td>Symmetric Keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Encryption and Decryption | • Triple-DES with 2 key (encryption disallowed) and 3 key in ECB, CBC, CFB8 and CFB64 modes;  
• AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in ECB, CBC, CFB8, CFB128, and CTR modes;  
• AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in CCM, CMAC, and GMAC modes;  
• AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 GCM decryption;  
• NIST SP XTS-AES XTS-128 and XTS-256;  
• SP 800-56B RSADP mod 2048 (IEEE 1619-2007 XTS-AES, AES GCM encryption, RC2, RC4, RSA, and DES, which cannot be used in FIPS mode) | Symmetric Keys | Asymmetric Public Keys | Asymmetric Private Keys |
| Hashing and Message Authentication | • FIPS 180-4 SHS SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512;  
• FIPS 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 HMAC;  
• AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in CCM, CMAC, and GMAC;  
• MD5 and HMAC-MD5 (allowed in TLS and EAP-TLS);  
• MD2 and MD4 (disallowed in FIPS mode) | Symmetric Keys (for HMAC, AES CCM, AES CMAC, and AES GMAC) | Asymmetric Public Keys | Asymmetric Private Keys |
| Signing and Verification | • FIPS 186-4 RSA (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS) digital signature generation and verification with 2048 and 3072 modulus; supporting SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 | Asymmetric Public Keys | Asymmetric RSA Private Keys | Asymmetric ECDSA Public Keys | Asymmetric ECDSA Private keys |

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9 SHA-1 is only acceptable for legacy signature verification.
4.2.2 Mapping of Services, Export Functions, and Invocations

The following table maps the services to their corresponding export functions and invocations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Export Functions</th>
<th>Invocations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algorithm Providers and Properties</td>
<td>BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider BCryptSetProperty BCryptGetProperty BCryptFreeBuffer</td>
<td>This service is executed whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Number Generation</td>
<td>BcryptGenRandom SystemPrng EntropyRegisterSource EntropyUnregisterSource EntropyProvideData EntropyPoolITriggerReseedForIum</td>
<td>This service is executed whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key and Key-Pair Generation</td>
<td>BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey</td>
<td>This service is executed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptGenerateKeyPair</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptFinalizeKeyPair</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptDuplicateKey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptDestroyKey</td>
<td>whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Entry and Output</td>
<td>BCryptImportKey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptImportKeyPair</td>
<td>This service is executed whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptExportKey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encryption and Decryption</td>
<td>BCryptEncrypt</td>
<td>This service is executed whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptDecrypt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashing and Message Authentication</td>
<td>BCryptCreateHash</td>
<td>This service is executed whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptHashData</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptDuplicateHash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptFinishHash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptDestroyHash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptHash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptCreateMultiHash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptProcessMultiOperations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing and Verification</td>
<td>BCryptSignHash</td>
<td>This service is executed whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptVerifySignature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret Agreement and Key Derivation</td>
<td>BCryptSecretAgreement</td>
<td>This service is executed whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptDeriveKey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptDestroySecret</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptKeyDerivation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptDeriveKeyPBKDF2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show Status</td>
<td>All Exported Functions</td>
<td>This service is executed upon completion of an exported function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Tests</td>
<td>DriverEntry</td>
<td>This service is executed upon startup of this module.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeroizing Cryptographic Material</td>
<td>BCryptDestroyKey</td>
<td>This service is executed whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptDestroySecret</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.2.3 Non-Approved Services

The following table lists other non-security relevant or non-approved APIs exported from the crypto module.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCryptDeriveKeyCapi</td>
<td>Derives a key from a hash value. This function is provided as a helper function to assist in migrating from legacy Cryptography API (CAPI) to CNG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SslDecryptPacket</td>
<td>Supports Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol functionality. These functions are non-approved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SslEncryptPacket</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3 **Authentication**

The module does not provide authentication. Roles are implicitly assumed based on the services that are executed.

5 **Finite State Model**

5.1 **Specification**

The following diagram shows the finite state model for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library:
6 Operational Environment

The operational environment for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is the Windows 10 operating system running on a supported hardware platform.

6.1 Single Operator

The for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is loaded into kernel memory as part of the boot process and before the logon component is initialized. The “single operator” for the module is the Windows Kernel.

6.2 Cryptographic Isolation

In the Windows operating system, all kernel-mode modules, including CNG.SYS, are loaded into the Windows Kernel (ntoskrnl.exe) which executes as a single process. The Windows operating system
environment enforces process isolation from user-mode processes including memory and CPU scheduling between the kernel and user-mode processes.

### 6.3 Integrity Chain of Trust

Modules running in the Windows OS environment provide integrity verification through different mechanisms depending on when the module loads in the OS load sequence and also on the hardware and OS configuration. The following diagrams describe the Integrity Chain of trust for each supported configuration that impacts integrity checks:

![Boot Sequence and Chain of Trust Diagram]

- **UEFI**: Validates when Secure Boot enabled.
- **Boot Manager**: Manages the boot process.
- **Windows OS Loader (WinLoad.elf)**: Loads the Windows OS.
- **Windows Resume (WinResume.elf)**: Resumes the Windows OS.
- **HVLoader.elf**, **SKCL.dll**, **Cl.dll**, **CNG.sys**: Modules loaded during the boot process.
- **TPMEngU.elf**, **DUMPFE.sys**, **BCRYPTPRIMITIV ES.dll**: Additional integrity modules.

Each module is checked for integrity based on the configuration of the hardware and OS. The diagrams illustrate the flow and interactions between these components.
The Windows OS Loader checks the integrity of Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library before it is loaded into ntoskrnl.exe.

Windows binaries include a SHA-256 hash of the binary signed with the 2048 bit Microsoft RSA code-signing key (i.e., the key associated with the Microsoft code-signing certificate). The integrity check uses the public key component of the Microsoft code signing certificate to verify the signed hash of the binary.

7 Cryptographic Key Management

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library crypto module uses the following critical security parameters (CSPs) for FIPS Approved security functions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Relevant Data Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</td>
<td>Keys used for AES or Triple-DES encryption/decryption. Key sizes for AES are 128, 192, and 256 bits, and key sizes for Triple-DES are 192 and 128 bits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC keys</td>
<td>Keys used for HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384, and HMAC-SHA512.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Keys used for the verification of ECDSA digital signatures. Curve sizes are P-256, P-384, and P-521.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Private Keys</td>
<td>Keys used for the calculation of ECDSA digital signatures. Curve sizes are P-256, P-384, and P-521.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Keys used for the verification of RSA digital signatures. Key sizes are 2048 and 3072 bits. These keys can be produced using RSA Key Generation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</td>
<td>Keys used for the calculation of RSA digital signatures. Key sizes are 2048 and 3072 bits. These keys can be produced using RSA Key Generation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Entropy Input</td>
<td>A secret value that is at least 256 bits and maintained internal to the module that provides the entropy material for AES-CTR DRBG output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Seed</td>
<td>A 384 bit secret value maintained internal to the module that provides the seed material for AES-CTR DRBG output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG V</td>
<td>A 128 bit secret value maintained internal to the module</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, NIST SP 800-90A Revision 1, page 49.
that provides the entropy material for AES-CTR DRBG output.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AES-CTR DRBG Key</th>
<th>A 256 bit secret value maintained internal to the module that provides the entropy material for AES-CTR DRBG output.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DH Private and Public values</td>
<td>Private and public values used for Diffie-Hellman key establishment. Key sizes are 2048 to 4096 bits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDH Private and Public values</td>
<td>Private and public values used for EC Diffie-Hellman key establishment. Curve sizes are P-256, P-384, and P-521 and the ones listed in section 2.3.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.1 Access Control Policy

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library crypto module allows controlled access to the security relevant data items contained within it. The following table defines the access that a service has to each. The permissions are categorized as a set of four separate permissions: read (r), write (w), execute (x), delete (d). If no permission is listed, the service has no access to the item.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kernel ModeCryptographic Primitives</th>
<th>Library crypto module</th>
<th>Service Access Policy</th>
<th>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</th>
<th>HMAC keys</th>
<th>Asymmetric ECDSA Public keys</th>
<th>Asymmetric ECDSA Private keys</th>
<th>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</th>
<th>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</th>
<th>DH Public and Private values</th>
<th>ECDH Public and Private values</th>
<th>AES-CTR DRBG Seed, AES-CTR DRBG V, &amp; AES-CTR DRBG key</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algorithm Providers and Properties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</td>
<td>HMAC keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Public keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Private keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</td>
<td>DH Public and Private values</td>
<td>ECDH Public and Private values</td>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Seed, AES-CTR DRBG V, &amp; AES-CTR DRBG key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Number Generation</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</td>
<td>HMAC keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Public keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Private keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</td>
<td>DH Public and Private values</td>
<td>ECDH Public and Private values</td>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Seed, AES-CTR DRBG V, &amp; AES-CTR DRBG key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key and Key-Pair Generation</td>
<td>wd</td>
<td>wd</td>
<td>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</td>
<td>HMAC keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Public keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Private keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</td>
<td>DH Public and Private values</td>
<td>ECDH Public and Private values</td>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Seed, AES-CTR DRBG V, &amp; AES-CTR DRBG key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Entry and Output</td>
<td>rw</td>
<td>rw</td>
<td>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</td>
<td>HMAC keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Public keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Private keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</td>
<td>DH Public and Private values</td>
<td>ECDH Public and Private values</td>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Seed, AES-CTR DRBG V, &amp; AES-CTR DRBG key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encryption and Decryption</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</td>
<td>HMAC keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Public keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Private keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</td>
<td>DH Public and Private values</td>
<td>ECDH Public and Private values</td>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Seed, AES-CTR DRBG V, &amp; AES-CTR DRBG key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashing and Message Authentication</td>
<td>wx</td>
<td></td>
<td>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</td>
<td>HMAC keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Public keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Private keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</td>
<td>DH Public and Private values</td>
<td>ECDH Public and Private values</td>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Seed, AES-CTR DRBG V, &amp; AES-CTR DRBG key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing and Verification</td>
<td>x x x x x x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</td>
<td>HMAC keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Public keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Private keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</td>
<td>DH Public and Private values</td>
<td>ECDH Public and Private values</td>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Seed, AES-CTR DRBG V, &amp; AES-CTR DRBG key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret Agreement and Key Derivation</td>
<td>x x x x x x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</td>
<td>HMAC keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Public keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Private keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</td>
<td>DH Public and Private values</td>
<td>ECDH Public and Private values</td>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Seed, AES-CTR DRBG V, &amp; AES-CTR DRBG key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</td>
<td>HMAC keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Public keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Private keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</td>
<td>DH Public and Private values</td>
<td>ECDH Public and Private values</td>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Seed, AES-CTR DRBG V, &amp; AES-CTR DRBG key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid.
### 7.2 Key Material

When Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is loaded in the Windows 10 operating system kernel, no keys exist within it. A kernel module is responsible for importing keys into Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library or using Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library’s functions to generate keys.

### 7.3 Key Generation

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library can create and use keys for the following algorithms: RSA, DH, ECDH, ECDSA, RC2, RC4, DES, Triple-DES, AES, and HMAC. However, RC2, RC4, and DES cannot be used in FIPS mode.

Random keys can be generated by calling the BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey() and BCryptGenerateKeyPair() functions. Random data generated by the BCryptGenRandom() function is provided to BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey() function to generate symmetric keys. DES, Triple-DES, AES, RSA, ECDSA, DH, and ECDH keys and key-pairs are generated following the techniques given in SP 800-56A_r2 (Section 5.8.1).

Keys generated while not operating in the FIPS mode of operation cannot be used in FIPS mode, and vice versa.

### 7.4 Key Establishment

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library can use FIPS approved Diffie-Hellman key agreement (DH), Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement (ECDH), RSA key transport and manual methods to establish keys. Alternatively, the module can also use Approved KDFs to derive key material from a specified secret value or password.

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library can use the following FIPS Approved key derivation functions (KDF) from the common secret that is established during the execution of DH and ECDH key agreement algorithms:

- **BCRYPT_KDF_SP80056A_CONCAT.** This KDF supports the Concatenation KDF as specified in SP 800-56A (Section 5.8.1).
- **BCRYPT_KDF_HASH.** This KDF supports FIPS approved SP800-56A (Section 5.8), X9.63, and X9.42 key derivation.
- **BCRYPT_KDF_HMAC.** This KDF supports the IPsec IKEv1 key derivation that is non-Approved but is an allowed legacy implementation in FIPS mode when used to establish keys for IKEv1 as per scenario 4 of IG D.8.
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library can use the following FIPS Approved key derivation functions (KDF) from a specified secret or password:

- **BCRYPT_SP80056A_CONCAT_ALGORITHM.** This KDF supports the Concatenation KDF as specified in SP 800-56Ar2 (Section 5.8.1).
- **BCRYPT_SP800108_CTR_HMAC_ALGORITHM.** This KDF supports the counter-mode variant of the KDF specified in SP 800-108 (Section 5.1) with HMAC as the underlying PRF.
- **BCRYPT_PBKDF2_ALGORITHM.** This KDF supports the Password Based Key Derivation Function specified in SP 800-132 (Section 5.3).

In addition the. the proprietary KDF, **BCRYPT_CAPI_KDF_ALGORITHM** is described at https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379916.aspx. This KDF cannot be used in a FIPS approved mode.

### 7.4.1 NIST SP 800-132 Password Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF)

There are two options presented in NIST SP 800-132, pages 8 – 10, that are used to derive the Data Protection Key (DPK) from the Master Key. With the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library, it is up to the caller to select the option to generate/protect the DPK. For example, DPAPI uses option 2a. Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library provides all the building blocks for the caller to select the desired option.

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library supports the following HMAC hash functions as parameters for PBKDF:

- SHA-1 HMAC
- SHA-256 HMAC
- SHA-384 HMAC
- SHA-512 HMAC

Keys derived from passwords, as described in SP 800-132, may only be used for storage applications. In order to run in a FIPS Approved manner, strong passwords must be used and they may only be used for storage applications. The password/passphrase length is enforced by the caller of the PBKDF interfaces when the password/passphrase is created and not by this cryptographic module.14

### 7.4.2 NIST SP 800-38F AES Key Wrapping

As outlined in FIPS 140-2 IG, D.2 and D.9, AES key wrapping serves as a form of key transport, which in turn is a form of key establishment. This implementation of AES key wrapping is in accordance with NIST SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping.

---

14 The probability of guessing a password is determined by its length and complexity, an organization should define a policy for these based based their threat model, such as the example guidance in NIST SP800-63b, Appendix A.
7.5 **Key Entry and Output**

Keys can be both exported and imported out of and into Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library via BCryptExportKey(), BCryptImportKey(), and BCryptImportKeyPair() functions.

Symmetric key entry and output can also be done by exchanging keys using the recipient’s asymmetric public key via BCryptSecretAgreement() and BCryptDeriveKey() functions.

Exporting the RSA private key by supplying a blob type of BCRYPT_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB, BCRYPT_RSAFULLPRIVATE_BLOB, or BCRYPT_RSAPRIVATE_BLOB to BCryptExportKey() is not allowed in FIPS mode.

7.6 **Key Storage**

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library does not provide persistent storage of keys.

7.7 **Key Archival**

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library does not directly archive cryptographic keys. A user may choose to export a cryptographic key (cf. “Key Entry and Output” above), but management of the secure archival of that key is the responsibility of the user. All key copies inside Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library are destroyed and their memory location zeroized after used. It is the caller’s responsibility to maintain the security of keys when the keys are outside Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library.

7.8 **Key Zeroization**

All keys are destroyed and their memory location zeroized when the operator calls BCryptDestroyKey() or BCryptDestroySecret() on that key handle.

8 **Self-Tests**

8.1 **Power-On Self-Tests**

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library module implements Known Answer Test (KAT) functions when the module is loaded into ntoskrnl.exe at boot time and the default driver entry point, DriverEntry, is called.

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library performs the following power-on (startup) self-tests:

- HMAC (SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-512) Known Answer Tests
- Triple-DES encrypt/decrypt ECB Known Answer Tests
- AES-128 encrypt/decrypt ECB Known Answer Tests
- AES-128 encrypt/decrypt CCM Known Answer Tests
- AES-128 encrypt/decrypt CBC Known Answer Tests
- AES-128 CMAC Known Answer Test
- AES-128 encrypt/decrypt GCM Known Answer Tests
- XTS-AES encrypt/decrypt Known Answer Tests
• RSA sign/verify Known Answer Tests using RSA_SHA256_PKCS1 signature generation and verification
• ECDSA sign/verify Known Answer Tests on P256 curve
• DH secret agreement Known Answer Test with 2048-bit key
• ECDH secret agreement Known Answer Test on P256 curve
• SP 800-90A AES-256 counter mode DRBG Known Answer Tests (instantiate, generate and reseed)
• SP 800-108 KDF Known Answer Test
• SP 800-132 PBKDF Known Answer Test
• SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• SP800-135 TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF Known Answer Test
• SP800-135 TLS 1.2 KDF Known Answer Test
• IKE SP800_135 KDF Known Answer Test

In any self-test fails, the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library module does not load, an error code is returned to ntoskrnl.exe, and the computer will fail to boot.

8.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library performs pair-wise consistency checks upon each invocation of RSA, ECDH, and ECDSA key-pair generation and import as defined in FIPS 140-2.

ECDH key usage assurances are performed according to NIST SP 800-56A sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and 5.6.3.

A Continuous Random Number Generator Test (CRNGT) is performed for SP 800-90A AES-256 CTR DRBG per SP800-90A section 11.3.

A CRNGT is performed for the non-approved NDRNG per FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8.

When BCrypt_ENABLE_INCOMPATIBLE_FIPS CHECKS flag (required by policy) is used with BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey, then the XTS-AES Key_1 ≠ Key_2 check is performed in compliance with FIPS 140-2 IG A.9.

If the conditional self-test fails the function returns the status code STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR.

9 Design Assurance
The secure installation, generation, and startup procedures of this cryptographic module are part of the overall operating system secure installation, configuration, and startup procedures for the Windows 10 operating system.

The Windows 10 operating system must be pre-installed on a computer by an OEM, installed by the end-user, by an organization’s IT administrator, or updated from a previous Windows 10 version downloaded from Windows Update.
An inspection of authenticity of the physical medium can be made by following the guidance at this Microsoft web site: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/howtotell/default.aspx

The installed version of Windows 10 must be verified to match the version that was validated. See Appendix A – How to Verify Windows Versions and Digital Signatures for details on how to do this.

For Windows Updates, the client only accepts binaries signed by Microsoft certificates. The Windows Update client only accepts content whose SHA-2 hash matches the SHA-2 hash specified in the metadata. All metadata communication is done over a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) port. Using SSL ensures that the client is communicating with the real server and so prevents a spoof server from sending the client harmful requests. The version and digital signature of new cryptographic module releases must be verified to match the version that was validated. See Appendix A – How to Verify Windows Versions and Digital Signatures for details on how to do this.

10 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The following table lists the mitigations of other attacks for this cryptographic module:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Protected Against</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHA1</td>
<td>Timing Analysis Attack</td>
<td>Constant time implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cache Attack</td>
<td>Memory access pattern is independent of any confidential data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA2</td>
<td>Timing Analysis Attack</td>
<td>Constant time implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cache Attack</td>
<td>Memory access pattern is independent of any confidential data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triple-DES</td>
<td>Timing Analysis Attack</td>
<td>Constant time implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>Timing Analysis Attack</td>
<td>Constant time implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cache Attack</td>
<td>Memory access pattern is independent of any confidential data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Protected against cache attacks only when used with AES NI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11 Security Levels
The security level for each FIPS 140-2 security requirement is given in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Requirement</th>
<th>Security Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic Module Specification</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles, Services, and Authentication</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finite State Model</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Security</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic Key Management</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMI/EMC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Tests</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design Assurance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitigation of Other Attacks</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 Additional Details
For the latest information on Microsoft Windows, check out the Microsoft web site at:

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/windows

For more information about FIPS 140 validations of Microsoft products, please see:

13 Appendix A – How to Verify Windows Versions and Digital Signatures

13.1 How to Verify Windows Versions
The installed version of Windows 10 OEs must be verified to match the version that was validated using the following method:

1. In the Search box type "cmd" and open the Command Prompt desktop app.
2. The command window will open.
3. At the prompt, enter “ver”.
4. The version information will be displayed in a format like this:
   Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.xxxxx]

If the version number reported by the utility matches the expected output, then the installed version has been validated to be correct.

13.2 How to Verify Windows Digital Signatures
After performing a Windows Update that includes changes to a cryptographic module, the digital signature and file version of the binary executable file must be verified. This is done like so:

1. Open a new window in Windows Explorer.
2. Type “C:\Windows\” in the file path field at the top of the window.
3. Type the cryptographic module binary executable file name (for example, “CNG.SYS”) in the search field at the top right of the window, then press the Enter key.
4. The file will appear in the window.
5. Right click on the file’s icon.
6. Select Properties from the menu and the Properties window opens.
7. Select the Details tab.
8. Note the File version Property and its value, which has a number in this format: xx.x.xxxxx.xxxx.
9. If the file version number matches one of the version numbers that appear at the start of this security policy document, then the version number has been verified.
10. Select the Digital Signatures tab.
11. In the Signature list, select the Microsoft Windows signer.
12. Click the Details button.
13. Under the Digital Signature Information, you should see: “This digital signature is OK.” If that condition is true, then the digital signature has been verified.
### 14 Appendix B – References

This table lists the specifications for each elliptic curve in section 2.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Curve</th>
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</tr>
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<td>ec192wapi</td>
<td><a href="http://www.gbstandards.org/GB_standards/GB_standard.asp?id=900">http://www.gbstandards.org/GB_standards/GB_standard.asp?id=900</a> (The GB standard is available here for purchase)</td>
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<td>Specification</td>
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