



Cisco 5508 Wireless LAN Controller

FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy Level 2 Validation

Version 0.1

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1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose

This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cisco Systems 5508 Wireless LAN Controller, Firmware 8.3; referred to in this document as controller or the module. This security policy describes how the modules meet the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2 and how to run the modules in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation and may be freely distributed.

1.2 Model

- Cisco Systems 5508 Wireless LAN Controller (HW: 5508)

FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html>.

1.3 Module Validation Level

The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.

No.	Area Title	Level
1	Cryptographic Module Specification	2
2	Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
4	Finite State Model	2
5	Physical Security	2
6	Operational Environment	N/A
7	Cryptographic Key management	2
8	Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility	2
9	Self-Tests	2
10	Design Assurance	2
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A
Overall	Overall module validation level	2

Module Validation Level

1.4 References

This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the Cisco Systems 5508 Wireless LAN Controller in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the routers from the following sources:

For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco Systems website at www.cisco.com.

The NIST Validated Modules website (<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html>) contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.

1.5 Terminology

In this document, the Cisco Systems 5508 Wireless LAN Controller is referred to as Controller, WLC, or the module.

1.6 Document Organization

The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains:

- Vendor Evidence document
- Finite State Machine
- Other supporting documentation as additional references

This document provides an overview of the Cisco Systems 5508 Wireless LAN Controller and explains the secure configuration and operation of the module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the general features and functionality of the appliances. Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.

With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems.

2 Cisco Systems 5508 Wireless LAN Controller

The Cisco 5508 Wireless LAN Controller is a highly scalable and flexible platform that enables system wide services for mission-critical wireless networking in medium-sized to large enterprises and campus environments. Designed for 802.11ac and 802.11n performance and maximum scalability, the 5508 offers enhanced uptime with:

- RF visibility and protection
- The ability to simultaneously manage up to 500 access points
- Superior performance for reliable streaming video and toll-quality voice
- Sub-second stateful failover of all access points and clients from the primary to standby controller

2.1 Cryptographic Module Physical Characteristics


Each Controller is a multi-chip standalone security appliance, and the cryptographic boundary is defined as encompassing the “top,” “front,” “back”, “left,” “right,” and “bottom” surfaces of the case.

2.2 Module Interfaces

The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following tables:

Router Physical Interface	FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 8 SFP 1 GB ports	Data Input Interface
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 8 SFP 1 GB ports	Data Output Interface
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 8 SFP 1 GB ports• 2 USB• Console Port• Service Port• mini-USB	Control Input Interface
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• LED Indicators• Console Port• Service Port• USB• mini-USB	Status Output Interface
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Power Supply 1	Power Interface


Cisco 5508 Wireless LAN Controller Physical Interface/Logical Interface Mapping



1	Redundant port (RP) for future use (RJ-45)	6	SFP distribution ports
2	Service port (RJ-45)	7	Management port LEDs
3	Console port (RJ-45) ¹	8	SFP distribution port Link and Activity LEDs
4	USB ports 0 and 1 (Type A)	9	Power supply (PS1 and PS2), System (SYS), and Alarm (ALM) LEDs
5	Console port (Mini USB Type B) ¹	10	Expansion module (EM) slot

¹ You can use only one console port (either RJ-45 or mini-USB). When you connect to one console port, the other is disabled. See the ["USB Console" section](#) for information on the USB console port. See the ["Connecting the Controller's Console Port" section](#) for information about connecting the console port.

Cisco 5508WLC Front Panel



1	Power supply PS1	4	Power supply PS2 slot with blank cover
2	Power supply PS1 on/off switch	5	Fan tray
3	Power supply PS1 AC cable connection		

Cisco 5508 WLC Rear Panel

2.3 Roles, Services and Authentication

The module supports these four roles:

- AP Role—This role is filled by an access point associated with the controller.
- Client Role—This role is filled by a wireless client associated with the controller.
- User Role—This role performs general security services including cryptographic operations and other approved security functions. The product documentation refers to this role as a management user with read-only privileges.

- **Crypto Officer (CO) Role**—This role performs the cryptographic initialization and management operations. In particular, it performs the loading of optional certificates and key-pairs and the zeroization of the module. The product documentation refers to this role as a management user with read-write privileges.

This Module does not support a Maintenance Role

User Services

The services available to the User role consist of the following:

Services & Access	Description	Keys & CSPs
System Status	The LEDs show the network activity and overall operational status and the command line status commands output system status.	N/A
Random Number Generation	Key generation and seeds for asymmetric key generation	DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG v, DRBG Key – r, w, d
Key Exchange	Key exchange over Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman	Diffie-Hellman public key, Diffie-Hellman private key, Diffie-Hellman shared secret, EC Diffie-Hellman Public Key, EC Diffie-Hellman Private Key, EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret – w, d
TACACS+	User & CO authentication to the module using TACACS+.	TACACS+ authentication secret, TACACS+ authorization secret, TACACS+ accounting secret, User password, Enable secret – w, d
IPSec	Secure communications between module and RADIUS server.	skeyid, skeyid_d, IKE session encryption key, IKE session authentication key, IKE ECDSA private key, IKE ECDSA public key, IPSec session encryption key, IPSec session authentication key, ISAKMP preshared – r, w,d
RADIUS Key Wrap	Establishment and subsequent receive 802.11 PMK from the RADIUS server.	RADIUSOverIPSecEncryptionKey, RADIUSOverIPSecIntegrityKey, RADIUS KeyWrap MACK, RADIUS AES KeyWrap KEK, RADIUS Server Shared Secret, – w, d
HTTPS/TLS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment and subsequent data transfer of a TLS session for use between the module and the user. • Protection of syslog messages 	HTTPS TLS Pre-Master secret, HTTPS TLS Encryption Key, HTTPS TLS Integrity Key, TLS pre-master secret, TLS encryption key, TLS integrity key, TLS ECDSA private key – w, d
Module Read-only Configuration	Viewing of configuration settings	N/A

User Services

Crypto Officer Services

The Crypto Officer services consist of the following:

Services & Access	Description	Keys & CSPs
Self Test and Initialization	Cryptographic algorithm tests, firmware integrity tests, module initialization.	N/A (No keys are accessible)
System Status	The LEDs show the network activity and overall operational status and the command line status commands output system status.	N/A (No keys are accessible)
Random Number Generation	Key generation and seeds for asymmetric key generation	DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG v, DRBG Key – r, w, d
Key Exchange	Key exchange over Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman	Diffie-Hellman public key, Diffie-Hellman private key, Diffie-Hellman shared secret, EC Diffie-Hellman Public Key, EC Diffie-Hellman Private Key, EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret – w, d
TACACS+	User & CO authentication to the module using TACACS+.	TACACS+ authentication secret, TACACS+ authorization secret, TACACS+ accounting secret, User password, Enable secret – w, d
IPSec	Secure communications between module and RADIUS server.	skeyid, skeyid_d, IKE session encryption key, IKE session authentication key, IKE ECDSA private key, IKE ECDSA public key, IPSec session encryption key, IPSec session authentication key, IPSec authentication key, IPSec encryption key, ISAKMP preshared – r, w, d
Zeroization	Zeroize CSPs and cryptographic keys by calling 'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or cycling power to zeroize all cryptographic keys stored in SDRAM. The CSPs (password, secret, cscoCCDefaultMfgCaCert, engineID) stored in Flash can be zeroized by overwriting with a new value.	All Keys and CSPs will be destroyed
Module Configuration	Selection of non-cryptographic configuration settings	N/A
SNMPv3	Non-security related monitoring by the CO using SNMPv3	snmpEngineID, SNMPv3 Password, SNMP session key – w, d
SSH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishment and subsequent data transfer of a SSH session for use between the module and the CO. 	SSH encryption key, SSH integrity key, SSH ECDSA private key – w, d
HTTPS/TLS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishment and subsequent data transfer of a TLS session for use between the module and the CO. Protection of syslog messages 	HTTPS TLS Pre-Master secret, HTTPS TLS Encryption Key, HTTPS TLS Integrity Key, TLS pre-master secret, TLS encryption key, TLS integrity key, TLS ECDSA private key – w, d
DTLS Data Encrypt	Enabling optional DTLS data path encryption for Office Extended AP's	DTLS Pre-Master Secret, DTLS Master Secret, DTLS Encryption/Decryption Key (CAPWAP session keys), DTLS Integrity Keys, DTLS ECDSA private key – w, d

RADIUS Key Wrap	Establishment and subsequent receipt of 802.11 PMK from the RADIUS server.	RADIUSOverIPSecEncryptionKey, RADIUSOverIPSecIntegrityKey, RADIUS KeyWrap MACK, RADIUS AES KeyWrap KEK, RADIUS Server Shared Secret, – w, d
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Crypto Officer Services (r = read, w = write, d = delete)

AP and Client Services

The AP and Client services consist of the following:

Services & Access	Description	Keys & CSPs
MFP (AP Role)	Generation and subsequent distribution of MFP key to the AP over a CAPWAP session.	Infrastructure MFP MIC Key, ciscoCCDefaultMfgCaCert – w, d
Local EAP Authenticator (Client Role)	Establishment of EAP-TLS or EAP-FAST based authentication between the client and the Controller.	TLS Pre-Master Secret, TLS Encryption Key, TLS Integrity Key, TLS ECDSA private key – w, d
802.11 (AP Role)	Establishment and subsequent data transfer of an 802.11 session for use between the client and the access point	802.11 Pre-Shared Key (PSK), 802.11 Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), 802.11 Group Temporal Key (GTK), 802.11 Key Confirmation Key (KCK), 802.11 Key Encryption Key (KEK), 802.11 Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) – w, d
RADIUS Key Wrap (AP and Client Role)	Establishment and subsequent receipt of 802.11 PMK from the RADIUS server.	RADIUS KeyWrap MACK, RADIUS AES KeyWrap KEK – w, d

AP and Client Services

User and CO Authentication

The Crypto Officer role is assumed by an authorized CO connecting to the module via CLI. The OS prompts the CO for their username and password, if the password is validated against the CO's password in memory, the user is allowed entry to execute CO services. The password feedback mechanism does not provide information that could be used to determine the authentication data.

CO passwords must be at least eight (8) characters long, including at least one letter and at least one number character, in length (enforced procedurally). If six (6) integers, one (1) special character and one (1) alphabet are used without repetition for an eight (8) digit PIN, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 251,596,800 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total. The calculation should be $10 \times 9 \times 8 \times 7 \times 6 \times 5 \times 32 \times 52 = 251,596,800$). Therefore, the associated probability of a successful random attempt is approximately 1 in 251,596,800, which is less than the 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2.

AP Authentication

The module performs mutual authentication with an access point through the CAPWAP protocol.

RSA has a modulus size of 2048 bit, thus providing 112 bits of strength. An attacker would have a 1 in 2^{112} chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 5.2×10^{28} attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the modules to support.

ECDSA P-256 provides 128 bits of strength and P-384 provides 192 bits of strength. An attacker would have a 1 in 2^{128} chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 3.4×10^{33} attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the modules to support.

Client Authentication

The module performs mutual authentication with a wireless client through EAP-TLS or EAP-FAST protocols. EAP-FAST is based on EAP-TLS and uses EAP-TLS key pair and certificates.

RSA has modulus size of 2048 bit, thus providing 112 bits of strength. An attacker would have a 1 in 2^{112} chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 5.2×10^{28} attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the modules to support.

ECDSA P-256 provides 128 bits of strength and P-384 provides 192 bits of strength. An attacker would have a 1 in 2^{128} chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 3.4×10^{33} attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the modules to support.

2.4 Non-FIPS Approved Services

- SSHv1
- SNMP v1 and v2
- IPSec/IKE with Diffie-Hellman 768-bit/1024-bit modulus, EC Diffie-Hellman 163/192 curves, and Triple-DES

The above services shall not be used in the FIPS approved mode of operation.

2.5 Unauthenticated Services

An unauthenticated operator may observe the System Status by viewing the LEDs on the module, which show network activity and overall operational status. A solid green LED indicates normal operation and the successful completion of self-tests. The module does not support a bypass capability.

2.6 Physical Security

This section describes placement of tamper-evident labels on the module. Labels must be placed on the device and maintained by the Crypto Officer in order to operate in the FIPS approved mode of operation. The 5508 FIPS kit (AIR-CT5508FIPSKIT=) includes the FIPS Tamper Evident Labels. The Tamper Evident Labels shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. The precise placement of the tamper-evident labels is shown below:




Tamper Evident Label Placement (front view)



Tamper Evident Label Placement (left side view)



Tamper Evident Label Placement (right side view)



Tamper Evident Label Placement (rear view)

The tamper evident seals are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive backing. Any attempt to open the device will damage the tamper evident seals or the material of the security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident seals have non-repeated serial numbers, they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers to verify that the security appliance has not been tampered with. Tamper evident seals can also be inspected for signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices. The word “OPEN” may appear if the label was peeled back. The Crypto-Officer should inspect the seals for evidence of tamper as determined by their deployment policies (every 30 days is recommended). If the seals show evidence of tamper, the Crypto-Officer should assume that the modules have been compromised and contact Cisco accordingly

NOTE: Any unused TELs must be securely stored, accounted for, and maintained by the CO in a protected location.

2.7 Cryptographic Algorithms

The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.

Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations, whose names are Cisco FOM 6.0 and CN56xx Datapath.

Algorithm	Cisco FOM	CN56xx
AES 128/256 (ECB, CBC, CFB, CTR, CMAC, GCM, CCM, KW, KWP)	#4409	
AES 128/256 (CBC)		#1348
SHA (SHA-1/256/384/512)	#3635	
SHA (SHA-1)		#1230
HMAC SHA (SHA-1/256/384/512)	#2931	
HMAC SHA (SHA-1)		#787
DRBG (AES CTR-256)	#1422	
RSA ((KeyGen; PKCS1_V1_5; Siggen/Sigver) 2048 bits)	#2396	
ECDSA (KeyPair, PKV, SigGen, SigVer (NIST curves P-256 and P-384))	#1061	
CVL (SP800-135) (IKE, TLS, IPsec, SSH, SNMP)	#1115	
CVL (SP800-56A) (ECC CDH)	#1116	
KBKDF (SP800-108)	#126	

Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

- KTS (AES Cert. #4409; key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength)

Note:

- CVL Cert. #1115 supports the KDF (key derivation function) used in each of IKE, TLS, SSH and SNMPv3 protocols.
- IKE, TLS, SSH and SNMPv3 protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Please refer IG D.11, bullet 2 for more information.
- There are algorithms, modes, and keys that have been CAVs tested but not implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in this table are implemented by the module.

Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms but Allowed in FIPS mode

The module supports the following non-approved, but allowed cryptographic algorithms:

- Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #1115, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
- EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Certs. #1115 and #1116, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 128 or 192 bits of encryption strength)
- MD5 (MD5 is allowed in DTLS)
- NDRNG

Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

- Diffie-Hellman (less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
- EC Diffie-Hellman (less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
- HMAC-MD5
- RC4
- Triple-DES (non-compliant)

2.8 Cryptographic Key Management

Cryptographic keys are stored in plaintext form, in flash for long-term storage and in SDRAM for active keys. The AES key wrap KEK, AES key wrap MACK keys, and the Pre shared key (PSK) are input by the CO in plaintext over a local console connection. The PMK is input from the RADIUS server encrypted with the AES key wrap protocol or via IPsec. RSA public keys are output in plaintext in the form of X.509 certificates. The CAPWAP session key is output wrapped with the AP's RSA key, and the MFP MIC key and 802.11 PTK, 802.11 GTK are output encrypted with the CAPWAP session key. Asymmetric key establishment is used in the creation of session keys during EAP-TLS and EAP-FAST. Any keys not explicitly mentioned are not input or output. Key generation and seeds for asymmetric key generation is performed as per SP 800-133 Scenario 1. The DRBG is seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy strength prior to key generation

CSPs below are stored in plaintext in both SDRAM and Flash.

Key/CSP Name	Generation / Algorithm	Description	Key Size	Storage	Zeroization
General Keys/CSPs					
DRBG entropy input	SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG	HW based entropy source output used to construct seed	256-bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
DRBG seed	SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG	Input to the DRBG that determines the internal state of the DRBG. Generated using DRBG derivation function that includes the entropy input from hardware-based entropy source.	384 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
DRBG V	SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG	Internal V value used as part of SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG	128 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
DRBG Key	SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG	This is the 256-bit DRBG key used for SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG	256 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
ciscoCCDefaultMfgCaCert	rsa-pkcs1-sha2	Verification certificate, used with CAPWAP to validate the certificate that authenticates the access point generated/installed at manufacturing	2048	Flash	Overwrite with new certificate
Diffie-Hellman public key	Diffie-Hellman (Group 14)	The public key used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange	2048 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
Diffie-Hellman private key	Diffie-Hellman (Group 14)	The private key used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange	224 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
Diffie-Hellman shared secret	Diffie-Hellman (Group 14)	The shared key used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) Exchange. Created per the Diffie-Hellman protocol	2048 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle

Key/CSP Name	Generation / Algorithm	Description	Key Size	Storage	Zeroization
EC Diffie-Hellman public key	Diffie-Hellman (Groups 19 and 20)	P-256 and P-384 public key used in EC Diffie-Hellman exchange. This key is derived per the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.	P-256 and P-384	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
EC Diffie-Hellman private key	Diffie-Hellman (Groups 19 and 20)	P-256 and P-384 private key used in EC Diffie-Hellman exchange. Generated by calling the SP 800-90A CTR-DRBG.	P-256 and P-384	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret	Diffie-Hellman (Groups 19 and 20)	P-256 and P-384 shared secret derived in EC Diffie-Hellman exchange	P-256 and P-384	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
RADIUS Server Shared Secret	Shared secret	This is the shared secret between the RADIUS server and Controller. Entered by the Crypto Officer in plaintext form and stored in plaintext form.	22 bytes	Flash	Overwrite with new password
RADIUSOverIPSecEncryptionKey	AES-128/256	AES-128/AES-256 encryption/decryption key, used in IPSec tunnel between module and RADIUS to encrypt/decrypt EAP keys.	128-256 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
RADIUSOverIPSecIntegrityKey	HMAC	Integrity/authentication key, used in IPSec tunnel between module and RADIUS	160-384 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
User password	Shared Secret	Identity based authentication data for user	Variable (8+ characters)	Flash	Overwrite with new password
Enable secret	Password	Identity based authentication data for CO	Variable (8+ characters)	Flash	Overwrite with new secret
TACACS+ authentication secret	Shared secret	This is the authentication shared secret between the TACACS+ server and Controller. Entered by the Crypto Officer in plaintext form and stored in plaintext form.	64 bytes	Flash	Overwrite with new secret

Key/CSP Name	Generation / Algorithm	Description	Key Size	Storage	Zeroization
TACACS+ authorization secret	Shared secret	This is the authorization shared secret between the TACACS+ server and Controller. Entered by the Crypto Officer in plaintext form and stored in plaintext form.	64 bytes	Flash	Overwrite with new secret
TACACS+ accounting secret	Shared secret	This is the accounting shared secret used for authentication between the TACACS+ server and Controller. Entered by the Crypto Officer in plaintext form and stored in plaintext form.	64 bytes	Flash	Overwrite with new secret
IKE/IPSEC					
skeyid	HMAC	It was derived by using 'ISAKMP pre-shared' and other non-secret values through the key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKE).	160-384 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
skeyid_d	HMAC	It was derived by using skeyid, Diffie-Hellman shared secret and other non-secret values through key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKE).	160-384 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
IKE session encryption key	AES	The IKE session encrypt key is derived by using skeyid_d, Diffie-Hellman shared secret and other non-secret values through the key derivation functions defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKE). Used for IKE payload protection	256-bit AES	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle

Key/CSP Name	Generation / Algorithm	Description	Key Size	Storage	Zeroization
IKE session authentication key	HMAC	The IKE session) authentication key is derived by using skeyid_d, Diffie-Hellman shared secret and other non-secret values through the key derivation functions defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKE). Used for payload integrity verification.	160-384 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
IKE ECDSA public key	ECDSA	P-256 and P-384 generated by calling the SP 800-90A CTR-DRBG.	P-256 and P-384	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
IKE ECDSA private key	ECDSA	P-256 and P-384 generated by calling the SP 800-90A CTR-DRBG.	P-256 and P-384	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
ISAKMP pre-shared	Shared secret	This shared secret was manually entered by CO for IKE pre-shared key based authentication mechanism.	8 chars	Flash	Overwrite with new secret
IPSec authentication key	HMAC	The IPsec authentication key is derived via using the KDF defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKE). Used to authenticate the IPSec peer.	160 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
IPSec encryption key	AES	The IPsec encryption key is derived via a key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKE).Used to Secure IPSec traffic.	256-bit AES	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
DTLS					
DTLS Pre-Master Secret	Shared Secret	Generated by approved DRBG for generating the DTLS encryption key	48 bytes	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
DTLS Master Secret	Shared Secret	Derived from DTLS Pre-Master Secret. Used to create the DTLS encryption and integrity keys	48 bytes	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle

Key/CSP Name	Generation / Algorithm	Description	Key Size	Storage	Zeroization
DTLS Encryption/Decryption Key (CAPWAP session keys)	AES-CBC, AES-GCM	Session Keys used to e/d CAPWAP control messages	128-256 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
DTLS Integrity Keys	HMAC-	Session keys used for integrity checks on CAPWAP control messages	160-384 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
DTLS ECDSA private key	ECDSA	P-256 and P-384 generated by calling the SP 800-90A CTR-DRBG.	P-256 and P-384	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
Infrastructure MFP MIC Key	AES-CMAC, AES-GMAC	This key is generated in the module by calling FIPS approved DRBG and then is transported to the Access Point (AP) protected by DTLS Encryption/Decryption Key. The Access Point (AP) uses this key with sign management frames when infrastructure MFP is enabled.	128 and 256 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
SNMPv3					
snmpEngineID	Shared secret	Unique string to identify the SNMP engine	32-bits	Flash	Overwrite with new engine ID
SNMPv3 Password	Shared Secret	This secret is used to derive HMAC-SHA1 key for SNMPv3 Authentication	32 bytes	Flash	Overwrite with new password
SNMPv3 session key	AES-CFB	Encrypts SNMPv3 traffic	128-bit	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
HTTPS/TLS					
HTTPS TLS Pre-Master secret	Shared secret	Shared secret created using asymmetric cryptography from which new HTTPS session keys can be created.	48 bytes	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle

Key/CSP Name	Generation / Algorithm	Description	Key Size	Storage	Zeroization
HTTPS TLS Encryption Key	AES-CBC, AES-GCM	AES key used to encrypt TLS data	128 and 256 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
HTTPS TLS Integrity Key	HMAC	HMAC key used for HTTPS integrity protection	160-384 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
TLS Pre-Master Secret	Shared secret	Shared secret used to generate new TLS session keys.	48 byte	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
TLS Encryption Key	AES-CBC, AES-GCM	Symmetric AES key for encrypting TLS.	128 and 256 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
TLS Integrity Key	HMAC	Used for TLS integrity protection.	160-384 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
TLS ECDSA private key	ECDSA	P-256 and P-384 generated by calling the SP 800-90A CTR-DRBG.	P-256 and P-384	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
802.11					
802.11 Pre-Shared Key (PSK)	Shared secret	This is the shared secret used for 802.11 client authentication.	63 bytes	Flash	Overwrite with new secret.
802.11 Pairwise Master Key (PMK)	HMAC	The PMK is transferred to the module, protected by RADIUS AES KeyWrap key. Used to derive the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) for 802.11 communications	160-384 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
802.11 Key Confirmation Key (KCK)	HMAC	The KCK is used by IEEE 802.11 to provide data origin authenticity in the 4-Way Handshake and Group Key Handshake messages.	160-384 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle

Key/CSP Name	Generation / Algorithm	Description	Key Size	Storage	Zeroization
802.11 Key Encryption Key (KEK)	AES Key Wrap	The KEK is used by the EAPOL-Key frames to provide confidentiality in the 4-Way Handshake and Group Key Handshake messages.	128 and 256 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
802.11 Pairwise Transient Key (PTK)	AES-CCM, AES-GCM	The PTK is the 802.11 session key for unicast communications. This key is derived from the PMK and then is transported into the Access Point (AP) protected by DTLS Encryption/Decryption Key. The Access Point (AP) uses this key with AES-CCM function to implement 802.11 unicast communications service.	128 and 256 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
802.11 Group Temporal Key (GTK)	AES-CCM, AES-GCM	The GTK is the 802.11 session key for broadcast communications. This key is generated in the module by calling FIPS approved DRBG and then is transported into the Access Point (AP) protected by DTLS Encryption/Decryption Key. The Access Point (AP) uses this key with AES-CCM function to implement 802.11 broadcast communications service.	128 and 256 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
RADIUS AES KeyWrap KEK	AES-ECB	This key is used by the RADIUS Keywrap service to protect the PMK for the 802.11 protocol.	16 bytes	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
RADIUS KeyWrap MACK	HMAC-SHA1	The MAC key used by the RADIUS Keywrap service to authenticate RADIUS traffic.	16 bytes	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
SSHv2					

Key/CSP Name	Generation / Algorithm	Description	Key Size	Storage	Zeroization
SSH Encryption Key	AES-CBC, AES-GCM	Symmetric AES key for encrypting SSH.	128 and 256 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
SSH Integrity Key	HMAC	Used for SSH integrity protection.	160-384 bits	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle
SSH ECDSA Private Key	ECDSA	P-256 and P-384 generated by calling the SP 800-90A CTR-DRBG.	P-256 and P-384	SDRAM	'switchconfig key-zeroize controller' command or Power cycle

Cryptographic Keys and CSPs

Note 1 to table: The KDF infrastructure used in DTLS v1.0/1.2 is identical to the ones used in TLS v1.0/1.1/1.2, which was certified by CVL Cert. #1115.

Note 2 to table: The module meets IG A.5 for TLS, IKE and 802.11 protocols.

2.9 Self-Tests

The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to insure all components are functioning correctly.

2.10 Self-tests performed

- Firmware Integrity Test RSA 2048
- Cisco FOM algorithm implementation
 - AES encryption KAT
 - AES decryption KAT
 - SHA-1 KAT
 - SHA-224 KAT
 - SHA-256 KAT
 - SHA-384 KAT
 - SHA-512 KAT
 - HMAC SHA-1 KAT
 - HMAC SHA-224 KAT
 - HMAC SHA-256 KAT
 - HMAC SHA-384 KAT
 - HMAC SHA-512 KAT
 - ECDSA KAT

- ECDH KAT
- RSA sign and verify KATs
- SP 800-90A DRBG KAT
- SP 800-90A Section 11 Health Tests
- CN56xx Datapath algorithm implementation
 - AES encryption KAT
 - AES decryption KAT
 - SHA-1 KAT
 - HMAC SHA-1 KAT

The module performs all power-on self-tests automatically at boot. All power-on self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the initialization of the LAN's interfaces; this prevents the module from passing any data during a power-on self-test failure.

The following conditional tests are also performed –

- Continuous Random Number Generator Test for the FIPS-approved DRBG
- Continuous Random Number Generator Test for the non-approved NDRNG
- ECDSA pairwise consistency test
- RSA pairwise consistency test

3 Secure Operation

The Cisco 5508 Wireless LAN Controller meets all the Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2 once configured as a FIPS 140-2 compliant module. The Cisco 5508 Wireless LAN Controller is shipped only to authorized operators by the vendor, and the devices are shipped in Cisco boxes with Cisco adhesive, so if tampered with the recipient will notice. Follow the setting instructions provided below to place the module in a FIPS-approved mode. Operating this module without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation.

It should also be noted that the Cisco 5508 Wireless LAN Controller is shipped to the customer site without the FIPS compliant firmware pre-installed on the device. This means that the module arrives at the customer in a non-compliant state until such time as the Crypto Officer has performed the following steps:

- downloaded the module's correct FIPS firmware image (via a secure method from <https://software.cisco.com/>)
- verified the integrity of the firmware image file (by calculating an MD5 or a SHA512 checksum value of the downloaded image file and comparing it with values provided on the Cisco download page),
- installed the firmware onto the module, and
- has performed all of the correct initialization steps (see below) after which time the module will then be in a FIPS compliant state.

Only after a successful completion of all required FIPS POSTs in the FIPS compliant state, will the module be considered to be in a FIPS validated module.

The module was validated with firmware version 8.3 with Cisco FOM 6.0 and CN56xx Datapath (This is the only allowable firmware image for the FIPS validated module.). Follow the setting instructions provided below to configure the device as a FIPS validated module. Operating the module without maintaining the following settings will remove the module as a FIPS validated module.

The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps:

1. Enable the FIPS validated module

The following CLI command places the controller in a FIPS validated module, enabling all necessary self-tests:

```
> config switchconfig fips-prerequisite enable
```

2. Configure HTTPS Certificate

The following command configures the controller to use the manufacture-installed Cisco device certificate for the HTTPS server. It must be executed after enabling FIPS validated module:

```
> config certificate use-device-certificate webadmin
```

3. Configure Authentication Data

All users shall have a password containing 8 or more characters, including numbers and letters. A crypto officer can use the following CLI command to set user passwords:

```
>config mgmtuser password username password read-write
```

Note that this and all subsequent configuration steps may also be performed through HTTPS. However, only the CLI commands are included in this document. It is the Crypto Officer's responsibility to securely deliver the password over to User.

4. Configure Communications with RADIUS

Communications between the controller and RADIUS may be configured for RADIUS KeyWrap or IPsec.

5. RADIUS KeyWrap and MACK Keys

The following CLI commands configure the RADIUS secret and AES-key wrap KEK and MACK:

- > **config radius auth add** *index ip-address port hex secret*
- > **config radius auth keywrap add** *hex kek mack index*
- > **config radius auth keywrap enable**

6. IPSec/IKE

Optionally, the controller may be configured to communicate with RADIUS via IPSec/IKE. Refer to the document at the following link for additional instructions:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6366/products_tech_note09186a0080a829b8.shtml

In addition, please be aware that AES is the only allowed symmetric algorithm used in IPSec/IKE encryption/decryption operations in the FIPS validated module.

7. Configure Pre-shared Keys for 802.11

802.11 Pre-shared key (PSK) is an optional mode permitted by this security policy. Generation of this key is outside the scope of this security policy, but it should be 64 hexadecimal values (256 bits) and entered by Crypto Officer using the following commands:

- > **config wlan security wpa akm psk enable** *index*
- > **config wlan security wpa akm psk set-key** *hex key index*

Refer to Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Configuration Guide for additional instructions.

8. Configure Ciphersuites for 802.11

The following CLI commands create a wireless LAN, configure it to use WPA2, associate it with a RADIUS server, and enable it:

- > **config wlan create** *index profile_name ssid*
- > **config wlan radius_server auth add** *index radius-server-index*
- > **config wlan enable** *index*

9. Configure SNMPv3

Only SNMPv3 with HMAC-SHA-1 is permitted by this security policy. The user passwords shall be selected to be 8 or more characters, including numbers and letters. This has been tested and is FIPS compliant.

The following CLI commands enable SNMPv3 with HMAC-SHA1:

```
> config snmp version v1 disable
> config snmp version v2c disable
> config snmp version v3 enable
> config snmp v3user create username <ro|rw> hmacsha aescfb128 authkey
encryptkey
```

10. Configure TACACS+ secret

The crypto officer may configure the module to use TACACS+ for authentication, authorization and accounting. Configuring the module to use TACACS+ is optional. If the module is configured to use TACACS+, the Crypto-Officer must define TACACS+ shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long. The following CLI command configures TACACS+ for authentication (auth), authorization (athr) and accounting (acct):

```
config tacacs <auth|athr|acct> add index ip port <ascii|hex> secret
```

Refer to the Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Configuration Guide for additional instructions.

11. Configure Data DTLS (optional)

The crypto officer may configure the module to use CAPWAP data encryption. CAPWAP data packets encapsulate forwarded wireless frames. Configuring the module to use CAPWAP data encryption is optional.

The following CLI commands enable DTLS data encryption for access points on the controller:

To enable or disable data encryption for all access points or a specific access point, enter this command:

- a. `config ap link-encryption {enable | disable} {all | Cisco_AP}`

When prompted to confirm that you want to disconnect the access point(s) and attached client(s), enter

- b. `>Y`

To save your changes, enter this command:

- c. `save config`

Refer to the Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Configuration Guide for additional instructions.

12. Save and Reboot

After executing the above commands, you must save the configuration and reboot the system:

- a. `save config`
- b. `reset system`

Once these configuration steps are completed, it is the responsibility of the CO to ensure the module only uses Approved algorithms and services to keep the module in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. Using any of the non-approved algorithms and services switches the module to a non-FIPS mode of operation. Prior to switching between modes the CO should ensure all keys and CSPs are zeroized to prevent sharing of keys and CSPs between FIPS Approved and non-FIPS mode of operation.